Factors Affecting the Designing and Implementing of

Security, as Morgan (2006) describes, is the quality of being and feeling safe which is a fundamental value in societies. It is the condition to live without being anxious over one’s own safety. Furthermore, when such conditions are threatened, people do all they can to protect themselves or the people they love. Like people, the state when threatened will take all necessary precautions to make sure that, first and foremost, security is guaranteed and its interests are safeguarded. The presence of security means stability is achieved to maintain a peaceful environment and retain the feeling of safety. Security policies are a set of important measures taken to act as guidelines with the aim to protect the national interests of states.

Threats, either external or internal, often cause harm to the overall interest of states and therefore government officials and strategists are considered to provide the best advice in the designing of policies that will negate such impacts. In border areas, security policies are considered an important part of maintaining relations and providing the basic foundations for cooperation in the field of military, policies, customs, health, quarantine and other government related sectors.

Security has become one of the most important aspects of foreign policy in recent years. For instance, powerful states like the US, Russia and China appears to take security matters seriously. Hence, security issues are a central part to their foreign policies because it comes at a huge expense with the pursuit of serious harm and real risks (Morgan, 2006). On the other hand, weaker governments have tried to maintain the balance or either face the threat of going to war. With regard to Indonesia and PNG relations, security policies remain an important component of their existence as neighbours, especially in terms of providing security along the borders.

Border security policies have been adjusted and nurtured to serve for mutual gains. As outlined in the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation, Indonesia and PNG vow to accommodate each other’s interests with mutual understanding and goodwill. Nonetheless, the issue of Papuan separatism has often caused inconvenience in the relationship.

Threats that arise along the border have, to some extent, affected the level of trust between both countries. Despite such inconveniences, Indonesia and PNG have taken initiatives to closely cooperate to eliminate those threats.

First of all, it is important to understand that the issue of Papuan separatism has not only been around for decades, but it has been psychologically indoctrinated throughout generations of Papuans who’s, whether old or young, understands his or her identity. Identity is known to be one of the most sensitive aspects of nationhood. Identity whether social or individual as defined by Tajfel (2010) is based on “self-concept” that relates to their relations to a particular group (family, tribe) that possess the same values with significant attachment to each other. Papuans, for over five decades, have tried to tell the world that identity is one of the main causes that drives separatism while suffering at Indonesia’s violent military hands.

Secondly, the armed conflict, unrest, extra-judicial killings and jailing of Papuans and the marginalisation of their culture (Radio New Zealand, 2017) have all contributed toward Papuanization. The term Papuanization in this case simply means the feeling of being Papuan, or being Melanesian. The tribe that is totally different from Asian Indonesians. The suffering and trauma over decades of military occupation and violence have forced Papuans to develop a sense of dislike. Indeed, such mentalities would create more opposition which is unwilling to cooperate with an Indonesian nationalist. There is no doubt that Papuans have long suffered at the hands of the Indonesian armed forces. As a result, today Papuans simply display a don’t care attitude. Whether or not Jakarta is willing to develop Papua is entirely up to Jakarta. Moreover, Papuans are known to take around with them such mentalities. Driven by a disappearing sense of belonging, is often the cause of poor performance in carrying out responsibilities and duties.

Basically, Papuans who work for the autonomous governments are also affected from this syndrome. Hence, the outcome of their responsibilities often portrays a lack of seriousness and effectivity (because of the ‘don’t care’ attitude). For instance, in dealing with the designing of policies,

Papuans who work for the autonomous government of Papua sometimes perform below standard. It is surely not because of poor education and training but has been accredited to a long history of Indonesian occupation.

Papuan policy-makers for years have also failed to shine under the special autonomy. Despite the name being ‘special autonomy’, many Papuan bureaucrats reckon that there is nothing special about it. Therefore, policy makers are faced with the challenge to either come up with high quality and efficient policies that will defend Indonesia or defend Papuans. In most cases Papuan policy makers are trapped because the final policies will endanger or have adverse effects on their own kind. Indeed, policy makers are left with no choice, thus resulting in the designing of policies that will at least benefit both the local Papuans and the rest of Indonesia. Hence, when policy makers from Jakarta arrive, they find out that policies lack connection to national interest and that these need to further accommodate Jakarta’s interests.

Thirdly, the designing of border security policies often illustrates the problem between designing and implementing border security policies itself. Even though border security policies are often designed to cater to the overall interests of Indonesia, the implementation of the policies have often become the problem. Border policies are often meant to provide safe passage to the people who use the border, especially travellers and locals. However, in most cases, the Indonesian military often takes charge in the implementation process. The involvement of the military is where it all goes wrong. In Papua, under special autonomy, it gives the autonomous provincial government the right to be involved in the processes of designing and implementing security policies.

Basically, what has happened here is that the autonomous government has tried to minimize the involvement of the military along the border apart from providing security. The military in this case is only needed to provide security and maintain stability. When the military is more involved, it overlaps the responsibility of other institutions that are part of the CIQS (Customs, Immigrations, Quarantine, Security). An overlap in responsibilities means

that the implementation of policies will experience problems because not all the institutions get to function according to their job descriptions. Mostly, the border policies would focus on trust-building and engaging all required institutions to improve credibility, stability and relations.

Fourthly, is the impact of relationship between Papuan decision makers and the OPM. Decision makers and policy makers are faced with the challenge to provide effective policies that will benefit the relationship of Indonesia (Papua) and PNG. However, at some point, the decision makers are faced with situations that will force them to come up with policies that will not entirely be in Jakarta’s interests. Papuans who are involved in the designing and implementing of border policies are aware that either way they may also be in danger, thus causing them to try to implement policies that will also indirectly benefit the OPM and its people.

Despite the OPM not directly being involved in the designing of the policies, Papuans who work inside are somewhat representing their aspirations on a low scale. For example, the operational hours of the border market are 8:00 am to 4:00pm, however, sometimes the markets are open till 8:00pm for locals after hours to cater for local needs. Sometimes the border is open over long weekends or special occasions such as Easter and Christmas.

Another would be the engagement of government officials which excludes the military; this method has been strictly based on a people-to-people approach. In this case, the Papuan government deals directly with the PNG border officials to address problems directly in order to find solutions.

It is common in Papua that the implementation of policies be conducted in such a manner that it accommodates various interests. Another example would be the border portal; even though it is closed, the gate-keeper opens it when locals come after hours. Such actions have often created problems between the autonomous government officials and the armed forces who are stationed at the border. The main reason is because the armed forces carry direct orders from Jakarta, while the autonomous government officials are protected by the autonomy law to run the border’s daily management.

The autonomy law provides the legal basis for Papua province to design and implement border policies. The autonomy law accommodates for traditional and cultural approaches to settling issues that affect border security. For example, land disputes are dealt with traditionally in a dialogue form with related authorities. Basically, what the autonomous government does via its Border and International Cooperation Board is to try to maintain a good relationship with all parties; both domestic and in PNG.