Effects of the administrative levels on the Ping RBC framework

Apart from rules and regulations, and directives that the public agencies and LGOs concerned have to follow, there are also the administrative levels that regulate these public entities: central, provincial, and local (see Section 2.4; Figure 2.1). Generally, public agencies are distinguished clearly in terms of their administrative levels and their mandates. For example, the Chiang Mai Provincial Irrigation Project (CIP) is a unit of the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) at the provincial administrative level, and responsible for irrigation-related tasks in Chiang Mai, while Irrigation Regional Office 1 is a unit of RID at the central administrative level and supervises, among others, CIP and the Mae Tang Irrigation Project (see Section 4.3.1). Implementation of the Ping RBC framework also was influenced by these administrative structures, especially the central and provincial administration.

6.1.2.1 The central administration

Apparently, the RBC framework is designed for implementation in provincial areas nationwide. From a DWR perspective, this fact already poses a challenge. Unlike several other departments from central administration, the DWR has no provincial offices at the provincial administrative level. Thus, it has no official link to the provincial administration, and also no ‘local’ unit to facilitate RBC framework implementation in respective provinces (cf. the RID presented above). Instead, the DWR has to rely solely on its WROs and river basin coordination and management sections (CMSs)⁶⁷. Regarding Ping RBC implementation, WRO 1 delegated the task to the URCMS and LRCMS, who were responsible for two provinces (Chiang Mai and Lamphun), and covered three (Tak, Kampaengphet, and Nakornsawan), respectively.

The RBC framework was unfolded in implementation of the Ping RBC setup, and it was evident that public sector members of the river basin governing bodies largely represented central administration at the river basin level (i.e. the Ping RBC and Ping River Basin Sub-Committee). All but one of the assigned public agencies for the Ping RBC represented central administration (11 of 12 agencies; see Table 5.4), while most public sector members of the Ping River Basin Sub-Committee (see Table 5.5) also came from this administrative level (14 of 18 members). From the perspective of Thai administration, these arrangements were intended to be above the provincial administration level, which would be involved mainly with governing bodies of the river basin at the provincial and sub-river basin level.

However, as discussed in Section 5.1.1.2, the central public agencies concerned simply assigned the directors of their regional offices to the Ping RBC. With different internal structures, certain regional office directors were appointed as member of more than one RBC. The Director of WRO 1 was an ex officio member and secretary of four RBCs, including the Ping RBC. In practice, it is difficult already for these members to participate in Ping RBC activities. The same likely holds true for the public sector members concerned with the Ping River Basin Sub-Committee, who were appointed by the Ping RBC. This is because they were also regional directors of the central public agencies concerned, and maybe assigned as members of certain RBCs as well. Indeed, some were appointed also as Ping RBC members (e.g. directors of Irrigation Regional Office 1 and Marine Regional

67 There are 31 CMSs in total from ten WROs.

Office 1). In addition, this situation is complicated further by the fact that these public sector members were obliged to follow specific mandates and directives given by their superiors, as discussed in the previous section.

6.1.2.2 The provincial administration

As observed in the Ping RBC setup, the provincial administration was relied upon for implementing the RBC framework. It was involved from the beginning through the provincial recruitment sub-committees to identify eligible persons for appointing as Ping RBC non-public sector members (see Section 5.1.1.1). Five provincial governors also were seen as ex officio members of the Ping RBC; one of whom was selected as its chairperson.

In addition, the provincial governors also were appointed as chairpersons of the Ping River Basin Sub-Committee and provincial river basin working groups, with the latter including some provincial public agencies as their members (see Table 5.5 and 5.6). District officers were also assigned as chairpersons and members of the sub-river basin working groups (see Table 5.7).

Administratively, it deems logical to include those from the provincial administration in the river basin governing bodies, as they have authority in provincial areas that is exercised especially through provincial governors (see Section 2.4). However, it seems that only the DWR needs provincial administration, and not vice versa. Evidently, the Chiang Mai Governor, as the chairman and a member of the Ping RBC, never attended the meetings, nor did the governors of Lamphun, Tak, Kamphaengphet or Nakornswan, who also were ex officio members, but they sent their representatives instead of their selves.

Again, this situation does not indicate that the provincial administration resists or fails to provide collaboration in implementing the RBC framework. From the provincial administration’s perspective, the framework is yet another activity in which it has to take part. However, the provincial administration also has its own mandates. In other words, the government and Ministry of Interior gives all provinces (76 in total) specific mandates and directives that can be grouped into four main areas: economy, social development, security, and administration. Under the integrated provincial administration scheme (see Section 2.4), all provincial public agencies have to support the provinces, while at the same time address their own specific mandates and directives assigned by their respective departments and ministries (i.e. central administration).

Thus, to realize the RBC framework in general, and implement it at the provincial and sub-river basin level in particular, the DWR would have to readjust its implementation approach, while taking the nature of the provincial administration previously mentioned into consideration. This might mean a compromise with the idea of using a basin as a managerial unit, as described in a collaborative water governance/river basin governance approach (BAKKER & COHEN, 2011; JASPERS, 2003). However, scholars suggest going beyond this idea and building sustainable water governance on existing administrative structure (GIORDANO & SHAH, 2014; WARNER et al., 2008). From the public administration’s point of view, a comprehensive legal infrastructure is required to facilitate RBC framework implementation that would bind together all provincial offices (and provincial governors) and provincial public agencies, as well as the central public agencies concerned (see Section 6.3).