2.3 The form of government in Kurdistan region
2.3.2 Enforcement phase and answerability phase of accountability under existing structures
Under existing structures, the mechanism of accountability in both phases of
answerability and enforcement is different to the president and the government. The mechanisms of accountability against a president do not have the answerability phase although no-confidence
362 Robert Elgie, supra note 75, at 4.
363 Cf., e.g., Robert Elgie elaborates the Uzbekistan constitution which contain same discretionary power of the president over vote non-confidence. Concerning Uzbekistan, He states that “The vote of non-confidence in the PM [Prime Minister] shall be deemed adopted if it receives a vote of at least two-thirds of the lower chamber and the upper house of the Uzbek parliament, respectively. In this case the president decides on the release of the PM from office. The entire composition of the Cabinet of Ministers resigns together with the PM.” Thus, he argues this feature excludes the Uzbekistan from semi-presidential, and it becomes more close to presidential. See Robert Elgie,
‘Difficult’ cases – Uzbekistan, (Last visited June.26,2015), available at http://www.semipresidentialism.com/?cat=72.
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votes require daily questioning because the vote implies that the president should act as the agent of the parliament. Yet, the parliament does not have the committee to oversee the president’s actions in order to make sure to what extent the president’s actions are consistent with the will of parliament. Further, the Parliament by law did not have the power to allow a member of the parliament to hold an inquiry on the president’s actions. Presumably, the parliament has only the three-fourths majority no-confidence vote as a tool of enforcement. Because of the super
majority required to trigger this tool, it is effectively impossible to use.
The enforcement phase against the government and ministers is even more problematic because voting out the government would entail escalating enforcement processes. For instance, if the parliament votes out the government by two-thirds and the president does not approve, the parliament would have to vote the president out by three-fourths. It means that this back and forth in the procedures tend to incentivize the prime ministers act in a way to ensure the president supports him or her. Under draft constitution, voting out the prime minister could be blocked by the president. Presumably, changing the president is difficult in both theoretical framework of impeachment subject-matter jurisdiction and the process in the draft.364 Even if the parliament impeaches the president by two-thirds, the trial of the president would be in
constitutional court. The verdict against a president should be passed by supermajority of the constitutional court.365
364 Article 62, Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region] of 2009 (“ If the President of the Region, or the Vice President, is impeached by a vote of a majority of two-thirds of the Members of Parliament on account of perjury of the constitutional oath, serious violation of the Constitution, or high treason, and is then found guilty by the Region's Constitutional Court, he shall be removed from his position.”).
365 See Article 95, Section 6, Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region] of 2009 (“Try the President or Vice President of the Kurdistan Region after they have been impeached by the
Parliament in accordance with Article 62 of this Constitution. The conviction of the President or the Vice President requires the agreement of at least five of the Court's members.”).
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In KR, the legal clauses of answerability with respect to the questioning process and committee oversight offer the government and ministers more leeway to not provide information or be accountable to the parliament. For instance, the questioning process is divided by two categories the written questions and oral questions. If the prime minister or ministers do not respond to the questions, the member of the parliament can trigger an interrogations process, but the prime ministers and ministers must consent to interrogations and to appear in the main chambers.366 Thus, if the prime minister and ministers do not appear in the interrogation sessions, legislators are powerless to pass a motion for a no-confidence vote. Additionally, the interrogation of the prime minister focuses on political questions. Consequently, the judiciary cannot interfere to force the prime ministers and ministers to be present in the main chamber.
In KR, although the committees are gatekeepers of the main chamber in creating policies and providing oversite of the ministers in respect to their jurisdictions, these committees tend not functions when the same majority controls the government ministers, parliament presidium, and the chairman of these committees.367 Consequently, when that majority has strong party
discipline, these committees tend to do no oversight on government actions or their senior leaders in the executive. Generally, chairing these committees is very important to the political opposition, but in KR, the same majority that forms the government and constitute the presidium can deprive opposition from chairing important committees such as the legal committee,368
366 Article 69 & 70, Parliament By-law No.1 of 1992 (Kurdistan Region-Iraq).
367 See official website of Kurdistan Parliament (Last visited, June.26, 2015),
http://www.perlemanikurdistan.com/Default.aspx?page=committees&c=Committees-Permanant2009
368 E.g., the legal committee is very crucial because it formalize and drafts polices of all others committees. Without legal committee’s screening, it is not possible for any polices to reach main chamber.
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finance affairs committee,369 Consequently, depriving these committees form political opposition creates an inactive parliament.
2.4 Undermining the political accountability of both the council of ministers and parliament