— The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order, is conclusive upon the title to the thing, and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Panotes vs CTDC: The property was sold to him as a buyer, not as a developer. He was not a successor-in-interest because he was a buyer in good faith. He did not even know there was an encumbrance in the property. Writ of execution cannot be implemented against a non-party to an action. How about a successor-in-interest? Under the doctrine of res judicata, identity of parties is not absolute. It is identity of interest and not identity of persons.
The case stemmed from a complaint filed with the National Housing Authority (NHA) by Rogelio Panotes, then president of the Provident Village Homeowners Association, Inc., against Provident Securities Corporation (PROSECOR), owner-developer of the Provident Village in Marikina City. The complaint alleges that PROSECOR violated PD 957 (REGULATING THE SALE OF SUBDIVISION LOTS AND CONDOMINIUMS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF), one of which was its failure to provide an open space in the
said subdivision. NHA directed PROSECOR to provide the Provident Village an open space which is Block 40.
Considering that PROSECOR did not appeal from the NHA Resolution, it became final and executory.
When Panotes filed a motion for execution of the NHA Resolution, it was found that the records of the case were “mysteriously missing.” Hence, his motion was
“provisionally dismissed” without prejudice.
Meanwhile, PROSECOR sold to City Townhouse Development Corporation (CTDC), respondent, several lots in the subdivision. Among the lots sold were those comprising Block 40. CTDC was unaware of the NHA Resolution ordering PROSECOR to have Block 40 utilized as open space of Provident Village.
The new president (Araceli Bumatay) of the Provident Homeowners Association, Inc. filed with the HLURB a complaint for the revival of the NHA Resolution.
Impleaded thereon as defendant was CTDC, which was alleged as successor-in-interest of PROSECOR. HLURB rendered its Decision in favor of Bumatay, reviving NHA Resolution and declaring Block 40 of the Provident Village as “open space” for the said subdivision. On appeal to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Decision was affirmed with modification in the sense that CTDC has the right to recover from PROSECOR
“what it has lost.” After its MR was denied, CTDC interposed an appeal to the Office of the President which affirmed in toto the judgment of the HLURB Board of Commissioners. CTDC then filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43. CA rendered its Decision reversing the Decision of the OP and dismissing the complaint for revival of judgment.
SC: NHA Resolution may not be enforced against CTDC.
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of 5 years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor’s case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.
The original judgment or the NHA Resolution sought to be revived was between Rogelio Panotes and PROSECOR, not between petitioner Araceli Bumatay and
respondent CTDC. In maintaining that CTDC is bound by the NHA Resolution, petitioner claims that CTDC is the successor-in-interest of PROSECOR and, therefore, assumed the obligations of the latter to provide an open space for Provident Village. CTDC purchased from PROSECOR Block 40 in the said village, not as an owner-developer like PROSECOR, but as an ordinary buyer of lots. Even after the sale, CTDC did not become an owner-developer. The Deed of Sale executed by CTDC, as buyer, and PROSECOR, as seller, shows that the subject matter of the sale is the unsold lots comprising Block 40 within the subdivision to CTDC. The contract does not include the transfer of rights of PROSECOR as owner-developer of the said subdivision. Clearly, there is no basis to conclude that CTDC is the successor-in-interest of PROSECOR. When CTDC bought Block 40, there was no annotation on PROSECOR’s title showing that the property is encumbered. In fact, the NHA Resolution was not annotated thereon. CTDC is thus a buyer in good faith and for value, and as such, may not be deprived of the ownership of Block 40.
The real party-in-interest in the revival of NHA Case is PROSECOR and not CTDC. PROSECOR was the lone defendant or respondent in that case against whom judgment was rendered. To insist that CTDC is a successor-in-interest of PROSECOR may have some truth if we are talking about the ownership of the lots sold by PROSECOR in favor of CTDC as a result of a civil action between the two. But then, to hold CTDC as the successor-in-interest of PROSECOR as the developer of the subdivision, is far from realty. CTDC is simply on the same footing as any lot buyer-member of PVHIA.
Furthermore, strangers to a case, like CTDC, are not bound by the judgment rendered by a court. It will not divest the rights of a party who has not and never been a party to a litigation. Execution of a judgment can be issued only against a party to the action and not against one who did not have his day in court.
Fajardo vs Quitalig: Sheriff Rodolfo Quitalig of the MTCC was charged by Reverend Fernando Fajardo with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and/or dereliction of duty.
Petitioner filed a motion for execution of a judgment in an ejectment case. The court issued a writ of execution.
Sheriff served writ on defendant, who asked for a period
of 2 weeks to remove her personal properties. After 2 weeks he went to Sheriff Quitalig so that the Writ of Execution may be implemented but he was told that a restraining order was issued, but when he asked for it, Quitalig told him that he left it in the office. Fajardo discovered that no restraining order has really been issued. He told Quitalig to implement the Writ of Execution. Sheriff, accompanied by a policeman and the barangay captain went to the place where the Writ of Execution is to be implemented but when they reached the place, Quitalig did not do anything except to ask the defendant to bring out her personal properties. His reason is that an employee of the Probation Office, Leonardo Martinez, talked to him. The restraining order was brought to the place, and Quitalig told him that the writ of execution can no longer be implemented.
Quitalig denied the charge. He asked for the dismissal of the case, because he had already implemented the Writ as evidenced by his Report of Service. OCA found Quitalig to have been negligent in the performance of his duty as a sheriff.
SC: Quitalig was negligent in the performance of his duty as sheriff. Quitalig enforced the Writ of Execution dated March 7, 2000 only on August 24, 2000, as shown by his August 25, 2000 Report of Service. Within 30 days from receipt thereof and every 30 days thereafter until the judgment is fully satisfied, a sheriff is required by the Rules of Court to render a report on the action taken on a writ of execution. Evidently, Quitalig was not only remiss in his implementation of the Writ, but likewise derelict in his submission of the returns thereof.
Quitalig should have immediately implemented and made a return of the Writ after duly serving it upon the defendant on March 9, 2000. Nonetheless, because of the request of the defendant and her promise that she would vacate the premises on March 23, 2000, he allowed her to remain there. However, when he came back on March 24, 2000, he was unable to enforce the Writ because of a TRO issued by the RTC. He averred that he was finally able to execute the Writ on August 24, 2000 and to submit his Return thereof on the next day.
By his own words, Quitalig admitted his dereliction of duty. First, as we have said earlier, he should have
immediately executed the Writ when he served it upon the defendant on March 9, 2000. Second, he should have immediately reported to the MTCC that he was unable to enforce the Writ because another court had issued a TRO enjoining him from doing so. Third, he should have informed the parties, particularly the plaintiff or his counsel, about his inability to enforce the Writ. Fourth, he should have immediately enforced it 20 days after its issuance. Fifth, he should have made periodic Reports to the MTCC until the judgment was fully satisfied and the parties furnished a copy thereof.
Sixth, within 30 days from his receipt of the Writ, he should have promptly made his Return, a copy of which he should have immediately furnished the parties.
The actuations of Quitalig constitute disrespect, if not outright defiance, of the MTCC’s authority. In the absence of instructions to the contrary, a sheriff has the duty to execute a Writ with reasonable celerity and promptness in accordance with its mandate.
RCBC vs Magwin Marketing Corp
Villaruel vs Fernando: Panfilo Villaruel is the former Assistant Secretary for Air Transportation Office (ATO) of DOTC. Fernando, Abarca and Cleofas are the Chief, Chief Admin Assistant and Admin Assistant of Civil Aviation Training Center (an adjunct agency of ATO tasked to train air traffic controllers, airway communicators and related civil aviation personnel).
Villaruel issued a memorandum detailing respondents to the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo Cal. The latter wrote to DOTC Secretary Garcia requesting to reconsider the detail order but to comply with the order, they reported Cal’s office.
Without acting on this request, Villaruel issued another memorandum placing Abarca under preventive suspension for 90 days without pay pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct. After 90 days, respondents requested Sec. Garcia to lift these orders and they also sought the intervention of the Ombudsman. Ombudsman inquired but Garcia only replied that he already issued a memorandum recalling respondents to their mother unit. In the end, the respondents were never reinstated to their old positions.
Respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (RTC). Injunction was granted and ordered Villaruel to recall respondents to their mother unit.
Villaruel never complied with this order so he was declared guilty of indirect contempt.
Villaruel, through the OSG, filed a special civil action for certiorari (CA) assailing the order of contempt.
Meanwhile trial in the RTC continued and Villaruel was declared in default. Respondents’ evidence were already presented ex parte. Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondents.
Villaruel appealed this decision to CA. (So he has two cases before CA: certiorari and appeal). Apparently, respondents filed MTD in the certiorari case and it was granted because the issue there is already moot and academic. OSG failed to file a memorandum. The appeal was dismissed. Assistant Solicitor Luciano filed MR but it was denied and the resolution was declared final and executory.
Respondents filed a Motion for Execution with the RTC and a copy was served to OSG but the latter did not file any opposition. RTC issued a writ of execution and the sheriff issued a notice of sheriff’s sale (Villaruel’s real estate property).
Villaruel through a new counsel filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and Suspend Sheriff’s sale alleging that the RTC’s decision never became final and executory because it deprived him of due process. OSG failed to file his memorandum and failed to inform him of the orders of dismissal and granting of execution. He further alleged that the resolution of the Ombudsman (Abarca was found guilty, Fernando and Cleofas were also dismissed) superseded the RTC decision. RTC quashed the writ because the Sheriff failed to follow Section 9, Rule 39 and issued an Alias Writ. The MR filed by Villaruel was denied. Villaruel went to CA again and filed certiorari (based on the motion for execution). CA dismissed this and the MR so now Villaruel filed this case.
Issue: WON the Ombudsman resolution finding Abarca guilty superseded the trial court’s decision and rendered it unjust and inequitable.
SC: No. A judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. This rule admits of certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. This, however, is not the case here. The Ombudsman issued his Resolution prior to the finality of the RTC’s decision.
The Ombudsman issued his Resolution on 22 January 1997 while the RTC’s decision became final and executory on 14 June 1997. Therefore, the resolution of the Ombudsman is not a supervening event to warrant the stay of the execution of the decision of the trial court.
Furthermore, the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of RA 6713 did not and could not supersede the decision of the RTC holding petitioner liable for damages. The action filed by the petitioner before the Ombudsman is completely different from the action instituted by respondents before the RTC. The 2 actions, which are clearly separate and distinct from each other, presented 2 different causes of action. Petitioner’s cause of action arose from respondents’ alleged violation of certain provisions of RA 6713 whereas respondents’ cause of action resulted from petitioner’s refusal to recall respondents to their mother unit at CATC. In the administrative case before the Ombudsman, the issue was whether respondents were guilty of violating RA 6713. In contrast, the issue in the civil action before the RTC was whether respondents were entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandamus and damages.
The findings of the Ombudsman did not render the execution of the trial court’s decision unjust and inequitable. The resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of RA 6713 did not state that petitioner had a valid reason to detail respondents to the Office of Undersecretary Cal. In fact, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against Reynaldo Fernando and Mary Lou Cleofas. Thus, the trial court correctly awarded damages to respondents.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, awarding damages to respondents does not amount to rewarding respondents for their alleged wrongdoing. The award merely compensates respondents for petitioner’s own
unlawful acts. Clearly illegal were petitioner’s acts of unjustifiably detailing respondents to the office of DOTC Undersecretary Cal and refusing to comply with the 9 November 1995 directive of Secretary Garcia to recall immediately respondents to their mother unit.
Morta vs Bagagnan: Sps. Morta charged Judge Bagagnan of the MTC with gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, bias and delay. They also indicted Sheriff Matias of RTC with gross ignorance of the law, negligence and connivance with the defendants in 2 civil cases in the MTC.
Judge Magagnan, in his Answer/Comment, explained that he had denied the spouses' motion for the issuance of a writ of possession because by the time the 2 civil cases were finally decided by the SC, they had already been ousted from the lots pursuant to a DARAB decision (directing them to cease and desist from disturbing the peaceful possession of Jaime Occidental), and a decision ordering the spouses to vacate the lots (a writ of execution/demolition was issued). Regarding the alleged delay in the resolution of the Motion for Contempt, Judge Bagagnan contended that an ocular inspection and a hearing had been conducted to determine if their motion had any basis. The hearing had to be deferred pending receipt of the sheriff's report.
Sheriff Matias admitted that there was delay in the full implementation of the Writ of Execution of the 2 civil cases, and explained that the delay was due to his heavy workload and was unintentional.
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA): the explanation of the judge was sufficient, the records showed that the spouses had been evicted from the lots they were claiming when the 2 civil cases were finally decided by the SC; the delay in the contempt proceedings was due primarily to the need of the court to clarify some important matters, and not due to the negligence or partiality of the judge. OCA recommended that the charges against him be dismissed. OCA, however, found that Sheriff Matias failed to implement the Writ of Execution promptly and efficiently, and recommended that he be ordered to pay a fine.
SC: The writ of execution was not implemented promptly and efficiently. Sheriff Matias is guilty of
simple neglect of duty. The final stage in the litigation process, the execution of judgment, must be carried out promptly. Those tasked to implement court orders and processes should exert every effort and indeed consider if their bounden duty to do so, in order to ensure the speedy and efficient administration of justice. A decision that is left unexecuted or delayed indefinitely because of the sheriff’s inefficiency or negligence remains an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. For this reason, any inordinate delay in the execution of judgment is truly deplorable and cannot be countenanced by the Court.
According to Section 14, Rule 39 of the ROC, a writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within 30 days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every 30 days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties.
According to Administrative Circular No. 12, October 1, 1985, he must submit to the judge concerned a report on actions taken on all writs and processes assigned to them within 10 days from receipt.
According to Administrative Circular No. 12, October 1, 1985, he must submit to the judge concerned a report on actions taken on all writs and processes assigned to them within 10 days from receipt.