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Exchanging Self and Others (BCA 8:120-173)

In document Ethics in Schopenhauer and Buddhism (Page 98-101)

Chapter 5: Śāntideva’s Account of the Bodhisattva Ideal

5.2 The Bodhicaryāvatāra in Translation

5.2.4 Exchanging Self and Others (BCA 8:120-173)

Now Śāntideva moves from equalising self and others to exchanging self and others. Near the start of this section he explains that some people are so obsessed with themselves and their own welfare that they use other beings for their own selfish ends by killing them (animals, 8:122, close relatives, 8:123), robbing them (8:122) and/or stealing from the saģgha.137 Such people, he says, are destined to burn in the lowest realm of saņsāra and it would be unwise to cultivate such a personality, never mind protect and guard it. At this point he moves from

considerations of the short-sightedness of selfishness to the rewards138 of working for the welfare of others (BCA 8:125) regardless of the consequences:

By oppressing another for one’s own sake, one is roasted in hells, but by oppressing oneself for the sake of another, one meets with success in everything.

A bad rebirth, inferiority, and stupidity result from the mere desire for self-advancement. By transferring that same desire to others, one achieves a good rebirth, honour, and intelligence.

(BCA 8:126-7; Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 99)

Transposing oneself in place of another guarantees personal success; failure to do so guarantees failure (BCA 8:128). Success and happiness come through working for the benefit of others; failure, servitude (BCA 8:128) and unhappiness come from working only for your own happiness:

All whosoever who are happy in the world

Are (so) through the wish for the happiness of others;

While all whosoever who are miserable in the world Are (so) through the wish for the happiness of themselves.

(BCA 8:129, Berzin, 2004) Although we are not to be motivated by rewards when acting in an altruistic fashion, it seems there are many rewards to come for so doing!

So far it has been nothing but assertion on Śāntideva’s part and he moves to the

137 And more figuratively, from the Buddha or the Dharma – Batchelor’s translation is the ‘Triple Gem’, BCA 8:123, p. 119, Crosby’s and Skilton’s is the ‘Three Jewels’, p. 99, and Kelsang’s is ‘a spiritual community’, p. 133.

level of argument now139 where he considers this ‘self’ that the selfish person is so attached to. He sees a strong identification with the idea of self as the source of the recurring duųkha of the world and it is not difficult to see that the person who kills animals140 causes duųkha for animals; the person who kills humans causes duųkha for humans; the person who steals and lies for self advancement causes duųkha for those he has stolen from and lied to. All such suffering is caused because the selfish person clings strongly to the idea of their own separate self and the separate selves of others. If they did not think this way then they would not act in ways which cause the kinds of duųkha Śāntideva identifies.

The calamities which happen in the world, the sufferings and fears, many as they are, they all result from clinging onto the notion of self, so what good is this clinging of mine?

If one does not let go of self one cannot let go of suffering, as one who does not let go of fire cannot let go of burning.

(BCA 8:134-5; Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 100)

It is at precisely this point that Śāntideva takes his position a step further and says that the way to relieve all suffering - that of myself and of other sentient beings – is to recognise that there is no difference between the two:

Therefore, in order to allay my own suffering and to allay the suffering of others, I devote myself to others and accept them as myself.

(Ibid., 8:136, p. 100) Returning to the theme of the Bodhisattva vow (see p. 77) he declares that since the relationship to others is so strong and unbreakable, from now on he will only be concerned with the welfare of others (BCA 8:137).141

We are then invited to meditate on the way the world appears to someone who has a strong identification with a ‘self’ which they pit against ‘others’ (ibid., 8:138-9).

There are several perspectives from which to do this and Śāntideva suggests we start from that of an ‘inferior’ person (ibid., 8:140) who is inferior because of their lack of virtue (ibid., 8:42-6), their lower rebirth, their social standing or material wealth (ibid., 8:147). The imagined person is consumed with jealousy as he compares himself to a ‘superior’, and dreams of the superior’s downfall and mockery (ibid., 8:148-50). He even goes as far as thinking that after such a

139 After some further descriptions of the difficulties in store for the selfish person, BCA 8:130-3.

140 Including using them for food or medicine, v. 122. This is clearest in Kelsang’s translation, p.

133 and Batchelor’s translation, p. 119.

141At least this is the sense I make of the various translations of this verse and I take Crosby’s and Skilton’s translation to be the most appropriate since the link to the Bodhisattva vow seems clearest there. Compare Crosby’s and Skilton’s ‘Hey Mind, make the resolve, ‘I am bound to others’! From now on you must have no other concern than the welfare of all beings’, (BCA 8:137, 1995, p. 100) to Berzin’s ‘O mind, decide for sure, “I'm under the governance of others.”

Except for the welfare of all limited beings, You're not going to have other intentions now.’ (BCA 8:137, 2004). I take the last half of Kelsang’s to be in the same spirit as Crosby’s and Skilton’s:

‘From now on, mind, you must understand this clearly And not think of anything Other than benefitting all living beings.’ (BCA 8:137, 2002, p. 136.) Similarly Batchelor’s is in the same vein:

‘Now, except for benefitting every creature, You must not think of anything else.’ 1979, p. 122.

person’s comeuppance, any food he is given (we may assume he is comparing himself to another monk) should be stolen, leaving him with just enough to survive (BCA 8:153). The superior person obviously has a strong sense of self identity since he seems to enjoy being fêted (ibid., 8:141-2) and feeling superior to others (ibid., 8:145-6) but he is castigated for this self-identification, an attitude which is at the root of suffering for all:

O mind, because you wish to benefit yourself, All the hard work you have done

For countless aeons in samsara Has resulted only in suffering.

(BCA 8:155; Kelsang, 2002, p. 138) Comparing oneself to others, as either an inferior, superior or both, is a result of self-thinking and self-striving, which leads to duųkha and rebirth. It is short-sighted and ultimately pointless. If the imaginary person had understood in a previous life that self and other should be exchanged so that there were no longer feelings of ‘self’ and ‘others’, then the current suffering he imagines would not exist. (BCA 8:157). When someone is attached strongly to a notion of self, they forget that they did not spontaneously appear in this world but came into being as a product of the union of their parents. There is no independent origination and to imagine you are an autonomous self is illusory and goes against the facts. To be more in tune with reality, you might want to acknowledge, as a first step, that you are born of two others and are not entirely and independently distinct from them.

Just one more leap of the imagination could lead you to accept that you have a connection to other beings too. Śāntideva puts this in a slightly different way (although the outcome is the same) when he says (ibid., 8:158) that you have no problem identifying with yourself despite the fact that it took the semen and blood142 of others to create you, so you should not find it too difficult to imagine that others are you. It follows that if others are you then anything you do should be for others and not this imaginary isolated ‘self’ (ibid., 8:159):

Therefore, just as you’ve placed the sense of a “me”

Onto drops of the semen and blood of others, Likewise, make it a habit (of placing it) Onto those of others as well.

(BCA 8:158; Berzin, 2004) Acting as the other person, take away from this body every useful thing you see in it, and use that to benefit others.

(BCA 8:159; Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 102) If it seems that others are unhappy but that I am happy, then I should pass my happiness to them and take on their unhappiness. In this way I can show that I am prepared to exchange myself with others (BCA 8:161). If other people make mistakes or transgress in some way then exchanging self for others means I should take the blame for what they have done, whereas if I have done something praiseworthy I should pass the credit to others and by such actions show that I have no attachment to self (ibid., 8:162-4). I would also want the negative

consequences of any of my previously selfish acts to be applicable only to me and

in that way reroute the pain I caused back to myself and away from others (ibid., 8:165). Recognising others as oneself is possible because the idea of ‘self’ is itself a construct. Śāntideva explains that a construct which is restricted to self has no more foundation than one which includes others as oneself.

The next phase of the meditation involves an undertaking to keep the mind in check lest it return to its old habit of assuming there is a self, which we have already seen is the cause of all duųkha (ibid., 8:167-173). There then follows a reminder or summary (BCA 8:174-86 in Crosby and Skilton, vv. 174-87 in Batchelor, Kelsang and in Berzin) that bodily desires are an ultimately

disappointing distraction (BCA 8:174), that the ‘self-cherishing mind’ is always dissatisfied (BCA 8:176), that being non-attached is fruitful (ibid., 8:177), that there is good reason to be non-attached since the body is disgusting (ibid., 8:178) and temporary (ibid., 8:179) and ultimately the cause of personal suffering (ibid., 8:180) and that those who want to look after the interests of their bodies because they are attached to them ought to realise that they are also attached to others and so we should look after their interests:

Those who are fond of this body are said to be my friends. Why are those who are fond of their own body not also dear to me?

(BCA 8:183; Crosby and Skilton, 1995, p. 104) The unattached person has no compunction about giving their body away (in terms of its use) to others since it will be used to work for their well-being (BCA 8:184).

Finally there is a revisiting of the Bodhisattva vow to work tirelessly for the well-being of other sentient creatures and never to give in to distractions or weakness of any kind (BCA 8:185-6) and to meditate on what will give the highest level of clarity (ibid., 8: 186/7).143

A very simplified encapsulation of this chapter is that we start with physical and mental preparation for the meditation, we meditate on the transitory and

unappealing nature of our bodies and the distracting desires of our minds, then we realise that we are equal to, not better than, others and that attachment to self is the cause of all the problems in the world. Non-attachment to self means not despising self but exchanging anything good about it for the sufferings of others and in that way making the best contribution we can to the ending of existing duųkha and ensuring that you do not contribute to the creation of duųkha in the future.

In document Ethics in Schopenhauer and Buddhism (Page 98-101)