It took almost two decades for thefils de harkisto emerge as a mature and organised memory carrier, a process that, as the previous chapter demonstrated, was by no means simple and straightforward. The same is true of the years since 1991, which have seen significant changes both within the activist segment of the community and more broadly with respect to the place of the Algerian War of Independence within French history and collective remembrance. As associations run by and for the harki community grew in numbers and confidence, the very term ‘harki’ lost its pejorative connotations and was instead reclaimed as an affirmation of a historically unique identity. These years also saw the French media increasingly turn its spotlight on the harkis, resulting in a substantial multiplication in documentaries and discussion panels devoted to this previously neglected population. This heightened media profile coincided with, and indeed facilitated, the emergence of a group of prominent individuals who were increasingly presented as emblematic spokespeople for their community. Garnering the lion’s share of the new media attention, this cohort was novel in many respects, not least because it included filles as well as fils de harkis. Although they shared many characteristics, these men and women emerged into the public eye at different points over a period of more than fifteen years. Each person’s moment in the spotlight was due to certain unique attributes and the resonance of these at particular moments with the wider public mood, while the transition in prominence from one individual to another was indicative of changing contexts and commemorative needs. It is therefore important to understand the background, motivations, and style of activism pursued by these men and women and why these struck a chord more broadly when they did.543Finally, the 1990s also witnessed ‘une prise en compte officielle’ by ‘les pouvoirs publics plus visibles’ in response to the raised profile of the community and of the war in general, leading many to speak of ‘la fin d’un tabou’ by the dawn of the new millennium.544 This in turn impacted upon the strategies adopted byharkiactivists and associations, something most clearly indicated by the increasing recourse to the judicial system to obtain a satisfactory level of practical assistance and official recognition. This chapter seeks to explore each of these major evolutions in turn, while simultaneously highlighting the causality and connections between them so as to
543It should be noted that this transition has not been a simple linear progression. There has been a
considerable degree of overlap throughout and none of the individuals discussed have really ‘disappeared’ from the activist scene, even though the media’s attention may have moved on.
544
Mohand Hamoumou, with Abderahmen Moumen, ‘L’histoire des harkis et Français musulmans: la fin d’un tabou?’, inLa Guerre d’Algérie 1954-2004: la fin de l’ amnésie,ed. by Mohammed Harbi and Benjamin Stora (Paris, 2004), pp.339, 341.
produce a coherent history of the next phase of the activism undertaken by descendants of the
harkis.
Characteristics of grassroots activism
‘Dès qu’un harki sait lire et écrire, il crée une association’, the Libération reporter Nicolas Beau was told by the president of one such association.545 This remark is borne out by the statistics which show that by 2001 more than five hundredharkiassociations existed.546Amid this flourishing grassroots activism, the dual demands for practical assistance and recognition which dominated early organisations have endured, albeit now in a more formally organised context. In principle, association formation represents ‘le moyen le plus efficace’ for the descendants ofharkis, as for other minority groups, enabling them to combine forces in order to make their voices heard, as well as to confront and surmount common difficulties in a spirit of solidarity.547 Yet theory has not translated into practice and assessments of the progress made by these five hundred plus associations have been highly negative. Criticised for, amongst other things, their ‘immaturité et inefficacité politiques’, the difference between the status of theharkiandpieds-noirscommunities as collective memory carriers is marked, with the former lacking the coherence, inter-associational networks, established calendar of events, and the regular communications that characterise the latter group.548Journalist Alain Rollat was particularly forthright when he wrote: ‘Elle [la communauté] en a pâti et elle continue d’en pâtir. Sa triste histoire est émaillée, depuis 1962, de grèves de la faim, de marches de protestation, de faits divers oubliés, de mille révoltes individuelles dont l’impact a toujours été limité’.549For Abrial, the weaknesses inherent in these associations are a reflection of the difficultiesharkidescendants have experienced finding their place in French society.550‘Nous sommes les enfants illégitimes de deux histories illégitimes’ explained one, or, as Abrial put it, ‘La France est à la fois leur pays d’origine et leur pays d’accueil mais ils ne partagent pas les fondements culturels. L’Algérie n’est ni leur pays ni leur patrie mais ils sont attachés par des liens familiaux, traditionnels et religieux’.551 The result was a late developing associational movement characterised by a destabilising combination of influences and allegiances.
545
Michel Roux,Les harkis: les oubliés de l’histoire 1954-1991,(Paris, 1991), p.377.
546Mohand Hamoumou cited in ‘Plus de 500 associations représentent les harkis’,AFP Infos
Françaises,23 September 2001.
547
Nordine Boulhaïs,,Histoire des harkis du Nord de la France,(Paris, 2005),p.213.
548Abderahmen Moumen, ‘Les associations harkis: de la revendication sociale au combat pour la
reconnaissance’,Guerre d’Algérie Magazine,4 (July-August 2002), 40.
549Cited in Patrick Eveno and Jean Planchais (eds.),La guerre d’Algérie,(Paris, 1989), p.366. 550
Abrial, Stéphanie,Les enfants de harkis de la révolte à l’intégration, (Paris, 2001) pp.23.
551Salem Kacet cited in Yvan Gastaut, ‘Le racisme anti-maghrébin et les séquelles de la guerre
Other academics, however, have cited the predominantly local and specific orientation of harki associations as the principal problem, with insular concerns preventing wider connections being made across groups, thus calling into question any claim to broad representation. Another obstacle to the development of a strong and cohesive associational movement is the ongoing use of violence. The recurrence in 1993 and 1994 of the extreme style of protests of the ‘hot’ summers divided the harkicommunity. On the one hand, there were those who argued this violence was qualitatively different to the violence of banlieue
riots because it was anchored in the defence of a precise historical cause and that it was furthermore justified given the injustices endured since 1962. On the other hand, there were many who felt the recourse to violence undermined the legitimacy of the demands presented and did more harm than good to theharkicause.552
However, the principal root of the failures of the harki associational movement is generally deemed to be the heterogeneity of the community. For all that the media tend to present theharkis as a block, in truth, as already discussed, it is a case of ‘un milieu plutôt qu’une communauté’.553 What unity does exist is largely due to the shared trauma of exile from Algeria and marginalisation in France. Beneath this lies a myriad of intersecting and overlapping divisions that have impeded attempts to collectivise the harkicommunity into a powerful and effective group. Some of these divisions are longstanding such as those pertaining to tribe, region, and religion, as well as the linguistic split between Arabic and Berber.554Further fissures have emerged since 1962, such as a socio-economic generation gap with those born later tending to be better educated and better off. These divisions are manifested in the different approaches pursued by various associations. Most notable in this respect is the Convention nationale des Français Musulmans (CNFM). Although formed in 1979 as part of an attempt to federate the diverseharkigroups and despite boasting forty-six member associations in 1988, the association has remained aloof from, and inaccessible to, most harkis. Hamoumou’s rather scathing assessment of the organisation’s bi-monthly journal, Le Rappel,was that it contained ‘peu d’informations’, was ‘rarement polémique ou incisif’ and existed primarily to demonstrate to politicians that there were ‘des Français musulmans rapatriés “bon chic, bon genre” susceptibles de faire partie des états-majors politiques sans détonner’.555Out of touch with the grievances and needs of those they claimed
552Abrial,Les enfants,pp.178-184.
553Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, ‘Harkis: le paradoxe identitaire’,Regards sur l’actualité,175
(November 1991), 43.
554In his study ofharkisin the north of France, Nordine Boulhaïs noted that one of the reasons the
Association des Français Musulmans rapatriés de l’Avesnois (AFMRA) had proved so successful was that the majority of its members originated from the Chaoui tribe. In his eyes, this fact noticeably reduced ‘les excès d’individualisme’ in comparison to other associations. Boulhaïs,Histoire des harkis,
p.222.
to speak on behalf of, the CNFM ultimately failed in its federative endeavour. Subsequent efforts to follow in their footsteps such as the États généraux of 24 and 25 March 1990 that sought to unite 350 harki associations, also stumbled. According to Boulhaïs, this was ‘un décevant échec’ which suggested that the barriers to unity were insurmountable.556
Beyond differences in origin, age, and agenda, the harkicommunity has also had to contend with diverse political allegiances as several fils and filles have eschewed harki-
orientated activism in favour of broader organisations such as SOS Racisme and Sans Frontière which reached their apogees in the mid to late 1980s, while a minority even turned to the Front National.557 The politics of others have also impacted negatively upon the associational movement, namely the government’s policy of financial support to associations, which has encouraged a proliferation of small groups and prevented the emergence of a single, powerful and representative spokesperson to act as an intermediary between the community and the state. The overall effect of the lack of complementarity between allegiances, agendas, and structures has been that harki associations have struggled to find common platforms.558 In essence, proliferation has not been accompanied by depth or durability; out of over five hundred associations, it is estimated that less than 10 per cent are actually active.559 This had led to a pattern developing whereby frustrations build up within the most marginalised sections of the community and boil over into violent protest. However, momentum and visibility cannot be sustained long enough for significant gains to be made because there is no strong and united grassroots base to support the surface peak. The result is that ‘Chaque fois la chape d’oubli est retombée très vite. Plus lourde’.560
Rise of Media Profile
What is particularly unfortunate is that this endemic weakness within the associational movement has prevented the harki community capitalising on the more favourable cadres sociaux of the 1990s, in particular the growth of media interest in them. Although never completely absent from the French media, one of the most notable features of the post-1991 period has been the sharp increase in the number of televised documentaries and debates
556Yet interestingly Boulhaïs goes on to note that in contrast to trends in the south of France, the north
has seen a decline in the overall number of associations which he attributes partly to an increase federation among smaller associations. Boulhaïs,Histoire des harkis,pp.235, 213-216.
557For further information on this see Martin Evans, ‘TheHarkis: the Experience and Memory of
France’s Muslim Auxillary’, inThe Algerian War and the French Army 1954-1962: Experiences, Images, Testimonies,ed. by Martin S. Alexander, Martin Evans, and J.F.V. Keiger, (Basingstoke, 2002), p.130.
558Even at the height of the 1991 protests, the delegation ofharkirepresentatives invited to talks with
the government was riven by factionalism to the point that a joint appeal for calm had to be made by Hacène Arfi and Hamlaoui Mekachera.Le Monde,6 August 1991, p.6.
559Jean-Jacques Jordi, and Mohand Hamoumou,Les harkis, une mémoire enfouie,(Paris, 1999), p.41. 560Hamoumou,Et ils sont devenus harkis,p.40.
devoted to the harkis and their descendants. In the 1960s and 1970s, the small number of
harki-specific programmes were overwhelmingly focused on la vie quotidienne of the new arrivals. When documentaries tackling the War of Independence in its entirety began to emerge, the harkis were usually featured as brief and stand alone segments. In such programmes their story was generally narrated by a French ex-militaire with the emphasis consequently placed upon the shame of abandonment in 1962 and the narrator’s personal regret over the fate of his brave and loyal men. Yvon Durand, a former SAS officer, was one such figure; his disgust over the ‘hypocrise’ and ‘lâcheté’ of his civilian and military superiors with respect to theharkiscompelling him to resign at the end of the war.561In these programmes commentary from within the harki community was almost always provided by
fils and usually centred on their struggles to adapt and to be treated like the French citizens their identity cards proclaimed them to be. ‘On vivait en double exil’, Mohammed told the camera in 1982, ‘exil de fait d’avoir changer de pays d’une manière aussi tragique et puis exil aussi de la vie même de cette accueil en France’.562Studio debates during this time were still largely the territory of the pieds-noirs and prominent military personnel like Bigeard or Méliani who spoke on behalf of theharkis.
In the 1990s the tone changed with the broadcasting of Les années algériennes and
La guerre d’Algérie. After this, treatments of the war in general, but also of the harkis
became far more common, enabling the community to benefit from a numerical increase in emissions devoted solely to them and from more sustained consideration within programmes with broader scopes. Particularly notable in this respect was Les années algériennes, which drew heavily on interviews with Saïd Ferdi who was arrested by the French army aged just 13 and forced to enrol as aharki.563At the end of the conflict he was evacuated to France by the army where he attempted to come to terms with all he had experienced and to start a new life, although he found it impossible to forget the old one, writing, ‘je constate avec force qu’il me manquera toujours les plus belles années de ma vie, volées par les hommes’.564Through his willingness to publicly recount his experiences, Ferdi thus became one of the first and the most prominent eyewitnesses to emerge from the harkicommunity. By calling into question the idea that harkischose, of their own volition, to fight with the French, his narrative broke with the Manichean division between traitors and patriots, exposing instead the more complex reality. Ferdi was also notable because his testimony was not mediated through a third party. He thus became something of a poster boy for the harkis, a status which unfortunately
561
‘Guerre d’Algérie, Mémoire enfouie d’une génération: 3. Déchirements et fidelités’,Moeurs en direct,aired 21 November 1982 (Channel 2).
562Ibid.
563Although he had previously been featured in a 1981Apostrophesdebate, Ferdi’s contribution to
Stora’s documentary was lengthier and more detailed.‘La guerre d’Algérie’,Apostrophes,aired 11 September 1981 (Channel 2); ‘Les tricheurs’,Les années algériennes, aired 30 September 1991 (A2).
resulted in many of the nuances of his account being lost as the media and public concentrated on the most shocking elements at the expense of the implications of his account for the way the war was being represented and commemorated in France and in Algeria at this time.
Another key media moment occurred when Planète Chaude broadcast a three-part documentary exclusively concerning the harkis.565 Moving from ‘l’enrôlement’ through ‘l’abandon’ to ‘les fils de l’oubli’, a thorough chronological explanation of the harkis was offered, supported by interviews with bothharkisand their children, representing the most in- depth consideration of the subject to-date. Coming two years after Les années and the 1991 demonstrations, and mere months after another summer of protest by thefilsin the south,Les harkis stood at a crossroads. Casting theharkis as ‘ni patriotes, ni traîtres, mais simplement des victimes’, the programme sought to continue in Stora’s tradition of adding nuance while also breaking new ground by highlighting previously neglected aspects of this still relatively unknown period of French history.566 Consequently, the different roles undertaken by the
harkiswere stressed, particularly the fact that by no means all harkiswere engaged in active combat. The documentary also did not shy away from evoking the violent nature of the harki
experience, whether as victims or perpetrators. Tales of FLN atrocities, especially in the closing stages of the war, were told, accompanied by montages of massacred harkis and abandoned villages. These were, however, juxtaposed with testimony from men like Yahia Zaid who confessed that he would never forget the treatment of the ‘suspects’ who passed through the hands of his Commando.567This is also one of the fewharki-orientated television emissions, indeed treatments of theharkisin any media, to dwell at length on the role of the
harkis on 17 October 1961 as part of Papon’s FPA. The ‘impressionante’ record of the FPA in breaking FLN cells in Paris is related by a former FPA commander Pierre de Roujoux and supported by photos of large caches of weapons recovered from the FLN and a series of headlines from the time with captions such as ‘La Goutte d’Or, quand les harkis passent les rues se vident’.568
However, although innovative in certain respects, other aspects of Les harkis
conformed very much to traditional patterns of representation.While space was reserved for direct testimony fromharkisand their children, the majority of commentary was provided by people external to the community. Whether from a military, administrative, or personal perspective, all spoke on behalf of the harkis they had been in charge of. In the mouths of these men, the harkis lost much of their agency, while the complexities of their various
565‘Les harkis’,Planète chaude(3 episodes), aired 12 December 1993 to 8 November 1994, (Channel
3).
566
‘Les harkis: 1. L’enrôlement’,aired 12 December 1993.
567Ibid.
combatant statuses were erased, replaced with a monolithic image of a community of victims betrayed French politicians. The documentary therefore comprises two separate narrative