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Exploring the role of materiality in the capacity tension

Road space allocation

Chapter 6 – Road space allocation and infrastructure

6.3 Exploring the role of materiality in the capacity tension

VicRoads has continued to pursue different tram pilot projects aimed at providing greater priority for trams. Examples include the Route 86 Demonstration Project, the Route 6 Tram Study and the Route 96 Full Tram Priority Trial.

The Route 86 Demonstration Project included redevelopment of a 6.8 kilometre tram corridor (DCC, 2009). The projected included constructing a central island tram platform stop, the first of its kind for Melbourne. The project also included tram platform stops similar those constructed along Swanston Street in Melbourne’s CBD.

The design affords a shared path for pedestrians and cyclists to interact, but allows for a platform-style tram stop design. The Route 6 Tram Study is an ongoing project that combines Fairways with clearways. Fairway programmes subsequent to the 1980 programme have remained stand-alone programmes. Combining part-time tram priority with clearways reflects new organisational conventions. The study includes technological enhances such as electronic signs and embedded road measures.

During clearways, signs blink “tram lane ahead” and “merge left” (Figure 6.10).

Embedded road measures consist of blinking lights (Figure 6.11). As Figure 6.11 illustrates, such measures remain insufficient to curtail motorists from parking along the road during clearway hours.

Figure 6.10: New flashing Fairway sign, photo from author

Figure 6.11: New blinking road measures, photo from author

Compared with either the Route 86 Demonstration Project or the Route 6 Tram Study, the Nicholson Street Route 96 Full Tram Priority Trial provides a tram project worthy of more detailed analysis. The trial project sought to “empirically” test complete 100%

priority for the 96 tram (GHD, 2012).

The 96 tram route that runs along Nicholson Street is one of Melbourne’s busiest tram routes. ‘Full Tram Priority’ was defined as ensuring trams were not held up at a red light at nine specific intersections (GHD, 2012, p. 8). The nine intersections included a particular portion of Nicholson Street (Figure 6.12). The trial’s goal was to empirically test, in real time, what full time tram priority involved and looked like, and to document side-effects, such as delay to cross-street traffic.

Figure 6.12: Schema of Nicholson Street included in the trial, from GHD report

From preliminary meetings between VicRoads, DOT and Yarra Trams, to conducting the trial, took three years. Community consultation was minimised to ensure the trial occurred in normal travel conditions (GHD, 2012). Preliminary analysis developed a baseline. Pre and post data measured during the trial included tram travel times, queue lengths of cross roads and pedestrian and cyclist data. The trial occurred on 16-17 November 2011 during morning peak travel period (7:30am-10:00am), inner-peak (12:00-2:00pm) and evening peak period (4:00-6:30pm); trams did not run to standard timetables.

The Nicholson Street Route 96 Full Tram Priority Trial is notable in that it represents an explicit attempt by senior decision makers and transport planners at state and local governments to discuss and agree upon ‘tram priority’. The trial therefore, marks a greater willingness to implement tram priority, and a first for consensus as to the definition of ‘tram priority’. However, issues that arose from conducting the trial strongly suggest that such consensus needs to be judiciously pursued.

The final consultant report found that “there is no denying that the trial was restricted by signal and infrastructure parameters, predominantly relating to limitations with software, faults in hardware and inaccuracies associated with stop locations” (GHD, 2012, p. 80).

For example, underground detector loop devices relaying a tram’s location to the Victoria Parade Blyth

Street

CCTV cameras stationed at each intersection provided a mechanism for transport planners to manually provide priority. Figure 6.13 is a mock-up illustrating the control panel used during the trial. The CCTV cameras were critical in overcoming multiple issues, from malfunctioning underground detection devices to cars turning in front of an on-coming tram.

central tram centre often failed to work every time a tram travelled through an intersection. Issues from the trial were identified in the final consultant report as constituting issues that could be reasonably addressed with new infrastructure—a conclusion corroborated from interviews.

Figure 6.13: Mock-up of control panel

Passengers boarding and alighting trams, reflecting a normal occurrence for tram operations, required extending the green light phase to ensure trams passed through an intersection. Accounting for such mundane aspects of normal tram operations may at face value appear superfluous. Yet, such factors underscore the importance for applying a more fine-grained analysis to road space allocation. Normal everyday transport-related activities such as passengers boarding and alighting directly impacted the trial's results. Further, cars turning in front of oncoming trams required transport planners manually making split-second decisions. This highlights how practitioners actively engaged with technology performing their professional duties (Pickering, 1995). In this instance, it was to resolve another everyday problem of cars turning in front of oncoming trams. The trial also shows how engaging technology helps create, assemble and refine new competencies and knowledge. Examining the recent adoption of a network perspective by VicRoads staff in relation to trial also reveals how knowledge is understood and translated.

VicRoads Network Operating division was created to engage road space allocation from a network perspective (elaborated in Chapters 7 and 8). From this perspective, congestion caused from the trial along perpendicular roads that intersected with Nicholson Street were of central concern to VicRoads staff. Vehicles on perpendicular roads were forced to wait for longer time periods as the 96 tram was given priority through an intersection. This generated congestion ripples of varying degrees on the nine perpendicular roads. Whereas some roads were less impacted, other roads experienced significant congestion; to the degree that congestion generated further

impacts to roads significantly further from Nicholson Street. During interview, a Network Operating manager made a sketch to represent the impacts from the trial (Figure 6.14).

Figure 6.14: Author’s sketch from interview

The circles in the sketch are indicative and helped convey the manager’s main points. From a network perspective, leaving these intersections alone would result in negligible impacts to Melbourne’s road network. Thus, giving priority on intersections that impacted the network the least would result in X, additional intersections would result in Y, and all nine intersections would be Z.

From a network perspective, providing priority at X and Y intersections would result in negligible impacts to Melbourne’s road network. The logic contained in the network perspective appears sound. But, how determination of X and Y intersections were arrived at are the product of multiple intersecting elements. The trial applied a systematic empirical analysis of tram priority. The trial defined and then measured 100% tram priority. Priority was defined as trams not being held up at a red light at nine specific intersections; an outcome that did not occur each and every time.

The confluence of multiple intersecting factors such as unreliable technology and society impacted the trial reaching 100% priority every time a tram travelled through an intersection. During interview, the Network Operating manager acknowledged that such factors shaped the trial’s results. But, in its current form the network perspective applied to translate the trial’s results remains based on a narrow conceptualisation of mobility. It is important to note that the manager understood many of the limitations with the current network perspective. Thus, on the one hand, issues with the network perspective remain not explicitly with VicRoads transport planners interviewed such as the Network Operating manager. Yet, on the other hand, the daily actions, duties and decisions of the manager are shaped by the network perspective in its current form.

Thus, regardless to what extent professionals such as the manager understand and attempt to actively redress such limitations, their agency is structured by the narrow conceptualisation of mobility that supports the network perspective; as defined by the dominant car paradigm.

X

Y

Z

The narrow conceptualisation of mobility has several implications for how road space is allocated in Melbourne. Even if tram priority was provided in the few identified intersections, analysing tram priority a year later would still result in unknown ripples.

This helps substantiate the worldview taken in this thesis, which assumes that key to heterogeneity are various inanimate elements (i.e. technology, artefacts, road space)

“that directly or indirectly move or block the movement of objects, people and information” (Urry, 2008, p. 50). Accounting for all impacts is an almost impossible challenge, and where the network perspective adopted by VicRoads staff can provide the greatest assistance. Thus, the trial’s results can be viewed in a number of ways.

Tram priority could be applied to a select few intersections. This actually defeats the objective of ‘tram priority’, and might result in increased motorists’ confusion, since motorists would encounter a tram proceeding through an intersection unimpeded only occasionally. Tram priority could be rolled out incrementally. Intersections could be altered at set intervals, based on public campaigns, accumulation of professional knowledge and support at the governing and organisational levels.

In comparison, the trial underscores the inadequacy of implementing tram priority to one tramline. This in turn brings politics to the fore and centre. We saw in Chapter 3 that urban studies have documented that cities such as Zürich have achieved their results through explicitly implementing transit-priority strategies over several decades.

The approach adopted in Zürich to manage road traffic volumes is based on large geographic zones (Nash & Sylvia, 2001). When a zone is determined full, traffic lights surrounding the zone curtail further cars entering the zone, until traffic levels are reduced. As one car leaves, another may enter. Although this is a technical problem, it underscores the need for political support to implement such technical determinations, which are in turn the product of different social conventions.

6.4 Chapter summary

This chapter has highlighted re-occurring problem definitions and solutions in transport planning. In particular, uptake of a demand management stance is found to be deeply contingent due to unstable and ever-changing mobility visions developed by different state governments. This provides insight into greater reliance on—though professionally and institutionally bounded—the trend for increasing discretion of transport planners. With respect to understanding how infrastructure influences road space allocation, several important findings can be made.

First, bringing infrastructure to the fore in analysis has revealed several recurring themes crucial to resolution of the capacity tension, particularly the importance of having a unified mobility vision for Melbourne’s road network. Further, evidence suggests that adopting a demand management stance results in practitioners embodying crucial knowledge and experience. This in turn helps to create and nurture organisational conventions and professional relationships which are crucial to ingraining a demand stance. And finally, examining how transport planners go about resolving road space allocation tensions has revealed how constitutive elements intersect emerges during the course of allocating road space.

Restructuring of Port Phillip Council altered organisational conventions which afforded opportunities for staff to reframe the on-street car parking problem. Yet, council’s Parking Plan did not occur in a linear manner with community consultation, policy and then implementation. Instead, practice reflected a recursive process of community consultation, policy development and community consultation. The retraction of professional allowances within council, combined with different organisational conventions held within VicRoads, resulted in the Clarendon project having significantly less success compared to the Acland project. Thus, organisational conventions both opened and constrained opportunities for staff to resolve the capacity tension.

Examining the journey from problem-definition to completion of Port Phillip’s Parking Plan, shows how constitutive elements intersect is known, but emerges through the course of conducting professional duties.

On the one hand, the Clarendon and Acland projects can be viewed as examples of

‘good’ versus ‘bad’ planning. Leaving aside issues with respect to the problematic term good and bad planning, comparing specific aspects of the two projects does highlight important aspects of each project. The Clarendon project was conducted in a shorter timeline and with less attention towards how lessons from the Acland project might be applied. Thus, on face value, incorporating these aspects into the Clarendon project might have resulted in a different outcome in which business owners were less hostile and more receptive to the road measures put in place. This underscores that no two projects are the same, but it also alludes to a lack of mobility vision at the time, for how to allocate road space at the metropolitan level. On the other hand, comparing the two projects provides a lens to understand the emergent nature of allocating road space.

Thus, differences between each project emerged through the course of allocating road space. Comparing the two projects further highlights how greater reliance becomes placed on discretion of transport planners. Though such discretion is professionally

and institutionally bounded, discretion wielded by practitioners comes into conflict with different intersecting elements.

Third, it was shown in Chapters 4 and 5 that politics and legislatively mandated responsibilities constrain and limit how practitioners view and allocate road space.

Evidence presented in this chapter substantiates this finding. Analysis of the first Fairway programme indicates governance and uncertainty in defining tram priority both helped to alter the programme’s original design. Analysis of subsequent Fairway programmes reveals how lack of hardware (i.e. computer models, funding arrangements) to support software (i.e. organisational conventions, knowledge) provides insight for why professionals must test their ideas. Although continued low funding levels may indicate institutional constraints, the ‘tram priority’ trial provides a clear example of how engaging the capacity tension requires practitioners to actively engage with technology. Further, the confluence of multiple intersecting factors (e.g.

unreliable technology and society) constrained trams being provided 100% priority. As such, we can see that developing new competencies and skills to resolve the capacity tension and transition towards a demand management stance, results in generating unexpected outcomes. In turn, resolution of such unexpected outcomes has been revealed to occur through transport planners actively using, engaging with, and reacting to and against, technology, infrastructure and other inanimate objects.

Fourth, and following on from the third point, several points can be made with respect to different tensions. Both parties generally agreed with applying a demand management stance to resolve the hospital site (capacity tension). VicRoads and DOT transport planners were happy to pursue a DDA compliant tram stop at the Bridge Road site (liveability tension). But, the narrowness of Bridge Road prevented a new tram stop from being DDA compliant (spatial tension). As such, the tram platform stop underscores how resolving one tension often results in unravelling another tension which in turn requires attention.

The professional route from trialling to practical adoption of a demand stance in practice and organisational conventions has been shown in this chapter to be contested and in flux. Thus, the question remains, given that adoption of a demand stance in practice remains contested and in flux, how do transport planners reconcile competing views regarding the best use of road space? Addressing this question involves examining how constitutive road space allocation elements intersect to resolve the liveability tension, which is therefore focus of the next chapter.