Electoral rule

Hale (2006) had studied the effects of changes in the Russian electoral system (from mixed to proportional representation) on party consolidation, finding that institutional change can be not only an incentive but actually a tool that the executive elites use to shape party competition. In Russia the introduction of a single-member districts quota in the early 1990s had the objective to hinder party formation and to make it easier for the Kremlin

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to negotiate with members of the Duma elected as independents. Conversely, the adoption of proportional representation for all the 450 seats in the mid-2000s supposedly served the purpose of strengthening national parties and contrasting the formation of strong regional political entities, favouring greatly the pro- regime party United Russia (Hale 2006: 29-33).

In Kazakhstan the electoral rule has undergone a similar change in 2007, possibly with comparable effects. Before then, the electoral system in place was a majoritarian one (1993-1998), and then a mixed one (1999-2007) (Isaacs 2011: 87).

With the electoral system established in 1993, 135 of the 177 MPs were elected in Single Member Districts, while the remaining 42 were selected from a state list, two from each oblast’ as well as from the two cities with special status, then Almaty and Baikonur. This appointed quota seemed to have the goal of ensuring a number of deputies loyal to the President. However, this measure did not guarantee the formation of a pliable legislature: the parliament so elected entered into open conflict with the leader and was eventually dismissed in 1994 (Brill Olcott 2010).

The system was partially changed in 1995, when a new Constitution was approved, as well as a Constitutional law ‚On Elections‛ (Constitutional Law on Elections). The new parliament had two chambers: a lower, the Mazhilis, with 67 elected deputies; and a higher, the Senate, where members are elected from each oblast (two per oblast plus major cities), apart from seven who are appointed by the President of the Republic. Isaacs notes that this measure was necessary to maintain control of the Parliament in absence of a strong party, as the PNEK was still in its initial stages of formation (Isaacs 2011: 87).

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It was in fact in 1999, when the new party of power was created, that the first institutional measure toward a ‚partizanization‛ of the Parliament took place. A new electoral law established that a small quota of seats (10% of the total) was to be assigned through national distribution to party lists. Still, party affiliation was not yet a prerequisite for being elected in the Single Member Districts, and many deputies entered the parliament as independents (bezpartinniie) until 2004.

In 2007 Proportional Representation (PR) was extended to the totality of seats, requiring that all the candidates would be party- affiliated. Just as in Russia, this change created an advantage for the main national parties and in particular for the party of power. Establishing a centralized distribution of seats, it discouraged the formation of regional party organizations, and made much less significant the advantage opposition parties had in the main cities. Most of the opposition parties, in fact, are based in the southern capital, Almaty and have representations only in the main cities, lacking resources for reaching the rural areas (interview, Satpayev, 2011).

The change of electoral rule was combined with an increase of the threshold for entering the parliament , which was brought to 7% by the May 2007 Constitutional reform (Vadurel, 2008). These measures favoured significantly the concentration of the political market: the high threshold guaranteed an advantage for the party of power – a huge organization with branches even in the most remote provinces - over opposition parties, smaller and, as mentioned, concentrated in the main cities.

Indeed Nur Otan was the only party which could overcome the threshold in the August 2007 elections, forming a single-party parliament. In its observation mission report, the OSCE recommended that the threshold was lowered, ‚in order to

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promote pluralism‛ (OSCE 2007)39_{. Recommendations in favour} of political pluralism were included also in the list of steps Kazakhstan should have taken before its chairmanship of the OSCE, in 2010. The threshold it is felt as a particularly strong constraint for the political system by many observers and political actors, including Nur Otan senior members (interviews, Sarym,2011; Bokayev, 2011; Karin, 2011).

The electoral law was emended in 2009 but, contrarily to the expectations, the 7% threshold was not lowered. Instead, a special provision was added: in the case of only one party overcoming the 7% limit, also the first runner-up is now allowed to enter the Mazhilis (Constitutional Law ‚On Elections‛ Art, 97. 1. 2). In the latest elections (January 15th _{2012), this measure} proved superfluous, as three parties managed to reach the threshold and entered the Parliament: Nur Otan, which conquered 80.99% of votes and 83 seats; the business party Ak Zhol (8 seats); and the Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan (7 seats). While it is now nominally a multi-party legislative chamber, it is still very unbalanced in favour of pro-regime forces: Ak Zhol is a pro-presidential party, led by the former Civil Party leader and Nur Otan member Azat Peruashev. The Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan is the most moderate among the two communist parties, and is generally considered as a representative of the ‚loyal opposition‛.

39 _{The recommendation to lower the threshold has been renewed in the Preliminary}

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