Question 1. Aristotle has taken this whole Chapter to answer this ques-tion, which he mentioned above in Book 7, Chapter 12,58 where we have made some remarks as well as several remarks in the Disputations about matter and form, especially Disputation 15, Section 1.59 And in his discus-sion Aristotle has not taught anything else which merits remarking. We should only observe that when Aristotle at the end of the Chapter seems to exclude every medium by which matter and form may produce an es-sential unit, he does not exclude the mode of union.60 For that is impos-sible, as we have shown in the same Disputation 15, Section 6.61 But he is excluding another distinct entity, by way of which that unity exists—and in this way the issue is clear.
Question 2. We should also observe how Aristotle says here that simple things and those abstracting from matter have in themselves unity and are something one, which plainly confirms the explanation we have given above in Chapter 3.
Question 3. Also from the doctrine in this Chapter there can be con-firmed what we have said in Disputation 3, Section 6 [sic],62 about the way of determining being to the most universal genera.
Notes
1 Book 8 clearly effects the transition from 7 to 9. In Book 7, substance is regarded under its static aspect, without reference to change; Book 9 concentrates on potency and act (which are at the heart of change). In Book 8, this is already adumbrated when after some problems are solved which relate to the nature of matter and form, Aristotle explains the unity of the elements of the definition and the unity of composite substances, by the action of an efficient cause which makes being pass from potency to act. For this, cf. Tricot, Aristote…, p. xxviii.
2 For this, cf. DM 1, s. 2, vol. 1, pp. 12–22, where the question is: “Whether metaphysics is concerned with all things at the level of their proper natures?”
3 DM 12, vol. 25, pp. 372–95: “Generally, about the Causes of Being.”
4 DM 13, vol. 25, pp. 395–461: “About the Material Cause of a Substance.”
5 DM 14, vol. 25, pp. 461–497: “About the Material Cause of Accidents.”
6 DM 15, vol. 25, pp. 497–566: “About a Substantial Formal Cause.”
7 “ ’ .” Metaphysics 8.1.1042a25–6.
8 Ibid. 8.1.1043a10–11.
9 “ ,…” ibid., 1042a, 27–8.
10 That is potency for a change of place.
11 “ , ,
.” ibid., 1042b5–7.
12 DM 12, vol. 25, pp. 372–95: “In General about the Causes of Being.”
13 Cf. “… ” ibid., 1042a29.
14 Cf. Pseudo–Alexander (Michal of Ephesus), In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, VIII, c. 1, ed. Hayduck, p. 546, ll. 1–10.
15 Suárez generally uses “precision” as equivalent to an “abstraction” which does not require a separation.
16 DM 36, vol. 26, pp. 477–491: “About Material Substance in General.”
17 Cf. Metaphysics 8.1.1042a30–31.
18 Cf. “ ’ . Metaphysics 8.1.1042a31.
“Separable” is in the clause immediately before.
19 Aristotle’s , Moerbeke’s “nam”.
20 Cf. DM 15, s. 4, vol. 25, pp. 516–17, where the issue is: “Whether a form is properly produced when it is educed from matter?” Especially, cf. n. 4, pp. 516–17, where the composite is said to be the direct term of production.
21 DM 15, vol. 25, pp. 497–566: “About a Substantial Formal Cause.”
22 Cf. “
,…” Metaphysics 8.3.1043a29–31. Note here that Aristotle’s text translates
“whether the term signifies the composite substance or the act and the form”. Suárez’
mistranslation follows Fonseca, who has correctly edited the Greek but in his Latin has placed “composite” with “term” (nomen) rather than with “substance”; Fonseca, Comment., VIII, Cap. 3, tom. 3, p. 463b.
23 How these terms as such may be “composite” escapes me.
24 Cf. Pseudo–Alexander, In Arist. Metaphys., VIII, c. 3, ed. Hayduck, p. 551, ll. 19–20.
25 “ ’ ’ , ’
.” Metaphysics 8.3.1043a36–7. Here again Suárez has mistranslated Aristotle.
Metaphysics Book VIII 163 Thus, the last phrase, “’ ” should be rendered, “but as toward one” or
“but as in relation to one.” This time, Fonseca translated correctly: “Fuerit autem et in utrisque animal, non tamen ut id, quod una ratione, sed ut id, quod ad unum dicitur.”
(“But the animal would also be in both, not however as that which is said with one meaning, but as that which is said in relation to one.”); cf. Fonseca, Comment. VIII, Cap. 3, p. 463b.
26 Cf. Bonini: In XII Arist. Metaphys. libros VIII, t. 7, fol. 249v.
27 Cf. Pseudo–Scotus [i.e. Antonio Andreas], In XII lib. Metaphys. Arist. expositio , VIII, c. 3, in Scoti, Opera omnia (ed. 1639), tom. 4, pp. 300b–301a.
28 Cf. In 12 lib. Metaphys., VIII, c. 3, l. 3, Cathala no. 1707.
29 That is the essence as such—here, the form precisely as such.
30 Cf. “ …” Metaphysics 8.3.1043b3–4. Note that all of our intermediate translators have translated Aristotle literally: “nisi et anima homo dicatur” (“unless the soul is also called a man”)—which differs from Suárez’s “nisi homo anima dicatur” (“unless a man is called a soul”).
31 Cf. Metaphysics 4.7.1012a22–24.
32 Cf. Metaphysics 7.10.1035b11–12.
33 Cf. Metaphysics 8.3.1043a29–b4.
34 Cf. DM 36, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 477–82, which asks: “What is the essential nature of material substance and whether it is entirely the same as the nature of corporeal substance?”
35 Cf. Bonini: In XII libros Metaphys. VIII, t. 8, fol. 250r.
36 Cf. DM 34, vol. 26, pp. 347–423: “About First Substance or Supposit and its Distinc-tion from Nature.”
37 Cf. DM 5, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 145–8, where the question is: “Whether all things which exist or can exist are singular and individual?” But also, cf. ibid., s. 2, pp. 148–61, which asks: “Whether in all natures an individual or singular thing as such adds something over the common or specific nature?”
38 Cf. DM 6, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 201–6, which asks: “Whether there is in things some formal unity which is distinct from and less than numerical?” Suárez’s concern here is with Scotistic “minor unity” as it is said to belong to a common nature. For a contrast between this and the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, cf. J. Owens, “Common Nature:
A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics,” Mediaeval Studies, 19 (1957), pp. 1–14.
39 Ibid., s. 2, pp. 206–11, which asks: “Whether a universal unity, which is distinct from formal unity, actually exists in things prior to the operation of the mind?”
40 Cf. DM 6, s. 5, vol. 25, pp. 222–3, which asks: “Whether universal unity arises from the operation of the intellect? And how should we answer the objections which have been stated against that?” But also, cf. ibid., s. 3, pp. 211–16: “Whether a common nature has of itself some unity of precision outside individuals prior to the operation of the mind?”
41 Cf. DM 41, vol. 26, pp. 587–604: “About Discrete Quantity and the Coordination of the Category of Quantity.”
42 Cf. Metaphysics 8.3.1043b33.
43 Aristotle’s ; Moerbeke’s “aliqualiter.”
44 Cf. DM 46, vol. 26, pp. 753–781: “About the Intension of Qualities.”
45 Cf. DM 13, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 395–9, which asks: “Whether by natural reason it is evident that among beings there is a material cause of substances, which we call “prime matter”?”;
ibid., s. 2, pp. 399–402: “Whether the material cause of generable substances is one or many?”; ibid., s. 3, pp. 402–9: “Whether the first and only material cause of generable substances is some simple body or a complete substance?” In this last Section, Suárez rejects the famous Scotistic doctrine of the “form of corporeity” (forma corporeitatis).
46 See DM 12, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 388–95, where the question is: How many kinds of cause are there?”
47 Cf. DM 13, s. 9, vol. 25, pp. 428–34, which asks: “What is the causality of matter?”;
ibid., s. 10, pp. 434–8: “Whether a substantial material cause is found in incorruptible bodies?”; ibid., s. 11, pp 438–52: “Whether the matter of incorruptible bodies is of the same kind as elemental [matter]?”; ibid., s. 12, pp. 452–3: “Whether celestial or elemental matter is more perfect?”; and ibid., s. 13, pp. 453–5: “Of what kind is the causality of the matter of incorruptible bodies?”
48 Cf. DM 14, vol. 25, pp. 461–497: “About the Material Cause of Accidents.”
49 Suárez’s word is “transmutationes” which could be translated by a correct, but rarely used, English cognate “transmutations.” I prefer simply to translate it as “changes.”
50 Cf. “ ‘ , .” Meta-physics 8.5.1044b28–29.
51 Cf. Metaphysics 8.5.1044b21–22.
52 Or “analogous.”
53 That is, whether a privation can be reduced to the corresponding habit. For this, see Metaphysics 8.5.1045a3–6.
54 For Suárez’s treatment of the Resurrection, in commentary on the Third Part of the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas, see Commentarii et disputationes in Tertiam Partem D. Thomae, Disputationes 44–50, in Opera, vol. 19, pp. 744–952.
55 Cf. DM 5, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 161–75, which asks: Whether designated matter is the principle of individuation in material substances?”; ibid., s. 4, pp. 175–7, where the question is: “Whether substantial form is the principle of individuation for material substances?’; ibid., s. 5, pp. 177–80, which asks: “Whether the principle of individu-ation is the existence of a singular thing?”; and ibid., s. 6, pp. 180–88: “What, finally, is the principle of individuation in all created substances?” This last Section (cf. n. 1, p. 180) contains Suárez’s own opinion that “each entity is by itself the principle of its own individuation” (…unumquamque entitatem per seipsam esse suae individuationis principium). On the relation of this opinion to the later position of Leibniz, see J.–F.
Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), pp. 496–519.
56 Cf. Metaphysics 8.5.1045a3–6.
57 Cf. In 12 lib. Metaphys, VIII, c. 5, l. 4, Cathala nos. 1750–54.
58 Cf. Metaphysics 7.12.1037b10ff.
59 Cf. DM 15, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 498–505, which asks: “Whether there are substantial forms in material things?”
60 On the Suarezian doctrine of modes, cf. J. Alcorta, La teoría de los modos en Suárez, Madrid, 1949.
61 Cf. DM 15, 6, nn. 7–11, vol. 25, pp. 530–2.
62 Cf. rather: DM 2, s. 6, vol. 25, pp. 98–102, where Suárez’s question is: “How being insofar as it is being is contracted or determined to its inferiors?”