Expectations on the use of clientelism

Characterizing voters by their affiliation with the parties campaigning in the election, and by their like- lihood to turn out, allows us to distinguish the strategy of the mobilization of potential supporters from alternative strategies parties could use. These are rewarding their loyalists, persuasion, and double per- suasion (Nichter, 2008, p. 20), which are illustrated in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3. Table 8.1 summarizes the implied effects of regional and individual-level factors on an individual’s likelihood to be targeted with clientelism, when parties follow the goal of mobilization. It also illustrates the implied effects we would need to see if parties were rather pursuing the goal of rewarding their loyalists, or that of persuasion or double persuasion.

If the dominant party in a region employed a strategy to mobilize its own supporters, we expect it to target voters living in those of its strongholds, where past turnout has been low. These strongholds in our data are characterized by a low level of competitiveness. Within these regions, we expect parties to concentrate clientelistic appeals on their partisans, and particularly on those of them who are unlikely to go and vote. This means that a voter’s affiliation with the dominant party in a region should increase her likelihood to be targeted with clientelism and her probability to turn out should decrease her likelihood to receive an offer to buy her support with clientelism. The competitiveness and the level of past turnout of the region she lives in should decrease her probability to be targeted with clientelism. This leads us to formulate the following expectations:

Individual-level factors

H1: Voters who are affiliated with the dominant party in a region are more likely to be targeted with clientelism than other voters.

H2: The lower a voter’s likelihood to turn out, the more likely she is to be targeted with clientelism.

H3: Voters who are affiliated with the dominant party in a region are more likely to be targeted with clientelism, the lower their likelihood to turn out.

Regional-level factors

H4: The less competitive the region a voter lives in is, the more likely she is to be targeted with clientelism.

H5: The lower the level of past turnout was in the region a voter lives in, the more likely she is to be targeted with clientelism.

As we expect parties to mobilize turnout predominantly among their supporters, we expect them to campaign most in those of their strongholds (non-competitive regions) where turnout has been low. This leads us to the following expectation:

H6: The negative effect of regional-level competitiveness on a voter’s likelihood to be tar- geted with clientelism becomes stronger, the lower past turnout has been in the region she lives in.

To the contrary, if clientelism were used to reward loyalists, we would expect parties to focus this appeal also on their strongholds, but on those regions where past turnout has been high. In addition, we would expect parties to predominantly target those partisans who are likely to turn out. This means that an individual’s affiliation with the dominant party in the region she lives in and her habit to turn out would then increase her likelihood to be addressed with clientelism. Regional-level competitiveness would decrease and regional-level turnout would increase her probability to be targeted with clientelism. Another option is that parties use clientelism to attract independent voters. If they focused clientelistic targeting in competitive regions with high past turnout, and among independent voters, who are likely to turn out, this would imply a goal of persuasion. What we would observe is that a voter’s affiliation with the dominant party in a region would decrease, but her habit to turn out would increase her likelihood to be targeted. Regional-level competitiveness and past turnout would increase her likelihood to be ad- dressed with clientelism.

If parties rather concentrated clientelistic appeals on those competitive regions where turnout has been low and on those independent voters, who are unlikely to go and vote, this would imply the aim of double persuasion. We would observe that the affiliation with the dominant party and her habit to turn

out decreased a voter’s probability to receive an offer to buy her support with clientelism. The competit- iveness of the region she lives in would increase and past regional turnout would decrease her probability to be targeted with clientelism. Lastly, parties could be using clientelism to pay voters to stay away from the polls. As has been described in Chapter 2, this strategy has not been studied as much as turnout- buying and vote-buying. Findings from a formal model suggest that parties should concentrate attempts to buy the abstention of opposed voters who are likely to turn out (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014, pp. 417–418). If parties were pursuing such a strategy, we would hence see that partisans with a high likelihood to turn out are targeted and those voters living in non-competitive regions with histories of high turnout. This would empirically not be distinguishable from a strategy directed at rewarding loyalists. We have not included this strategy in Table 8.1, because we have made the assumption that parties avoid campaigning in rival parties’ strongholds. However, if parties were predominantly using clientelism to pay opposed voters not to vote, this would mean that they overwhelmingly campaign in strongholds of the rival party. We discuss this possibility, nonetheless, when we interpret our results on the use of clientelism.

Table 8.1: Implied effects of regional and individual-level factors on an individuals’ likelihood to be targeted with clientelism

Individual level Regional level

Affiliation with Likelihood to turn out Competitiveness Turnout level GOAL dominant party

Increases likelihood Decreases likelihood Decreases likelihood Decreases likelihood MOBILIZATION Increases likelihood Increases likelihood Decreases likelihood Increases likelihood REWARDING OF

LOYALISTS Decreases likelihood Increases likelihood Increases likelihood Increases likelihood PERSUASION Decreases likelihood Decreases likelihood Increases likelihood Decreases likelihood DOUBLE

PERSUASION