See, for example, Ibrahim Nawwar in al-Ahram, 29 May 1981.

19 See C. Malak, 'Al-Takamul al Masri al-Sudani: A Case Study in the Dynamics of Arab Integration', unpublished M.A. thesis, A.U.C., January 1988, esp. pp. 156-166. 20 Text in al-Ahram, 13 October 1982.

years, though the practicalities were not spelled out. During the first of three phases (1983-84), the institutional groundwork would be laid; in Phase 2 (1985-88), the institutions would begin to function; and in the last phase (1989-92), Egypt and the Sudan would be unified. In the event, the entire scheme collapsed before Phase 1 had ended.

The text of the Charter was, in the words of a senior Egyptian diplomat, marked by a 'constructive ambiguity': Cairo, sceptical of the chances of fulfilling so ambitious an exercise and wary of Nimeiri's policies, had opted for language which was vague but sounded purposeful.21 This policy, based on a lack of alternatives, soon began to encounter problems. Egyptian- Sudanese relations fell victim to Nimeiri's vicissitudes, his repressiveness and his growing tendency to blame all internal troubles on outside - usually Libyan - interference.

In September 1983, Nimeiri decided, without informing Cairo, to introduce Islamic law, or sharia, into Sudan. The immediate result was a resurgence of civil strife of the kind Sudan had last experienced in the early 1970s, as non-Muslim southerners under the leadership of Colonel John Garang de Mabior rebelled against this latest dictate. The rebellion quickly affected Egyptian interests. Work on the the joint Jonglei canal project, whose purpose was to increase the Nile's flow by bypassing the Sudd swamps in southern Sudan, and which had begun in 1980, was halted in late 1983 when Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) kidnapped a group of construction workers. Some 280 kilometers of the planned 360 kilometres had by then been excavated.22

As Sudan's economic problems and the opposition to Nimeiri grew, the Egyptian-Sudanese relationship was distorted by Nimeiri's security

21 Director of Diplomatic Institute, Cairo, quoted in Malak, 'Al-Takamul', p.169.

22 See H. Ayeb, 'Le Haut Barrage d'Assouan ä l'epreuve de la secheresse’, Maghreb-

Machrek, No. 119 (jan.-f§v.-mars 1988), p.35. The SPLA is the military arm of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

concerns. M ansour K haled, a form er S udanese foreign m inister, observed th a t N im eiri's speeches on in teg ratio n w ith E gypt were used

to serve notice to the E thiopians an d Libyans by ra ttlin g the E gyptian sabre. In the process N im eiri...often em b arrassed Egypt, for exam ple, by his references to an E gyptian-S udanese m ilitary role in Chad, to which Egypt alw ays reacted by assertin g th a t its actions in th a t country would only be guided by th e resolutions of the OAU.23

This is n o t to suggest th a t Cairo was in d ifferen t to the continuing Libyan th re a t. A L ibyan aircraft bombed a n anti-L ibyan radio tra n s m itte r in O m durm an on 16 M arch 1984, only two days - M ubarak claim ed - after Q addafi had, for th e fourth tim e in the space of a year, proposed th a t Libya and E gypt reopen th eir common border an d unify.24 In Ju ly 1984, a m ysterious series of explosions dam aged some ships in th e Red Sea. M u b arak called upon the U nited S tates, B rita in and F rance to a ssist in a m inesw eeping operation, and publicly pointed th e finger of accusation a t Libya.25

N evertheless, M ubarak was em b arrassed not only by Nim eiri's dom estic repression, b u t also by his foreign policy. In 1985, it was revealed th a t N im eiri h ad cooperated w ith Israel in O peration M oses’, th e covert evacuation (during the period October 1984-January 1985) of F a lash a Jew s from E th io p ia to Israel, through Sudan. E gyptian sources stressed th a t Cairo h a d h a d no foreknowledge of th e plan, and h ad played no p a rt in it.26

It is clear th a t, by 1985, the political relatio n sh ip upon w hich S ad at had seized to underscore his regional sta tu re , h ad become a liability.

23 M. Khaled, Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dis-May (London, etc.: Kegan Paul Inti., 1985), p.345.

24 ’Every time I hear this’, said Mubarak, ’I realise something is being prepared.’ MENA, 17 March 1984, in FBIS-MEA, 19 March 1984. Al-Ahram (6 Sept. 1984) reported that Mubarak had refused to meet a Libyan envoy carrying a cheque for $5 billion, as an inducement for Egypt to abandon the peace treaty and hand over a pilot who had defected in 1983.

25 MENA, 9 August 1984, in FBIS-MEA, 10 August 1984. 26 ASR, 1985, p.371.

Perversely, E gyptian diplomacy in the re s t of the Arab world had begun to yield fruit.

T he A n ti-N im eiri B a c k la sh

M an su r K haled, w riting in late 1984, noted th a t N im eiri's constant re itera tio n of the Libyan th re a t was no longer tak e n a t face value in Cairo. He added:

T here is a b u n d an t evidence to show th a t Egypt has decided not to go to N im eiri's help if an in te rn al a tte m p t is m ade by a Sudanese group to oust him. They have also refused to be draw n into the w ar in the South. Only in th e case of foreign in terv en tio n could Egypt be expected to come to S u d an ’s (not N im eiri's) rescue.27

Even if K haled s assessm en t contained a n elem ent of w ishful thinking, it w as essentially accurate. On 7 April 1985, a g ain st a backdrop of continuing civil u n re s t in K hartoum , a group of officers led by G eneral Abd al-R ahm an Siw ar al-T hahab seized power. Nim eiri, p assin g th ro u g h Cairo on his way back to K hartoum from W ashington, was d etained in Egypt. Egypt had reportedly been notified in advance of th e coup, and the T ransitional M ilitary Council quickly reassu red Cairo th a t E gyptian-S udanese relations would not be affected.28 N evertheless, th e new governm ent's behaviour, p articu larly Siw ar al-T hahab's a p p a re n t em brace of Libya, caused m isgivings in Cairo.

Libya w as the first sta te to recognise th e new governm ent; Qaddafi hailed the N im eiri's overthrow , referrin g in th e sam e speech to 'the traito r H usni M u b arak ’.29 Qaddafi visited K h arto u m in April, and prom ised to suspend all aid to the SPLA.30 D uring his second visit in May, Libyan

27 Khaled, Nimeiri, p.369.

28 See al-Ahram, 7 & 11 April, 1985. The Egyptian opposition press was gleeful at the demise of 'America's friend', the 'dictatorial' Nimeiri; see al-Sha'b, 16 April and al-

Wafd, 17 April 1985.

29 Tripoli Domestic Service, 6 April 1985, in FBIS-MEA, 6 April 1985, and Tripoli Voice of the Arab People, 5 April 1985, in FBIS-MEA, 8 April 1985.