304 Both Kayumba and Karegeya escaped. Rudasingwa and Gahima were allowed to Exit but were constantly watched to see if they were speaking with estranged groups (Rudasingwa 2013).
Rwanda National Congress
Kagame + Family + Loyal Senior
Officers
Exit Loyalty
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the structures they have built, while sustaining their own power” (Tilly 2003, 35).
This occurs through highlighting the threat of the FDLR in the DRC or donors’
threats to withdraw aid. When individual elites decide to exit, they must justify their decisions either by attacking Kagame’s credibility or demonstrating that they are not motivated by material reasons. Donor support has provided the RPF with the
flexibility to exclude elites and discipline those who are perceived as threats. The significance of donor support is understood by rival elites, who use their positions abroad to question Kagame’s legitimacy.305
All of these shifts have occurred within an environment of secrecy (because of the threat of violence within Rwanda). Elites have little opportunity to voice their protest, often out of fear and distrust of other elites. The option of exit is also
restricted since the President (or other senior officers) has direct control over
authorising international travel.306 The dominant coalition demands loyalty but many elites within Rwanda are looking for an opportunity to exit.307 Administrative
positions in embassies are distributed carefully. These positions are used as ways to steer senior cadres away from positions of power in the military or reward older cadres for their loyalty.308 Other officials are kept waiting for long periods of time without being given jobs. A preferred option for excluded elites is to join the private sector (which military officials are not ‘allowed’ to do while they are in service).309 This is akin to giving individuals rents in exchange for silence. Ensuring donors and senior cadres remain loyal is central to legitimising RPF rule.
Reshuffles among upper echelons of the military and cabinet are ways of ensuring elites continue to compete against each other by proving their loyalty within the formal RPF structure. It also ensures that existing networks of support for elites
305 In 2015, David Himbara (2015) spoke at a US Congressional Hearing about Rwanda, accusing Kagame of human rights abuses and violence against opponents.
306 Such claims were evident in informal conversations with several military officials.
307 Many military and government officials expressed a desire to work and study abroad. However, they said “the boss” would have to grant it. The boss was always Kagame, no matter what the rank (although all of these respondents were high-ranking officials).
308 One interview, senior RPF cadre, May 2013; Two Interviews, senior RPF cadres, January 2015.
309 Spouses of military officers are allowed to work in the private sector. Rose Kabuye, the former Chief of State Protocol and Kigali’s first mayor, was loyal to the dominant coalition. However, her relationship with Kagame cooled after Kayumba went into exile. She eventually ‘retired’ and joined her husbands’ businesses, Virunga Logistics and Startech Limited. She said: “I was done. I’m always here to serve a country but it was time to give youth an opportunity” (Interview, May 2013). Her husband, David Kabuye, was a former RPF cadre and had been a businessman in Kigali for several years. David Kabuye continued to be a member of the reserve force.
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are broken up. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has changed twice since 2010.
Generals Kabarebe and Charles Kayonga were removed from their posts and transferred to administrative jobs.310 Patrick Nyamvumba has been the new CDS since 2013. He had served as Force Commander for the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in Darfur for four years. Shifting Kabarebe out of the position of CDS removed him from a position of immediate threat but encouraged him to stay loyal as the Minister of Defence. Kayonga’s removal as CDS mirrors Kayumba’s treatment in the earlier 2000s when Kayumba was sent to India. Some senior cadres are often reintegrated into power structures. Among such individuals is Karenzi Karake, the head of NSS. In the aftermath of Kayumba’s escape in 2010 and Ingabire’s arrest, Karake and Charles Muhire (former Chief of Staff of the Air Force) were arrested.311 Later, he was reintegrated as head of the NSS in 2011. Verhoeven (2012) suggests that the elevation of the popular Karake was a way of retaining the support of senior cadres. Reshuffles such as these place the onus on troublesome cadres to be loyal to the RPF.
Another move in recent years has been the replacement of older military cadres with new, younger cadres. Ex-FAR and former FDLR soldiers have also been reintegrated. By 1998, 38,500 ex-FAR officers were reintegrated into the army (Jowell 2014). Former FAR and FDLR officers now occupy senior positions across Rwandan government branches. Examples include Paul Rwarakabije (Rwanda Correctional Services), Jerome Ngendahimana (Deputy Chief of Staff – Reserve Force), Daniel Ufitikirezi (RSSB), Andre Habyarimana (Head of Reserve Force, Northern Province), Evariste Murenzi (Commanding Officer of the Rwanda
Mechanised Infantry Battalion) and Albert Murasira (CSS Zigama). Recently, there have been two large spurts of retirements. In 2013, 79 officers were retired from the RDF including six generals (Tabaro 2013a). In July 2014, a further 483 RDF officers were retired including two generals and eight colonels (Karuhanga 2014).312 The retirement age was set at 55 for generals, 50 for other senior officers (the ranks of major and colonel) and 50 for non-commissioned officers. Increasing Hutu numbers
310 Kabarebe moved on to become Minister of Defence and was replaced by Kayonga in 2010.
Kayonga was appointed Ambassador to China in 2013.
311 Muhire previously publicly disagreed with Kagame’s actions (Clark 2010). He held command positions during the liberation effort. From 1995 to 1997, he was Chief of Plans, Operation and Training at RPA headquarters. He was Chief of Staff of the Air Force for 13 years. In 2010, he was named Chief of Staff of the Reserve Force. In July 2014, he retired.
312 Retirees’ entitlements include three years of gross salary (Karuhanga 2014).
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now make up most of the RDF. The RDF is mixed ethnically, regionally and by country of birth (Jowell 2014). Government ministries retain few senior cadres who occupied prominent positions during the liberation effort and in the 1990s. One report argued that Protais Musoni and Tharcisse Karugaruma were among the last senior cadres in ministerial positions (Kagire 2013). The leading figures in official RDF posts are younger and more educated in Kagame’s representation of RPF ideology than older cadres, who had helped build it.
The dominant coalition has sharpened its public discourse, publicly stressing the importance of placing the national effort above individual priorities. In a Rwanda Today article (Special Correspondent 2014), eight powerful individuals including Rose Kabuye, Patrick Mazimhaka and Tharcisse Karugaruma were described as having “fallen from limelight.” The party-owned newspaper, The New Times, replied to the article reiterating that the RPF defined itself on three principles: “efficiency, accountability and delivery.” The article emphasised that there are “no sacred cows”
within the party and aggrieved cadres have an “internal transparent mechanism of addressing issues” (The New Times 2014). Kagame loyalist Nshuti Manasseh reinforced these ideals, stressing that many of the older cadres are no less ‘iconic’.313 Instead, Manasseh (2014) writes, “there is a time to go and do other private
engagements that are beneficial to the country.”
While older cadres may have “fallen from the limelight”, they continue to wield influence in determining the balance of power between Kagame’s dominant coalition and the RNC. By staying inside Rwanda, these cadres remain a threat to the dominant coalition and represent an opportunity for the RNC. Their choices have an impact on the relative holding power between the two coalitions. Some like
Kabarebe and Karake occupy formal positions of authority but are also potential rivals whose loyalty could shift the power balance between the two coalitions. The dominant coalition attacks the public image of the RNC and has designated the organisation as a threat.314 The rivalry between Kagame’s dominant coalition and the
313 Manasseh previously served as Minister of Trade and Commerce, and Minister of Finance. He was also Chairman of CVL till 2013. He retains his position as a Presidential Advisor and has written articles in 2013, expressing support for Kagame to extend his presidential term beyond 2017.
314 The government claimed that the RNC had begun recruiting students at the National University of Rwanda (Musoni 2014b).
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RNC takes the form of public attacks on the values of their rival group.315 Regardless of whether such charges are accurate, the stigma associated with corruption
delegitimises the moral authority of the accused.316 Kagame said of the RNC: “Most of those you know have cases to answer, with clear evidence to show for it. It is not my job to explain why they went or what they embezzled” (Kagire 2014a).
Kagame has also been accused of favouring some loyalists. A parliamentary report alleged mismanagement of funds in the construction of the Rukarara
hydropower project in 2011. The report highlighted the involvement of high-profile loyalists including John Rwangombwa317 and Kampeta Sayinzoga318 (although the report left out the name of James Musoni who was Minister of Finance when the project was commissioned).319 Punishments were not imposed though 30 people were questioned in 2012 (Karinganire 2012). Rwangombwa stressed that they “had all the required documents.” Such favouritism contradicts the RPF narrative.
However, retaining the support of technicians and some loyal political figures is necessary to strengthen the dominant coalition.
Estranged RPF members are faced with a choice: stay loyal to the national cause or choose to Exit and join the RNC. Other options are somewhere in between where elites are bought off to stay in Rwanda or leave (but choose not to protest).
Fear and the threat of violence are used to force senior cadres to remain silent. In situations when exit is controlled, as Hirschman’s (1993) analysis of East Germany
315 Members of the dominant coalition are constantly changing and elites compete with each other for these positions. This group includes individuals who occupy prominent formal positions within the military and the party (and have occupied them for some time). Nziza and Musoni are prominent Loyalists in the military and political wings (Interviews). Others have included Kabarebe, Charles Kayonga, Patrick Nyamvumba, Nziza, Ndahiro, Dan Munyuza, Agnes Bingwaho (the former family paediatrician and now, Minister of Health), Inyumba (before she passed away), Nshuti Manasseh, John Rwangombwa, Kampeta Sayinzoga, Claver Gatete, John Rwangombwa and Martin Ngoga.
316 The RPF is not the only political party in Africa to stigmatise the corrupt in this way (Olivier de Sardan 1999).
317 Rwangombwa has been the BNR Governor since 2013. He has previously served as both Minister of Finance (2009-2013) and Permanent Secretary in MINECOFIN (2005-2009).
318 Sayinzoga has been Permanent Secretary at MINECOFIN since 2009 (when she was just 27). She is also the wife of Kagame’s nephew. She is extremely popular with donors who see her as one of the brightest Rwandan officials (Interviews with embassy officials).
319 Musoni joined the RPF in 1990 (Mushemeza 2007). He has previously served as Mayor of the City of Kigali, Commissioner General of the RRA (2001-2005), Minister of Commerce (2005-2006), Minister of Finance (2006-2009) and was later Minister of Local Government (2009-2014). He is currently the Minister of Infrastructure. In 2012, a Rwanda Focus article challenged Musoni’s practices, alluding to him as “the main godfather, the chief manipulator, the master of intrigue, the boss of machinations… who has built a formidable network of political minions in important institutions” (Kanuma 2012).
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shows, voice is often agitated. Elite resistance does occur, similar to Scott’s
‘everyday forms of resistance.’320 This resistance takes various forms. Examples include breaking party rules, occasionally testing the party line, foot-dragging and speaking to people to whom they are not supposed to speak.321 The threat of violence and the appeasement of elites through rents (which goes against RPF values) are the only options available to restrain the use of voice by disenchanted elites. Another strategy used to force the loyalty of elites is the use of rhetorical commonplaces of
‘self-reliance’ that draws on the shared experiences of the liberation effort.
Three events are explored to show how they affected the elite bargain. In 2012, the Rwandan government was forced by donors to withdraw its support for the March 23 Movement (M23), a DRC-based rebel group linked to Rwanda. This reignited tensions within the RPF.322 Elites had previously disagreed with Kagame’s decision to put Laurent Nkunda, the leader of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), under house arrest in 2009.323 These elites retained interests in the DRC – both material and in the form of personal loyalties with former soldiers.
Other elites were “sick of war” and were no longer convinced the FDLR posed a significant threat.324 Kagame’s choice to bow to international pressure highlighted the necessity of retaining international support. As tensions resurfaced between RPF elites, Kagame astutely used the Agaciro Development Fund (AgDF) to bind the elite together by creating “an invisible army of the nation” (Kagame 2012b).325
“The fund came up when there was blackmail from the international community. It is not really the fund that was
important but the mentality of collectiveness that came with it.”326 The AgDF was used as a symbol of self-reliance and drew directly on the collective experiences of vulnerability of senior cadres. The official line remained
320 Scott (1985, 29) terms this as “the prosaic but constant struggle between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labour, food, taxes, rents, and interest from them.”
321 Personal observations of elite resistance.
322 Interviews conducted in May 2013 with military officials.
323 Observations made through interviews with serving military officers.
324 Powerful older cadres such as Kayonga and Muhire were perceived to support this line.
325 The AgDF was conceived in the 2011 National Dialogue. In 2012, it was launched as a sovereign wealth fund, initiated by voluntary contributions of Rwandans to help secure financial autonomy.
326 Interview, Nzabamwita, January 2015.
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that the withdrawal of aid had bound the elite to a common purpose – “they thought this would weaken us but it had the opposite effect.”327
“Our fund started when donors stopped their funding. People were uncomfortable about the DRC and how Rwanda was being unfairly treated. We can have a buffer – a solidarity fund. All Rwandans then gave what they could and the leadership led by example.”328
Second, two assassination attempts were attributed to Kigali in 2014. Out of the two targets, Kayumba survived while Karegeya died.329 Initially, Kagame did not deny allegations of the RPF’s involvement and did not show remorse when news of Karegeya’s death was received. Kabarebe marked it by saying, “Karegeya chose to be a dog and died like a dog”, while Kagame called him a traitor (Himbara 2014).
The RPF accused Kayumba and Karegeya of supporting the FDLR, assisting enemies of the regime and engaging in terrorist activities.330 Regardless of whether Kigali ordered the attack, the tone of the replies signifies the precarious nature of the elite bargain. These former allies were depicted as traitors and were linked to
supporting security threats. The RPF’s lack of remorse was a signal to those elites who considered supporting the rival coalition. As Wrong (2014) writes, “the more dramatic the retribution, the stronger the reminder of loyalty’s value.”
Third, three prominent RPF cadres – Frank Rusagara, Byabagamba and David Kabuye – were arrested.331 Rusagara and Byabagamba were charged with
“spreading rumours with intent to incite people into rebellion against government and carrying out activities aimed at tarnishing the image of the country”
(Uwiringiyimana 2014). Kabuye was initially charged with illegal possession of a firearm and remanded to jail for 30 days (Musoni 2014c). However, he completed a six-month sentence and was arrested on his release for “inciting insurrection and insulting senior government officials” (Special Correspondent 2015). As of April 2015, the court cases against Rusagara and Byabagamba were still being pursued.
327 Interview, Nzabamwita, May 2013.
328 Interview, Vianney Kagabo, AgDF, January 2015.
329 Karegeya advised South African and Tanzanian intelligence, who sent their troops to the DRC to counter the M23. Karegeya’s support of enemies was a direct affront to the RPF (Gatehouse 2014).
330 Gahiji (2014b) accused the FDLR and RNC of holding talks in Tanzania. Lt. Joel Mutabazi, who was accused of terrorist acts, was accused of links to the RNC and FDLR (Musoni 2014d). Kizito Mihigo, a Rwandan musician accused of terrorist acts, was reported to have admitted to links to the RNC and FDLR (Musoni 2014e).
331 Rusagara was previously the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defence and the Commandant of the Nyakinama Military College.
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A few days later, Kagame said (at an RPF meeting):
“No one owes you anything. You cannot go around asking to be paid for the sacrifices of your past. We cannot live in the past. Do not expect to sit back and benefit from the hard work of others.
Don’t tell me about your excellent past when you are not telling me about your excellent present or future.”332
These arrests were part of a series of warnings aimed at senior RPF cadres.
Prominent female RPF cadres, who were wives of two of these officers, were also publicly admonished for speaking out against the government.333 The choice to act against senior cadres demonstrated the fragility of the elite bargain. Other prominent officials resigned in the same period. Angelique Katengwa (of the Rwanda Social Security Board) was charged with illegal tendering and abusing her public office (Musoni 2014f). Jean Damascène Ntawukuriryayo (President of the Senate) resigned after being accused of taking unilateral actions and failing to work with other
senators (Kagire 2014b). Loyalist Makuza replaced him as President of the Senate.
The RPF’s alleged violence or the approval of violence and its actions against senior cadres indicates the weakness and turmoil within the dominant coalition. The RPF fears the emergence of a viable rival faction. North et al. (2009) highlight the fear of factions in LAOs, with factions growing primarily because they assumed they would be better off if they used violence. The RNC’s threat to the dominant coalition had become worrying enough for Kagame to use violence. Decisions have been taken to weaken the RNC and impose fear on those senior cadres who resorted to voice inside Rwanda or were trying to exit. This is similar to Gambetta’s (1993) description of the use of violence by mafiosos in Sicily where the use of violence is a signal that things are not going as planned.
Following the assassination attempt on Kayumba, diplomatic relations between the Rwandan and South African governments reached a deadlock. The South African government accused Rwandan diplomats of attempting to murder refugees living in South Africa. Four Rwandan diplomats were expelled. Rwanda responded by expelling six South African embassy staff (Maylie 2014). An HRW (2014) report, following Karegeya’s death, highlighted RPF violence against exiles.
This reaction was a warning to estranged RPF cadres. Rudasingwa said, “Kagame
332 Musoni (2014g).
333 These cadres were Rose Kabuye and Mary Baine (Kanuma 2014b).
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has never had any support among the Hutus; Tutsi support is fracturing. So he is nervous. He supports himself through fear” (Wrong 2014).
However, the RNC’s decisions have countered the actions expected of those who share a collective memory with other senior cadres. This has detrimentally affected the RNC’s legitimacy within Rwanda and became particularly evident after a BBC documentary, Rwanda’s Untold Story, was aired in October 2014. In the documentary, Rudasingwa, Nyamwasa and other critics accused Kagame of ordering the shooting down of Habyarimana’s plane. Rudasingwa and Nyamwasa had
previously made these allegations. Kagame (Smith 2014) and the Ngoga Inquiry Committee (Baird 2015) accused the BBC documentary of genocide denial. The RPF also accused the ‘Gang of Four’ of collaborating with the FDLR. The RNC also struggled to work collectively as an organisation. Recent reports suggest that there
previously made these allegations. Kagame (Smith 2014) and the Ngoga Inquiry Committee (Baird 2015) accused the BBC documentary of genocide denial. The RPF also accused the ‘Gang of Four’ of collaborating with the FDLR. The RNC also struggled to work collectively as an organisation. Recent reports suggest that there