Epistemological and Ontological Framework

One way of categorising research models or paradigms is to differentiate between Positivism, Post-positivism, Critical Theory and Constructivism (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The first two worldviews are traditionally associated with quantitative research and the latter two with qualitative methods.

The empiricist or positivist worldview assumes that there is an objective reality (truth) which exists and which can be known through repeated observations that do not contradict a universal law ascertained from previous observations. It assumes that the researcher’s scientific observation is value-free and unbiased (Roberts, 2014). Post-positivists or critical realists also believe in real truths, but are less certain of being able to fully uncover these and are more circumspect about their findings. A critical theorist assumes that values linked to society, economics, politics, culture, gender and ethnicity structure reality, which can also be defined as historical realism. Finally, those who hold a relativist ontological position and who believe that there is no one truth, but that multiple realities are constructed in different contexts, are constructivists. Their research outcomes are regarded as being mutually created with research participants.

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This research, situated in a qualitative framework, was shaped by a critical realist ontology and epistemology because this was the best fit with the research question and the researcher’s personal stance. A critical realist is mindful of causal influences being interrupted from acting on certain entities, particularly with human agency where individuals exercise free will with regards to deciding whether to do something or not (Bhaskar & Lawson, 1998). Therefore, actions are seen as a separate domain to language and critical realism strives to provide a better knowledge of how human beings engage with tasks and make choices. It acknowledges the important ways science has changed our view of our physical and social environments (Lane & Corrie, 2006). For Manicas, attaining this type of objectivity is possible for critical realist researchers, as long as they are reflexive about what they are investigating, constantly questioning their views and whether these truly reflect the unique social processes in a specific setting. He refers to this as a “responsible form of rationality” (2009: 35).

The approach has been used before to understand clients’ experiences in psychotherapy (Baillie & Corrie, 1996). It also matched the therapeutic process being studied in this research, because the participants’ narratives showed that their understanding of how to manage the impact of a client’s religious beliefs on themselves was either based in their own religious beliefs/practices or in an external professional code of clinical practise which they referred to. In a similar vein, Lane & Corrie (2006) suggest that one question raised by critical realism which psychologists can use to critique their practice, concerns “the ways in which different types of professional intervention enable or constrain the self-interventions of clients” (2006:85). By focussing on how change takes place (the process), not what needs changing (eg. psychopathology), or whether change has happened (outcomes), this study will help to bridge the research-practice divide which exists in counselling psychology (Bury and Strauss, 2006).

However, while a critical realist position was taken in data collection, analysis was located in both realist and constructivist standpoints. This is because holding a purely objective worldview does not always capture the nuances of clinical practice, the unusual ideas which inform a knowledge base. It minimizes the importance of subjectivity, a cherished value of the psychology and counselling professions (Hansen, 2004). Therefore, being a psychologist and scientist-practitioner, it was deemed necessary that this research embraced both the pursuit of truth and practical knowledge, remembering that there are various factors which can influence these

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processes (Lane & Corrie, 2006). As Lane and Corrie (2006) advocate, it is important for psychologists to re-examine their working paradigms and the costs and benefits associated with these and to even consider how rival paradigms could complement one another in advancing knowledge. Failure to do this, could lead to splintering within the counselling psychology discipline.

It is a particular strength of critical realism that it is able to hold together two competing perspectives – while it recognizes the social constructionist view of knowledge being a product of social and historical developments and the role that communication plays in this, it also suggests there is an independent reality which exists that is not constructed by social discourse and must be investigated (Manicas and Secord, 1983). What makes this valuable is that the researcher can pursue this independent reality, but exercises great caution with regards to generalizing their findings (Trierweler & Stricker (1998). Mackay (2003) notes that an essential part of counselling psychology practice is the ability to make objective observations of clients’ meanings and adapt these as the meanings change.

Constructivism assumes that people construct their own meanings of an event which represents their perception of reality and has an underlying relativist ontology which does not seek for universal truths in participants’ accounts, but favours uncovering their subjective explanations which are contextually-based (Willig, 2012). Paradoxically, constructivism’s emphasis on multiple realities being equally true, offers a pathway for religious issues to be voiced and respected in clinical practice. Nevertheless, taking this position, the scientist-practitioner is faced with the challenge of how to usefully understand and respond to people’s difficulties, which suggests an equal necessity for acknowledging the existence of an independent world that is not constructed through social interactions only (Lane & Corrie, 2006).

This research aimed to conceptualise how participants’ reflect on a particular therapeutic event (constructivist) (Willig, 2001) as well as attain a precise appearance of their construction of meanings (Willig, 2013). These two different ontological positions generated some uneasiness when analysing the data. A constructivist position, in data analysis portrays only the researcher’s impressions of the information (McLeod, 1994), which a critical realist position does not, as it seeks to show the participant’s experience truthfully (Willig, 2013). In line with the positivist ontological stance of critical realism, the researcher acknowledges that she placed less emphasis on how her own interpretations might impact the analysis, to keep the precision of the

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participants’ views. Nevertheless, the initial descriptive coding in grounded theory can potentially be flawed, since researchers may choose only those aspects of the data which are of interest and could lead to a diminished representative account of the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). This has implications for conceptualising and theorising at later stages, which are supposed to represent everything that is in the data. Thus, when doing the analysis, the researcher kept in mind how her own perceptions of the data may change participants’ meanings. To do this, the researcher carefully considered her own assumptions and after analysis asked for participants’ feedback about the results.

Willig (2001) states the challenge facing researchers with regards to holding only one epistemological point of view and that this might not be possible. She also says it is necessary to separate the data and analysis with regards to holding a constructivist or realist position, implying that realist/positivist data can be analysed from a constructivist standpoint. To summarise, it can be said that this research used a less positivist form of critical realist epistemology, or, alternatively, a more positivist, critical form of constructivist epistemology.