The Fall of the League and the Onset of the Cold War,

Before Pridi was ousted from power in a November 1947 military coup, the League attempted to convene a special meeting of the Southeast Asia League to discuss foreign policy matters and the changing regional and international situation. The Indonesian and Burmese representatives in Bangkok, as well as leaders of the resistance governments from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, were ready to meet when the November coup took place.127 The meeting was never held and the future of the Southeast Asia League was cast into doubt as Pridi went into hiding and Phibun Songkhram, backed by increasingly powerful military and police officials, began his return to power.

The Vietnamese were clearly worried by this development. On 10 February 1948, General Nguyen Binh, commander-in-chief of Vietnamese forces in Nam Bo, personally wrote a letter in French to Phibun. In this letter, Binh sent Phibun his "congratulations and best wishes for the realisation of your noble aim—the prosperity of the Siamese people and the defence of Siamese national integrity against foreign aggression."128 One

125 While I have no direct evidence to support this possibility, Indonesian leader, Dr. Sutan Sjahrir, backed the idea of a Southeast Asian regional body, but qualified it by saying that '1 do not use the term 'bloc' as this suggests an idea of power conflict What I mean by regional organisation is simply an effort from Asia toward a world order." See: 'Southeast Asia Union' [Editorial], BP, 7 May 1948.

1 2 ^ Interview with Tran Van Giau, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.

127 Interview with Nguyen Dtirc Qüy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City and Stanley Swinton (AP), 'Southeast Asia League,' BP, 22 November 1947.

128 'Vietnam General Urges Southeast Asia Unity,' BP, 20 February 1947. Nguyen Binh also sent a message

to the overseas Vietnamese in Thailand in which he and the President o f the National Union o f Vietnam praised the overseas Vietnamese support o f the DRV. See: 'Viet Nam Leaders Send Greetings to Viet Nam Nationals in Siam,' VNS, 3 March 1948. At the same time, N guyin Binh also sent a letter to Pandit

of the ways Binh said this could be done more effectively was through closer ties between Vietnam and "Siam and all South-East Asian countries." As Binh told Phibun:

In the Southeast Asia bloc, the geographic situation and the historical bonds between our two peoples require that Siam and Vietnam be closer united. If we maintain stronger relationships between our two countries and tighten the friendly ties between ourselves, and every other people o f Southeast Asia, we can defeat all manoeuvres of aggression by foreigners.129

On 23 April, a letter from the Acting President of Vietnam's delegation in Bangkok, Le Hy, to Phibun was published in the Bangkok Post. Hy sent best wishes to Phibun on behalf of the "Government and the people of Vietnam."130 Continuing, Hy said:

Vietnam as a neighboring country has every desire to see political and economic stability brought about in Siam, and it is felt that under your leadership this goal will be achieved. I take this opportunity o f reaffirming the feelings o f sincere friendship of the Vietnam government and the Vietnam people and o f the loyalty of Vietnam nationals resident in Siam towards the Siamese government131

On 27 April, Phibun answered Le Hy in a letter sent to the Vietnamese Delegation in Bangkok. Phibun's response:

. . . [I]t gives me great pleasure to feel that Vietnam desires to see political and economic stability brought about in Siam . . . I avail m yself of this opportunity to wish Viet Nam speedy success in her struggle for independence and full nationhood.132

But Phibun's sympathy did not last for long. Political changes in Bangkok and the emergence of the Cold War in the region soon altered Phibun's view of the Vietnamese independence struggle, as we shall see in the next chapter. In 1948, Thai critics of Pridi, individuals often more concerned with their own political ambitions than with accuracy, pointed to the League as evidence of a communist plan to infiltrate Southeast Asia. Writing in 1950, Luang Kat Songkhram, one of the chief planners of the November 1947 military coup, included the military's fear of a Southeast Asian communist union among the listed reasons for the coup. Under item thirteen, Kat confuses, perhaps intentionally, the League and the French Pan Southeast Asia Union:

129 BP, 20 February 1947. DRV officials must have channelled this letter to MacDonald at the BP in a deliberate m ove to make it public, and thereby demonstrate Vietnam's good intentions in a public forum as well as to play off Phibun's anti-French sentiments in a move to gain his support of their considerable resistance activities in Thailand. Considering the wide-range of Vietnamese activities in Thailand, Phibun was almost certainly aware the importance o f Thailand to Vietnam.

1 For a copy o f this letter, see: M essage from Vietnam Delegation to Premier Phibun Songkhram,' VNS,

23 April 1947 or BP, 24 April 1947.

131 'Message from Vietnam Delegation to Premier Phibun Songkhram,' VNS, 23 April 1947. 1 3 2 TNA, H.l. 0201.37.6, Phibun to Vietnamese Government Delegation,' 27 April 1948.

13. Excessive Red Ideology. The powerful have gone and allowed Thailand to become a member of the Southeast Asia Union together with Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, all of which are French colonies.133

Kat and others pointed to Pridi's leftist views and his leading role in the League as evidence o f growing Soviet influence in Southeast A sia.134 Pridi rebutted these accusations, asking how the League could be a communist machination when it included members of the Lao Royal family. But the charges continued, spurred on by western diplomats, journalists, and the distortions created by the Cold War.135

While it is certainly true that Pridi held leftist ideas throughout his political career, it does not follow that he would necessarily bow to Moscow at the expense o f the region's own interests. From the evidence available, the allegations that Moscow somehow exercised influence within the League or over Pridi in 1947 and 1948 are hard to support. John Coast, a balanced source and a correspondent who had close contacts with some of the members o f the League, wrote that the Southeast Asia League

is first local in character, then international. It is a defensive organisation. It is definitely not now, or in its beginning, under any Communist influence. Where it may end up will largely depend on the colonial policies followed by Russia, America, and ourselves [Great Britain], At the moment, both Indonesians and Viet-Namese will say to you: 'Anyone that helps us is our friend. So far the Russians have done absolutely nothing to assist us either at the United Nations or in any other sphere.'136

Immediately following WWII, Moscow had very little influence in Southeast Asia, refusing to recognise both Thailand and the DRV, for fear of upsetting its relationship

133 'Cotmai lae Banthirk Suantua khong Phontho Kat Katsongkhram: Rurang Sähet Haengkantham Rathaprahan, 8 PS 90' [Letter and Documents of Lieutenant General Kat Katsongkhram: The Origins of the 1947 Coup d’Etat] in Suchin Tantikun, Rathaprahan PS 2490 [The 1947 Coup], (Bangkok: Samakhom Sangkhomsat Haeng Prathet Thai, 1972), p. 147.

134 Chi wit, p. 90.

133 Ibid., p. 90. In 1947, US officials considered the League to be a nationalist, anticolonial organisation. However, as the Cold War made its way in the region things began to change. In a confidential March 1948 State Department memo on the "Possible Formation of a Bloc of Eastern Peoples," the League was singled out by ranking US policy-makers as a symbol of Soviet designs in the region. As one official bluntly wrote, "Representatives from the various countries of Southeast Asia have established a Southeast Asia League, which is a Communist organization, at Bangkok." US, DOS, 'Possible Formation of Bloc of Eastern Peoples,' RG 59, Southeast Asia 1950, Communism, Box 5, USNA.

136 GB, PRO, F.O. 371/69686 XC/A 55667, John Coast, The Southeast Asia League,' 12 June 1948. My discussion of the Southeast Asia League differs from previous discussions of this organisation and its significance. See: John Coast, Some Aspects o f Thai Politics, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953), p. 38; Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 94-95; David A. Wilson, The United States and the Future o f Thailand, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 30; Charles Keyes, 'Isan: Regionalism in Northeastern Thailand,'

SEADP, No. 65, (1967), pp. 31-32; Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy o f Southeast Asia, 1945-1948, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 340 and others who have relied on these sources. Bruce Reynolds is the notable exception. Although my account differs from his too, he has nonetheless made a fme contribution to a better understanding the League, one of the few historians to have studied it in any serious detail. See: Bruce E. Reynolds, op. cit, pp. 1-18.

with France. In fact, although Moscow recognised the Phibun government in 1948, it would take two more years before establishing diplomatic relations with Ho Chi Minh’s government. And, with similar national interests in mind, India, Indonesia, and Thailand were also very cautious in joining the DRV in anticolonial regional organisation. In the end, while there may have been vague notions of "Southeast Asian-ness" after WWII, the evidence suggests that the Southeast Asia League meant the most to the Vietnamese. With war underway with the French, DRV officials working in Bangkok saw Southeast Asian regionalism as a further means by which they could counter the French. They had little to lose and everything to gain.