possess the immoral, fascistic understanding of Jews that the Cantos advocates. On balance, the
disvalue of the w ork as art in this regard may outw eigh the possible value of the other aspects of
imaginative understanding the Cantos has to offer us. Thus, though of some value as art. Pound'sCnntos
may not truly be considered as good art.
It is quite compatible with holding that artw orks are disvaluable as art to the extent they
promote immoral imaginative understandings of the world, that works such as The Trinmph of the
Will and Good Fellas may even be good artworks. This is, however, despite the overall imaginative
understanding they promote. It is only because of the prodigious artistry, the pleasure the imaginings themselves afford and the glimpses they afford into how those who constitute the subjects of the work m ight im aginatively understand them selves and m isunderstand the w orld, that they may be considered as artworks. W hether the imaginative understanding promoted is of moral value or not is centrally relevant to the work as art. Artworks which engage the imagination are concerned not merely to entertain and promote pleasurable imaginings. They aim to intimate through these imaginings, particular imaginative understandings of w hat they represent and thus, though the relations are complex, our world. As imaginative understanding includes moral understanding, there is a necessary link between art promoting imaginative understanding and cultivating moral insight. If the Marquis de Sade's work merely promotes pleasurable imaginings but promotes an inadequate, immoral im aginative understanding of hum an relations, then his writings cannot be good art. Indeed, if de Sade's writings lack even artistry, they can hardly qualify as art at all. This is even more true of Bret Easton Ellis. At least de Sade, despite the brutality and immorality of the imaginative understanding prescribed, may perhaps provide a small insight into how sexual relations may be understood in terms of power and the assertion of the individual will. Ellis' work is so crude and banal as to lack even that small possible contribution to our imaginative understanding. *
We are now also in a position to reply to the second kind of case cited against the necessary link between art and morality. That is, cases where someone engages with an artwork, yet, afterwards, rem ains apparently im pervious to the im aginative understanding and insight prom oted by the artw ork. Firstly, it is quite possible that the person concerned has not grasped the im aginative understanding prescribed by the artwork. Obviously, this may be due to misinterpreting the artw ork. In tliis case, we would attem pt to show them that their appreciation of the work rested upon a false basis. For example, we w ould try to show them that their interpretation was at odds w ith various key features of the work and why certain aspects were to be taken in particular ways. This is not to deny
^ Compare, for example, the Marquis dc Sade s JidieUe, tr. A. Wainhou.se, (London: Arrow, 1968) w ith Bret
interpretative pluralism . Rather, it is to recognise that one may m isunderstand the possible interpretations open to one in one's engagement with an artwork.
How ever, the more significant case is w here the possible im aginative understandings prescribed by the work are apparently agreed upon but not acted upon. This depends upon the prior imaginative understanding brought to bear upon the w ork and how it is taken to inter relate with the im aginative understanding prom oted by the artw ork. An artw ork which prom otes a particular imaginative understanding may be dismissed by someone on the grounds that it does not promote any
ethical insight. Thus a Nazi m ay watch Schindler's List and adm ire Spielberg's artistry, take
pleasure in the imaginings prescribed and yet, at the end, dismiss the im aginative understanding promoted. Of course, such responses are more or less justifiable. In this case, the Nazi's response serves only to show how inadequate his imaginative understanding of others and the world really is. If he
cannot even appreciate the basic insight that Jews, qua human beings, are deserving of the same kind of
respect and humanity that we expect from others, then that only goes to show how morally blind he really is. If he can appreciate that basic imaginative insight, as shown in the film, then the work will develop, to some extent, his im aginative understanding of the world. If he both recognises the imaginative understanding promoted as holding in this regard and remains impervious to it, then one must say that this shows he is, in fact, truly evil. After all, art cannot be expected to redeem even those who would knowingly spurn the requirement to be moral.
A less extreme case is the criticism George Orwell makes of Graham Green's The Heart of the
M atter. Orwell criticises the work on the grounds that its fundamental im aginative understanding is not only deeply flawed but unintelligible. Therefore, if Orwell is right, Greene's book cannot but promote an inadequate imaginative understanding of the world, our place in it and our relations with and obligations to others. Thus it is that our evaluation of the value of an artwork not only constitutes a judgem ent upon the work of art, it also substantially reflects our own concerns, goals, values and im aginative appreciation of the world. It m ight be thought that this kind of explanation cannot
account for the plausibility of Alex's actions in A Clockwork Orange. Yet, consider what happens at the
end of the novel, when Alex has broken free from the effects of 'Ludovico's Technique'. He goes back to his old ways, but comes to appreciate that such brutally, violent, animalistic ways are wrong. Hence his enthusiasm for it wanes and the pleasure he derives from it is m arred and diminishes. Alex's imaginative understanding of the world develops and, he sees, he will try to explain this to his son. Of course, Alex knows his son will not understand from his explanation, but, rather, have to find out for himself. Yet, this understanding is precisely what constitutes Alex's growing up. Hence, even his taste in music changes.
Of course, things are typically much more complex than the hard cases we've discussed would suggest. Nonetheless, there are three basic reasons why one who grasps the imaginative understanding promoted by an artwork may not act thereafter on the basis of that imaginative understanding. Firstly,
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one may fail to appreciate the relationship between the imaginative understanding promoted in an artwork and its possible bearing upon the world. A crude instance of this would be the man who walked
out of The Cnfing Game, apparently interpreted the film properly, and still viewed transsexuals with inhumanity. He might do this because he thinks of the film as merely a piece of fiction. What he fails to understand, is that the whole point of the film is to prescribe a particular im aginative understanding of people as appropriate not just within the fictional world but as holding good in our world. We would think that he failed to see the point of the film. Thus, though he may seemed to have interpreted the film properly, he has not appreciated its full significance. After all, if true, it would be a significant criticism of the film to suggest that its portrayal of transsexuals was wholly im plausible.
Secondly, one may fully appreciate an artw ork's imaginative understanding of the world and agree with it, yet fail to act accordingly because one may act akratically. That is, mere insight is not enough, of itself, to determ ine ethical behaviour. Thus we may believe som ething to be wrong or im prudent and, nevertheless, go ahead and do it. An artwork may intimate and thus lead us to believe that a certain regard for others is morally sound. Yet, when we actually meet a transsexual we may react with repulsion and horror because our ingrained prejudices remain at odds with our imaginative understanding. After all, the cultivation of our moral sentim ents tow ard inappropriate objects of opprobrium , blame or adm iration may not be easily undone. But, if we recognise the im aginative understanding concerned as holding good, we will at least feel a sense of shame at such a reaction, where previously we m ight not have done. The cultivation of harmony between our im aginative understanding, theoretical understanding and our ingrained prejudices and sentiments is, as Plato recognised, a difficult, temporal process. ^ ^
Thirdly, we may not act in accord with the imaginative understanding promoted by an artwork
because we think its insight is only partial. A relevant example, discussed above, is Van Gogh's Potato
Eaters. Imagine we came to the work with the prior imaginative understanding that poor, peasantry tend to be particularly greedy, selfish creatures. Through engaging with the work, we grasp the im aginative u nderstanding prom oted. N am ely, that peasants' necessarily em body an anti- materialistic, quasi-religious concern for the individual and communal well-being of others. However, we might not take the imaginative understanding prom oted on board as our own. Rather, through our im aginative acquaintance with the sensitivity tow ard others portrayed, we may come to a more m odified understanding. For example, that certain harsh, peasant lives may embody an altruistic concern for others, often hard to find amongst those who are well off. This, though, is quite compatible with holding that a more Hobbesian picture may still be true of some peasants.
* ^ See Plato, The Republic, tr. W. K. C. Guthrie, (Harmondsvvorth: Penguin, 1956), Book IV, 434e-44Ic, pp. 206- 217, for Plato’s account of akrasia. Plato recognised, as Socrates could not, that our irrational elements may at times override what it is we judge best to do and would therefore, rationally speaking, desire to do.
Similar kinds of considerations also explain why even good or great artists may themselves possess an inadequate imaginative understanding of others and the world. This is complicated by the fact that the imaginative understanding promoted by an artwork may be distinct from the im aginative understanding an artist intended to intimate. However, even in cases where they may be one and th e same, an artist's w ork may prom ote ethical insight despite the apparent lie given to this by the artist's actions. An artist's w ork may promote a sound imaginative understanding in one regard and yet not in another. This may be because he regards the understanding he has prom oted as itself partial or
because, though it affords insight, it is flawed in some respect. For example, Dickens' Hard Times
affords us insight into the nature of m en like G radgrind and how a utilitarian understanding is inadequate to a proper understanding of our reciprocal relations with others. Nevertheless, it promotes a flawed understanding to the extent it crudely represents the poor as, necessarily, people of simple, honest sentiment.
This suggests how it is that an artist may possess and thus act on the basis of a sound
imaginative understanding in one respect, whilst failing to do so in another. Picasso's Weeping Woman
may promote our imaginative insight into a certain kind of female grief. Nevertheless, it may also reflect Picasso's inadequate understanding and behaviour toward women as a whole. Furthermore, an artist m ay fail to appreciate the relation the im aginative understanding he prom otes stands in relation to his or our world. For example, Giacomo Balia may have under appreciated that the glorification of technology, speed and domination in his works actually promoted a morally inadequate aestheticisation of war.*^ Lastly, the artist may him self promote an imaginative understanding that he himself fails to live up to or does not himself hold as good. Essentially, these considerations are similar to those which show why an artw ork which promotes a significant imaginative understanding may apparently fail to effect those who engage w ith it.
The common imaginative pool our art provides for us, reveals much about our times and society. It reflects our concerns, aspirations and preoccupations. Our access to the im aginative pool of art may serve to expand not only our imaginative resources, emotions and conceptual tools but our understanding of ourselves, others and the world. Artworks provide a representation of the imaginative wanderings of others. O ur imaginative engagement w ith art may thus prove to be of benefit or, perhaps, detrim ent in various ways. Ideally, artw orks prom ote the originality, inventiveness and vivacity of our own im aginings, guiding us tow ards a sounder im aginative understanding. We can go over our own imaginative development, use and engagement of artworks as contrasted with others. This process may itself lead to the developm ent of the im agination and prom ote com m on intellig ibility and understanding. The point and purpose of im aginative artw orks is to engage and guide us to better
It would seem, however, that other futurist artists, such as Marinetti, fully appreciated and revelled in tlie nature
of the imaginative understanding they sought to promote. Sec Robert Hughes, “Futurism” in Nothing If Not Critical