Explaining Autocracy: the Main Structural Variables

Since the introduction of the structural explanations of democratisation, a significant number of quantitative studies have tested the impact of structural factors on democracy based on different time periods, different regions and different contextual factors (see Chapter 2). The aim of this third chapter is not only to identify potential factors for detailed analysis to re-test the major notions of the structural approach, but also to detect the outliers. This section therefore first provides an overview of the major internal and external factors that relate to democratisation in the existing literature. There is a detailed discussion to scrutinise major variables related to the structural explanation, including level of democracy, economic development, social homogeneity, oil production, religious belief and external factors, such as former colonial influence, receipt of economic support from external powers and number of democratic countries in the surrounding area. After discussion of these variables, the next section describes the data sources and measurement. I derived the data for the independent and intervening variables from existing data sets (see Lieberman 2010: 39). Two principles will be vigilantly emphasised when selecting a database, namely high reliability of measurements or scales and comprehensiveness of data coverage, to ensure that it provides the maximum amount of data to cover most cases around the world. So, what are the most important independent variables as analysed in previous quantitative studies?

Economic Development

Economic development has been regarded as the major independent variable for explaining consolidation of democracy and transition to democracy. As discussed in the previous chapter, the ground breaking study of Lipset (1959) explored economic development as the main requisite for sustaining democracy in Western Europe and North America. In the following years, various research projects have replicated this

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argument and have shown the positive effect of economic development on sustaining democracy (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Coulter 1975; Cutright 1963; Cutright and Wiley 1969; Lipset et al. 1993; Smith 1969). Economic development is not only relevant to democratic consolidation, but there are also many studies which have shown that high levels of economic development have a positive impact on the chance that a country makes a transition to democracy (see Barro 1996; Boix 2011; Colaresi and Thompson 2003: 383; Croissant 2004; Crouch and Morley 1999; Epstein et al. O’Halloran 2006; Lipset 1959; Lipset 1994; Lipset et al. 1993; Narayan et al. 2010; Ravich 2000; Rost and Booth 2008: 635; Rowen 1995; Teorell 2010). Let me just highlight a few examples of these excellent studies., Boix (2011: 827) confirmed the positive effect of economic development on democratic transitions and consolidation with a data set from the early nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth century. Colaresi and Thompson (2003) also found that ‘that when external conditions are controlled, there is qualified confirmation that economic development supports democracy’ (p. 383). In addition, Jensen and Skaaning (2012: 1125) showed that economic development in terms of GDP per capita still has a significant positive effect on political rights and civil liberties. In the context of Asia, Croissant (2004) indicated that social and economic determinants, such as a high level of economic modernisation, positively correlate with democracy. But he also highlighted cases against the grain, e.g. stating that ‘democracy did not emerge despite high socio-economic modernisation (Singapore)’ (pp. 166-168). This is precisely the puzzle I seek to unpack further in the small-N analysis part of this study.

Countries with high levels of economic development can facilitate social development in the society. These intervening variables, including urbanisation, educational level, life expectancy and vibrancy of communication channels are also favourable for transitions to democracy (see Barro 1996; Cullen and Sommer 2011; Cutright 1963: 259; Diamond 2009: 78; Gurses 2011: 173; Halpern and Gibbs 2013; Huntington 1991; Lipset 1994; Lipset et al. 1993; Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008). Another study, which analysed 174 countries from 1960 to 2005, showed that a higher level of schooling (average years of education) had a positive impact on democratisation: ‘[w]hile countries that have remained autocratic over the past three

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decades had 1.72 average years of schooling in 1975, countries that managed to opt out from autocracy had on average 3.59 years of schooling’ (Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008:374). These intervening variables can also be used in the large-N analysis when replicating the findings of the structural approach and when mapping out the deviant autocracies.

Homogenous Society

A homogenous society has also been considered favourable to democratic development (see Barro 1996; Dahl 2000; Gurses 2011: 173). Previous research has been inconclusive, though, with mixed findings. According to Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008: 376), ethnic diversity is not a significant factor in predicting transition to democracy in the third wave of democratisation. However, Mansfield and Snyder (2009: 381-384) illustrated that ethnic diversity, especially when there is conflict between dominant and outsider groups, is very likely to intensify political struggle based on nationalism and result in incomplete democratisation. With quantitative data from 1972 covering 167 countries, Jensen and Skaaning (2012) suggested that not only modernisation but also ethnic fractionalisation have significant positive relationships with democratisation.

Hence, it is not clear whether this variable has an important impact. Moreover, potential deviant autocracies are quite homogenous in general. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (2014), Hong Kong (93.1% Chinese), Macau (92.4% Chinese), Saudi Arabia (90% Arab) and Singapore (74.2% Chinese) are dominated by a single ethnic group. Countries such as Brunei, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are relatively multi-ethnic societies, if we count both national and non- national populaces. Take UAE as an example. According to the latest official government census data, 85% of the total population is non-national, i.e. only 15% are citizens, so the country is dominated by a single ethnic group so to speak (Federal Competiveness and Statistics Authority 2015).

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Religious Belief

Religious belief is another important factor in the literature which may help us to understand transition to democracy. Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) found that ‘there is a significant negative correlation between Muslim share and the likelihood that a non-democratic country will democratise’ (p. 375). Nevertheless, Lust (2011: 168) pointed out that there are different strands of Islam. This implies that the traditional way of measuring the share of Muslims in the total population is biased. With regard to Muslim(-majority) states, Lust (2011) argued that they should be further subdivided four ways: ‘[a] secularist-based state allowing non-state Islamist groups to participate, an Islamic based state allowing such Islamist participation, an Islamic-based state excluding participation of non-state Islamist groups, and a secularist-based state excluding Islamist participation’ (p. 173). Rost and Booth (2008: 649) found that religious factionalism and percentage of Muslims have no relationship to democracy at all. Empirical evidence from the Middle East shows that historical experiences and institutional structures, especially in different types of Muslim- majority states, may affect the likelihood of democratisation. Islamic society is not necessarily anti-democracy, however, as the absolute power of incumbents in high income countries such as Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia has been challenged in recent political uprisings (see Bellin 2012; Brynen et al. 2012; Matthiesen 2013).

Oil Producing Country

Being an oil producing country is often regarded an important factor impeding democratic progress (see Ross 2001: 327-328). Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008: 376) boldly suggest that oil producing countries are ‘always autocratic’. To illustrate this idea, Diamond (2009) used the example of Russia to explain why it failed to

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emerge as a legitimate democracy in recent years even though Russia has notable economic growth and development. He suggests that a ‘distorted type of economic growth has been occurring in Russia—very dependent on natural resources—and occurring in a way that has actually given more resources, more control, and more political power to the existing authoritarian ruling elites’ (p. 80). To further explain the underlying logic, Crystal (1989: 430-441) clarified how oil revenues facilitate coalition building between rulers and merchants to stabilise the regime. Recently, Amundsen (2014: 185) provided a detailed discussion of how the ruling elites monopolise power and block democratisation. Cross country analysis also supported the claim that natural-resource wealth impedes transition to democracy (Ulfelder 2007).

New findings in recent years supported the opposite conclusion, however. A large-N empirical study focused on the Muslim world from 1972 to 1999, and showed that oil-rich countries have a potentially positive effect on democratisation (Gurses 2009: 523). Gurses (2011) also used ‘fuel’ and ‘ores and metals exports’ to measure the effect on democratic development of countries’ dependence on exporting natural resources, arguing that

‘the emergence of natural-resource-rich democracies (e.g., Mexico, Chile, Indonesia) in the aftermath of the Cold War coupled with those democracies that have proven durable despite (or because of) substantial natural resources (e.g., Botswana, Trinidad and Tobago) have raised a more complex view of the relationship between natural resource wealth and the endurance of democracy’ (p. 172).

To counteract the claim that oil production may be alien to democracy, Liou and Musgrave (2014) used timing effects to analyse the cases of Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Trinidad and Tobago to show that ‘[m]ost of the countries we investigate did not become more authoritarian than we would have expected even without an influx of oil income’ (p. 1604). Likewise, a recent regression analysis shows that oil producing countries are not hindering democracy (Ahmadov 2013). In addition, Bearce and Hutnick (2011: 706) identified a new variable, ‘net immigration per capita’, as an important intervening variable to explain lack of democratisation among resource-rich countries. After controlling for this variable, GDP per capita still maintains a positive relationship with democracy. Based on the

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above findings and in view of the recent ‘Arab Spring’, it would seem that oil-reliant countries are not necessarily alien to democracy (see Butcher 2014: 736). Given the latest findings and recent political developments among oil producing countries, it is reasonable to expect that this factor only has a marginal effect on democratisation.

Inequality

The interplay of elites, such as middle class is also crucial for democratisation. Moore’s (1966:418) famous dictum, ‘no bourgeoisie, no democracy’, suggest that the middle class plays an important role in the transition to democracy. The size of the middle class can be useful in explaining democratic transitions (Doorenspleet 1997) and democratic consolidation (Inglehart 1988). But if the society is highly stratified, income and economic resources are highly concentrated among a small elite in a way that is unfavourable for the emergence of a middle class and the development of democracy.

Indeed, Moore’s thesis has been challenged in recent studies. Bernhard (2016) analysed post-communist societies to show that ‘in 1989 we witnessed for the first time the emergence of democracy without a bourgeoisie in Moore’s sense’ (p. 123). Boix and Stokes (2003) also implied that ‘democracy is caused not by income per se but by other changes that accompany development, in particular, income equality’ (p. 540). Similar arguments can be found in Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), highlighting that elites or a landowning class continually act to impede democratisation. Recent studies also stress the important role of inequality in the process of democratisation, such as elite support in oil producing countries (Gurses 2011: 173) and the effect of adjusting taxation in highly unequal countries, which increase the plausibility of democratisation (Yi 2012).

Haggard and Kaufman (1995 and 1997) used the economic approach to highlight the importance of inequality and its effect on democracy. Basically, the poor prefer democracy, whereas the rich prefer (right-wing) dictatorship. To that extent,

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the socio-economic background of the ruling elites is crucial in the process of political transition and democratisation. If right-wing actors take power, they will be reluctant to promote democracy. Nevertheless, Teorell (2010) argued that ‘[t]he greatest drawback of the economic approach, to date, is its relative lack of empirical corroboration’ (p. 27). To address this issue, Chapter 4 will provides a detailed elaboration of the interaction between elites with a neo actor-based approach to understand how business and professional elites seize power during the period of transition.

External Factors

In the process of transitions to democracy, it is not uncommon to notice cases where democratic institutions are imposed by external actors. International forces generally refer to pressure from powerful states in the region, ‘demonstration effects, the collapse of regional hegemons, and regional economic crises’ (Hawkins 2001: 447). Haggard and Kaufman (2012) also made the following claim, ‘[e]xternal actors were decisive in some cases’ (p. 496). Colaresi and Thompson (2003) also claimed that ‘the international environment significantly alters the prospects for democracy. External threats from other states decrease the likelihood of democracy’ (p. 383). In the cases of former Soviet states, the package of economic incentives offered by the European Union may become ‘the most powerful incentives for democratic behavior… but you have to have political actors in the target countries that are willing to respond to incentives and cultural and social circumstances that provide at least some political pluralism and scope for influence’ (Diamond 2009: 85).

However, the desirability of exporting democratic systems from developed countries to developing nations is being questioned. Barro (1996) found that ‘political freedoms tend to erode over time if they [the country with democratic political structure imposed by external actor] get out of line with a country’s standard of living’ (p. 24). In any case, the interplay between external and internal actors may shed light on the existence of deviant autocracies. We will see how external actor(s) such as the

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British government and communist China have shaped the political structure of former colonies such as Hong Kong and Singapore during the transitional period.

In the same vein, external influence via diffusion effects has been shown to be quite effective in breaking down autocracies. Lipset (1994: 16) explained that ‘events in neighbouring countries, diffusion effects from elsewhere, leadership and movement behaviour, can affect the nature of the polity’. More importantly, this effect is widely accepted by a range of scholars (Doorenspleet and Kopecký 2008; Doorenspleet and Mudde 2008; Gibler and Tir 2014; Hale 2013; Hawkins 2001; Huntington 1991). This demonstration effect has a significant effect on democratisation. The influence of the demonstration effect or diffusion on democracy has been further illustrated in a study based on a dataset from the early 1950s to late 1990s (see i.e. Gleditsch 2002; Gleditsch and Ward 2006, 2008). Examining how political actors interact with and respond to the democratic experiences of neighbouring countries or influential external powers may help us to understand and explain deviant autocracies.

Finally, another critical international factor is colonial influence. The colonial experience, especially British rule, is often regarded as favourable to democratic development (Barro 1996: 19; Huber et al. 1993: 9; Jensen and Skaaning 2012: 1129). Glaeser et al. (2004) argued that European colonisation can enhance the human capital of the colonies. Likewise, Lipset et al. (1993: 160) claimed that ‘former British colonies are more likely to have political democracy through the 1970s than countries that have been ruled by other colonial powers’. Lipset and his colleagues did not, however, provide any detailed description of the situation from the 1980s onward. It is worth noting that the relationship between British colonial experience and democracy is not statistically significant in their study after the 1970s. This result was replicated in Croissant’s (2004) analysis, suggesting that there is ‘no positive correlation between British colonialism and (liberal) democracy’ (pp. 168-169).

These contradictory findings inevitably triggered debate on this issue. Some scholars were sceptical of the effect of colonial experience on democracy. Huntington (1991: 19) argued that ‘no real effort was made to introduce democratic institutions’

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in the colonies. Hariri (2012) shared a similar opinion: ‘European colonisation and settlement did not export democracy, but European settlers did bring institutional forms of governance from their countries of origin, and their identity as Europeans… Institutional transplantation was not an export of democracy because none of the colonial powers were democratic at the time’ (p. 474). In the case of India, Subrahmanyam (2006:87) argued that the British colonial government adopted divide and rule, trying to politicise social tensions to ensure effective rule. Further examples are illustrated by McMillan (2008), who stated that the British colonial government ‘introduced elections to the Indian system of government, although with a severely restricted franchise, and with safeguards built in to guarantee representation for particular groups’ (p. 738).

A recent econometric analysis based on a dataset from 1960 to 2000 also showed that countries colonised by Britain are associated with a negative relationship with democracy (Posso and Feeny 2015: 1260-1261). Moreover, Ganguly (2007: ix) claimed that the British did little or nothing to promote the growth of democratic institutions in India. In the case of Botswana, according to Good and Taylor (2008), the country acquired no functioning legislature until the year before independence in 1966, as the limited political development was concentrated on the embryonic executive (p. 753). Hong Kong is another pertinent example. It was a British colony for over 150 years; yet the introduction of direct elections with a limited franchise was initiated in 1988 right after the ratification of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. Why was the British colonial administration reluctant to develop liberal democracy during the colonial era? Was the colonial policy of British adjusted after the 1970s? If so, why?

It is worth noting that Comeau (2003) is cautious on the impact of British colonial experience on democracy, arguing that

[u]sing the colonial experience as an indicator of a nation’s political tradition has some intrinsic conceptual problems. Due to fierce competition among colonial powers, a number of nations have experienced a succession of colonial administrations over time. The fact that a competitor would prevail, usually after throwing its rivals out of a disputed territory, does not necessarily imply that the losers

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left behind no impact. Therefore, it might not be appropriate to attribute the entirety of a nation’s political heritage before independence to the one predominant colonial ruler (p. 4).

Therefore, it would be useful to study the interaction of the former colonial elites and the successors during the process of negotiation and political transition, in cases such as independence (Bahrain, Brunei and Singapore) and handover of sovereignty (Hong Kong and Macau).

The Selected Structural Variables and Hypotheses

To sum up, there are multiple factors contributing to transition to democracy, as illustrated by Fukuyama (1992):

Democratisation is an autonomous political process, however, that is dependent on a variety of political factors including: the apparent success of democracy relative to its authoritarian competitors in other countries; the fortunes of war (and peace) in the international system; the skill and competence of the individual leaders who seek to create and consolidate democratic systems; and sheer accident. There are also cultural obstacles to stable democracy, such as religion, ethnicity, preexisting social structure, and the like, that are independent of the level of economic development and affect the possibility of democracy (p. 108).

Most studies which have tested the structural explanation indicate that economic development is still a significant independent variable in predicting democratisation. To re-test the structural explanation, I state the following two hypotheses:

H1: There is a positive relationship between economic development and level of democracy.

H2: Ceteris paribus, economic development is the most important predictor in explaining level of democracy.

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To test the above hypotheses, I collected data from various sources and data sets (see Table 3.3). The dependent variable is based on the Polity score (Marshall et al. 2011). The scores for the independent and intervening variables are mainly collected from data of the World Bank’s (2012) World Development Indicator, which provides a