6.1 Horizontal dimension 109
6.1.1 EU multilevel system 109
As was demonstrated in Part 5, there are a number of European institutions and bodies involved in EU energy governance towards Morocco, whereas in the following, and with regard to the EU multilevel system, the focus is on the European Council, the Council, the Parliament, the Commission, the External Action Service and the Investment Bank.
As laid out in Part 3, intra-institutional consistency/coordination is concerned with consistency between one policy area or various policy areas within a political level or institution, whereby as regards the EU, the Commission is often cited as a risk for or source of inconsistent behaviour in the literature, basically because inconsistencies may occur both between the Directorate Generals (DGs) and between the DGs and the commissioners (MARANGONI, 2014:42). For this reason, and in the spirit of collective responsibility of the Commission, several mechanisms have been put in place to avoid frictions, with ‘inter-service consultation’ being key, meaning that all directorates concerned by a proposal must be consulted ex ante and their positions must be taken into account (MARANGONI, 2014:53). In this regard, and as for the Directorate General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), the latter is required to work closely with the line DGs in charge of thematic priorities, i.e. including the Directorate General Energy (DG ENER). Interviews with DG NEAR in Morocco confirmed this and attest to an extensive level of inter-service coordination (and thus high consistency) between the two directorates with both actors pursuing a unified strategy. In fact, they do not act independently from one another but regularly share and exchange information, consult one another and even establish common priorities (see Figure 18).
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Figure 18: Intra-institutional coordination in the EU multilevel system
EC (DG ENER-DG NEAR)
Unified strategy
Establishment of
common
parameters/priorities
Search for consensus
Consultation Information-sharing No interaction Sometimes achieved Not achieved Achieved No c o o rd . L im it ed co o rd . E xt en si ve c o o rd .
Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research.
As presented in Part 3, inter-institutional consistency/coordination is concerned with the consistency between different political levels or institutions. Here, the European Council is one of the most important institutions when it comes to establishing external consistency (GEBHARD, 2017:109), the context in which it seeks to maximise the EU’s impact ‘by improving coordination and coherence between the main fields of EU external action, such as trade, energy, justice and home affairs, development and economic policies […]’ (EUROPEAN COUNCIL 26/27 June 2014 Conclusions). Next, the Commission is equally responsible for ensuring consistency in external areas outside of the CFSP, whereby it is thought to be assisted by the HR and the EEAS who play a key role in ensuring external consistency and has become the ‘principal channel for Commission participation in EU external relations’ with the Treaty of Lisbon (DAGAND, 2008:6).662 Contrary to the abovementioned actors, the Parliament does not play a direct role in
ensuring consistency, but an indirect one. This is reflected in the fact that it must give consent on legally binding agreements or in its monitoring powers such as budgetary control. In this light, so Van Vooren and Wessel (2014:461), its role may be ‘crucial in ensuring coherence between EU energy interests and values.’ For example, ‘to leverage in negotiations with energy producing and consuming countries’, it insisted on the need to ‘Speak with one Voice’ and even advocated that the Commission should be in charge of this (NATORSKI and HERRANZ SURRALLES, 2008:79). Moreover, since its set-up, the Parliament has equally been a strong supporter of the EEAS, a context in which it has also tried to create synergies between the EU delegations and the EU member states’ diplomatic services, ‘both in terms of practical arrangements (sharing quarters) and in terms of sharing information to avoid duplication’.663
As just mentioned, the Commission plays a vital role in guaranteeing consistency between the internal and external dimensions of energy policy, as well as between energy and other policies (Art. 280I Treaty of Lisbon). Here, it is widely acknowledged in the literature that coordination
662 Apart from the Commission, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) also participates in
the work of the European Council (albeit without being a member) and provides support to the Council as will be detailed later. In fact, it is the European Council with the agreement of the President of the Commission and the approval of the Parliament, which
appoints and discharges the HR..In turn, the EEAS is appointed by the Council which must act on a proposal of the HR after
consulting the Parliament and after obtaining the Commission’s consent (Art. 27 TEU).
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between the Commission and the European Council with regard to energy is extensive (and consistency high) (see Figure 19) and that the cabinet of the Commissioner and the cabinet of the European Council President maintain ‘close relations’, with ‘concerted action’ having led to ‘unprecedented progress in the field’ from 2005 onwards (THALER, 2016:16). This overall close energy relationship is also reflected in the frequent exchanges taking place between the Secretaries General of both institutions as well as between DG ENER and the Secretariat of the European Council (THALER, 2016:16). As for the coordination between the Commission and the External Action Service, there is equally consensus in the literature that it is extensive (and consistency high) (BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 2017:127), notably because the Action Service’s main responsibility is, as shown before, to coordinate the Commission’s work on external relations and to ensure consistency (see Figure 19). Indeed, as stated in Article 3 of the Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, the EEAS shall cooperate with the services of the Commission and consult them ‘on all matters relating to the external action of the Union in the exercise of their respective functions, except on matters covered by the CSDP’664 (HELWIG,
IVAN and KOSTANYAN, 2013:46). This includes, amongst other things participation in the Commission’s preparatory work and procedures and it is worth repeating that overall, the EEAS heavily relies on the technical expertise of the DGs. In general, so the literature, the coordination with the DGs functions well, but ‘could be improved’ (BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 2017:4-5, 134). To support this claim, Blockmans, Kostanyan, Remizov, Slapakova and Van der Loo (2017:127) cite the March 2011 Communication of the ENP. In fact, whilst the communication aimed at inviting the southern ENP member countries to join the Energy Community Treaty, this policy objective was not supported by DG ENER.665
However, and as regards Morocco, there is no friction whatsoever and most coordination takes place between the EEAS and DG NEAR which serves as the first point of contact for the EEAS (Interview EEAS, 2017).666 One important tool to ensure unity is the ENP as it allows for the
EEAS to regularly assist in the NIP negotiations and meetings in which it is encouraged to actively participate (Interview EEAS, 2017). Apart from DG NEAR, the EEAS also cooperates with DG ENER and the Directorate General Climate (DG CLIMA), depending on the field. For example, in the case of the organisation and preparation of the COP22, DG CLIMA clearly was the most important contact. Apart from the Commission, the EEAS is, according to the beforementioned Article 3 also supposed to work in cooperation with or to extend cooperation to the Parliament to which it is highly accountable, notably in terms of information-sharing and reporting (HELWIG, IVAN and KOSTANYAN, 2013:50; VAN VOOREN and WESSEL, 2014:23).667 For
example, the Heads of EU delegations are required to speak in front of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) before taking up their posts in a third country to inform and exchange information about policy priorities to be conducted in this particular country.668 Moreover, they,
as well as the desk officers, regularly participate in meetings of the parliamentary delegation to
664 EEAS (Accessed on 30 October 2019).
665 In fact, whilst discrepancies between the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Directorate General Energy (DG ENER)
may arise, DG ENER is likely ‘to emerge as the winner’ from this, as it can usually count on the support of the Council’s Working Party on Energy (HELWIG, IVAN and KOSTANYAN, 2013:47).
666 Cooperation with the Directorate General Energy (DG ENER) is overall less pronounced, notably when compared with the
Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR). EC (Accessed on 05 November 2011); EC (Accessed on 10 December 2017).
667 EEAS (Accessed on 30 October 2019).
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the third states669 (HELWIG, IVAN and KOSTANYAN, 2013:56) (see Figure 19). Finally, and
recognising the important role the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) plays when it comes to bringing together important actors around one table and attracting investors and coordinating investments (Interview EEAS, 2017), the EEAS also coordinates internally with the organisation (Interview EEAS, 2017) (see Figure 19).
Inter-institutional coordination is equally extensive (and consistency high) between the EU institutions and the European Investment Bank, which, jointly owned by the EU institutions and the EU member states, serves as the EU’s financing arm and therefore falls under the category of inter-institutional cooperation (see Figure 19). As claimed by Tagliapietra (2016:200), the EIB has a role of utmost importance in the Mediterranean, as it is the only institution capable of delivering financing mechanisms able to attract or leverage new investments (thanks to its financing capacity & reputation) – a role that cannot be assumed by any of the other stakeholders in the region. In terms of consistency between the EU institutions and the EIB, the latter is, in line with Article 19 (§ 2) of its statute, obliged to request the former’s opinion on all financing operations outside the EU.670 However, the EIB’s organisation structure forms the
actual institutional basis for the permanent exchange of information. In fact, the bank has four statuary bodies, 1) the Board of Governors, 2) the Board of Directors, 3) the Management Committee and 4) the Audit Committee,671 with management responsibilities lying within 1) - 3).
The Board of Governors consists of 28 Ministers (usually Finance Ministers) of the member states and is in charge of defining general lending policies and deciding on the bank’s external activities (including outside the EU).672 By contrast, the Board of Directors673 is composed of 29
Directors – 28 from each member state and one from the Commission – as well as of 19 Alternate Directors and meets around 10 times a year. It is, amongst other things, responsible for authorising the granting of loans.674 Decisions are generally675 taken by one third of its
members, representing at least 50% of the subscribed capital.676 As this shows, the composition
of the EIB’s governance system allows for a certain degree of consistency between EU policies and EIB projects thanks to the participation of the Commission and the member states. Nonetheless, this cooperation framework is complemented by various bilateral agreements to ensure alignment and compatibility. For example, in order to facilitate coordination between the Commission and the EIB and improve consistency between the EU’s external policy objectives, the Commission and the EIB signed an MoU on the strengthening of coordination of EU external lending policies on May 26, 2008 (see Table 8). Measures under the MoU have for example included the reinforcement of dialogue and planning between the two institutions,677 with the
Commission having been assigned a ‘key role’ here.678 In this regard, Article 6 (§ 1) of Decision
No 466/2014/EU requires for the EIB to be in a regular exchange of information with both the Commission and the EEAS on strategic documents or other policy and operational aspects. Here, it is interesting to note that apart from referring to consistency, and contrary to what is
669 The Parliament maintains one Delegation for Relations with Maghreb countries (DMAG) which is comprised three Joint
Parliamentary Committees of which one deals with Morocco. EP (Accessed on 08 November 2019).
670 EIB (Accessed on 07 December 2017).
671 EIB (Accessed on 11 February 2018).
672 EIB (Accessed on 27 August 2017).
673 The Board has under its supervision the Management Committee, the bank’s executive so to speak, with 9 members. EIB
(Accessed on 27 August 2017).
674 EC (Accessed on 26 August 2017).
675 Exceptions exist in certain policy areas.
676 EIB (Accessed on 27 August 2017).
677 EC (Accessed on 06 December 2017).
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generally the case in EU documents, Article 6 contains a clear reference to coherence (‘[…] with a view to maximize synergies between EIB financing operations and Union budgetary resources […]’). This, in turn, implies a high level of coordination, reaching a least the establishment of common parameters on the Metcalfe scale. Apart from the Commission and the EEAS, the EIB also closely cooperates with the UfM which is, amongst other things, reflected in the fact that the bank is represented in the UfM Secretariat.679 Further, in January 2011, the EIB and the UfM
signed an MoU on cooperation in the fields of economic, social and sustainable development with the aim of implementating a global and regional development strategy. As part of the MoU, both partners agreed to cooperate in the exchange of information in order to ‘avoid any possible overlapping and trying to complement the other party’s views in order to increase the value added of the final outcome’.680 Another provision is network-building, where the EIB is asked to
establish contacts between the UfM and the industry (other banks, chambers of commerce, think tanks, NGOs etc.). In return, the intention was for the EIB to play a role in the UfM energy platforms which, however, has not materialised so far.681 The MoU was renewed in 2014.682 Table 8: Coordination between the EIB and other European institutions
Coordination between the EIB and other (European) institutions
Date Agreement
02/05/2016 MoU with the EBRD
05/11/2014 Decision No 466/2014/EU of the EP and the Council 08/04/2014 Renewal of MoU with the UfM
17/01/2011 MoU with the UfM
03/01/2011 MoU with the EC, the European Investment Fund and the EBRD
26/5/2008 MoU with the EC, based on Council Decision 2006/1016/EC
13/7/2009 Decision 633/2009/EC of the EP and the Council
19/12/2006 Council Decision 2006/1016/EC Source: Own elaboration based on EIB (Accessed on 27 August 2017).
679 EIB; UfM (Accessed on 01 January 2018).
680 EC (Accessed on 22 November 2018).
681 EIB (Accessed on 01 January 2018).
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Figure 19: Inter-institutional coordination in the EU multilevel system
EC-European Council
Unified strategy
Establishing common parameters/priorities
Search for consensus
Consultation Information-sharing No interaction Sometimes achieved Not achieved Achieved N o c o o rd . L im it ed co o rd . E xt en si ve c o o rd . EC (DG ENER/DG NEAR)-EEAS Unified strategy Establishing common parameters/priorities
Search for consensus
Consultation Information-sharing No interaction Sometimes achieved Not achieved Achieved N o c o o rd . L im it ed co o rd . E xt en si ve c o o rd . EEAS-EP Unified strategy Establishing common parameters/priorities
Search for consensus
Consultation Information-sharing No interaction Sometimes achieved Not achieved Achieved N o c o o rd . L im it ed co o rd . E xt en si ve c o o rd . EEAS-UfM Unified strategy Establishing common parameters/priorities
Search for consensus
Consultation Information-sharing No interaction Sometimes achieved Not achieved Achieved N o c o o rd . L im it ed co o rd . E xt en si ve c o o rd . EIB-EC Unified strategy Establishing common parameters/priorities
Search for consensus
Consultation Information-sharing No interaction Sometimes achieved Not achieved Achieved N o c o o rd . L im it ed co o rd . E xt en si ve c o o rd . EIB-EEAS Unified strategy Establishing common parameters/priorities
Search for consensus
Consultation Information-sharing No interaction Sometimes achieved Not achieved Achieved N o c o o rd . L im it ed co o rd . E xt en si ve c o o rd .
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EIB-UfM
Unified strategy
Establishing common parameters/priorities
Search for consensus
Consultation Information-sharing No interaction Sometimes achieved Not achieved Achieved N o c o o rd . L im it ed co o rd . E xt en si ve c o o rd .
Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research.
Concerned with consistency between two or more governments, intergovernmental
consistency/coordination is, as shown before, not only considered a critical issue in the
literature – prime examples of a lack of consistency here are disagreement amongst the member states as regards a common energy approach towards Russia or as regards the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) – but also in empirical research. Indeed, the latter attests to limited coordination (and thus medium consistency) between the member states when it comes to EU energy governance towards Morocco (see Figure 21). The main institution in charge of interstate coordination or political coordination amongst the member states is the Council (GEBHARD, 2017:109). Indeed, whilst overall, both the Commission and the Council are in charge of ensuring consistency between the EU and the member states, much or most of the interstate coordination happens within the Council (DUKE, 2006:27), with Article 32 TEU consolidated foreseeing, for example, for the member states to ‘consult one another within the European Council and the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to determine a common approach’ and to ‘show mutual solidarity’. Whilst its Presidency, as well as its COREPER are the main institutions in this context (TRAUNER, 2011:22-24), the body in charge of ensuring continuity between the Councils is the General Affairs Council (Art. 9C Treaty of Lisbon)683 which holds a number of administrative and budgetary competencies involving the
CFSP. As regards Morocco, the most important Council though is the FAC’s ‘Maghreb/Mashreq’ (MaMa) Working Party which de facto contributes to setting the Council's agenda towards the Maghreb country (SCHUBERT, POLLAK and KREUTLER, 2016:133-134; Interview EEAS, 2017). The FAC and the MaMa do not interact with each other directly but via the Political and Security Committee (PSC), a body that is composed of the ambassadors of member states to the EU and is chaired by the EEAS.684 One of the aims of the PSC685 is to coordinate common European foreign
policy matters and to prepare the FAC (in fact, it is the main preparatory body for the Council and formally reports to COREPER II). It is divided into several sub-categories, one of which is responsible for the Maghreb and the Mashreq regions – the MaMa group which, as an entity specialised on the North African region, serves as a useful provider of political expertise with
683 Europa (Accessed on 08 November 2018).
684 In fact, the national diplomatic services being represented by ambassadors based at their respective country’s Permanent
Representation in Brussels, one ambassador is generally assigned to the Political and Security Committee (PSC).
685 The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is, amongst other things, also responsible for monitoring the international situation.
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respect to common foreign and security policies (see Figure 20). For example, based on proposals made by the EEAS, it is entitled to agree on priorities (or Action Plans) within the ENP and also to examine legislative proposals made by the EC.Meetings are held on a regular basis twice a week686 and by providing a platform for a regular dialogue between the member states
on main political and economic developments, they allow for political exchange and coordination. As mentioned before, energy topics are usually also discussed within the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council (TTE) and the Working Party on Energy, however, as regards energy policies towards Morocco, these bodies play a subordinate role. Figure 20: Foreign energy policy relevant bodies within the Council
Council of the European Union
Foreign Affairs Council
(FAC) Political and Security Committee (PSC) COREPER II Working Party (MAMA)Maghreb/Mashreq
- Chaired by the High Representative on Foreign
Affairs - Foreign Affairs Ministers
- Chaired by the rotating presidency
- Chaired by the EEAS - Ambassadors of the Member
States to the EU
- Chaired by the EEAS - Staff of the permanent
representations of the Member States to the EU Supported by the Council General Secretariat (DG C)
and the EEAS The EC is represented at all levels
The EP may be consulted
Source: Own elaboration based on information from Euromedrights (Accessed on 07 August 2017) and Hill, Smith and Vanhoonacker (2017:112).
Figure 21: Intergovernmental coordination in the EU multilevel system
Inter-Member states (within the Council)
Unified strategy
Establishing common parameters/priorities
Search for consensus
Consultation Information-sharing No interaction Sometimes achieved Not achieved Achieved No c o o rd . L im it ed co o rd . E xt en si ve c o o rd .
Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research.