The principle of counterpoise for Indian troops was provided mainly in two ways: first, as daid above, by fixing the strength of the important communities represented in the army; and secondly, by*, the
careful make-up of regiments. The Madras and Bombay armies, for instance, were organised in ’mixed regiments’, under which men of different races,
religions and provinces were thrown together into the same company or troop.
1 In the cavalry the Muslims formed 40 out of 87 squadrons in 1899. Pari. Papery, LXX (1902), 487-88.
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Such a system of promiscuous mixing was designed to reduce the chances 1
of combination to a minimum. In the Punjab and Bengal armies the
majority of corps were ’class company* regiments, that is, the regiments
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drew their recruits from three or more different races and recruiting 2
grounds, hut the men of each class were kept in separate companies. The Indian officers of each company ordinarily belonged to the race, tribe or sect from which the company was recruited. Under this system each
regiment contained elements of checks and balance. In the event of disaffection among a certain class of one or more regiments, the entire corps m s not likely to be affected. Moreover, other classes, having no religious or caste affinities with the disaffected group, could be
safely employed against it. Care was also taken not to make any one class in a regiment excessively preponderant. The Punjab Committee of
1 In a memorandum of 1891 on the Reorganisation of the Bombay army, the Government of India emphasised the advantages of the class company system, remarking that the general mixture regiment was as liable to mutiny as the former. It observed that the power of
putting one class or religion against another would be more developed in the case of clas3 regiments in which a regiment of Sikhs would have no hesitation in shooting down a regiment of Hindustanis or
Pathans in case of mutiny, and a regiment of Gurkhas would be opposed to any one of them. (Mil. Progs., Ho.57, Bov. 1891). The scheme of class company system was finally carried out in Bombay in 1895* In the same year the Government of India sanctioned, with the approval of the Secretary of State, the formation of class companies in Madras. (Summary of Measures in the Mil. Dept, during Elgin’s Viceroyalty, 2-j). In 1897 the Secretary of State sanctioned the reorganisation of the Eyderabad Contingent on the class squadron and class company system.
(Mil. Des. to India, Ho.62, 5 1897).
2 There were also some ’class regiments’ composed exclusively of men belonging to one community or tribe* such as, a number of Gurkha corps and regiments of pure Sikh corps.
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I858 had suggested that each regiment should have a different predominating cl^ss, which, however, was not to exceed one-half of its strength^ The Army Commission of 1879 was not disposed to disturb the existing system.
It re-emphasised the following observations of the Committee: "As we cannot do withoht a large native army in India, our main object is to mate that army safe; and next to the grand counterpoise of a sufficient
European force, comes the counterpoise of natives against natives To preserve that distinctiveness.... which, while it lasts, makes the
Muhammadan of one country despise, fear, or dislike the Muhammadan of
another, corps should in future be provincial, and adhere to the geographical 2
limits, within which differences and rivalries are strongly marked." In short the Committee recommended that formation of provincial corps on the grounds that it would prevent the assimilation of the various classes in
the Indian army and remove the discontent arising from service far from the homes of the soldiers. Generally speaking, it was against the system of homogeneous corps. The Commission of 1879 endorsed the above suggestion and recommended that the bulk of the Punjab and Bengal armies should consist more of less of ’class company’ regiments, each with its own principal
3
recruiting grounds. This sybtem was modified to a large extent in 1893 4 when sixteen Hindustani battalions were converted into class regiments.
1 John Lawrence, The Chief Commissioner, Br.G-en. Heville Chamberlain, and H.B.Edwardes submitted their united answers to the questions on the
Recruiting and Composition of Corps, 1 July I858. See supp. to Report of Peel Commission, 28.
2 Quoted in Report of Army Commission (1879), para. 258. 3 Ibid., para. 239.
4 In 1887 the Bengal army, including the Punjab unit, consisted of 42 class company regiments and 22 class regiments, in 1889 it had 22 class company regiments and 42 class regiments. Pari. Papes, LXX, 1902, 487-88.
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The Government of India had recommended the change on the grounds that it would increase efficiency and attract recruits of a "better stamp. It was pointed out that ’class* regiments would lead to the contentment of
soldiers and facilitate their promotion and strengthen segregation by engendering the feeling of rivalry "between regiment and regiment}
So strong was the faith in the principle of division and counter poise that’ in its name many distinguished military men continued to oppose
i
the abolition of the system of the Presidency armies long after it had outlived its usefulness.
The establishment of three armies with their own commanders-in- chief and placed under the administrative control of the Presidency
governments* was necessitated by the expansion of the British Empire from three bases* separated from each other by intervening Indian States.
During the Company’s rule the authority of the Local Governments was
substantial, but the new developments, which took .place in the second half of the nineteenth century, tended to diminish their control. So far as the Mutiny itself was concerned, it rather strengthend then weakened the cause of the Presidency system. The immunity of the Madras army from infection was a strong argument in its favour, though more powerful arguments could be advanced against it. When the whole of India came under one strong Central Government and all its parts were brought much
closer to each other by rapid means of communication, the very raison d’etre of three distinct armies ceased to hold good. The Army Commission of
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1879, presided over by Sir Ashley Eden, recommended its abolition on several grounds. First, the system was complicated and expensive;
secondly, the Government of India1s responsibility for the final decision of all great military questions called for a centralised administration; thirdly, provincial governments should not be invested with military administration; fourthly, if Madras and Bombay exercised such functions, other Provinces could reasonably demand separate military arrangements; fifthly, the system affected the efficiency of the army, involved a break in the chain of responsibility and caused much embarrassment in wartime^" It may also be noted that the military jurisdiction of the Madras and Bombay Governments was not coincident with their civil jurisdiction. The Madras army served the Presidency proper.; Hyderabad, the Central Provinces and Burma; and the Bombay army was in charge of the Presidency proper, Bajputana, Central India and Sind. In 1881 the Government of
India remarked that there might have been some justification for the system if the area of their civil and military jurisdiction had been
2
coincident.
The Army Commission recommended the abolition of the Presidency ajrmies and their replacement by four separate and distinct bodies, each
to be commanded by a Lieutenant-General and all placed under central control. The proposed four divisions represented, according to it, the areas of
distinct nationalities. The Commission strongly emphasised the necessity of maintaining the segregation of armies in matters of recruitment* and
1 Benort, paras. 49, 128, 129.
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added that the existing arrangements -under which the Sikhs, the men from the eastern HortMSfe stern Provinces, the Muslims of the Punjab and of Oudh served side by side in all parts of the Bengal Presidency was more favourable to amalgamation than to segregation. It claimed for its
1