What Ethics Is: The Role of Reason

In both Practical Ethics and The Expanding Circle Singer argues that solutions to moral dilemmas are possible by appreciating the role that reason plays using what he calls a new understanding of ethics.⁵⁰ He tackles some of the most intractable issues in practical ethics using this decision making method, and his statement on abortion below illustrates his confidence in the process.

In contrast to the common opinion that the moral question about abortion is a dilemma with no solution, I shall show that, at least within the bounds of nonreligious ethics, there is a clear-cut answer and those who take a different view are simply mistaken.⁵¹

This is a bold claim because among the various arguments for and against abortion, no argument has achieved the statues of being the solution based on rationality qua rationality. Later in this chapter, Singer‘s solution will be shown to be plausible within the confines of preference calculus, but it also contains several basic assumptions that undermine his bold claim.

According to Singer, resolving ethical disputes is done by taking the impartial point of view and extending this to a type of equality that gives equal weight to the like interests of all relevant stakeholders.⁵² This new understanding involves a three-step process of moral enquiry. Rational agents should, first, universalise self-interestedness by acknowledging the interests of other stakeholders; second,

50 Singer, The Expanding Circle, 148-173.

51 Singer, Practical Ethics, 137.

52 Singer, Practical Ethics, 21.

determine both the quantity and the quality of these interests; and, third, act in a way that promotes preference satisfaction overall. Singer‘s explanation for the role of reason in ethics is kept simple because his primary concern is to show how the principle of equality works. This is partly due to his target audience, but it is also because he thinks that the ―proof of the pudding lies in the eating‖ as far as preference utilitarianism is concerned.⁵³

Step 1: Ethical Action and Universalisation

Singer‘s first step of moral deliberation defends the claim that ethical conduct is acceptable only from a point of view that is universal. He cites Moses‘ version of the golden rule, the Stoic concept of a universal natural law, Kant‘s categorical imperative, and the utilitarian ideal that every stakeholder counts as one as justification for the claim that ethics involves universalisation of some sort.⁵⁴ The principle of universalisation is also referred to appropriately as the principle of fairness because it expands the consideration of ethics to all humans, such as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

If Singer is right to suggest that some non-human animals exhibit self-awareness, then it would also seem reasonable to expand the circle of ethics to include them as well. The practical difficulty is how one decides where to draw the line between those animals and humans who are only sentient (cats, dogs, human fetus) and those animals and humans who are self-aware (humans over 2 years,

53 Singer, Practical Ethics, 8.

54 Singer, Practical Ethics, 11.

chimps, dolphins). A pig, for instance, is not technically self-aware, although this may be due to a human preference for visual self-awareness. If, as seems to be the case, pigs, dogs, and cats differentiate themselves using their sense of smell, then the self-awareness circle might include many different species of animals. Singer does acknowledge that trying to calculate the qualitative interests of animals and humans is a difficult problem, and this issue will be dealt with later in this chapter.⁵⁵

Singer explains that while most ethical theories take universalisation for granted, no single form of universalisation has been agreed upon. He is right that the principle of universalisation provides a boundary condition for ethical thinking that is removed from local or particular concerns. To this extent, the oldest expression of universalisation, ―treat others only as you consent to being treated in the same situation,‖ is as timeless as moral theory gets. Harry Gensler describes the Golden Rule as ―wisdom of the ages‖ because it has been replicated in numerous and diverse human communities.⁵⁶

Taken literally, however, the golden rule is absurd, which is why both Kant (a non-consequentialist) and Sidgwick (a consequentialist) sought to formalise this basic principle of fairness into a philosophical maxim. So, the principle of universalisation is best understood as a tool that philosophers use to identify the boundary of ethical theory, rather than as a means to solve moral problems. A major thinker like Kant uses three different formulations of the categorical

55 Singer, Practical Ethics, 61-63.

56 Harry J. Gensler, Formal Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1996), 104-105.

imperative in an attempt to provide a prescriptive or formal approach to universalisation. His explanation of the categorical imperative illustrates the problems associated with pushing the principle of universalisation too hard. As a descriptive principle of fairness, universalisation remains a useful concept because it connects a moral claim with all the relevant stakeholders, but as a prescriptive tool it is incapable of solving complex moral dilemmas.

The failure of theories of ethics to agree on how to apply the principle of universalisation does not dissuade Singer from attempting an equally bold initiative.⁵⁷ He argues that precisely because ethics takes a universal point of view, a rational agent can accept that a moral action is never justified if it attempts to argue from the standpoint of a partial or sectional group. Therefore, the first step in Singer‘s version of moral enquiry is to accept that ethical actions have to be universalisable. Singer argues that deontological forms of universalisation are too demanding and that the only way to resolve Kantian-type rule conflicts is to formulate a complex hierarchy of rules or commands. He claims that the consequentialist approach is untouched by complexity problems because the emphasis is on goals.⁵⁸ Significantly, he does not say, at this early stage, why emphasising goals rather than duty reduces complexity. Later in this thesis this claim will be shown to be too bold, largely as a result of Singer‘s subsequent recognition of the impractical complexity of preference calculus in The Expanding Circle.⁵⁹

57 Singer, Practical Ethics, 8.

58 Singer, Practical Ethics, 3.

59 Singer, The Expanding Circle, 161.

Singer argues that universalisation is a useful first step in ethics because it helps to differentiate claims about ethics from claims about personal or cultural preference.

He illustrates this by showing how racism is thwarted by the principle of universalisation. Both consequentialists and non-consequentialists provide cogent arguments against racism, and the connecting principle for Singer is the principle of fairness or universalisation, even though the respective theoretical traditions may share almost nothing else in common. In other words, the principle of universalisation provides a thin justification for extending the boundary of ethical consideration to all humans – and perhaps some non-humans. From a historical perspective, this seems appropriate because many moral philosophers have used the principle of universalisation as the starting point of moral evaluation, even though they have had different perspectives on what constitutes universalisable moral argument.

However, the idea that one should universalise ethical deliberation in this way does have its critics. Toulmin argues that the Modern shift from particular concerns toward universals was a retrograde step because it rejected important Middle Age and Renaissance conceptions about ethics that followed Aristotle in claiming that the Good lacked universal form. Toulmin says the move toward principles of universality had its genesis in the seventeenth-century hope that ethics might achieve a formal theoretical status.⁶⁰ He claims that the Enlightenment shift toward universals was part of a general shift away from four

60 Toulmin, Cosmopolis, 30-35.

different kinds of practical knowledge advocated in Renaissance humanism: the oral, the particular, the local, and the timely. He further claims that the focus of philosophical enquiry during the Modern period ignored particular and local concerns because philosophers were searching for a higher-order foundation for ethics, one that was abstract, timeless, and universal.⁶¹ Toulmin further argues that this search for an epistemic foundation for ethics was misguided precisely because practical philosophy should give timely consideration to oral, particular, and local concerns.⁶² In effect he advocates a conception of rationality that targets the pragmatist concern for appropriate reasonableness between rational discussants, rather than one that is disconnected and impartial. Toulmin agrees with Rorty that strong foundationalist claims need to be rejected because they preclude a type of thinking that fits the practical rationality necessary for disciplines like medicine and law.⁶³

Dancy is another philosopher who rejects the focus on moral universalisation. He claims that grounding ethical decisions in moral universalisability is mistaken because it ignores the difference that new knowledge can make to a given case.⁶⁴ Because this new knowledge may be sufficient to cause a change of mind about moral action, it calls into question what were previously thought to be sufficient reasons for moral judgment. Dancy claims that we should not be driven from case to case by universalisable moral judgments because we cannot be certain about the particular facts of a case on which moral action is judged.⁶⁵ In the same way

61 Toulmin, Cosmopolis, 35.

62 Toulmin, Cosmopolis, 186.

63 Toulmin, Cosmopolis, 33.

64 Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 240.

65 Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 240.

that an experimental scientist can never be certain that experimental probability leads to facts, a moral agent will not be sure that a universalisable moral rule should be applied to a particular case. Dancy argues that ethics does not need ―a suitable supply of moral principles‖ because practical rationality is about particular cases and should always be open, revisable, and conditional to the complexities involved.⁶⁶

This is the problem Kant overlooks when he tries to justify how one categorical imperative can be used to trump another. In his essay, On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives, Kant defends the moral duty to be truthful to a murderer, even when lying could prevent harm. He states that honesty and truthfulness are a ―sacred and unconditional command of reason, and not to be limited by any expediency.‖⁶⁷ Kant is responding to critics who claim that moral imperatives are not absolute. Modern philosophers also reject the absolute commands of reason that Kant attached to the principle of universalisability. For example, MacIntyre argues that as long as one is creative, absurd propositions such as ―let everyone except me be treated as a means‖ can be turned into categorical imperatives.⁶⁸ This proposition seems blatantly immoral but it is consistent with all formulations of Kant‘s categorical imperative.

In Singer‘s case, however, he does not use the principle of universalisation in this formal sense. Rather, he uses it as a principle of fairness, to show how ethical

66 Dancy, Ethics Without Principles, 5-7.

67 Immanuel Kant, ―On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives‖ (1797), in Thomas K. Abbot, trans. Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, sixth edition (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954), 361.

68 MacIntyre, After Virtue (2007), 45.

thinkers differentiate between ethical claims that are universal and other claims that are not. The fact that they universalise is Singer‘s justification for taking this first step in moral enquiry. Given this limited understanding, it seems to provide an appropriate boundary for articulating moral claims.

Step 2: Ethical Action and Preference Utilitarianism

After grounding ethics in the principle of universalisation, Singer‘s second step of moral enquiry is to adopt what he calls a broadly utilitarian position.⁶⁹ He follows Sidgwick in claiming that from the ―point of view of the universe,‖ it is self-evident that the good of one individual counts the same as the good of another.⁷⁰ In so doing, Singer argues that we can no longer limit ethical consideration to humans and that the circle of ethics should therefore be expanded to include all sentient beings at one level and self-aware beings at another.⁷¹ He explains that the motivation to include sentient and self-aware animals in ethical consideration is simply an extension of the type of arguments now used to oppose racism. When rational thinking eventually acknowledged that the colour of a person‘s skin was irrelevant to ethical concerns, treating people differently for that reason was no longer acceptable. For Singer, the time has come to expand the circle of ethics as far as the sentience boundary, because this is the only reasonable comparison that can be made between humans and other species.⁷²

69 Singer, Practical Ethics, 12.

70 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics [1874], seventh edition (London: Macmillan, 1907), 382.

71 Singer, Practical Ethics, 55.

72 Singer, Practical Ethics, 58. He has in mind here previous claims about species separation based on the use of tools, capacity for rational thinking, and, more recently, the capacity for language.

In many institutions this recognition has already taken place. In Australia, research institutions are required to consider the suffering that animals may experience in the process of the research. It is routine now for animal research ethics committees to reject applications that fail to take animal suffering into consideration. When Practical Ethics was written, Singer had in mind pharmaceutical and cosmetic companies who, until relatively recently, gave no serious consideration to the suffering caused to their animal research subjects.

Singer‘s method of explanation, however, seems unnecessarily provocative, and this sometimes masks the point he is trying to make:

If experimenters are not prepared to use orphaned humans with severe and irreversible brain damage, their readiness to use nonhuman animals seems to discriminate on the basis of species alone.⁷³

Singer is not suggesting that experimenters ought to start using disabled humans as research subjects. He is making the point that a severely disabled child has less capacity to suffer (sentience) than many research animals. Singer‘s thought experiment highlights a significant problem associated with preference calculus.

The child in the case above must be orphaned because Singer appreciates that a non-orphaned child has parents whose interests need to be considered. This accommodation to the loss felt by parents provides a key to appreciating why Singer‘s disabled infant illustration fails on utilitarian grounds. If one takes into consideration the interests of parents then one ought also to take into

73 Singer, Practical Ethics, 65.

consideration the interests of unrelated members of the community who feel uncomfortable about using disabled children in this way. If so, then the interest calculus is weighted against using disabled children. A fuller account of the problems associated with the principle of equal consideration of interests will follow later in this chapter, but the following description highlights the problem in the above case:

The principle of equal consideration of interests acts like a pair of scales, weighing interests impartially. True scales favour the side where the interest is stronger or where several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number of similar interests; but they take no account of whose interests they are weighing.⁷⁴

The capacity to suffer is used by Singer as a short-hand category for sentient beings. Because the capacity to suffer is not restricted to humans, a rational agent ought to accept that the subjective human preference to avoid suffering must, in some sense, also be accepted for all sentient beings.⁷⁵

The essence of the principle of equal consideration of cannot, if we accept the principle of equal consideration of interests, say that doing the act is better, despite the facts described, because we are more concerned about Y than

The reason that Singer‘s thought experiment about using disabled orphans as research subjects can be rejected, on preference utilitarian grounds, pivots on the last sentence in the quote above. When Singer claims both that ―true scales favour the side where the interest is stronger or where several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number of similar interests‖ and that ―an interest is an interest, whoever‘s interest it may be,‖ he seems not to appreciate how this impacts on his animal suffering argument. At some stage, the amount of preference satisfaction achieved by causing animals to suffer could conceivably be overridden by a greater number of people who benefit from the research. Were this to be the case, preference calculus justifies animal suffering.

Singer‘s description of a sphere or circle of interest⁷⁷ is similar to cost-benefit protocols commonly used in a stakeholder analysis.⁷⁸ The aim of stakeholder analysis is to map the stakeholders and then to give equal consideration to their concerns. Equal consideration does not imply that the interests of all stakeholders are granted equal value. There are often valid reasons for overriding the interests of a small number of stakeholders if the benefits gained from doing so are substantial, so equal consideration does not necessarily imply equal treatment.

The difference between Singer‘s preference circle and other stakeholder models is the recognition of the individual interests of non-human stakeholders. In other stakeholder models, animals are lumped together in species groups. In Singer‘s

77 Singer, Practical Ethics, 18.

78 For example, the office of the Public Sector Standards Commissioner in Western Australia makes extensive use of stakeholder protocols in administering the Public Sector Management Act 1994.

version of interest calculation, the individual cow, sheep, or chicken has interests that ought to be given equal consideration in the same way as that offered to individual humans.⁷⁹ A chicken counts for something because it can suffer and therefore the decision to use a battery-hen model of egg production must weigh the amount of individual chicken suffering against the amount of interest satisfaction from farmers and people who eat eggs. If eggs can be harvested from hens not held in cages, for little extra cost, then it seems reasonable to choose this method. A method of egg harvesting that does not require a battery of hens appears to diminish only marginally the interest of egg eaters, whereas the suffering of the battery hens appears significant. Because hens are sentient creatures, Singer‘s second step of moral evaluation seems valid, at least to some extent.

The idea that one should expand the circle of ethics to include animals is a reasonable extension to traditional arguments that limit ethics to human concerns only. Singer argues that because there is no justification for refusing to take any interests into consideration, the ―limit of sentience (using the term as a convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand for the capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness)‖ is the only defensible boundary of concern for a moral agent.⁸⁰ The difficulties associated with implementing this aim might diminish its impact, but it still seems a reasonable goal to pursue. Bentham‘s

79 Singer, Practical Ethics, 132.

80 Singer, Animal Liberation, 58.

claim, that if a being can suffer, it should be given ethical consideration is arguably still the best formula for the ethical consideration of animals.⁸¹

Step 3: Ethical Action and the Principle of Impartial Concern

Singer‘s third step of moral enquiry requires a moral agent to calculate interests or preferences in a manner that achieves the most preference satisfaction for all

Singer‘s third step of moral enquiry requires a moral agent to calculate interests or preferences in a manner that achieves the most preference satisfaction for all