My father never permitted anything which I learnt to degenerate into a mere exercise of memory. He strove to make the understand-ing not only go along with every step of the teachunderstand-ing, but if pos-sible, precede it. Anything which could be found out by thinking, I was never told, until I had exhausted my efforts to find out for myself. J. S. Mill, Autobiography, Chapter 2
In this chapter we consider a classic ‘nugget’ of an argument due to John Stuart Mill (1806–75). It comes from his Principles of Political Economy which was first published in 1848 and which ran to seven editions in his own lifetime.
James Mill, John Stuart Mill’s father, and his friend Jeremy Bentham founded and promulgated the philosophy of ‘utilitarianism’ which was based on the doctrine that actions are good in so far as they ‘promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. James Mill was a highly educated man in many spheres and he took sole charge of his son’s education from the beginning. He began to teach his son Greek at the age of three. They sat at the same table at which his father worked and, since there were no such things as English–Greek dictionaries,
I was forced to have recourse to him for the meaning of every word which I did not know. This incessant interruption he, one of the most impatient of men, submitted to, and wrote under that interruption several volumes of his History and all else that he had to write in those years. (Autobiography, Chapter 2)
Mill learned arithmetic in the same way and began Latin when he was eight; his education included philosophy, logic, political economy and much more. He describes it in detail in his Autobiography and it makes formidable reading. His father was determined that Mill should take over the leadership of the utilitarian movement and his education was necessary to and fitted him well for that role, a role he took over in due course. J. S. Mill produced many beautiful arguments in the course of his life and although the one we have chosen is over one hundred years old it is still very much alive as you can see in exercise 6, p. 194.
I An argument from J. S. Mill’s Principles of Political Economy Before reaching our extract in the Principles of Political Economy, Mill argues the general case ‘in favour of restricting to the narrowest compass the inter-vention of a public authority in the business of the community’ (Book V, Chapter XI,§7). Having put the general case for keeping government ‘off the backs of the people’ he notes various exceptions to that case. One such exception is the following (sentences are labelled for ease of subsequent reference):
To a fourth case of exception I must request particular attention, (a)
it being one to which as it appears to me the attention of political economists has not yet been sufficiently drawn. There are matters in (b)
which the interference of law is required, not to overrule the judg-ment of individuals respecting their own interest, but to give effect to that judgment: they being unable to give effect to it except by concert, which concert again cannot be effectual unless it receives validity and sanction from the law. For illustration, and without (c)
prejudging the particular point, I may advert to the question of diminishing the hours of labour. Let us suppose, what is at least (d)
supposable, whether it be the fact or not – that a general reduction of the hours of factory labour, say from ten to nine, would be for the advantage of the work-people: that they would receive as high wages, or nearly as high, for nine hours’ labour as they receive for (e)
ten. If this would be the result, and if the operatives generally are convinced that it would, the limitation, some may say, will be (f )
adopted spontaneously. I answer, that it will not be adopted unless the body of operatives bind themselves to one another to abide by it.
(g)
A workman who refused to work more than nine hours while there were others who worked ten, would either not be employed at all, or if employed, must submit to lose one-tenth of his wages. However (h)
convinced, therefore, he may be that it is in the interest of the class to work short time, it is contrary to his own interest to set the example, unless he is well assured that all or most others will follow it. But suppose a general agreement of the whole class: might not (j)
this be effectual without the sanction of law? Not unless enforced by (k)
opinion with a rigour practically equal to that of law. For however (m)
beneficial the observance of the regulation might be to the class collectively, the immediate interest of every individual would lie in violating it: and the more numerous those were who adhered to the rule, the more would individuals gain by departing from it. If nearly (n)
all restricted themselves to nine hours, those who chose to work for ten would gain all the advantages of the restriction, together with the profit from infringing it; they would get ten hours’ wages for nine hours’ work, and an hour’s wages besides. I grant if a large (p)
majority adhered to the nine hours, there would be no harm done;
the benefit would be, in the main, secured to the class, while those individuals who preferred to work harder and earn more, would have an opportunity of doing so. This certainly would be the state (q)
of things to be wished for; and assuming that a reduction of hours without any diminution of wages could take place without expelling the commodity from some of its markets – which is in every par-ticular instance a question of fact, not of principle – the manner in which it would be most desirable that this effect should be brought about, would be by a quiet change in the general custom of the trade; short hours becoming, by spontaneous choice, the gen-eral practice, but those who chose to deviate from it having the fullest liberty to do so. Probably, however, so many would prefer (r)
the ten hours’ work on the improved terms, that the limitation could not be maintained as a general practice: what some did from choice, others would soon be obliged to do from necessity, and those who had chosen long hours for the sake of increased wages, would be forced in the end to work long hours for no greater wages than before. Assuming then that it really would be the interest of each (s)
to work only nine hours if he could be assured that all others would do the same, there might be no means of attaining this object but by converting their supposed mutual agreement into an engagement under penalty, by consenting to have it enforced by law. I am not (t)
expressing any opinion in favour of such an enactment, which has never in this country been demanded, and which I certainly should not, in present circumstances, recommend: but it serves to exem-plify the manner in which classes of persons may need the assistance
of law, to give effect to their deliberate collective opinion of their own interest, by affording to every individual a guarantee that his competitors will pursue the same course, without which he cannot safely adopt it himself.
This is an ingenious piece of argument and it is just the sort of reasoning to which this book is addressed. It is not easy to say what the argument is or whether it is a good one but again we want to show how far you can get with careful thought. Again it will help the reader to assess the utility of our approach if he or she first writes careful answers to the following questions before reading sections II and III.
Questions
(1) What is Mill’s main conclusion?
(2) What is his basic argument for it?
(3) What would show the truth of,
Assuming that it really would be in the interest of each to work only nine hours if he could be assured that all others would do the same, there might be no means of attaining this object but by converting their supposed mutual agreement into an engagement under penalty, by consenting to have it enforced by law?
(4) Does Mill establish his conclusion?
(5) Can you think of another example which resembles Mill’s (which entails similar arguments)?
II Extracting the argument from Mill’s text
To extract the argument from Mill’s text we proceed as usual. We first read through the passage to get its sense and circle all the inference indicators as we go. These are ‘therefore’ (sentence (h)), ‘For’ (sentence (m)), and ‘then’
(sentence (s)). The reader might not notice at a first reading that ‘then’ in sentence (s) is functioning as a conclusion indicator but a closer reading should convince him or her that this is the case (and the next chapter will explain why this usage might mislead some readers). We next underline any clearly indicated reasons and conclusions using inference indicators to help us. This means we must underline the conclusions in sentences (h) and (s) and the reason in sentence (m): it is not quite clear what we should take as the ‘scope’ of ‘For’ in sentence (m); should it be,
however beneficial the observance might be to the class collectively, the immediate interest of every individual would lie in violating it:
or should it continue to include,
and the more numerous those were who adhered to the rule, the more would individuals gain by departing from it?
We leave it open at present and we can decide after further reflection on the argument – if anything turns on it.
The next step is to identify Mill’s main conclusion. It is clear that Mill wants to establish that there are cases where the law must intervene in order to enable individuals to achieve what they want and he tries to do this by producing just such a case – as an ‘illustration’. For this reason we must underline the general statement of this claim in both sentences (b) and (t) as his main conclusion; sentence (b) puts it like this,
There are matters in which the interference of law is required, not to overrule the judgment of individuals respecting their own interests, C
but to give effect to that judgment: they being unable to give effect to it except by concert, which concert again cannot be effectual unless it received validity and sanction from law.
If we next ask ‘What immediate reason is presented in the text for accepting C?’ the answer is clearly the conclusion of his ‘illustration’, from line (s),
(1) Assuming . . . that it really would be the interest of each to work only nine hours if he could be assured that all others would do the same, there might be no means of attaining this object but by converting their supposed mutual agreement into an engagement under penalty, by consenting to have it enforced by law.
Most of the interest in this text focuses on the reasoning for (1); however, if we now ask, ‘What immediate reasons are presented for (1)?’ the question is surprisingly hard to answer and there are several reasons for this: it is partly because explicit argument indicators are lacking, partly because Mill uses long and logically complex sentences and partly because the conclusion (1) is itself complicated; it says something of the form ‘Assuming W if X, there might be no means of attaining Y except by doing Z’. However, if you understand (1) you must be able to give some account of how you could decide whether it was true or false (see principle * p. 23), so the way to proceed here is to ask the Assertibility Question, in short, ‘What would show (1) to be true?’
Surely the obvious way to show this is to consider the apparent alterna-tives and to show that these might not or will not achieve their objective. So
the question is, ‘What are the alternatives to legal enforcement?’ or, equiv-alently in the context, ‘What scope is there for effective voluntary action?’
Mill appears to consider three broad possibilities. He considers what happens firstly if an individual tries to act alone ‘to set an example’, and secondly if individuals try to act together by ‘general agreement’, and thirdly if a ‘large majority’ adheres to the nine hours by ‘spontaneous choice’.
His argument against the effectiveness of the first possibility is clear from the argument indicator and the context. It is this,
(3) A workman who refused to work more than nine hours while there were others who worked ten, would either not be employed at all, or if employed, must submit to lose one-tenth of his wages therefore
(2) However convinced . . . he may be that it is in the interest of the class to work short time, it is contrary to his own interest to set an example, unless he is well assured that all or most others will follow it.
Mill’s argument against the effectiveness of the second possibility seems equally easy to find. He asks whether ‘general agreement of the whole class . . . might not be effectual without the sanction of law’ and answers,
(6) If nearly all restricted themselves to nine hours, those who chose to work for ten would gain all the advantages of the restriction, together with the profit from infringing it; they would get ten hours’
wages for nine hours’ work, and an hour’s wages besides therefore
(5) however beneficial the observance of the regulation might be to the class collectively, the immediate interest of every individual would lie in violating it
therefore
(4) [Even] a general agreement of the whole class might not . . . be effective . . . unless enforced by opinion with a rigour practically equal to that of the law.
His view of the third possibility appears to be that it would be the most desirable state of things but that it would also probably be unstable; the argument is,
(8) Probably . . . so many would prefer the ten hours’ work on the improved terms, that the limitation could not be maintained as a
general practice: what some did from choice, others would soon be obliged to do from necessity, and those who had chosen long hours for the sake of increased wages, would be forced in the end to work long hours for no greater wages than before
therefore
(7) [Majority choice might not be effective.]
Thus, in summary, Mill’s argument appears to be represented by the fol-lowing diagram,
6
3 5 8
2 + 4 + [7] + [There are no other alternatives]
1 C
There are certainly other ways of representing this argument, but we have adopted this approach (using the Assertibility Question) because it seems to be the simplest way of extracting all that is necessary for understanding and evaluating the argument. The reasoning actually employs several ‘supposi-tions’ and we could analyse it quite differently using the techniques to be developed in the next chapter, but it is doubtful whether this would be worth the effort (whether it would generate any greater insight). It might be pos-sible to try to apply the formalism of predicate logic (see pp. 184f.) to the analysis of this reasoning: that would certainly not be worth the effort if our objective is to spot as quickly and efficiently as possible any weaknesses we can in the argument. There is no doubt that our approach relies heavily on an understanding of the text – the approach outlined in Chapter 2 is skeletal and explicitly leaves room for judgement based on such understanding – but it is also intended to be relatively efficient.
The passage marked up according to the method of Chapter 2 looks as follows,
To a fourth case of exception I must request particular attention, it being one to which as it appears to me the attention of political economists has not yet been sufficiently drawn. There are matters in which the interference of law is required, not to overrule the judgment of individuals respecting their own interest, but to give C
effect to that judgment: they being unable to give effect to it except
by concert, which concert again cannot be effectual unless it receives validity and sanction from the law. For illustration, and without prejudging the particular point, I may advert to the question of diminishing the hours of labour. Let us suppose, what is at least supposable, whether it be the fact or not – that a general reduc-tion of the hours of factory labour, say from ten to nine, would be for the advantage of the work-people: that they would receive as high wages, or nearly as high, for nine hours’ labour as they receive for ten. If this would be the result, and if the operatives generally are convinced that it would, the limitation, some may say, will be adopted spontaneously. I answer, that it will not be adopted unless the body of operatives bind themselves to one another to abide by it.
A workman who refused to work more than nine hours while 3
there were others who worked ten, would either not be employed
↓3
2 at all, or if employed, must submit to lose one-tenth of his wages.
However convinced,
therefore , he may be that it is in the interest 2
of the class to work short time, it is contrary to his own interest to set the example, unless he is well assured that all or most others will follow it. But suppose a general agreement of the whole class:
might not this be effectual without the sanction of law? Not unless 4
enforced by opinion with a rigour practically equal to that of law.
↓6
↓5 4
For however beneficial the observance of the regulation might be 5
to the class collectively, the immediate interest of every individual would lie in violating it: and the more numerous those were who adhered to the rule, the more would individuals gain by departing from it.If nearly all restricted themselves to nine hours, those who 6
chose to work for ten would gain all the advantages of the restric-tion, together with the profit from infringing it; they would get ten hours’ wages for nine hours’ work, and an hour’s wages besides. I grant if a large majority adhered to the nine hours, there would be no harm done; the benefit would be, in the main, secured to the class, while those individuals who preferred to work harder and earn more, would have an opportunity of doing so. This certainly would be the state of things to be wished for; and assuming that a reduction of hours without any diminution of wages could take
place without expelling the commodity from some of its markets –
place without expelling the commodity from some of its markets –