European agri-environment schemes
European agri-environment schemes (AES) were introduced into European Union agricultural policy in the late 1980s, and offer financial incentives for individual farmers to adopt management practices that will enhance their environment (Lobley et al., 2013). Individual AES operate as single farm agreements. Even though the European AES model prescribes individual farm practices (Emery & Franks, 2012), AES are considered voluntary interventions because participation in an AES and choice of management options are optional. As Burton et al. (2008, p.16) summarised, voluntary AES have become ‘a key policy instrument for conserving and enhancing the environment’.
A large body of empirical literature explores farmers’ responses to AES. As highlighted earlier, farmers responded to the AES scheme as a whole, rather than responding to the interventions used (e.g. educational, economic incentives) to achieve the goals of an AES. While the majority of literature investigates individual farmers’ responses to AES (e.g. attitudes, awareness and understanding), some researchers also investigate a collective response, for example, group based collective AES, social learning, and how socio-cultural aspects influenced individual farmers’ responses.
Studies variously investigate individual farmers’ responses to AES. For example, awareness and understanding of AES, participation in AES, resistance to AES, adoption of AES contracts, engagement with AES principles, and changes in management practice. Several studies report varied participation: while many farmers were adopting contracts, putting areas under management agreement and changing practice, other farmers were not (Lobley et al., 2013; C. Morris & Potter, 1995; J. Morris et al., 2000). Some researchers found varied farmer awareness and understanding of AES schemes. For example, the farmers in J. Morris et al.’s (2000) study were aware that farming negatively impacts on wildlife and the landscape, but had less knowledge and understanding of how an AES operates.
A range of studies found farmer resistance to AES. The factors contributing to farmer resistance varied. In earlier studies of farmers’ responses to AES, researchers found some farmers considered AES intrusive, thought AES would restrict their autonomy and/or their freedom to make their own decisions, constrain productive farming, increase bureaucracy, and increase long- term uncertainty (Curry & Winter, 2000; C. Morris & Potter, 1995; J. Morris et al., 2000). Some
farmers were concerned about increased public access to their land (C. Morris & Potter, 1995; J. Morris et al., 2000). C. Morris and Potter (1995) developed a participation spectrum based on farmer attitude towards AES, and this spectrum indicated the level of farmer resistance to AES measures. They classified farmers as either active (farmers committed to the scheme) or passive adopters (farmers were motivated by financial gain), conditional non-adopters (can be persuaded to join if farmer, farm or family circumstances change), or resistant non-adopters (would not participate under any circumstances). Although farmers were adopting AES contracts, C. Morris and Potter (1995) found high rates of passive adoption. These findings suggest behavioural change was motivated by financial reward, with limited farmer engagement with the schemes’ environmental objectives and limited long-term change in attitude towards the environment. Lobley et al.’s (2013) more recent research summarised studies with similar findings to C. Morris and Potter (1995). Lobley et al. (2013) described farmer uptake of AES as considerable, yet summarised studies where farmers participated in AES for financial gain. Based on these studies, they concluded there is limited farmer engagement with the environmental principles of these schemes, and minimal long-term farmer attitudinal change towards the environment. Compared with other research that emphasises the diversity within agriculture, and the complexity of socio- cultural aspects that influence farmers’ responses to interventions (Blackstock et al., 2010; Burton, 2004a), these findings of the factors influencing farmer resistance appear simplistic.
The majority of AES target individual farmers, establish single farm agreements, and the majority of empirical research investigates individual farmers’ responses to agri-environment schemes. A few researchers investigated farmers’ responses to collective AES, or AES involving a group of farmers in a geographic location (e.g. Emery & Franks, 2012; Mills et al., 2011). These scholars found that social learning and socio-cultural aspects, namely social norms and being a ‘good farmer’, can both encourage and discourage individual farmer behaviour change. Mills et al. (2011) found social interaction and knowledge sharing during farmer group activities, led to changes in individual farmers’ understanding about sustainable management of their land. Shared norms (e.g. valuing traditional hill management practices) and trust were identified as key factors in influencing individual farmer behaviour. Emery and Franks (2012) investigated farmers’ interest in collective AES (termed collaborative AES), and identified several ‘cultural barriers’ to a collective scheme. The farmers identified: a loss of autonomy and timeliness (ability to quickly respond to changing circumstances), where timeliness and flexibility are recognised attributes of a ‘good farmer’; a lack of communication and mutual understanding of other farmers’ motives;
factors identified by Emery and Franks (2012), builds on Burton’s (2004a, 2004b) earlier work on how farmer identity influences farmer decision making.
Other researchers also investigated the socio-cultural aspects of farmers’ responses to AES (Burton et al., 2008; Burton & Paragahawewa, 2011). Burton et al. (2008) reviewed a range of European studies, and summarised that although individual farmers were participating in AES schemes, there has been little enduring change in individual farmer motivation, environmental attitude, and long-term behaviour change. These studies suggested farmers were motivated to participate for commercial interests (financial rewards), and because little change in existing farm systems was required. Burton et al. (2008) contend that if farmers’ attitudes towards the environment and behaviour are to change, AES must become integrated into the existing farming culture and become a ‘symbol’ of good farming. Once an AES scheme is established (e.g. fences erected), Burton et al. (2008) found farmers have limited opportunity to demonstrate their productive skills, or their ‘good farming skills’ (p.26), through conservation practices to other farmers. They concluded that AES have failed to change the farming culture from a production- led to a pro-conservation, or in Burton et al’s (2008) words, to an ‘environmentally friendly farming culture’ (p. 30). Further work by Burton and Paragahawewa (2011) built on these findings. They contend that voluntary AES support a conventional farming culture, rather than encouraging a culture based on farming and the environment where environmental farming practices are accepted as part of ‘good farming’ practice. Additionally, they argue that ‘little’ long-term change in farmers’ attitudes towards the environment are not resulting in changes in social norms, or in their words, not ‘altering the culture of conventional farming’ (Burton & Paragahawewa, 2011, p.96). As a result, they concluded that removal of financial rewards could result in farmers reverting to pre-AES social norms and behaviours.
The Australian Landcare programme
Landcare, the Australian Land Management Programme, was established by the Australian Federal Government in 1989 (Sobels et al., 2001). The voluntary National Landcare Programme is a federal government programme designed to encourage individual farmers to work collectively to improve natural resource outcomes (Compton & Beeton, 2012). Community landcare refers to the network of voluntary community groups established across Australia that are working towards sustainable land management (Cary & Webb, 2000). While Landcare and AES are both voluntary interventions, their approach differs. Landcare is a group-based scheme (individuals join groups,
obtain group funding, undertake group projects), whereas AES offers payments to individual farmers and operates as single farm agreements. Collective AES are more similar in approach to Landcare groups. Farmers’ responses to the Landcare programme and landcare groups are included in this review, because this voluntary intervention utilises a group- based approach (collective response) to encourage an individual farmer response.
Individual and collective farmer response to the Landcare programme is variously reported. Farmer involvement in community landcare is wide and varied. Many farmers are or have been a member of a landcare group (Cary & Webb, 2000), and many farmers have undertaken an individual or cooperative group project (e.g. revegetation, rabbit extermination) (Sobels et al., 2001). Farmers have participated in social learning. Through community landcare, farmers attended field days, group meetings and training courses where they discussed issues and best practice with farmers and others, shared ideas, and observed other farmers’ practices (Sobels et al., 2001). Sobels et al. (2001) contends that knowledge creation through landcare has resulted in landholders with an improved understanding of natural resource management issues.
Through community landcare, group members were found to feel empowered and more in control of their decisions (Compton & Beeton, 2012; Sobels et al., 2001). Group members work with and lobby government, deal with bureaucracy, and write funding proposals. Group members were found to feel more confident to choose and trial methods to address the natural resource management issues facing their group (Compton & Beeton, 2012; Sobels et al., 2001). Sobels et al. (2001) also found that as a result of landcare, group members have an increased ability to adapt to change. The next section explores farmers’ responses to the four intervention types: voluntary, educational, economic and regulatory.