Expert Knowledge is biased due to high influence from interest groups

reasons. Firstly, it uses knowledge to increase the legitimacy of its policy proposals; secondly, it is often seen by the public as populated by experts rather than democratically elected politicians (Chari & O'Donovan, 2011; Cini, 2008 ). Hence, interest groups are embedded in a highly complex and multi-layered institutional environment that enables them to successfully pursue their interests (Chari & O'Donovan, 2011;Klüver, Braun, & Beyers, 2015).

Between all the sectors of industries lobbying within the European Commission, the car industry shows an example of the relationship between industries organisations, and lobbying done by each companies (Chari & O'Donovan, 2011). The Association des Constructeurs Europe´ens d’Automobiles (ACEA) is an umbrella group that has between its members 15 of the biggest car manufacturers, which include global car industry leaders such as Volkswagen and Honda (Acea, 2018). ACEA create its positions by achieving consensus among its member companies (Chari & O'Donovan, 2011). This sector association utilizes its knowledge of the policy-making process and use it to steer critical automotive sectors’ issues when they are discussed at the EU Level, but it also acts as a coordinator ensuring that company representatives are in Brussels at the right time (Chari & O'Donovan, 2011). In addition, the Acea Group is not the only one that represents a clear example of business over representation. Research conducted by the Alliance on Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU, 2016) has shown that the representatives of large corporations and their lobby groups in expert groups, within the EC, are clearly more numerous (often the double) than all other non-governmental interests groups together11: from small and medium enterprises

11 _{ALTER-EU, Secrecy and corporate dominance: a study on the composition and transparency of European}

Commission expert group http://www.alter-eu.org/fr/documents/2008/03/secrecy-and-corporate-domi nance (25.3.2008); ALTER-EU, A captive Commission: the role of the financial industry in shaping EU regulation http://www.alter-eu. org/documents/2009/11/captive-commission-financial-industry-shaping-eu-regulation

38

(SMEs) to trade unions, consumers, academia, independent NGOs etc. This can be justified by the fact that major business groups have more financial resources rather than SMEs and NGOs, however it is the Commission’s job to ensure an equal representation in all expert working groups, in order to make sure that all the interests are taken into account (Chari & O'Donovan, 2011).

When considering the members in the RDE-LDV Working Group organized by DG Grow, the group was composed for 78% by interest groups and 22% by Member States12(Figure 3) (European Commission, 2017). Already with this graph, it is clear that the main power was in the hand of interest groups.

Figure 3

Moreover, if we look only at the composition of interest groups we can see that more than 79% of interest groups is composed of car companies and car companies’ associations such as ACEA and CLEPA13 (Figure 4). The second largest interest group for members was composed by NGOs, which only represented 13% of members of the expert working group. Academia and Trade Unions only represented 6% of the members (European Commission, 2017). It is fair to ask why car companies were involved in such a high percentage in a working group with the

(5.11.2009); ALTER-EU, Who’s driving the agenda at DG Enterprise and Industry? The dominance of corporate lobbyists in DG Enterprise’s expert groups, http://www.alter-eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/DGENTR- driving.pdf (14.7.2012); Corporate Europe Observatory, DG Internal Market’s expert groups: More needed to break financial industry’s stronghold (1.12.2011) http://corporateeurope.org/publications/dg-internal-market- expert-groups-more-needed-break-financial-industrystronghold (20.2.2013).

12 _{http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=1295} 13 _{http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=1295}

78% 22%

Members of the RDE-LDV Expert Group

39

aim on strengthening test regulations for car companies. In the answers given by Antionio Tajani, DG Grow former commissioner, to the EMIS Committee with regards to this topic, he clearly stated that the Commission’s in-house expertise was not sufficient to develop and implement new test procedures and that all stakeholders should be involved (Tajani, 2016). The Commission should have organized a more balanced working group to ensure fairer representation (European Parliament, 2017). Because of such a high presence of car manufacturers and car companies, the regulation on emissions was constantly delayed. The evidence of this is found in the report of the European Parliament, where it was clearly noted that car industry representative constantly delayed the approval process on real on-the-road testing, by re-discussing topics that had already been decided and clarified in previous meetings (European Parliament, 2017).

Figure 4

The fact that business interests are so over-represented at the European level firstly can easily leads to biased regulations, since businesses can filter the expertise they provide in base of their own interests. Moreover, in this specific case, business over-representation also causes the postponing of the implementation of new test procedures that could have avoided years of highly unhealthy presence of very strong pollutants in the air.

3%

79% 12%

1% 2% 3…

INTEREST GROUPS PART OF THE RDE-LDV WORKING

GROUP

Academia, Research Institute and Think Tanks

Car Companies/Car Business Associations NGOs Other Organisations Professional Consultancies Trade Unions

40

The high participation of car companies in car transport regulation showed lack of legitimacy, mismanagement and biased regulations (European Parliament, 2017). In addition, it violates the Commission’s own rules for advisory groups, which clearly states that a balanced representation in expert group is required (European Parliament, 2017). Furthermore, it also confirms our expectation that the Commission in-house expertise was clearly influenced by interest groups, in particular by car businesses. In fact, the investigation on the installation of defeat devices was not pursued and a regulation that in heavy-duty vehicles only needed one year to be implemented, in this case took 3-4 years.

In conclusion, car companies could have less stringent tests for more time, investigation was not pursued over illegal defeat devices. In addition, new regulations started to be implemented in a faster way just after the VW scandal was disclosed to the public (European Parliament, 2017). Showing that the Commission started to use expertise in an instrumental way, just when the issue was highly salient for the public.