There are many examples of risk analysis methods implementations, many variations of the same method or hybrid method of a few. Some of the methods proved to be more applicable or more effective and to give better overview of the situation. Therefore their implementation is more common. The highlighted are considered to be good examples, better recognized and utilized.
One of the analyses of the potential threats and hazards based on two dimensions of "risk" view given above is developed for The Netherlands and is conducted using a methodology called the National Risk Assessment. In this methodology, threats and hazards are described in scenarios that are assessed in terms of likelihood and impact using a uniform scoring method. The impact criteria reflect five vital national interests and one sub national interest. The results of the assessment are presented in a risk diagram in which each scenario is plotted according to its degree of likelihood (i.e. probability) and impact. By doing this, the scenarios can be uniformly compared in terms of risk. Impact and likelihood values are the results of a risk assessment methodology. The results of the assessment can be used to analyze, determine and strengthen capabilities that are needed to reduce the risk and enhance response to an incident [2]. The morphological analysis consists of five successive steps, resulting in scenarios. It is a four steps methodology for the risk assessment process. Further it is recommended, adapted and implemented on different levels for other countries and regions.
The second example is also very accepted in many areas dealing with risk analysis. In probabilistic hazard risk methodology three sets of data, i.e., hazard, exposure and the vulnerability of the exposed assets at stake, should be available to provide the risk information and each of them presented as the random variable. For example, in the case of the hazardous event one must not only know the magnitude and related impact but also the frequency or probability of its occurrence for any certain time frame. The exposure model provides information on location and characteristics of the assets of interest. When no uncertainties are introduced in the exposure model (and this is usually the case), its data are considered as deterministic values. Vulnerability of the asset is often expressed as the probability that a certain damage level would be exceeded at a
are advantages in expressing the impact indicator in a more differentiated manner. Particularly, in the analysis of natural hazards, impacts are often expressed in terms of vulnerability V and exposure (elements at risk) E: Risk =ƒ (p*E*V).
Subject to the specific risk analyzed, the measurement of risk can be carried out with a greater number of different variables and factors, depending among other things on the complexity of the chain of impacts, the number of impact factors considered, and the required level of precision, thus improving certainty. In the case of hazard chain analysis, the best approach is to use so called event tree, which is a system applied to analyze all the combinations and the associated probability of occurrence of the parameters that affect the analyzed system. Risk assessments are often complex and do not allow development of a full numerical approach, since many aspects are not fully quantifiable or have a very large degree of uncertainty. It also contains the difficulty to define hazard scenarios, map and characterize the elements at risk, or defining the vulnerability using vulnerability curves. Therefore risk is frequently assessed using risk matrix or consequences frequency matrix, made of classes of frequency of the hazardous events on one axis, and the consequences (or expected losses) on the other axis. The use of classes allows for more flexibility and incorporation of expert opinion, instead of using fixed values. This approach also permits visualization of the effects and consequences of risk reduction measures and setting a framework to understand risk assessment. In many situations the (semi)quantitative methods for risk mapping are not appropriate, because of data lacking to be able to quantify the components, such as hazard frequency, intensity, and physical vulnerability. Another reason is taking into account a number of different components of vulnerability that are not incorporated in (semi)quantitative methods. In those cases it is common to apply an indicator based approach to measure risk and vulnerability through selected comparative indicators in a quantitative way in order to be able to compare different areas or communities. Here the process of disaster risk assessment is divided into a number of components, such as hazard, exposure, vulnerability and capacity, through a criteria tree, which lists the subdivision into objectives, sub objectives and indicators. Data for each of these indicators are collected at a particular spatial level, then they are standardized, weighted internally within a sub objective and then the various sub objectives are weighted amongst themselves. The resulting vulnerability, hazard and risk results are scaled
between 0 and 1, which allows comparing the indicators for the various administrative units.
Examples of implementation
There are many examples of risk analysis methods implementations, many variations of the same method or hybrid method of a few. Some of the methods proved to be more applicable or more effective and to give better overview of the situation. Therefore their implementation is more common. The highlighted are considered to be good examples, better recognized and utilized.
One of the analyses of the potential threats and hazards based on two dimensions of "risk" view given above is developed for The Netherlands and is conducted using a methodology called the National Risk Assessment. In this methodology, threats and hazards are described in scenarios that are assessed in terms of likelihood and impact using a uniform scoring method. The impact criteria reflect five vital national interests and one sub national interest. The results of the assessment are presented in a risk diagram in which each scenario is plotted according to its degree of likelihood (i.e. probability) and impact. By doing this, the scenarios can be uniformly compared in terms of risk. Impact and likelihood values are the results of a risk assessment methodology. The results of the assessment can be used to analyze, determine and strengthen capabilities that are needed to reduce the risk and enhance response to an incident [2]. The morphological analysis consists of five successive steps, resulting in scenarios. It is a four steps methodology for the risk assessment process. Further it is recommended, adapted and implemented on different levels for other countries and regions.
The second example is also very accepted in many areas dealing with risk analysis. In probabilistic hazard risk methodology three sets of data, i.e., hazard, exposure and the vulnerability of the exposed assets at stake, should be available to provide the risk information and each of them presented as the random variable. For example, in the case of the hazardous event one must not only know the magnitude and related impact but also the frequency or probability of its occurrence for any certain time frame. The exposure model provides information on location and characteristics of the assets of interest. When no uncertainties are introduced in the exposure model (and this is usually the case), its data are considered as deterministic values. Vulnerability of the asset is often expressed as the probability that a certain damage level would be exceeded at a
78
certain magnitude of the event. Vulnerability models describe the uncertainty how the exposed asset will react to different magnitudes of the hazardous event and this is strongly related to the hazard type and the characteristics of the concerned asset. So vulnerability models are developed and assigned to each type of the asset. Then it is possible to calculate the losses with their probability of occurrence related to each of the possible events. The combination of all input data with full probabilistic description is part of the modeling which produces also the probabilistic interpretation of the output. The output of probabilistic risk assessment is usually presented as a loss exceedance curve relating the certain level of losses with their probability of occurrence in certain time frame. If this time frame is set to one year, the area under the loss exceedance curve is known as the annual average loss, describing expected average loss per year considering all the events of the same hazard type that could occur over a long time period. High damage from an extreme event would be multiplied by a very low probability, so that its average annual contribution would be small although the event loss would be very large [8].
Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper is to promote, emphasize and introduce some risk analysis methodologies implementation in the region. The necessity of such introduction and support is briefly given and it is illustrated by examples of successful implementation. Many countries invest in development of risk analysis methods to support their crisis management systems. Besides the development of mathematical models and the appropriate software for the implementation, education and training of experts’ teams conducting this implementation are also necessary. All risk assessment methodologies and methods used have certain advantages and disadvantages. Cooperation, support and experience sharing with the developed countries are very important for regions introducing and improving the risk assessment methodologies. However, cooperation between organizations dealing with risk assessment and crises management and science representatives, is crucial for developing more effective scientifically supported methodologies.
REFERENCES:
1. C. J. van Westen, Caribbean Handbook on Risk Information Management (www.charim.net)
2. Commission Staff Working Paper, Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management, (European Commission, Brussels, 2010)
3. EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative, Methodology Guidance for CBRN Scenario Generation and Risk Assessment (Project 11: Integrated Multi-perspective Methodology to assess risks of CBRN Misuse (IM3))
4. Maria Papathoma-Köhle et al., A Common Methodology for Risk Assessment and Mapping of Climate Change Related Hazards— Implications for Climate Change Adaptation Policies, (Climate, 2016, 4,8)
5. Tom De Groeve et al., Index for Risk Management, Concept and Methodology (European Commission, Joint Research Centre Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen, 2016)
certain magnitude of the event. Vulnerability models describe the uncertainty how the exposed asset will react to different magnitudes of the hazardous event and this is strongly related to the hazard type and the characteristics of the concerned asset. So vulnerability models are developed and assigned to each type of the asset. Then it is possible to calculate the losses with their probability of occurrence related to each of the possible events. The combination of all input data with full probabilistic description is part of the modeling which produces also the probabilistic interpretation of the output. The output of probabilistic risk assessment is usually presented as a loss exceedance curve relating the certain level of losses with their probability of occurrence in certain time frame. If this time frame is set to one year, the area under the loss exceedance curve is known as the annual average loss, describing expected average loss per year considering all the events of the same hazard type that could occur over a long time period. High damage from an extreme event would be multiplied by a very low probability, so that its average annual contribution would be small although the event loss would be very large [8].
Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper is to promote, emphasize and introduce some risk analysis methodologies implementation in the region. The necessity of such introduction and support is briefly given and it is illustrated by examples of successful implementation. Many countries invest in development of risk analysis methods to support their crisis management systems. Besides the development of mathematical models and the appropriate software for the implementation, education and training of experts’ teams conducting this implementation are also necessary. All risk assessment methodologies and methods used have certain advantages and disadvantages. Cooperation, support and experience sharing with the developed countries are very important for regions introducing and improving the risk assessment methodologies. However, cooperation between organizations dealing with risk assessment and crises management and science representatives, is crucial for developing more effective scientifically supported methodologies.
REFERENCES:
1. C. J. van Westen, Caribbean Handbook on Risk Information Management (www.charim.net)
2. Commission Staff Working Paper, Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management, (European Commission, Brussels, 2010)
3. EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative, Methodology Guidance for CBRN Scenario Generation and Risk Assessment (Project 11: Integrated Multi-perspective Methodology to assess risks of CBRN Misuse (IM3))
4. Maria Papathoma-Köhle et al., A Common Methodology for Risk Assessment and Mapping of Climate Change Related Hazards— Implications for Climate Change Adaptation Policies, (Climate, 2016, 4,8)
5. Tom De Groeve et al., Index for Risk Management, Concept and Methodology (European Commission, Joint Research Centre Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen, 2016)
325.254.4-022.326.5:355.45(497.7) Original scientific article
REFUGEE CRISIS: SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR MACEDONIA
AND THE REGION
Ass. Prof. Marjan GJUROVSKI, PhD Faculty of Security – Skopje
Email: [email protected]
Prof. Nedzad KORAJLIC, PhD
Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina Email: [email protected]
Ass. Prof. Muhamet RACAJ, PhD
Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia Email: [email protected]
Abstract: The refugee crisis as a global phenomenon, triggered by
several wars in the crisis regions on different locations in Asia and Africa, as well expanded and internationally emphasized by the war in Syria and its surroundings, putted to the test the political and institutional capacities of the European countries and the EU as a global political actor. The approach to solving the problem of the refugee crisis, in the part referring to Europe and addressing the core of the problem on the spot, showed that the EU lacked a rapid and effective response, using mostly ad hoc solutions.
Small European countries, even some of them are part of EU, are concerned with the consequences of the refugee crisis without the ability to influence its causes. Using the two different general country’s positions
regarding the approach to the refugee crisis standpoint of the countries
that could manage the crisis and standpoint of crisis manage them, most of concerned countries, that represent the entrance point and collateral damage in this problem, are familiar with second standpoint.
The realities in the last few years showed that Balkan countries, as countries which do not have capacity to resist to the supremacy for power and dominance among the major powers, are not target (final destination) for refugees and source of conflict related to the refugee phenomena, as
325.254.4-022.326.5:355.45(497.7) Original scientific article
REFUGEE CRISIS: SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR MACEDONIA
AND THE REGION
Ass. Prof. Marjan GJUROVSKI, PhD Faculty of Security – Skopje
Email: [email protected]
Prof. Nedzad KORAJLIC, PhD
Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina Email: [email protected]
Ass. Prof. Muhamet RACAJ, PhD
Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia Email: [email protected]
Abstract: The refugee crisis as a global phenomenon, triggered by
several wars in the crisis regions on different locations in Asia and Africa, as well expanded and internationally emphasized by the war in Syria and its surroundings, putted to the test the political and institutional capacities of the European countries and the EU as a global political actor. The approach to solving the problem of the refugee crisis, in the part referring to Europe and addressing the core of the problem on the spot, showed that the EU lacked a rapid and effective response, using mostly ad hoc solutions.
Small European countries, even some of them are part of EU, are concerned with the consequences of the refugee crisis without the ability to influence its causes. Using the two different general country’s positions
regarding the approach to the refugee crisis standpoint of the countries
that could manage the crisis and standpoint of crisis manage them, most of concerned countries, that represent the entrance point and collateral damage in this problem, are familiar with second standpoint.
The realities in the last few years showed that Balkan countries, as countries which do not have capacity to resist to the supremacy for power and dominance among the major powers, are not target (final destination) for refugees and source of conflict related to the refugee phenomena, as
82
well as they only suffer from its consequences. The war in Syria emphasized its multidimensional destructive potential, and the events and consequences created a need for a redefinition of national security policies and strategies.
The paper highlights the refugee crisis as a global phenomenon, as well perspectives of the Republic of Macedonia and Balkans, comparing the EU approach with domestic and regional security policies and strategies. In that term, the goal of the paper is to analyze the on ground realities of refugee phenomenon combined with actions taken by the national governments in wide regional context, as well response of those national security systems in correlation with guidelines of EU policy and decision makers.
Keywords: refugee crisis, global security phenomenon, unilateral
approach, smuggling of migrants and human trafficking.
Introduction
In studies related to the phenomenon of refugees, migration is a global phenomenon that affects all countries, regardless of whether they are countries from which refugees fleeing, countries of transit or countries of destination.
Several factors at global level, with some variation of their intensity, produce migrant and refugees’ crisis. Some of them are the follows: disruption of the security and stability in regions in the Middle East and North Africa; the existence of double standards in the international world regime; disappearance of prospective for a better tomorrow among the young population in the domicile countries; the strong soft power of EU (especially Germany, France, Sweden and Great Britain).
About 20 million refugees worldwide have fled their countries for two reasons: the formation of new states and/or conflict rose from the social disorder. The connection of the two factors multiplies the risk and size. Statistically, in the last 5 years 15 new conflicts arose, 8 in Africa, 3 in the Middle East, one in Europe and three in Asia. And some old are restored. According to the UNHCR sources, nearly 6o million people have fled their countries, and a third of them are refugees. It is the largest amount since World War II.
Since the beginning of the wars and instability, around 60 million persons were forced to leave their homes. The refugees and migrants that flee to the EU member countries mainly come from Syria, but also from Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan and Eritrea. In reference to Syria, as a country that has produced the highest number of migrants and refugees in the period from 2011 till May 2016, 4 million people have left the country which amounts to one fifth of its