EU Policy-making Environment

From the rational choice institutionalism perspective, interaction of national preferences and institutions determine EU policy outcomes (Plott 1991, cited in Thomson 2006:9). In rational choice institutionalism, ‘institutions matter’ in a way that they provide opportunities and constraints for rational actors, seeking to attain their preferences (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995, cited in Börzel 1998:263). From the intergovernmentalism perspective, a state seeks to achieve its preferred outcome under the constraints imposed by preferences of other member states (Moravcsik 1007:521). In contrast, from the sociological institutionalism perspective, institutions have a decisive impact on national preferences.

Rational choice institutionalism treats EU institutions as constraints where actors pursue their fixed preferences. Institutions provide rules and practices, conditioning actors’ behaviour, through which the collective choices are made (Thomson 2006:9). Institutions are “the rules of the game;” they reduce uncertainty and provide a stable structure for human interaction (North 1990:97-99). Institutions can be formal and informal rules of decision-making, as well as “potential players of the game” (Mennon 2011:85).

I further address two questions. First, I look at what formal and informal EU foreign policy-making rules are relevant for uploading. Second, I examine what are the key actors in EU foreign policy-making.

Formal and Informal EU Decision-Making Rules

With regards to EU foreign policy-making rules, one should distinguish between the formal unanimity voting and informal consensus, applied in practice. Foreign policy is one of the few EU policy areas, which has preserved the intergovernmental character. It means that almost all EU foreign policy decisions should formally be taken by unanimous voting. The Lisbon Treaty did not abandon the unanimity rule.

Scholars agree that the unanimity rule is more advantageous for ‘smaller’ member states. Under unanimity, member states can veto a decision. Unanimity rule means that the least interested actor should also be on board (Beach & Pedersen 2013:109), and EU actors interested in a particular EU foreign policy decision “will much more take into account the interests of small states” (Thomas 2011).

In practice, however, formal unanimity rule does not determine EU foreign policy-making, which instead is guided by informal consensus. The consensus rule is

43 not identical with unanimity, and it may de facto include opposing parties who do not veto proposals.8 Therefore ‘consensus’ is considered to be a sort of ‘mystery:’ an “ill- defined decision-making rule” (Heisenberg 2005, cited in Lehtonen 2009:36). In fact, formal rules do not determine which actors succeed in uploading, but informal consensus determines (Thomson et al. 2006) national preference projection.

While the ‘consensus culture’ stimulates member states’ compromise seeking behaviour (Thomas 2010), it also reflects “the actual distribution of power” (Thomson 2011a). Competing member states’ interests at the end turn into EU decisions, which are not equally advantageous for all member states. Especially, if a member state has intensely held national preferences, in order to influence the outcome, it can “put enormous mobilising efforts” (Tallberg et al. 2011:9). This leads to question of who are the key actors in EU foreign policy-making? What role do the EU institutions, member states and private actors (interest groups) play?

Key Actors in EU Foreign Policy-making

In the informal consensus-based decision-making in the EU Council, member states, especially the more powerful ones, play a decisive role, especially the ‘bigger’ ones, e.g. those forming the ‘German-French alliance’ (Tallberg et al. 2011:21). Under the Lisbon Treaty increasingly important actors are the EU institutions, especially the High Representative (HR) for the CFSP, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission. Private actors in EU foreign policy, which is not a ‘distributive’ EU policy area, are less important.

Institutional Actors

With regards to the institutional actors in EU foreign policy-making, the EU represents the most institutionalized form of foreign policy-making (Wong & Hill 2011:230). Establishment of the CFSP in 1993 under the Maastricht Treaty marked the official beginning of the common foreign and security policy, when the EU officially “promised to create a much more effective European foreign policy” (White 2001:94). The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 established the High Representative for the CFSP. The area continued to develop at an unexpected speed with the most crucial changes under the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. The Lisbon Treaty marked a shift of competences to Brussels. The HR is supported now by the EEAS as a permanent

8 _{The member states are only asked if anyone has an objection, and if none of them has explicit}

44 chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). The European Parliament (EP), the European Council, the Council, the HR with the EEAS, and the Commission, all have specific formal roles in EU external action and the CFSP (Title V, TEU).

The EP formal power is modest, where it has only consultative rights in the main EU foreign policy issues. However, in practice, the EP has more influence in EU foreign policy because of its increasing role in external functions. The Council’s problem to formulate the common policy further stimulates the EP engagement in foreign policy (Tallberg et al. 2011:42). Notwithstanding a general importance of the EP, this study considers the Parliament’s role as limited in EU foreign policy.

The HR and the EEAS role is substantial as they provide a permanent chairmanship in the Council. The HR chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), and the EEAS provides chairmanship of the Council working groups. They also set agenda, draft decisions and mediate them until the final decision, as well as represent the EU in third countries. Given these broad functions, the EEAS challenges the position of member states in the EU foreign policy (Tallberg et al. 2011:40-41).

Apart, the Commission is an important institutional actor. While under the Lisbon Treaty the Commission’s role has been scaled down, it still continues to play a crucial role in the EU’s external action system. The Commission is often seen as the EEAS competitor: ‘turf battles’ have been observed in the EU external action (European Parliament study, evaluation of the EEAS, 2013). The Commission is the key institutional actor in visa issues, and economic and trade relations with third countries. It also has a mandate to negotiate the EU agreements with these countries. It is therefore important to take into account the Commission’s role when analysing a member state’s influence on the EU relationships with neighbouring countries.

How do these key institutional actors matter in terms of a member state’s uploading possibilities? Smaller member states traditionally benefit from permanent EU institutions, which mediate member states’ interests and help to reach a compromise. The Commission is perceived as an institution that small states can rely on when seeking influence (Howard Grøn & Wivel 2011:526). In a similar way, smaller states may benefit from permanent institutions in the area of foreign policy – the HR and the EEAS. Their limited resources do not allow them to make new contacts and efficiently make lobbying efforts with every rotating Presidency. Instead developing stable long-term relationships with the EEAS suits their interests better.

45 This demonstrates that the EU institutional actors – the HR, the EEAS and the Commission – have substantial implications on EU foreign policy-making. Given these influential actors, however, what is the role of member states?

Member States

Arguably, “despite the increasing role of Brussels-based institutions”, in EU foreign policy-making with its intergovernmental character member states remain the key actors (Gross 2009:4). Formally, member states have lost their influence for the sake of institutional actors, but under the informal consensus rule the informal power of the big member states have a critical importance (Tallberg et al. 2011:21). For instance, the German-French alliance has usually been perceived as an engine for EU integration. In the area of foreign policy, a large country like Germany is playing an increasingly important role. “Germany has been successful in influencing the development of CFSP to mirror its own national preferences” (Miskimmon 2007:1), and it effectively pushes its influence through the new EU institutional actors.

If big member states determine the EU foreign policy-making, it raises the question about the role of smaller states. The evidence shows that sometimes these countries can be even more successful than the larger ones. The national preference intensity, expertise and experience may play a crucial role. Smaller states with specific geographic interests can be successful in the EU, for instance, Belgium with its engagement in the Central Africa (Nasra 2011), the Netherlands in Indonesia, and the Nordic countries in the Baltic States (Tallberg et al. 2011:24).

Thereby, the EU foreign policy environment with its informal decision- making rules and influential involved actors, in particular the big member states, ‘constrains’ an individual member state’s preference projection in a way that it requires it to seek not only formal, but also informal ways to exert influence. I further discuss what uploading mechanisms can help a member state to attain its preferred outcome.