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4. State-led community-based forestry: Shifting control in the protection forests of West

4.1 Community-based natural resource management: From marginal to mainstream

4.1.2 Evolving governance and CBNRM

Despite the conceptual and practical appeals of CBNRM for the forestry sector, its empirical outcomes remain somewhat ambiguous globally and have not yet put to rest debates about the approach (Blaikie, 2006; Child & Lyman, 2005; Dressler et al., 2010;

Tole, 2010). Over time a number of studies have tried to understand both the equity and environmental outcomes of the systems (Bowler et al., 2010; Glasmeier & Farrigan, 2005;

McDermott & Schreckenberg, 2009; Pagdee et al., 2006). At the same time, a more critical strand of inquiry has raised questions about how key concepts are understood and mobilized by different actors and how and why such systems are formed (Brosius et al., 1998; Kumar, 2005; Li, 2002; Murphree, 2000).

In many ways these critiques reflect the tensions that are inherent in the concept of CBNRM and tend to insistently draw attention to the first and perhaps less mainstream of what McCarthy and Warren (2009) identify as two broad agendas embedded in the concept. The first aligns with Paavola’s (2007) focus on social justice (see Chapter 1) and is concerned with, “democratization, equitable resource access, and sustainable development” (p. 14). The second,

“focuses on the effective management of environments, or more specifically on the institutional, political and economic means and processes through which environmental protection and sustainable use outcomes could be achieved, with little or no concern for distributive effects” (p. 14).

For example, in a 1996 workshop about CBNRM, the generic use of terms such as,

“community, territory, rights, resources, management, indigenous, and traditional […]

without regard to local contests and wide-ranging political stakes in these terms” was highlighted as problematic (Brosius et al., 1998, p. 159, emphasis in original). As participants observed, “to the extent that these terms carry legitimacy in international

forums, they can be used coercively to create local resource management plans in ways that may or may not empower local people” (Brosius et al., 1998, p. 159). With the dramatic expansion of statutory CBNRM initiatives globally under the rubric of decentralization, especially in the forestry sector, this risk has only increased.

Early critiques shone light on the ways in which “community” as a central actor in CBNRM systems is conceptualized. According to Vandergeest (2006), “some of the more convincing criticisms of CBNRM […] argue that one of the most serious practical problems inherent in CBNRM practice revolves around unexamined assumptions about the nature of rural communities” (p. 321). Agrawal and Gibson (1999) observe that much of the CBNRM literature tends to describe “community” in terms of a spatial unit, a social structure or as a set of shared norms (p. 633). These, however, are a weak basis for policy, especially when not explained, and do not necessarily result in management systems that are relevant for the boundaries of the natural resources in question (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Blaikie, 2006). According to Gauld (2000), such approaches also “ignore those dimensions which are not amenable to purely geographic definition such as those based upon class, gender, ethnic, tribal or ancestral identifies” and fail to consider the manner in which people “become part of or influence a community through kinship, property ownership or other economic, political, cultural and social relations” (p. 242).

In the CBNRM literature and practice there also tends to be an emphasis on the discourses of “indigenous” and “traditional” (Li, 2002, p. 268) which can add layers of complications in real life situations where such distinctions are often unclear. This discourse also resonates with a rather strong thread in the CBNRM narrative which tends to focus on what Agrawal and Gibson (1999) describe as, “‘the mythic community’: small, integrated groups using locally evolved norms to manage resources sustainably and equitably” (p. 640). Related to this is the “notion that ‘community’ is intrinsically good,”

something which is seldom challenged (Kumar, 2005, p. 277).

As an example of the complexities that can result when simplistic conceptualizations of community meet complex realities, Li (2002) refers to uplanders in the Philippines and Indonesia. This is of particular relevance to the case study in this chapter. According to Li

(2002), “the extent to which diverse and sometimes mobile uplanders form ‘communities’

coherent enough to have, or to develop, systems of natural resource management and allocation (let alone sustainable and equitable ones) is varied” (p. 268).

The propensity to define communities simplistically as being spatially fixed, small, homogenous and intrinsically good tends to be accompanied by a relative blindness to the different actors, interests and power relations within a community (Agrawal &

Gibson, 1999; Kumar, 2005; Li, 1996). These dynamics are, however, integral to understanding how community-based systems are formed and function (as highlighted, for example, by Koch et al., 2008). They are also critical if there is to be a serious focus on social justice issues. It is difficult to ensure processes of meaningful participation, for example, if there is no understanding of who the actors are in the internal system (i.e.

within the “community”) or if the system itself was established without taking these complexities into consideration.

While understanding processes of participation within communities is crucial, it is also important with respect to relations between communities and external actors in the governance system. Blaikie (2006) notes that one of the core assumptions of a CBNRM system is that, “communities are supposed to be able to deliver on scientifically specified [natural resource management] principles (which are by definition seldom, if ever, community-constructed and local)” (p. 1944). He continues on to explain that according to the CBNRM narrative, “participatory and inclusionary techniques by which some form of hybrid knowledge can be negotiated and implemented” should help in bridging the space between formal science and local knowledge (Blaikie, 2006, p. 1944).

The use of the term “participation” is ubiquitous in development narratives, and not just related to CBNRM. Cornwall (2008) sees it as “an infinitely malleable concept” which can be used to “evoke – and to signify – almost anything that involves people” (p. 269). This interpretation is supported by an analysis of various typologies of participation.

Ultimately, no matter where an interpretation of “participation” sits on any given spectrum, Cornwall (2008) stresses that participation “constitutes a terrain of contestation, in which relations of power between different actors, each with their own

‘projects’, shape and reshape the boundaries of action” (p. 276). As such, “participation is an inherently political process rather than a technique” (p. 281). Cooke and Kothari (2001), drawing on chapters in their edited volume, came to a similar conclusion, observing that, “proponents of participatory development have generally been naïve about the complexities of power and power relations” (p. 14).

The ample space to interpret key CBNRM concepts and in turn develop locally specific environmental governance systems could support one of the stated strengths of community-based systems – their flexibility and the theoretic possibility that they can be calibrated in response to different and changing social and ecological situations (Lindsay, 1999). In reality, however, as statutory CBNRM systems have matured and more experiences have been analysed, concerns have been raised that they may not actually represent the oft touted “paradigm shift” from central state control over forests.

For example, Gauld (2000) observes that in the Philippines, “the apparent transition in forest policy from top-down towards community-based approaches is not reflected in the way in which community-based forestry is discussed and operationalized by policy makers” (p. 230). He highlights the following three characteristics in particular:

1. “community-based forestry policy bears many of the hallmarks of scientific forestry in which technical and productivity aspects rather than social and wider environmental considerations are emphasized.”

2. “strong state control over forest management is understood as being a necessary feature of community-based forest policy.”

3. “the predominance of a reductionist understanding of ‘community’

among policy makers” (Gauld, 2000, p. 230).

The first characteristic runs counter to the heralded flexibility of community-based forestry to be able to adjust to local social and environmental conditions. A similar tendency was noted in a number of other cases, and was described by Blaikie (2006) as reflecting the fact that, “the bureaucratic necessity is for ‘blueprints’ and replicability, [which deny] the complexity, diversity and internal differentiation of local communities”

(p. 1956; see also, Blaikie & Springate-Baginski, 2013, p. 382).

The second characteristic highlights the continuing uneven power relations in the system, with the state maintaining dominance. Devkota (2010) and Maryudi (2012), observed a similar dynamic in Nepal and Indonesia respectively. In cases where community-based arrangements had been established within the framework of the state system, they concluded that administrative procedures served as a way of maintaining control over forest management.

Several authors have also noted that a move from state-centred to community-based forest management requires a fundamental shift in the modes of operation of the forest department and this can be difficult. According to Pulhin et al. (2007), “the adoption of [a]

community forestry strategy requires a whole new set of knowledge, skills, values, and attitude within the forestry bureaucracy” (pp. 280-281). In cases like this, it then becomes reasonable to ask whether, instead of undertaking such a top-to-bottom dramatic overhaul, an institution might instead try to modify the rules of the game to move the external system closer to the familiar institutional norms (Springate-Baginski & Blaikie, 2007, p. 360).