In developing this new theory of strategic coercion, it is first important to identify the elements most fundamentally important to prevailing in any campaign directed against NSTOs. It is the contention of this paper that several key elements exist. The first element is that of
denial. Denial is a concept of strategic coercion concerned with preventing an adversary from attaining their goals, with the objective of creating a form of hopelessness by demonstrating to the adversary the futility of their efforts.1 As Glenn Snyder elaborates, denial is the ability to deter an adversary through targeting ―his estimate of the probability of gaining his objective.‖2
The end result is a cessation of the adversary‘s violent campaign through convincing them that their undesired course of behavior will not yield the results anticipated.
For many years, denial has been recognized for its fundamental value in strategic coercion. Comparing the advantages of denial with that of punishment for the purposes of deterrence, Snyder noted that ―A threat of denial action will seem more credible on two counts: it is less costly for the deterrer and it may be effective in frustrating the aggressor‘s aims, or at least in reducing his gains. A denial response is more likely than reprisal action to promise a rational means of defense in case deterrence fails; this consideration supports its credibility as a deterrent.‖3
In Bombing to Win, Robert Pape thoroughly investigated the value of denial— especially in active compellance aimed at stopping an opponent from ceasing and/or undoing a course of undesired, violent action. Through empirical research, Pape found that when denial is
1
David Johnson, Karl Mueller and William Taft V, Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Conventional Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002, 17.
2
Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defence: Toward a Theory of National Security, West Port, CT: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1961, 14-15.
3
Michael Andrew Berger 53 successfully implemented, chances are very high that the opponent will be successfully compelled to halt its undesired course of action.4
This dissertation accepts the premise that denial is a key element in strategic coercion. However, while denial is generally preoccupied with preventing battlefield successes and the seizure of territory when applied in the conventional sense between states, its essence changes somewhat in considerations tied to substate terrorist actors. Here denial is concerned with preventing the NSTO from successfully conducting acts of violence against the state‘s interests, or compelling change through doing so. The objective is to convey to the substate group‘s supporters and leadership that acts of terrorism will not yield the desired outcomes, nor compel the state to enact the political changes desired.
Implementing denial against substate groups—in this case NSTOs—however, is not as straightforward as in conventional state-to-state cases. Substate terrorist organizations do not tend to field large military formations or combat support functions/industry, nor offer as clear cut strategic targets for implementing denial operations. This issue is made considerably more problematic in light of the elusive nature of these groups, which can hide amongst population centers, or foreign sanctuaries while receiving the support necessary to continue to strike. As such, efforts at denial must be accompanied by another key strategic element—that of isolation.
As mentioned in earlier chapters, strategic coercion is about affecting an adversary‘s
choice.5 In that sense, denial is concerned with creating a sense of ―hopeless‖6 through demonstrating the futility of pursuing continued (violent/terrorist) efforts. In complimenting the efforts of denial to convey a sense of hopelessness, isolation aims to convey a sense of despair
through manipulating the NSTO‘s perception of existential vulnerability. Its purpose is to
4
See: Robert A. Pape. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.
5
Lawrence Freedman, ―Strategic Coercion,‖ Lawrence Freedman (ed.) Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 15.
6
demonstrate to the NSTO that is can indeed be targeted and eliminated (i.e. fatally held accountable), and will not be able to survive without the protection afforded to it by safe havens, willing populaces, and the material strength granted to it from external sources.
Isolation thus involves removing the NSTO from its sources of support, and can be broken down into two categories: 1) Isolation of external and international support; and 2) Isolation of popular support. In the case of external/international support, no shortage of policy space can be noted in those expounding on the necessity of implementing this facet of strategy. Indeed, the Administration of George W. Bush in its ―Global War on Terror‖ clearly specified for years the need to crack down on states providing sanctuary and succor to substate groups. Isolation of external and international support is essential in order to limit or remove the tangible and political support, as well as the provisions of foreign sanctuaries to substate terrorist organizations that make them more difficult to coerce, while enabling them to conduct their campaign(s) of violence.
However external and international support is not the only source of support requiring isolation. Isolation of popular support must also be enacted, which is critical to ―draining the sea‖ (in Mao‘s parlance) in which terrorist insurgent fish swim.7
While discussions of the importance of isolation of popular support are comparatively limited in the body of existing strategic coercion literature, the importance for conducting popular isolation can be found within works dedicated to the field of counter-insurgency (COIN). The perspective of the importance of popular support within COIN literature can perhaps be traced to T.E. Lawrence‘s observation that ―Rebellion [or insurgency] must have a population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to
7
See: Mao Tse Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, Translated by Samuel Griffith, Chicago, IL: First Illinois Paperback, 2000.
Michael Andrew Berger 55 the point of not betraying a rebel movement to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by two percent active in a striking force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic…‖8
This passively sympathetic population is perhaps most valuable to insurgents, in that it provides a ―wall of silence‖ behind which the substate group can hide. However, the important support that a sympathetic population can provide is not limited to this—it can also provide moral and political support, as well as very tangible support such as manpower, materials, safe houses, logistical needs, etc. It is therefore of the utmost importance to isolate these substate organizations from their sources of popular support. Once this support has been cut off, these insurgent groups will, according to John Nagl, ―wither on the vine or [be] easily coerced to surrender or destroyed by the security forces with the aid of the local populace.‖9
Indeed, as David Galula clearly asserts, a victory emerges following the ―permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population.‖10
This dissertation accepts this perspective espoused in COIN theory on the necessity of isolating the substate insurgent organization from its base of popular support.11 Isolation of popular support importantly serves to sap the NSTO of its support, protection, personnel and resources drawn from a complicit populace, thereby diminishing the capacity of the terrorist organization to conduct operations, and forcing it out into the open for targeting by the democratic state—all of which serves to enhance the sense of existential vulnerability felt by the NSTO. In contrast, however, to early works on investigating strategic coercion towards this end during the Viet Nam era, this dissertation takes the position that the most effective approach
8
T. E. Lawrence, Evolution of a Revolt; Early Post-War Writings of T. E. Lawrence, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968, 119.
9
John A. Nagl. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002, 28.
10
Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (PSI Classics of Counterinsurgency Era Edition), New York: Praeger Security International, 2006, 54.
11
In COIN literature, this fundamentally important perspective is generally referred to as ―Hearts and Minds‖ theory—a term coined by Sir Gerald Templer during the Malayan Emergency.
to isolating popular support does include coercing the populace to ensure its compliance—but rather through a ―hearts and minds‖ approach aimed at winning the support of populations championed by the terrorist organization, or at a minimum, persuading it to embrace non-violent options. The reason is that this dissertation contends that the most effective way to isolate popular support is through winning over the populace and addressing their grievances (rather than through coercing their compliance).12 Furthermore, as elaborated by Melnik and Ellsberg (mentioned earlier), use of coercion also runs the direct risk of actually generating support within the populace for the insurgent organization.13
Isolation of popular support is also fundamentally important for another reason—one that would likely be adversely affected from an approach that targeted the populace with punishment. This reason is concerned with effectively manipulating the NSTO‘s considerations of measured political expediency in its course of actions. As it is assumed in this dissertation that
nationalistic substate terrorist organizations depend (to at least some significant degree) on a specific population (or populations) for support—seeking to present themselves as ―champions‖ of the people‘s cause—then NSTOs will be concerned with maintaining the support of these people. The aim of isolation of popular support is thus meant to convey to the NSTO that at the very least, the granting of concessions and renunciation of violence will be accepted by the people they claim to represent (and receive support from)—if not, in the best case scenario, met favorably by/be demanded by these people. In lieu of such isolation of popular support, with populace(s) championed crying out for violence and revenge, it is unlikely that the NSTO will be willing to favorably comply with efforts at strategic coercion by the democratic state, as such compliance may entail an existential catastrophe for the NSTO.
12
For a good study on this, see: Michael Findley and Joseph Young, ―Fighting Fire with Fire? How (Not) to Neutralize and Insurgency,‖ Civil Wars, 9:4, December 2007, 378-401.
13
See: Daniel Ellsberg, Revolutionary Judo: Working Notes from Viet Nam, No. 10, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, January 1970; and Constantin Melnik, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1964.
Michael Andrew Berger 57 Moreover, isolation of popular support also contributes to efforts at denial, in that without it an NSTO with substantial popular support will be both harder to target and stronger in its military capacity through the provision of recruits, intelligence, funding and possible weaponry. Isolating popular support also contributes to efforts at isolation of external/international support, in that foreign adversarial nations will be more forthcoming in their provision of external support upon witnessing what they perceive to be the dire plight of co-religionists, co-ethnic/national groupings, etc. Furthermore, should negotiations through coercive diplomacy be necessary to bring the conflict to an end, then isolation of popular support will prove vital in developing and sustaining a willingness on the part of the NSTO to move forward towards negotiated progress.
Identifying the Three Key Elements
Given the above breakdown, three key elements are made clear for strategic coercion targeted against an NSTO. The first element, intended to instill a sense of hopelessness through demonstrating the futility of its violent efforts is denial. The second and third elements, in turn both include forms of isolation. They are isolation of external support and isolation of popular support. Both lend to enhancing the existential vulnerability felt on the part of the substate terrorist organization. Furthermore, isolation of popular support also helps to affect the NSTO‘s considerations of measured political expediency. Taken together, it is the contention of this dissertation that these three elements are vitally important to conducting a successful campaign of strategic coercion against any NSTO. Prior to specifically elaborating upon why and how these elements are so critically important to success in strategic coercion, however, it is first important to elaborate on what implementing these three elements entails.