The literature into civil wars indicates that civil wars last longer than international wars by more than six times (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2004, p. 253). While some state that the upsurge of civil wars was strongly associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, others report that on-going civil conflicts had been steadily, almost linearly, rising from the end of World War II (Fearon 2004, p.
275). The importance of sophisticated management in handling domestic armed conflicts has dramatically increased since the end of the Cold War. It is assumed that external interventions are a form of crisis and conflict management (Regan 2002, P.
55). Useful material, which allows the author to ‘test’ both the Cunningham (2010) and Regan (2002) models, is explored, providing a further justification for this research project in addition to exploring the Darfur Crisis. In this section, the literature on the role of third parties in internal armed conflicts, including factors that affect their expected duration, will be elaborated upon.
After reviewing existing literature, it is noticed that studies conducted to investigate the duration of armed conflicts have been separated into two main categories. Firstly, studies concentrated on the key internal factors that lead to the eruption of any civil war, including the attributes of the societies where the armed conflict occurs, and the
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economic, political, and geographic factors, as well as the internal conflict parties and their capabilities to wage war and achieve military victory or reach a negotiated end. In the second category studies focused on the impact of external involvement in internal wars. Types of interventions (whether political and diplomatic, economic, or military) and their effects on the duration of the civil conflict have been also addressed. Understanding the factors that control the duration of civil conflicts is crucially vital in examining how the duration of those conflicts can be affected by the role of external third-party intervention, the Darfur conflict in particular.
Existing literature into the factors that impact the expected duration of civil wars examined this topic from a variety of angles. Wagner (2000, p. 449) and Cunningham (2010, p. 116) similarly argue that the duration of warfare is driven by factors that affect the ability of one side to achieve decisive military victory and/or affect the willingness of each side to reach a negotiated settlement. Those factors can be significantly affected by external actors within the existing approach of external interventions in civil wars. In other research Cunningham (2006, p. 876) indicates that there are three approaches to understanding factors that can affect war termination. Firstly, the economic dimension, which focuses on the costs of warfare.
Secondly, the military dimension that examines how military position on the battlefield can be the key element of determining demands and form the final outcome of negotiations. There is also the diplomatic approach that addresses incentives that motivate parties to engage in a serious settlement process (Cunningham 2006).
Recently, scholars have begun to focus on the influence of third parties on the duration of civil conflicts as a main approach instead of limiting their analysis solely to the diplomatic instruments and their effectiveness in ending the internal conflict (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008). The basic expectations of outside interventions, be they diplomatic, military or economic, are that they would shorten a conflict's expected length, and the key motivation of these interventions is to manage the civil armed conflicts effectively (Gates and Strand 2004). Studies that have been conducted on the duration of internal wars have revealed that once a civil war starts, its duration depends critically on the balance of power and military capability between the rebels and the government (Elbadawi 2000).
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While a few studies have directly shed light on the duration of civil war, a handful of scholars have examined how it can be affected by outside regional or international actors. Some external interveners might seek to end the Darfur Crisis for humanitarian reasons. Other third parties have their own incentives to prolong the duration of the war with a view of plundering the natural resources of the civil war state, or draining the resources of a rival intervening actor (Balch‐Lindsay and Enterline 2000). Several studies have concluded that a variety of roles can be played by external state actors along the civil conflict's development, from urging the opposition to sit down at the negotiating table, offering incentives to groups to negotiate, hosting negotiations, deploying peacekeepers or peace enforcers, and providing economic or military support to either side (Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004;
Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Salehyan 2007; Gleditsch 2007).
Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis (2000) developed a formal theoretical framework to explore the basic determinants that contribute to the expected duration of civil wars. They tested the duration of intrastate conflict by examining the role of two different variables, external interventions and the degree of ethnic fragmentation of society, to predict the length of internal wars. The results of Elbadawi and Sambanis’ research show that ethnic wars tended to last longer and were harder to resolve than other types of internal wars. Moreover, like Patrick Regan (2002) they revealed that long war duration is positively related to outside interventions. Other authors have found that external interventions that support rebel movements against extremely autocratic governments typically would lead to a growth in rebel forces over time; furthermore, rebel mobilisation would be easier, which would have a significant impact on the duration of civil wars. Additionally, Elbadawi and Sambanis argue that to reduce the expected duration of internal wars there should be appropriate initiatives or strategies that are compatible with each case separately (Elbadawi 2000). Arguably, if it is agreed that outside interventions in ethnically diverse societies would not shorten a conflict’s duration because of a high level of rebel mobilisation. Intervening in other types of civil conflicts when driven by ideology, concerns for poverty, and political marginalisation would, however, be shorter because the rate of rebel mobilisation in those conflicts will be lower.
Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2004) investigated the factors that might account for the onset of civil conflict and its duration within the estimated hazard functions
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model, using a large-scale dataset on wars over 40 years between 1960 and 2000.
They empirically explored how the course of civil wars is systematically determined by two main different factors from their onset: structural circumstances prevailing prior to war and/or the conditions during conflict duration. They report that long civil war duration basically results from three major factors: low per capita income, high levels of inequality, and ethnic divisions. By contrast, a decline in the prices of exported primary commodities, and outside military intervention towards opponents are factors that have the most fundamental influence to end internal war in a short period. In general Collier and Hoeffler suggest that civil war is more likely to occur in countries where national income is largely dependent on the exportation of primary commodities (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2004).
The above review indicates that the authors attributed the key factors leading to the beginning of any civil war to economic determinants. The types of natural resources that countries have and the size of national revenues coming from those resources could make those countries more prone to civil war. Accordingly, it can be argued that the onset of civil wars depends on external considerations, precisely because the prices of primary commodities that countries export are directly associated with the international markets. In such a case, war duration would be related to the international economic circumstances during the internal conflict. Focusing mainly on the effect of natural resources and national revenue from exportation of primary commodities on the duration of internal wars results in the more reasonable argument that there is a great likelihood that the duration of civil war that breaks out in countries that have significant natural resources would be longer than in countries that do not. This is because those resources constitute easy sources of rebel finance.
Thus, access to these resources by the opposition implies that the risk of rebellion will be increased.
James D. Fearon (2004) investigates the expected duration of civil wars in terms of how long they last, and the possible obstacles that could undermine reaching a long-lasting negotiated settlement using a game-theoretic model of credible commitments.
He argues that a lack of military capability for either side to disarm the other is the key factor prolonging civil wars, leading to military stalemate. Conversely, they can be shortened when conditions favour a decisive victory. Fearon found that internal wars are shorter than those arising out of coups or popular revolutions. He reasons
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that these types of approaches for change usually favour decisive victories. More specifically, he argues that taking state power requires a quick process to achieve objectives which basically rely on defections that occur within the security and military apparatus. Leaders of such change movements are very often not willing to negotiate deals with government, as this would threaten their ability to bargain and even their lives (Fearon 2004). Nevertheless, civil wars related to land or natural resource disputes between state-supported migrants from a dominant ethnic group and peripheral ethnic minority are usually long-lived. These types of wars are mainly seen as military competitions as each combatant attempts to render the other unable to continue fighting, or seeks to exact more losses that force the other side to accept a negotiated settlement. An imbalance of military capabilities is vital for a decisive victory. Fearon shows that the state has numerous influences on the likelihood of a long-running stable peace. Negotiated settlements are quite achievable when the military capacity of the state is stronger than that of the rebels.
The state's military capacity and its ability to eliminate any rebellion tend to reduce the chances of a conflict lasting for a longer period of time. On the other hand, the military weakness of the state motivates rebels to continue fighting and increase their demands, undermining the efforts of a negotiated settlement and thus prolonging the duration of war. Furthermore, Fearon suggests that the expected duration of internal military conflict will be longer when the financial capability of insurgent groups is based primarily on contraband goods resources, such as diamonds and illegal drugs.
Rather than examining the impact of outside intervention in the determination of the crisis as Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) and Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004) did, Fearon looks at different angles where he studies the duration of civil wars through particular internal factors.
Cunningham (2006) offered a theoretical framework for understanding how the duration of internal wars, and the negotiation processes to end them, can be affected by the involvement of multiple parties in the conflict. He argues that the duration of internal wars with more actors is expected to be longer, and attributes this to the fact that actors can only accept a settlement that meets their own interests. The potential to end the conflict through the negotiated settlement is therefore less. Hence these 'veto players' tend to be a part of the problem instead of a part of the solution. The author found that the termination of internal wars is significantly associated with the
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number of actors who are veto players. He explains that whenever the number of conflict parties is more than two it is much more difficult to reach an end, because the differences in information, and shifting alliances and incentives to hold-out make a negotiated settlement more difficult. This brought him to emphasise that to have a good understanding about the duration of civil wars and their termination, it must be recognised that the hypothesis that civil war is a two-party phenomenon is no longer valid.
Cunningham provides three suggestions for policymakers who are directly involved in responding to internal conflicts. Firstly, reducing the number of primary veto players (external actors in particular) involved in civil war is vital. This can be done through looking for ways to remove the actors who are the major barriers of a negotiated resolution. He perceives that multi-party conflicts are less likely to be resolved than those involving two actors. The other suggestion is that the external parties who are involved in contributing to halting internal wars must indicate a strong willingness to reach an agreement that includes all fighting parties.
Furthermore, the main insurgents should be included in the peace process by encouraging them to participate in negotiations that ultimately lead to an end to civil war. Cunningham found this is a significant approach for achieving long-term stability. Finally, he revealed that if reaching a comprehensive agreement between veto players was not possible, international actors should attempt to make a domestic peace agreement among the government and the strongest internal opposition groups, and then seek to integrate the smaller groups. This tends to increase the chance of serious negotiations leading to a feasible and successful settlement (Cunningham 2006). Thus, if the main international actors have not successfully reached an agreement regarding the mode of dealing with the situation in Darfur, or have not successfully removed and/or isolated the major barriers to taking a decisive decision to end the conflict, the expected duration of the conflict will be longer.
According to Aysegul Aydin and Regan (2011) while researchers of peace-building in civil wars have paid a good deal of attention to the influence that collective intervention – in the framework of international and regional organisations – might have on the termination of civil war, some mechanisms within the conflict process that affect the expectations of civil war duration have not yet been fully explored.
Investigators have paid less attention to the role that unilateralism plays in the
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duration of internal wars through focusing on how this duration can be impacted upon by unilateral interventions undertaken by third party states, without prior coordination with these organisations. They contend that unilateral interventions by third-party states have a cumulative influence on conflict resolution depending on the interveners' interrelations. Aydin and Regan believe that regardless of the self-interests of third-party interveners, unilateral interventions undertaken by state actors that have critical cooperative relations creates potential to facilitate the war's end in a short period.
The writers’ network approach has highlighted the dependencies between third-party states’ unilateral efforts and modelled interveners’ roles through their interrelations.
Aydin and Regan offer a new model of civil war intervention that regards the degree of interactions among the intervening states and their coalitions as essential as the interventions themselves in shaping combatants’ preferences. This is import because the disagreement between the interveners creates new conditions of bargaining and results in intense competition between interveners for influence over the competing factions. This in turn encourages the opposition to escalate their initial demands, because a decisive action to end the war is not expected to be undertaken by external interveners, which makes the period of civil war longer (Aydin and Regan 2011). It is agreed that whenever the intervening states have less capability to act collectively to force a certain course of ending civil wars, these wars last longer, and vice versa.
An article by Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) considered the influence of third-party interventions on civil wars during the period 1816-1997 within the historical framework of competing risks, relying upon the competing risks approach.
They argue that third-party interventions must be regarded as central to the interstate war process, a process that is characterised by the duration of hostilities and the outcome. Their analysis reports that distinguishing between the lengths of time to different civil war outcomes is vital. They posit that two dimensions of civil war duration and outcomes are observable manifestations of the civil war process and are causally interdependent. Throughout this process, the probability of different types of outcomes is a function of various political, economic, and social factors.
The research results suggest that third-party intervention can be the key factor that plays a decisive role in the development of internal wars, as it has different effects on
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civil war duration to different civil war outcomes. The authors argue that while third-party intervention increases the potential of the supported opposition groups achieving military victory, third-party interventions that are biased increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. Yet, third-party interventions on both sides reduce the probability of a negotiated settlement and make civil wars last longer (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008).
The authors’ work sheds light on the significant differences in the dynamics of civil wars, and emphasises that civil war is a dynamic process. Relatedly, Karl R.
DeRouen Jr and David Sobek (2004) offer new contributions to the existing literature on civil wars. They find that state capacity has a great impact on the outcomes and the duration of civil wars. According to these authors, the involvement of state capacity can be observed in two different ways: the type of state, and governmental army size. While an effective state bureaucracy reduces the chances of rebel victory, regime type and the strength of the government's army do not appear to significantly increase the likelihood of governmental victory.
On the other hand, other results outside the state’s influence are also generated. They show that UN involvement greatly underpins the probability of a truce or treaty. In terms of time, the involvement of the UN in civil wars tends to prolong the expected duration for both government and rebels to achieve victory, while shortening the period of time needed before reaching a negotiated settlement, whether in a truce or treaty form. In addition, the researchers’ analyses show that rebels have less capability to achieve a decisive victory in ethnic, identity, or religious wars, especially in those extremely heterogeneous countries (Karl and Sobek 2004).
A study carried out by Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala (2005) probes the potential influence of geographical factors and the strategic ambitions of rebels on the duration of armed civil conflicts. Their central themes are determining the strategic motivations of the rebel groups to reveal their fundamental aims, including whether the conflict is being fought for territorial secession or conquest of the government.
This is because the rebels’ goal type will impact the course of the civil conflict, where it is fought, and the possibility of one party achieving military victory. They found that drawing on a simple dummy variable for assessing whether the strategic
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ambitions of the rebels has a significant influence on the duration of civil conflicts does not provide sufficient information with regard to territory.
In order to examine how the duration of conflicts can be affected by geographic factors, the writers argued that the location of the conflict is importantly associated with the period of time, especially in terms of location of natural resources that can be seized. Proximity of the conflict zone to international borders also sustains armed civil conflict. Furthermore, in their attempt to assess the capability of rebel groups to sustain civil conflict, the results report that if the rebel groups have access to
In order to examine how the duration of conflicts can be affected by geographic factors, the writers argued that the location of the conflict is importantly associated with the period of time, especially in terms of location of natural resources that can be seized. Proximity of the conflict zone to international borders also sustains armed civil conflict. Furthermore, in their attempt to assess the capability of rebel groups to sustain civil conflict, the results report that if the rebel groups have access to