Entry into Composition 1.1: Opening Statements

1.1.1: The Verse of Reverence

So, with the intent to explain the entry into composition first, we explain the verse of reverence (mchod brjod) at the start of a treatise:

An excellent author of a treatise [373] should give a verse of rever- ence to the teacher [i.e., the Buddha]. In order that the teachings may flourish, pure words are here seen to be proper and good.

Verses of reverence have three [aspects]: the purpose, the summary, and the meaning of the words. There are two kinds of purpose: that which arises in the composer’s own continuum, and that which is realized in the continua of others—[including both the people] who have explained and [those who have] listened to [the treatise]. The meaning in summary form is to whom, by whom, and in what manner the praise is offered, and so on. As for the mean- ing of the words: Once [the composer] has examined the statement meaning (ngag don) in the manner of a lion’s glance, [he can then proceed to] explain the subject matter (gzhung don) with the gait of a tortoise.14_{Each subject mat-}

ter must be understood at length in the context of its own composition and exposition.

Suppose someone should ask, is it certain that verses of reverence are of only one kind?

[Verses] whose nature are reverence, praise, homage, auspicious wish, etc. are commensurate (mi ’gal), because they all teach only the great- ness of the teacher [i.e., the Buddha].

Verses of reverence include verses that end with [an expression] of reverence, and likewise those ending with praise, going for refuge, or auspicious wish. As for the first, the Madhyantavibha¯gabha¯s·ya [of Vasubandhu] says:

Having honored the noble composer of this treatise, born of the nature of the well-gone one, and the ones who expounded [it] to myself and others, I will make an effort to analyze the meanings.15

Likewise praise, going for refuge, and auspicious wishes should be understood. Although these are different words, their meanings are commensurate (mi ’gal), because they are alike in stating the virtues of the Buddha or the favored de- ity. [374]

1.1.2: The Oath of Composition

As for the oath of composition and so forth, suppose someone should think that if you are going to give an exposition, it is unnecessary [to say what you are go- ing to say again anyway], and if you are not going to give an exposition, [a prom- ise to do so] is meaningless:

Oaths, exhortations, and so forth

Indicate one’s enthusiasm (spro ba) to give the exposition. Since it will bring about the achievement of supreme realization, There is no inconsistency (’gal ba med) in the promise.

The oath of composition is threefold: The meaning in its intent, the meaning in summary form, and the meaning of the words.

First, the promise “[I] will give an explanation,” indicates one’s enthusi- asm to give an exposition on this subject matter, and the cause of [that] enthu- siasm is that one is starting in on a good topic. For instance, a king promises to give away the throne, or to turn the wheel of the dharma, but even though he does engage in lesser activities, such as playing dice and checkers, he does not promise to do so in the middle of the assembly. Additionally, because of the promise one is recognized by others as himself a scholar in that topic. If he is not a scholar how can he make the promise in the middle of the assembly? Fur- thermore, the oath will be the cause of achieving the [goal]. For, as it is said, “Noblemen will give up their life, but not their promise.”

Likewise, exhortatory expressions such as “Come here to listen to the supreme dharma,” or “Make yourself happy: Listen up!” and so on should be understood like that.

The meaning in summary form is threefold: Object, agent, and action. [For the first,] “What is being explained?” The treatise. [Second,] “By whom?” THEGATEWAY TOLEARNING 157

By the composer. [Third,] “How is it being explained?” The statement meaning is summarized and taught in an expanded, middle-length, or concise version of the expression “It is being explained like this”16_{as is appropriate to the occa-}

sion. The word meaning [375] should be understood according to its subject matter.

1.1.3: The Expression of Humility

Now, if one should ask, what is the expression of humility (kheng bskyung ba

bshad pa) [that appears] in some treatises?

Even though I may not have the ability, in accord with my effort I yet begin the treatise—such expressions exist,

With respect to treatise and author,

In order to demonstrate the nobility (dam pa) of both.

“By nature I am of weak intellect, and by the condition that I have studied lit- tle, I may not be capable of composition. Nevertheless, I should make an effort for the sake of myself, those like me, and those inferior to me.” This statement indicates [first] the nobility of the treatise. The examination comes when some- one thinks, “Even if [the author] is not [fully] capable, if an effort like this is made, there [must be] a great prospect here. For instance, it’s like the merchant who goes to get a jewel from [across] the ocean.”

Also, the author is himself recognized to be a noble (dam pa) person. If one examines the humility like this, in which even such as a scholar of words and meanings (tshig don) [says] “I don’t know,” there is the [inevitable] recog- nition that the composer is a noble person.

Here too the summary and word meanings should be explained however it is appropriate.

1.1.4: The Outline

Now, if someone should ask, what is the purpose of placing an outline (rnam par

gzhag pa) of the body [of the treatise] at the beginning:

For ease of explanation (bshad sla ba) and ease of comprehension (gzung bde), and also the elimination of disputes about the treatise, some scholars summarize the body of the treatise and place an outline at the beginning.

There are three benefits to placing an outline of the body [of the treatise] at the beginning: ease of exposition by the expositor; ease of comprehension by the lis- tener; and generation of certainty about the treatise.

First, [376] knowing the outline of the body [of the treatise] has three benefits [for the expositor]: it acquaints him with what will be said, keeps the order undisturbed, and by indicating the order brings about the meaning with ease.

Second, easy comprehension by the listener has three benefits: when hearing, easily becoming acquainted with what will be said; when contemplat- ing, ease of comprehension without disturbing the order; and when meditat- ing, due to the practice being in summary form, the quick arising of meditative wisdom.

Third, generating certainty about the treatise is where, since the body and limbs are connected, the conviction arises that “This treatise is perfect,” be- cause it is free from the faults of being disordered, broken, or unnecessarily long. The meaning in summary form and the meaning of the words of these [outlines] should be explained [each] just as they are understood in their spe- cific section of the treatise.

1.1.5: The Statement of Purpose

If one should ask, what is the purpose of placing a statement of purpose and re- lations at the beginning of the treatise?

In order to indicate the nobility of the treatise,

The teacher [i.e., the Buddha] indicates the purpose in the beginning.

If one with supreme knowledge is seen [doing] this, Why not begin [one’s own] analysis as well?

The up-front placement of the statement of purpose and relations is threefold: The purpose, the summary, and the meaning of the words. First, as the purpose is explained in the Vya¯khya¯yukti:

Since, having heard the great significance of the sutra, Listening and accepting it, and so forth,

That listener becomes faithful,

The purpose should be stated up-front.

Here the purpose is, some say, to generate a beautiful text; some want to refute a wrong understanding of [some] meaning. It may be that these are not in- appropriate as temporary goals. But the [final] purpose is the creation of an ini- tial beginning (’jug pa).

The summarized [377] meaning is fourfold: The intended meaning (brjod

bya, lit. “what is to be said”), the purpose, the ultimate purpose (lit. “the pur-

pose of the purpose”), and the relations. With respect to these, there are three [topics] that should be understood at length as I have explained them else- where: Refuting an opposing tradition, presenting one’s own position, and elim- inating objections to it.17

1.2: The Linguistic Causes of Composition 1.2.1: Assembling Letters, Words, and Phrases

Having thus explained opening statements, if [now we] explain the composi- tion of the body of the treatise, there are three causes (rgyu) of expression: as- semblages of letters, words (ming), and phrases (tshig). First:

Without [themselves] indicating any speech intention, What will [nonetheless] be the basis for all expression (brjod), Are called “letters.”

“Letter” is defined as “the appearance of a term generality that does not indi- cate a meaning.” Furthermore,

Vowels and consonants18

are what have the nature of “a”-li and “ka”-li, [respectively].

Suppose [the following objection is raised]: [There is a problem] when [letters are defined] like this. When definitively stated, the letters, “a” and “ka” and so on are said to be [equivalent to] Mañjus´rı¯ and Brahma¯, and so forth, [in tantric symbolism]. And in Tibet as well, it is seen that individual letters can be words, so this [definition] is uncertain.

[Response: In fact] there is no mistake. Comprehension comes as a result of case endings or a speech intention (brjod ’dod), but no comprehension comes from the individual letters taken separately (yi ge ldog pa). For, [such an argu- ment] would issue in an extreme consequence.

Their divisions and summary are not explained here.

As for the divisions and summary of these letters, since I am not writing about them here out of fear of going on too long, they should be understood from such [texts as the] Entry into Language (Smra sgo).19

Having the nature of an assemblage of letters That indicates the substance of a meaning Is a word (ming).

“Word” (ming) is defined as “the appearance of a term generality that indicates the substance of a meaning.” That is, what arises out of a group of letters like “pillar” or “pot” and so on. [But] if it does not indicate the substance of a mean- ing with either case endings or a speech intention, [378] it will not become a word merely by being an assemblage of letters. For if even an assemblage of let- ters that doesn’t indicate a meaning is [included, there is the fault again of an] extreme consequence [in the definition of] a word.

When specifications (khyad par dag) of these20 Are indicated, they are called “phrases” (tshig).

“Phrase” (tshig) is defined as “the appearance of a term generality that specifi- cally indicates a meaning.” [These are] assemblages of words, such as “tall pil- lar” and “good pot.” If it does not specifically indicate a meaning, it will not be- come a phrase merely by being an assemblage of words. For if even a single word or an assemblage of words that do not specifically indicate [a meaning] are [in- cluded, there is the fault again of an] extreme consequence in [the definition of] a phrase.

What, by joining these [phrases] together

Clearly indicates a speech intention, is a statement (ngag).

When these are joined together, the understanding [that arises] in the intended combination of meanings is a statement.

By combining these, such things as a section (rab byed) and Everything else up to a portion of the dharma is obtained.

By combining statements, [if] one indicates one’s intended meaning from a par- ticular perspective, it is a specialized thesis (prakaran·a); indicating a few aspects, [it becomes] a chapter (le’u); giving it a full reckoning, it is a treatment (brjod

byed); then a complete dissertation; or a compendium of stages—such linguis-

tic formations are achieved, all the way up to a verbal portion of the dharma.

1.2.2: Proper Linguistic Application

1.2.2.1: Specific Problems in Word-Meaning Relations

How the old [linguistic inventors] (rgan po) of these words and phrases

Initially applied [them] is [called] “sign”;

What is later analyzed [in them] is [called] “term.”

Joining words and phrases with things, the linguistic inventors made [such] as- sociations by force of mere speech intention (brjod ’dod)—such are [called] “signs.” Later, secondary analysis of these is [called] “term.”

The first of these is an autonomous expression (’dod rgyal sgra); Based on that, later on, [what is made to]

Signify another meaning is a supervenient expression (rjes sgrub sgra).

The first, where [379] whatever is suitable [is used] as an independent sign without looking to the reason, is an autonomous expression—such as “wood” or “ox.” [The second type of expression] is a subsequent expression (rjes ’jug

sgra), [which is] made based upon that [autonomous expression] for reasons

such as similarity, association, and so on—as where [the meaning of] steadfast- ness21_{is superimposed on [the word] “wood,” or stupidity on “ox.”}22

The Grammarians (brda sprod byed pa) [hold that new] autonomous expressions for which no strong established reason appertains are not applicable in these latter days (slan chad). For even if the sign refers to a meaning, [it may be] unintelligible.

If scholars of grammar see that if they do not use a new sign, the mean- ing will not be established, there is no contradiction in using a new [sign]. Nevertheless, they do not apply a new sign for [some] small purpose, because of it being the cause of incomprehension, misconception, and doubt. For instance, the signs [invented by] doctors and magicians.23

As for differences among signs: What to some Is well known, to others is not well known [And] thus not understood. What in some [texts] Is well known is clearly well known.

Some signs, while well known in scripture, are not well known in reasoning; and some are well known in reasoning but not well known in scripture. And even though the three baskets of the sutras and the four tantras are not mutually well known, each in the other, there is no fault, since to be well known somewhere is to be well known.

A fully enlightened Buddha in front of his disciples [Says things] that do not exist in mundane scriptures.

Such signs are beyond the ken (spyod yul min) of ordinary people. Omniscient thought is incomprehensible.

Expressions in the sutras and tantras such as “father and mother should be killed,” “where the ocean changes,” and “kotaks·a” are signs made up by the Bud- dha. [380] Even though some people appear to understand a trifling explana- tion [of these], [such expressions] do not have a definitive explanation (nges pa) from only one side. Consequently, those who look [only] from their own per- spective have a hard time trying to explain them.

Even where they are not well known in other, previous [treatises], Signs that the scholars [can] understand

Are supervenient (rjes sgrub nyid), Because they [can] see [their] reasons.

Even where the sign is not elsewhere well known, some expressions, if they are analyzed, are accepted because they are supervenient [expressions] and figures of speech (mtshungs). The scholars are not at fault.

Similarity and opposition

Are the two kinds of supervenient [expression].

A supervenient expression of similarity is like saying “conch” for a white dog; a supervenient expression of opposition is saying what is dissimilar, such as “conch” for a black dog.

Being mutually related, and so forth—

Once some reason like this is seen, they [i.e., the supervenient expressions, are understood].

[Supervenient expressions made for the reason of] being mutually related are: Naming the cause after the result, as in [calling a] water spring “leg sick- ness”24_{; naming the result after the cause, as in “known thing” (shes pa) or “ob-}

ject possessor” (yul can);25_{naming the whole for the part, such as “sound of a}

drum” or “sprout of a seed”;26_{naming the part for the whole, such as calling}

one side of a stretch of cloth that has been burnt a “burnt stretch of cloth” or, when seeing one side of a house, [saying we are] seeing the house. [Superve- nient expressions] made by reason of similarity are, for instance, the medicine [called] “crows leg”27_{or calling a stupid person an “ox.” [Supervenient ex-}

pressions made by reason of] a reversal of similarity are, for instance, calling a stupid person “pleasing to the gods,” and the reversal of a relation [gives us something] like “auspicious” for Tuesday,28

or “good” for the vis·t·i-ka¯ran·a29_—

[381] all these ways of giving names should be understood after a thorough investigation.

Furthermore, contradiction between direct application (’jug) and well-known use (grags pa),

Not being in contradiction, and being in contradiction with one and not the other—

[Such are the] four kinds of linguistic application (’jug tshul) Well known (grags pa) to the grammarians.

Having no contradiction between well-known use (grags pa) and direct appli- cation (’jug pa) is, for instance, calling a lotus that was born from a lake “lake born.” Having a contradiction between direct application and well-known use is, for instance, using the expression “lake born” for [a lotus] that is not a lotus born in a lake. Direct application but not well-known use is like saying [“lake born”] of such things as lake-born plants and water animals that, though born in a lake, are not well-known as “lake born.” Having neither well known use nor direct application is like saying [“lake born”] of rocks and wood on dry land.

Preceded by an earlier application, [A usage that,] without giving any reason, Gets its impetus from a mere speech intention Is accepted as established in the reverse.

Relying upon a direct expression that precedes it, a later application in contra- diction with both convention and ordinary usage—such as using the word “conch” for a black dog or “good” for something bad—looks only to speech in- tention. But if a reason is explained, expressions that generate misdirection are called “secondary expressions that establish a reversal.”

Joy, great suffering, and amazement,

Cymbals too—sounds in accord with such things That are said to closely adduce [their objects]

Are called imitating expressions (or, onomatopoeia: rjes su byed pa’i sgra).

Joy is indicated with “ha ha,” etc.; great suffering with “khi hud,” etc.; amaze- ment with “ah la la,” etc.; and cymbals with “khral khrol” and “dar dir,” etc.30

[Such] sounds, which are manifestly in accord with their objects, are [382] well known to the grammarians as “imitating expressions.”

Visual forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tactile sensations, and Thoughts (sems las byung ba) of several different kinds

That cannot be ascertained in only one way— Indicating such are indefinite expressions.

For visual forms, “’od lhag lhag po”; for sounds, “cal cal”; for smells “chil chil”; for tastes, “myog myog”; for tactile sensations, “’byor ’byor po”; for thoughts, “sems sems

po”—when made in the mind, the several things made that cannot be ascertained

in only one way are [expressed by] what are called “indefinite expressions.”

Statements (ngag) that use [words] like this, for the most part, If they closely indicate [their objects], use repetitive sounds.

In the application of phrases like this, for the most part repeated sounds are used, such as “lhag lhag,” “khral khrol,” “sems sems,” and so forth.

1.2.2.2: General Problems in Signification Whatever expressions set forth a meaning,

All are included (’dus) in two types: classification (rigs) or naming (ming).

As Digna¯ga says, “Every meaningful expression (don brjod pa’i sgra) is [either] a classificatory expression or a naming expression.” If you should ask, what are these expressions like?

What has the opposite of that which it is not Is equal to a generality in all aspects.

Through mutual acceptance and rejection [of qualities], similarity is achieved.

What has indicated that [achieved similarity] is a classificatory