4. Self-reflection and the self in the present I
4.3 Experiment 6
Method
Participants
Sixty 4-year-olds, recruited from three nurseries took part, 30 in the photo-action task (M = 51 months, SD = 5 months, range = 43 - 60 months), and 30 in the pronoun-action task (M = 54.2 months, SD = 6 months, range = 42 – 63 months).
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure were as described for Experiment 5. However, to increase difficulty six extra object outline pictures and recognition cards were now included, bringing the total number of to-be-remembered stimuli to 16. Again, all object outlines were taken from Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s (1980) standardised set.
Results
Recall
Thirty-nine children (M = 54 months) offered free recall, recalling an average of 2.7 objects (SD = 1.4). In the photo-action task an above-chance average of 87%
(SD = 27%) of source-judgements arising from free recall were correct (t (19) = 5.9, p
< 0.01).
97 Recall rates did not show a significant correlation with age in months (r2= .13, p = 0.3) and neither task-type (photo-action task: M = 1.8, SD = 1.6; pronoun-action task: M = 1.7, SD = 1.8; F (1, 56) = 0.008, p = 0.9, ηp2 = 0.00) nor self-awareness condition (mirror present: M = 1.9, SD = 1.9; mirror absent: M = 1.5, SD = 1.5; F (1, 56) = 1.1, p = 0.3, ηp2
= 0.003) had a significant main effect on recall, or combined effects (F (1, 56) = 0.8, p = 0.4, ηp2
= 0.002). Similarly, within- subjects analysis found no recall advantage for self- (M = 0.8, SD = 0.9) over other-referent (M = 0.9, SD = 1.1) stimuli (F (1, 56) = 0.3, p = 0.6, ηp2
= 0.007), regardless of task type (F (1, 56) = 0.2, p = 0.7, ηp2
= 0.005) or self-awareness condition (F (1, 56) = 0.7, p = 0.4, ηp2
= 0.002), or a combination of these factors (F (1, 56) = 2.6, p = 0.1, ηp2
= 0.07).
Recognition
As shown in table 4.3, recognition was above chance overall, for self and for other-related stimuli and for all self-awareness conditions. Recognition rates were significantly positively correlated with age in months (r2= 0.26, p = 0.04). Eleven children (M = 54 months) performed at ceiling, recognising all 16 stimuli. At an average of 83% (SD = 17%) correct, children were significantly above chance at monitoring the source of recognised stimuli in the photo-action task (t (29) = 10.5, p <
0.01). There was no effect of self-awareness condition on accurate source-monitoring (mirror present: M = 82%, SD = 14%; mirror absent: M = 84%, SD = 20%, F (1, 28) = 0.08, p = 0.8, ηp2 = 0.003).
98 Table 4.3: Recognition performance for Experiment 6, split by task type and self-awareness condition
Overall recognition M=12 (75%), SD=4.2 (t (29) = 10.2, p < 0.01)
Overall recognition M=13.1 (81.8%), SD=3.5 (t (29) = 14.1, p < 0.01)
= 0.002) condition had a significant main effect on recognition, nor did these factors interact (F (1, 56) = 0.4, p = 0.5, ηp2 = 0.007). However, 3.5- to 4-year-olds showed a small but significant recognition bias for self-referent stimuli (M = 6.5, SD = 1.9) over other-referent stimuli (M = 6.05, SD = 2.2) (F (1, 56) = 6.1, p = 0.02, ηp2
= 0.1), regardless of task type (F (1, 56) = 0.6, p = 0.4, ηp2
= 0.001), or self-awareness condition (F (1, 56) = 1.3, p = 0.2, ηp2 = 0.02).
99 The combined effects of task-type and self-awareness condition on this SRE approached significance (F (1, 56) = 2.9, p = 0.09, ηp2
= 0.05). To investigate further, task types were analysed separately. In the photo-action task children showed a significant bias for self-referent stimuli (F (1, 28) = 4.6, p = 0.04, ηp2
= 0.1), regardless of self-awareness condition (F (1, 28) = 0.1, p = 0.7, ηp2
= 0.005) (see Table 4.3 for means). The overall SRE in the pronoun action task failed to reach significance (F (1, 28) = 1.7, p = 0.2, ηp2 = 0.06); however, as found for 3-year-olds in Experiment 5 there was a significant interaction between self-reference effects and self-awareness condition (F (1, 28) = 4.9, p = 0.035, ηp2
= 0.15). As evident in Table 4.3, and confirmed by independent analysis, 4-year-olds showed a strong bias for self-referent stimuli when the mirror was present at encoding (F (1, 14) = 9.3, p = 0.01, ηp2 = 0.4).
However, when the mirror was absent they recognised a similar number of self- and other-referent stimuli (F (1, 14) = 0.3, p = 0.6, ηp2
= 0.021).
Comparison of the magnitude of significant SRE in Experiments 5 and 6
In Experiment 5, 3-year-olds showed a significant overall SRE, and this effect was replicated for 3.5- to 4-year-olds in Experiment 6. To confirm that age had no impact on the magnitude of the SRE, the relevant data were brought together (60 3-year-olds Experiment 5, 60 3.5- to 4-3-year-olds Experiment 6) and a repeated-measures ANOVA, including age, task type and self-awareness condition as between-subjects variables was run. This analysis confirmed a significant SRE (F (1, 112) = 17.2, p <
0.001, ηp2 =0.13), with no suggestion of any significant interaction with age-group (F (1, 112) = 0.02, p = 0.8, ηp2 =0.00). The only significant interaction was between task
100 type and self-awareness (F (1, 112) = 5.3, p = 0.02, ηp2 =0.045); this reflected the role of the mirror in driving the SRE in the pronoun task.
Discussion
Experiment 6 confirms that 4-year-olds show a SRE in memory. Just as shown by 3-year-olds in Experiment 5, 4-year-olds showed a bias for the recognition of stimuli which had been presented pictorially or, provided they were self-focused, verbally as part of a self-performed action. As in Experiments 2 to 5, 4-year-olds proved adept at explicitly differentiating between the roles of self and other in an event after a short delay. Together then, Experiments 5 and 6 provide novel evidence that preschool children show both explicit self-other differentiation in memory, and an accompanying self-reference advantage. Although memory capacity generally increased with age, younger and older children showed a similar magnitude of self-bias, providing task difficulty was calibrated to their abilities. This confirms that preschoolers’ cognitive processing of events can be linked to, and is likely to mnemonically benefit from, the activation of self-awareness.
Note though, although mirror-induced self-focus was expected to boost memory for “I” statements, the data suggested that this was not the case. Rather, the mirror-induced SRE was largely attributable to a decrease in recognition of other-referent stimuli (see Figure 4.3, Table 4.3). This result highlights an oversight in the developmental SRE literature. As in our experiments, most developmental studies have relied on comparison of memory for self- and other-referent events experienced in tandem (Pullyblank et al, 1985; Baker-Ward, Hess & Flannigan, 1990; Summers &
101 Craik, 1994; Millward et al, 2000; Sui & Zui, 2005). Crucially though, when self- processing is qualified only in the context of other-processing, it is difficult to conclude that self-processing is independently superior. Rather, it may be that the introduction of self-focused attention detracts from non self-referent processing. For example, in this study, it is difficult to determine whether self-photographs increased self-memories or decreased other memories, relative to the norm.
Importantly, if the SRE is premised on the strength of the concept, self-processing should be superior to other-self-processing even when considered in isolation.
One simple way to test this hypothesis would be to compare self-referent and other-referent processing in separate sessions, or in separate children. Note though, it has been repeatedly suggested that one of the reasons the self-concept is so elaborated (and mnemonically valuable) is that self-reference is our default encoding condition (Catrambone, Beike, & Niedenthal, 1996; Catrambone & Markus, 1987; Fong &
Markus, 1982; Wells, Hoffman & Enzel, 1984). This implies that finding social comparisons which do not involve an aspect of self-referent processing is likely to be challenging. This problem was encountered in Experiment 2, where children showed a mnemonic bias for same-gender characters. Bennett & Sani (2008) report similar difficulties. In their study, when self (for example, “Are you clever?”) and non-self (for example, “Are dogs clever?”) processing was compared between children, many in the non-self condition began to talk of the family pet. Perhaps as a result, the SRE obtained was marginal. This is frustrating, as social processing provides the clearest analogue to self-processing, and so is important in determining if self-bias in memory is a specialised process.
102 Where stimuli are not inherently self-reflective, the SRE appears more likely to be a bottom-up process based on extensive cognitive networking, and less vulnerable to interference effects. For this reason, the self-neutral stimuli used in trait description tasks, or the ownership stimuli used in this volume, may be better suited to tracing the ontogeny of the effect. For attention-based SREs, developmental progression is not expected, as there is reason to believe that both 3- and 4-year-olds have an established capacity for self-focus. Nevertheless, it is likely that selective attention contributes even to conceptually based SREs. The SRE paradigm, whether employing linguistic or visual processing, depends on self-reflection and, as formalised by Duval & Wicklund (1972), this will inevitably lead to self-focus. Importantly, whether the SRE is primarily driven by self-focus, or by cognitive elaboration, the existence of an effect is enough to make clear that self-recognition has a functional impact.
103