EVALUATION BASIS

In this section I account for the basis of the evaluation of my own project, which is conducted in the next section.

8.1.1 Defining and measuring success and failure

In order to evaluate my own project I will use Heeks’ article (2002) about information systems and developing countries as a foundation to define success and failure. His work is based on qualitative review of a large number of case studies, e.g. Roche & Blaine (1996), Odedra-Straub (1996) and Avgerou & Walsham (2000). He is aware that

categorization (success or failure) runs into some immediate difficulties that are hard to completely resolve; subjectivity and timing of evaluation. Viewed from different

perspectives, according to Lyytinen & Hirschheim (1987) and Sauer (1993), one person’s failure may be another’s success. Still, Heeks’ categorization tries to address this within the limits imposed by the subjectivity of the case study writers themselves. This combined with the fact that the author, working at the Institute for Development Policy and Management at the University of Manchester, does not seem to have vested interests in the topic, makes me trust and place emphasis on this article.

The first category, total failure, is described as an initiative that was never implemented or abandoned immediately after the implementation. The second, partial failure, is a system that was implemented, but were major goals are unattained or there are significant undesirable outcomes. The third and final, success, is an implementation where most stakeholder groups attain their major goals and do not experience significant undesirable outcomes (Heeks 2002).

8.1.2 The extent of success and failure

Heeks emphasizes that no one knows for certain what proportion of developing country IS projects fall into each of the three outcome categories. The question is hard enough to answer in the industrialized countries, where there are, at least, a certain level of

surveys, evaluations, and analysis present (Korac-Boisvert & Kouzmin 1995, James 1997, Sauer 1999, The Economist 2000). On the basis of the range of figures provided in these surveys, one may estimate that something like 1/5 to 1/4 to one-quarter of

industrialized country IS projects fall into the total failure category, about 1/3 to 3/5 fall into the partial failure category, and only a minority fall into the success category (Heeks

102 2002). Heeks claims that despite the weak evidences, it all points in one direction;

toward high rates of IS failure in developing countries (ref 2.2.5).

8.1.3 Design-actuality gaps

Now, since there are high rates of IS failure in developing countries, Heeks wants to know why and seeks to understand developing countries better. He focuses on what he calls a design-actuality gap which is described as the mismatch between local actuality (where we are now) and system design (where the design wants to get us). In practice, because of subjective expectations about the future and subjective perceptions of reality, it could be argued that every individual IS stakeholder has their own design and their own version of actuality. The following figure illustrates his design-actuality conception.

Figure 7: Design-actuality gap

Heeks says that the most extreme form of design-actuality gaps occurs when industrialized country designers create an information system within and for an industrialized country context, and that IS is subsequently transferred to a developing country. In such situations, the actuality of local conditions in the developing country will not have been considered at all in the original design, and a considerable design–

103 actuality gap is therefore likely, leading to a significant risk of IS failure. Sandiford et al (1992) states that the socio-economic realities and priorities of the third world are quite different (ref 2.3) and, if GIS is to be used for the challenges facing developing countries, then it must respond to those realities.

Heeks’ further explanation is in my opinion particularly interesting and of great relevance to my own project. He claims that even if some effort is made to develop an information system specifically for a developing country, similar problems can arise. Industrialized-country stakeholders, such as consultants, IT vendors or aid donors, often dominate the IS design process in developing countries. Those stakeholders bring their context with them and inscribe it into their IS designs; inscriptions that will mismatch developing country actuality. Some stakeholders bring with them the “if it works for us, it will work for you” mentality that makes no attempt to differentiate between

industrialized and developing contexts. Others will differentiate, but - given their poor understanding of local developing country conditions - their assumptions about user actuality will be incorrect. In all cases, large design–actuality gaps and high failure risks are the outcome (Heeks 2002). An example is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United States federal agency responsible for administering civilian foreign aid. They deserve commendation for providing a great portion of the development aid in Africa, but at the same time they tend to support American companies, who often convey a “we know better” mentality, instead of local

organizations (like HISP South Africa) with better knowledge of the actual context.

Both Al-Romaithi (1997) and Georgiadou et al (2005) are of the opinion that GIS

technology is a product of the developed world (ref 2.2.6), and introducing such systems in developing countries involves large complexities dealing with social, technological, political and contextual issues. Taylor (1991) says that like most other information technologies, GIS is primarily a “first-world technology,” an artifact of industrial and postindustrial societies in the developed world. Martin (1998) states that cultural differences in concepts of time, scale, detail, distance, values, topology and relationships mean that GIS implementation is context sensitive. Beyond these cultural differences, GIS implementation is also affected by institutional contexts and organizational

interrelationships. Thus, the implementation of GIS in non-western settings requires a flexible and context sensitive approach, involving a variety of modifications to suit local needs. Successful investigations of GIS installations in non-western contexts require an

104 approach that analyses the interactions between the technology and the specific social or institutional setting (Martin 1998). Many scholars have emphasized that system development approaches in developing countries have failed to consider context, and as a result projects tends to fail (Braa 1997, Walsham 2001). Sahay and Walsham (1997) point out that (ref 2.3.2) one of the main reasons for failure in GIS implementations is that very little attention is given to adapting the technology to the needs and capabilities of the countries and organizations in which it is going to be adapted. Taylor (1991) urges that to develop any local GIS system for micro level decision-making, it should be introduced, developed, modified and controlled by local users in their context. In order to (ref 2.3.1) achieve sustainability according to Braa et al (2004), the system must be shaped and adapted to the given context. These statements support the two elements compounded by Heeks (2002) to be the main causes of design-actuality gaps, and thus the main cause of IS failures in developing countries:

 Components from the designers’ own context: IS design is a situated action - an

action “taken in the context of particular, concrete circumstances” (Suchman 1987). This action draws elements of that context into the design: “Our technologies mirror our societies. They reproduce and embody the complex interplay of professional, technical, economic and political factors” (Bijker & Law 1992). Designers themselves are part of and shaped by that context, so their own cultural values, objectives, etc. will be found inscribed in the design (Shields & Servaes 1989, Braa & Hedberg 2002).

 Conceived assumptions about the situation of the user: This includes assumptions

about the users’ activities, skills, culture, and objectives, and assumptions about the user organization’s structure, infrastructure, etc. (Boehm 1981, Suchman 1987, Clemons et al 1995, Wynn & deLyra 2000).

To summarize this section; in order to achieve success when introducing an information system in developing countries, the mentioned authors emphasize a context sensitive approach and modifications to suit local needs as vital. If these elements are disregarded you are most likely to extend the long list of IS failures in developing countries. This is because design-actuality gaps arise which means that the system’s features will not meet the users’ needs. I discuss this in relation to my own project in the next section.

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