An examination of material objects or tools as artefacts in practice

The term material objects or artefacts/tools (e.g. interactive radio or IRI programmes) as important mediating elements of social practice (including teacher practice) is mainly promoted by Reckwitz (2002). In his examination of the significance of the material in theories of culture, Reckwitz (2002a, p.196) points out that ‘the material’ in the classical sociology of knowledge is conceptualised as:

...‘social structures’ that provide a foundation for orders of knowledge…High- modern culturalism redefines the material as ‘objects of knowledge’ or ‘symbolic objects’, as objects which become visible in the context of systems of meaning (categories, discourse, communicative action).

Contrary to the above approach in conceptualising the material, Reckwitz draws attention to the broad body of work which he places under the heading of a ‘theory of social practices’. Using this heading, Reckwitz (2002a, p. 196) examines Bruno Latour’s (1987) ‘symmetric anthropology’— focusing on the manner in which “it enables one to grasp the material not as a social structure or as symbolic objects, but as ‘artefacts’, as ‘things’ which are necessary components of social networks or ‘practices’”. In reference to the ambiguity on how things or artefacts are regarded even within contemporary theories of social practice, Reckwitz (2002a, p. 209) says:

‘Things’ thus have the status of ‘hybrids’: On the one hand, they are definitively not a physical world as such, within practices they are socially and culturally interpreted and handled. On the other hand, these quasi-objects are definitively more than the content of cultural ‘representations’: they are used and have effects in their materiality.

Regardless of this ambiguity, Rekwitz (2002a, p. 212) goes on to emphasise the fundamentally important place of things/artefacts (the material) in practices:

The things handled in a social practice must be treated as necessary components for a practice to be ‘practised’. In fact, one can say that both the human

bodies/minds and the artefacts provide ‘requirements’ or components necessary to a practice. Certain things act, so to speak, as ‘resources’ which enable and

constrain the specificity of a practice.

As seen in the above quotation, Reckwitz mentions resources (in quotes) thereby drawing attention to the work of Giddens (examined earlier) and, in a footnote, suggests the integration of Giddens’ idea of resources with the notion of artefact as a potentially useful line of work. He thus elaborates on how human agents employ artefacts as part of their practice by further alluding to the work of Giddens:

Yet technical equipment cannot determine certain activities in a strict causal way. In order to have effects, artefacts must be used; and to be used, they must be treated with understanding and within the parameters of cultural codes - they must become an integral part of a social practice. Thus, from the point of view of practice theory, the ‘relationship’ between human agents and non-human things in the network of a practice is a relationship of practical understanding. (Reckwitz, 2002a, p. 212)

Attention is drawn to the way in which human agents become, in a sense, imbued with practical understanding:

When human agents have developed certain forms of know-how concerning certain things, these things “materalize” or “incorporate” this knowledge within the practice (the latter restriction is important because “as such” and beyond complexes of practices things do not incorporate anything — at least from the point of view of a post- Wittgensteinian theory). Things are “materialised

understanding”, and only as materialised understanding can they act as resources. (Reckwitz, 2002a, p. 212)

This aspect of ‘practical understanding’ highlighted by Reckwitz is somewhat neglected by Giddens. In the same vein, by emphasising that ‘beyond complexes of practices, things do not incorporate anything’, Reckwitz is refuting Latour’s plea for a symmetrical treatment of artefacts and humans (as part of an actor network) and in so doing, Reckwitz is in line with the perspective adopted by many activity theory writers. An important point being made here is that artefacts only have significance because they are handled and understood by human agents in certain specific ways – they cannot be entirely equal. Another point by Reckwitz (2002a, p. 213) that is also important as it provides a

foundational pillar for the empirical analysis in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis concerns the dynamics of social change:

Finally, if social change is a change of complexes of social practices, it

presupposes not only a transformation of cultural codes and of the bodies/minds of human subjects, but also a transformation of artefacts (a relationship which deserves closer study than can be offered here).

Three specific aspects of social change are highlighted in the above quotation: cultural codes, human agents and artefacts. Although a detailed empirical analysis to apply this ‘tripartite’ model of social change within the context will not be undertaken in full here, it suffices to mention that the relationship between social practice and the resources or artefacts that are employed as part of that practice are significant in shaping practice. Thus two things become clear: first, artefacts act as epistemic objects; secondly, that epistemic objects act as representations within the research/knowledge creation processes. Knorr Cetina (2001) develops her conceptualisation of ‘epistemic objects’ within the context of scientific knowledge creation work. She uses the term ‘epistemic practice’ to refer to those practices which are non-routine and involve creative and

constructive processes as an integral part of the knowledge creation process. Thus the various forms of knowledge representations that are fundamentally important and integral to the knowledge creation process are the ones that she refers to as ‘epistemic objects’.

For purposes of the current study, this perspective can be profitably applied to processes involved in the development, utilisation and modification of IRI programmes as learning- objects for teacher development. This perspective emphasises the potential significance of learning-objects as knowledge artefacts supporting the scholarship of teaching, and is the basis of the discussion in sections 3.5, 3.7 as well as chapter 8 of this thesis.

Therefore, only a certain category of objects fit this description of ‘learning’ objects. In this respect, Knorr Cetina (2001) draws attention to the highly ambiguous nature of what she refers to as knowledge or epistemic objects and how such objects are an integral part of the research/knowledge creation processes. Emphasis is put on how such objects are very different from the everyday notion of an object (e.g. a hammer). Knorr Cetina makes clear that attempts to clarify the nature of such objects, through closer observation and inquiry generate further questions and increase their complexity instead of providing clarification. To emphasise the distinction between epistemic objects and everyday- objects she states that:

The everyday viewpoint, it would seem, looks at objects from the outside as one would look at tools or goods that are ready to hand or to be traded further. These objects have the character of closed boxes. In contrast, objects of knowledge appear to have the capacity to unfold indefinitely. They are more like open drawers filled with folders extending indefinitely into the depth of a dark closet. Since epistemic objects are always in the process of being materially defined, they continually acquire new properties and change the ones they have. (Knorr Cetina, 2001, p.181)

This has resonance with the notion of a ‘boundary-object’ developed by Star and

Griesemer (1989). The congruence with the notion of epistemic objects can be concluded in the sense that Star and Griesener offer the notion of boundary-objects as key artefacts within the process of negotiation of the diverse intersecting social worlds. In their

analysis, Star and Griesemer (1989, p. 393) say that boundary-objects are objects that are:

both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. They are weakly structured in common use, and become strongly structured in individual-site use.

The above argument offers a fruitful opening for examining learning-objects (such as interactive radio) as artefacts of teaching practice. Therefore the next section is devoted to a discussion on learning-objects which should be regarded as a precursor to the main discussion on interactive radio in chapter 4.