ESTATE OF MACADANGDANG V. GAVIOLA ET AL

FACTS: Atty. Macadangdang is the administrator for the Estate of Felomina Macadangdang. He filed a case against all the respondents (madami sila, 12, all unrelated) for Unlawful Detainer. Respondents were occupying by mere tolerance, 4 parcels of land in the name of the late Felomina. The MTCC of Davao ruled in favor of the Estate. Respondents were ordered to vacate the land, remove their structures, pay damages.

Respondents appealed to the RTC, which dismissed the appeal for failure to file an appeal memorandum. Respondents then filed a Motion for Reconsideration/ New Trial, which RTC denied, ruling that it no longer had jurisdiction over the motion after the dismissal of the appeal. (Meanwhile, the MTCC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution).

Undaunted, the respondents filed a petition for review with the CA. It ruled that the order of the RTC dismissing the appeal for failure of filing an appeal memorandum should be set aside, since the dismissal of an appeal on purely technical ground is frowned upon. (Not so important: It also said that there is a difference between failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period and failure to file the appeal memorandum. The former would result to failure of the court to obtain jurisdiction, but the latter would only result to abandonment of appeal, which could lead to its dismissal upon failure to move for reconsideration). Thus, it ruled the RTC erred in denying the MR.

In the present case, Atty. Macadangdang argues that the CA erred when it allowed the filing of MR before the RTC. Because this case originated from an unlawful detainer case where the Rules on Summary Procedure apply, then the MR is a prohibited pleading.

Issue: is MR a prohibited pleading in this case? No.

Ruling: Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases fall with the M(etropolitan)TC, MTCC, M(unicipal)TC, MCTCs. Since the case was one for unlawful detainer, it was governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The purpose of the Rules is to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases and to achieve this, filing of certain pleadings is not allowed, including the filing of an MR.

However, the MR in this case was filed before the RTC acting as an appellate court. Thus, the appeal before the RTC is no longer covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The Rules only apply before appeal to the RTC, hence the MR before the RTC is not a prohibited pleading.

[Minor issues: On the failure to file an appeal memorandum and negligence of counsel. Rule 40 of the Rules of Court states that within 15 days from notice of appeal, it is the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum and failure to do so is a ground for dismissal of appeal. Here, the excuse for failure to file was the negligence of respondents’ counsel. CA held that the respondents were not bound by their lawyer’s gross negligence. SC disagrees. Failure of the counsel to file the appeal memo is due to heavy backlog of paperwork – this is not gross negligence.

Moreover, the respondents were not deprived of due process since appeal is not part thereof. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in accordance with provisions of the law.]

Petition is granted, the CA decision is set aside and reversed.

BONGATO V. MALVAR

Facts: Spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry against Petitioner Teresita Bongato, alleging that the latter unlawfully entered a parcel of land which belonged to the spouses and erected thereon a house of light materials. Petitioner Bongato filed an extension of time to file an answer which the MTCC denied because it said it was proscribed under the Rule on Summary Procedure and likewise containing no notice of hearing. Petitioner, on several occasions, changed counsels, each of which filed an answer and a motion to dismiss respectively.

Both were denied by the MTCC. The answer was denied because it was filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period while the motion to dismiss was denied as being contrary to the Rule on Summary Procedure.

MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner Bongato to vacate the land in question, and to pay rentals, attorney’s fees, and the costs of the suit. RTC affirmed. Petitioner Bongato filed an MR.

Respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration ‘only insofar as to determine the location of the houses involved in this civil case so that the Court will know whether they are located on one and the same lot or a lot different from

that involved in the criminal case for Anti-Squatting.’

In the same order, respondent Judge disallowed any extension and warned that if the survey is not made, the court might consider the same abandoned and the writ of execution would be issued.

Petitioner still filed a motion for extension of the deadline for the submission of the relocation survey.

This was obviously denied as respondent Judge noted that no survey report was submitted and ordered the record of the case returned to the court of origin for disposal. CA affirmed the MTCC.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed? YES, IT HAS PRESCRIBED.

2. Whether or not a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Summary Procedure? IT IS ALLOWED.

Held:

1. It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action for forcible entry filed by respondents had already prescribed when they filed the Complaint for ejectment.

Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be the owner of the land, possession thereof cannot be wrested through a summary action for ejectment of petitioner, who had been occupying it for more than one (1) year.

Respondents should have presented their suit before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their cause of action for forcible entry had prescribed already, and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

2. Petitioner further argues that a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is not a prohibited pleading, but is allowed under Sec. 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. We agree.

The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated specifically to achieve “an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.” The speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy, and the Rule should equally apply with full force to forcible entry cases, in which possession of the premises is already illegal from the start. For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. Consistently, Section 6 was added to give the trial court the power to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period.

However, as forcible entry and detainer cases are summary in nature and involve disturbances of the social order, procedural technicalities should be carefully avoided and should not be allowed to override substantial justice.

Pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129, the Court on June 16, 1983, promulgated the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases.

Under this Rule, a motion to dismiss or quash is a prohibited pleading. Under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, however, a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings.

Further, a court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer has been belatedly filed we likewise held in Bayog v. Natino.

“The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do not provide that an answer filed after the reglementary period should be expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default if a defendant fails to answer. It must likewise be pointed out that MAGDATO’s defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even been raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed under paragraph (a) thereof, x x x.”

In the case at bar, the MTCC should have squarely ruled on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of erroneously holding that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on

Summary Procedure. Because the Complaint for forcible entry was filed on July 10, 1992, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was applicable.

BANARES V. BALISING

Facts: Balising filed complaints for estafa against Banares and other accused. They pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa. Banares furthermore contended that since they lived in the same barangay and the amount involved in each of the cases did not exceed P200.00, the cases were to be referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa first before being filed in court (based on the LGC and Rules on Summary Procedure).

The MTC ruled in favour of Banares and dismissed the cases pursuant to the Rules on Summary Procedure. After 2 months, Balising filed a motion to revive the criminal cases stating that the requirement of referral to the Lupon had already been complied with. This was granted by the MTC.

Banares contends that he Order of the MTC dismissing the cases had long become final and executory, thus Balising should have re-filed the cases instead of filing a motion to revive.

Balising, on the other hand, claimed that the revival was in accordance with sec. 18 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. They state that the rule on finality of judgments do not apply to cases covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. They further insist that cases dismissed without prejudice for non-compliance with the requirement of conciliation before the Lupong Tagapamayapa may be revived summarily by the filing of a motion to revive regardless of the number of days which has lapsed after the dismissal of the case.

Issue: Does the rule on finality of judgments apply to the Rules on Summary Procedure? – YES.

Ruling: First, one must distinguish between a final order and interlocutory order. A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court. As distinguished therefrom, an

"interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. Previous jurisprudence state that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. As such, the dismissal of the criminal cases against Banares is a final order.

The law grants an aggrieved party a period of 15 days from his receipt of the court's decision or

order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same. After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke.

But what about the contention of Balising that these rules do not apply to the Rules on Summary Procedure? THIS IS WRONG! First, let us take a look at Sec. 18 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. It states that “cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.”

The contention of Balising that the case may be revived by a motion is wrong because Section 18 merely states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed.

Lastly, Sec. 22 of the Rules on Summary Procedure state that “the regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith.”