significant aspect of the so-called special relationship’ in Fidler and Huband, ‘A Special Relationship? The UK and US spying alliance’; K.A. O’Brien, ‘Europe weighs up intelligence options’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 March 2001) and A. Whittam Smith, ‘It’s France that has a special relationship with America’, The Independent (21 February 2005); see also content in Chapter 3: Literature Review [4.0], below. For the long-term nature of the UK-US intelligence relationship, see also, for example, J. Beach, ‘Origins of the special intelligence relationship? Anglo-American intelligence co-operation on the Western Front, 1917-18’, Intelligence and National Security, 22, 2 (April 2007), pp.229-249.
217 See Shukman (ed.), Agents for Change, p.xxii; see also R. Niblett, Director Chatham House, ‘What
Bush might make of Brown’, The Financial Times (07 February 2007) - via URL:
<http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/ArticeFT070207.doc> (accessed: 07/04/2007) - particularly where he notes: ‘[UK-US] Bilateral intelligence co-operation on counter-terrorism, for example, is more important than ever, as Mr Brown has noted in recent speeches…’
218 See, for example, R.J. Aldrich, ‘The UK–US Intelligence Alliance in 1975: Economies, Evaluations
and Explanations’, Intelligence and National Security, 21, 4 (August 2006), pp.557-8.
219 ISC, Annual Report, 1999-2000 (2000), paragraph 64; see also ‘Annex F – What happened in the
SIS’ in ISC, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report (2000), para.4, via URL: <http://www.archive.official- documents.co.uk/document/cm47/4764/4764-axf.htm> (accessed: 29/12/2006) – particularly where it is stated: ‘In the early stages, the highest priority was given to processing material bearing on UK and US interests…’
220 Rudner, ‘Britain Betwixt and Between’, p.575.
221 See, for example, some of the criticisms of the close UK-US intelligence sharing tabled below. 222 ISC, Renditions, p.53.
223 ibid. 224 ibid.
225 To date, these documents remain classified.
226 See A. Rathmell, ‘Towards Post-modern Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 17, 3
(Autumn, 2002), p.95.
227 That is, arguably very marginally moving away from being so firmly tied to ‘the state’ – see R.J.
Deibert, ‘Deep Probe: The evolution of network intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 18, 4 (Winter, 2003); see also J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt (eds), Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); and see ‘Opaque Networks’, chapter 6 in Roberts, Blacked Out, pp.127-149; see also Clutterbuck, ‘Network forms of Organisation in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism’ in his ‘Developing A Counter Terrorism Network’. Warfare is also moving more towards network centric operations, see, for example, C. Wilson, ‘Network Centric Operations: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress’, CRS Report for Congress (Updated 15 March 2007); L. Freedman, ‘The Transformation of Strategic Affairs’, IISS Adelphi Paper, 379 (2006).
228 For more on ‘epistemic communities’, see Evans and Newnham, Dictionary of International
Relations, pp.150-1; see also the discussion contained in D. Stone, ‘Introduction: Global knowledge and Advocacy Networks’, Global Networks, 2, 1 (2002), p.1-11; related, see also J. Sugden, ‘Security
Sector Reform: the role of epistemic communities in the UK’, Journal of Security Sector Management, 4, 4 (November 2006); see also P.M. Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, International Organization, 46, 1 (Winter, 1992), pp.1-35; for a case study, see, for instance, E. Adler, ‘The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control’, International Organization, 46, 1 (Winter, 1992), pp.101-145; P. Zelikow, ‘Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and Back Again’, International Security, 18, 4 (Spring, 1994), pp.143-171.
229 See also P. Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession: The Spy as Bureaucrat, Patriot, Fantasist,
and Whore (London: Deutsch, 1986), p.5 – where he argues: ‘… one of the curious features of intelligence agencies is that they gradually grow to resemble one another…’ (emphasis added), not least when carrying out matching functions. See also Smith, The Spying Game, p.25 – where he argues: ‘The relationship between the various American spy organisations has been so bad at times during the past 50 years that they have had far better relations with their British counterparts than they have enjoyed with each other.’
230 For an example of this type of exchange, see T. Harnden, ‘US may set up MI5-style spy agency in
security shake-up’, The Daily Telegraph (31 October 2002); see also: ISC, Annual Report, 1999-2000, paragraph 38(b) – ‘We recommend that a more co-ordinated and rigorous project-based approach is adopted, building on US experience…’; T. Masse, ‘Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States’, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report (19 May 2003); J. Burns and M. Huband, ‘US considers security reforms along UK lines’, The Financial Times (05 May 2003); G. Corera, ‘USA studies UK security service’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (23 January 2003).
231 Critic identified only as ‘Morley’ quoted at URL:
<http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/T_folder/troy.html> (accessed: 20/01/2006).
232 Based on information from various non-attributable sources [e.g. i-37 + i-30]; see also texts, such as
N. West, The Friends: Britain’s Post-War Secret Intelligence Operations (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988).
233 William J. Donovan, Director, Memorandum for the President 2/8/52-ABD (07 November 1944) –
via CREST – CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090008-3 (2006/02/07); see also Interpretive Notes of Memorandum for the President (18 November 1944) – via ibid. – especially where it notes (p.8): ‘The British Government is not to be condemned when high American commanders in Europe lean heavily upon British strategic and policy intelligence. There exists no American agency wholly competent to prepare or responsible for furnishing intelligence of American origin. Intelligence staffs in the various military commands may satisfy combat demands, but policy intelligence from American sources is inferior. Hence it is supplied largely by the better developed British system.’; see also T.F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1981) – via CREST – CIA-RDP90-00708R000600120001-0 (2000/04/18).
234 See, for example, UK Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2001-2002 (07 June
the Committee that the UK/US collaboration is highly valuable and remarked that it “is obviously a very important factor in relation to our thinking”…’; see also Shukman (ed.), Agents for Change, p.xxii – where he states: ‘The UK-US nexus is viewed by the UK as a precious asset…’; see Fidler and Huband, ‘A special relationship? The US and UK spying alliance’; for importance of UK-US intelligence liaison to Britain see also J. Freedland, ‘Comment & Analysis: Time for Tough Love: Gleneagles gives Tony Blair a chance to demand from Bush a relationship that’s a bit more special for Britain’, The Guardian (06 July 2005).
235 For example, see M. Dejevsky, ‘Comment: Now is the time to push for a European Army’, The
Independent (22 October 2003).
236 Based on information from non-attributable sources [e.g. i-30]; see also, for example, R. Norton-
Taylor, ‘Intelligence test: After the rapid reaction force, the logical step is an EU intelligence policy – and that would be the ultimate test of mutual trust between allies’, The Guardian (20 December 2000); see also the sentiments expressed in G. Poteat and W. Anderson, ‘A Declaration of Interdependence: A second letter from America to our British friends’, The Daily Standard (03 May 2007) - via URL: <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/562ahjrw.asp?pg=1>
(accessed: 06/11/2007); see also J. Bolton, ‘Britain cannot have two best friends’, The Financial Times (01 August 2007); see also ‘New EU treaty worries US intel services’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (15 January 2008) - particularly where it notes: ‘As EU governments focus on securing ratification of the proposed Lisbon Reform Treaty in 2008, United States policymakers are concerned its provisions could present serious challenges to transatlantic intelligence and homeland security co-operation. The main US reservation is that by transferring additional law and justice functions from the individual EU member states to EU institutions, the treaty could disrupt existing bilateral relations between US and EU governments without establishing anything better…’
237 See, for example, Secretary James Baker, III talk at Chatham House on Monday 29 October 2007,
especially where he noted: ‘Some have advocated the idea that the United Kingdom must somehow choose between the United States and the European Union. That is both misleading and dangerous. It is misleading because it fails to recognize the unique and productive role that London can play in both Washington and Brussels. And it is dangerous because it could lead to international divisions injurious to the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. Let me be blunt. The conduct of foreign policy is hard enough without creating false choices.’ - Secretary James Baker III, ‘The Whitehead Lecture – The West and the World: A Question of Confidence’, Chatham House meeting transcript (29 October 2007), p.5.
238 See, for example, ISC, Annual Report, 1999-2000, paragraph 14 – ‘The quality of intelligence
gathered clearly reflects the value of the close co-operation under the UKUSA agreement…’
239 Quoted in Hennessy, The Secret State, p.13.
240 See, for instance, Stables, ‘Alleged Plot in U.K. Highlights Improved Intelligence-Sharing With
U.S.’: ‘…Increased intelligence-sharing and cooperation with foreign countries, especially Britain, has been “one of our biggest accomplishments since 9/11,” [House Homeland Security Chairman Peter T. King, R-N.Y.] said. Not only do the British coordinate well with Americans on intelligence, they might be better at some aspects of it. William Rosenau of the Rand Corporation said the British are better at
human-source intelligence and “they’ve been willing to make investments in language skills that we haven’t been willing to make. … The British trump us in their use of police in counterterrorism,” while in the U.S., police are viewed largely as first-responders… The police are integrated into the
intelligence community in Britain in ways they aren’t in the U.S., except perhaps in New York, L.A., and Chicago, Rosenau said….’
241 On 11 September 2001, the US arguably did not have hegemony of intelligence power. This was for
a variety of reasons, such as ‘information overload’ – see, for example, the 9/11 Commission Report, pp.275-6 and references to the information ‘logjam’; see also Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.1.i], below.
242 For more on the US and HUMINT, see also B. Gerber, ‘Managing HUMINT: The Need for a New
Approach’, chapter 11 in Sims and Gerber (eds), Transforming U.S. Intelligence, pp.180-197; see also J. MacGaffin, ‘Clandestine Human Intelligence: Spies, Counterspies, and Covert Action’, chapter 5 in ibid., pp.79-95; see also D.C. Gompert, et al., ‘War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency’, RAND Counterinsurgency - Final Report (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008 [Prepared for the Office of the (US) Secretary of Defense]), p.231 – particularly where the report notes: ‘The surprise attacks of 9/11 and flawed intelligence about Iraq illuminated acute U.S. weaknesses in HUMINT.’
243 Smith, The Spying Game, p.432.
244 See, for example, ‘UK spied for US as computer bug hit’, The Times (26 April 2000); Keefe,
Chatter, p.109; ISC, Annual Report, 1999-2000, paragraph 14.
245 See, for example, ISC Annual Report, 2003-04 (June 2004), p.45, paragraph ‘J’.
246 This is reflected by American intelligence officials being allowed to attend some of the UK Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessment meetings; see also S. Lander, ‘International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17, 3 (October 2004); see also Chapter 4 [7.0], below.
247 See, for example, the earlier references to the reduction of financial costs to all parties through
having intelligence liaison [8.1].
248 For further details, see, for example, the ISC, Renditions report; see also Chapter 5: Case Study 1
[4.2.ii] of this study, below; see also A. Svendsen, ‘“Friends and Allies” like these: UK-US intelligence relations in the early 21st Century’, paper presented at the annual British International Studies Association (BISA) conference, University of Cambridge, UK (December 2007).
249 For more background detail on the ‘Katharine Gun affair’ see Chapter 5: Case Study 2 [2.4], below;
see also Keefe, Chatter, p.29.
250 Hitz, The Great Game, p.152. 251 ibid., p.157.
252 For more on the schools of interpretation in Anglo-American relations, see A. Danchev, ‘On
Specialness: Anglo-American Apocrypha’, chapter 1 in his On Specialness (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), from p.1; see also the ‘Introduction’ in J. Baylis (ed.), Anglo-American Relations Since 1939: The Enduring Alliance (Manchester University Press, 1997); for an expansion on the discussion here, see Chapter 2 [4.1] below. For an example of (at least perceived) ‘terminalism’ in an area of UK-US relations – which may threaten more of the whole of the relationship - see, for example, P. Chao and R.
Niblett, ‘Trusted Partners: Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship’, CSIS Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership, A Working Paper (26 May 2006). Reference can also be made to tensions within the ‘Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme’ – see, for example, D. Mulholland, ‘Bush second term strains defence co-operation’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (26 November 2004). However, there appears to be high-level political support for the UK in the US, see, for example, J. Murphy, ‘Bush supports UK role in JSF programme’, Jane’s Defence Industry (01 July 2006), suggesting that the difficulties encountered may be featuring more at the lower operational levels of UK-US JSF co-operation. See also ‘Future fighter takes to the skies’, BBC News Online (15 December 2006); see also R.D. Sugar, ‘Trends and Opportunities: US/UK Defence Co-operation’, RUSI Defence Systems, 9, 1 (Summer 2006), pp.24-27.
253 For more background on the overall UK-US alliance, see for example, L. Freedman, ‘Alliance and
the British way in warfare’, Review of International Studies, 21 (1995), pp.145-58; for the background history to the UK-US intelligence relationship, see, for example, B.F. Smith, ‘The Road to the Anglo- American Intelligence Partnership’, American Intelligence Journal, 16, 2/3 (Autumn/Winter, 1995).