Feminist Standpoint

This approach to deaf epistemology finds resonance with that of feminist standpoint theory, which, despite various interpretations,⁴⁸ is predicated on women’s experiences as a starting point in generating knowledge (Haraway, 1998). As Cockburn (2015) notes, standpoint theory is an epistemology, an account of the evolution of knowledge and strategies of action by particular collectivities in specific social relations in given

48 See e.g. Harding, 1987, 1991, 1993; Hartsock, 1983, 1985; Jaggar, 1983; Rose,1983; Smith, 1974, 1987, 1999.

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periods (331). Further, Harding defines feminist standpoint as “a feminist critical theory about relations between the production of knowledge and practices of power” (2004: 1).

Developed as an explanatory theory and methodology for feminist research, this perspective acknowledges that the lens through which the world is seen and experienced by women is distinctive and these socio-political positionalities are valuable sites of epistemic privilege, as opposed to knowledge as understood from the positions of dominant institutions.

Feminist standpoint can be traced to early feminist critiques which identified knowledge frameworks as historically biased, androcentric and monopolised by white, Eurocentric, male perspectives. From this perspective women were not included – their needs were misrepresented, and their experiences often conflated with that of men in the literature.

In recognition, academic feminism developed from second wave feminist theorising in the 1970’s, supporting research conducted and written by women. Women became emphasised as the subjects of knowledge in a move aimed at retaliating against the

‘God Trick’ – a neutral subject who spoke with authority and objectivity from no clear position but one whom, under critique, reproduced male hegemonic thinking that traditionally dominated research (Harding, 2004; Haraway, 1988).

This understanding and knowledge generation by feminist scholars led to the creation of alternative knowledge pathways, and reflexive methodologies, whereupon women were positioned at the centre of research (Harding, 2004; Fawcett, 2000; Buzzanell, 2003).

Subsequently, Harding coined the term ‘standpoint theory’ and Smith (1989) further developed this by examining the exclusion of women in sociology. She set out a challenge to sociology, arguing that women should be represented but traditionally were absent and excluded through a sociological lens put together exclusively by men. The implications of this were that the production of knowledge was in the hands of these male scholars. This has authority and power, we are governed by these specific ways of knowing (Hill Collins, 2004), this “view from the top” (Smith, 2004: 23). Smith advocated for instead, acknowledging the role and power of knowledge producer in producing knowledge and the strength of the situated nature of knowledge that should begin from the vantage point of marginalised lives. The evolution of feminist thinking witnessed significant critical challenge to ideas which universalise women’s experiences specifically through the discursive position of privileged white,

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class, heterosexual and able-bodied women (Hill Collins 2000). Here, the intersections of marginalisation become an important part of a critical feminist epistemic lens.

This is a particularly valuable and appropriate methodological frame for exploring how deaf women understand and experience sexuality and access sexuality-related services and supports. Drawing on Elliot (1994: 424), Bowell (2018) provides a clear example to illustrate the value of considering the social location and epistemic knowledge of research participants:

Person A approaches a building and enters it unproblematically. As she approaches, she sees something perfectly familiar which, if asked, she might call

‘The Entrance’. Person X approaches the same building and sees a great stack of stairs and the glaring lack of a ramp for her wheelchair (Bowell, 2018: para 8)

Using standpoint theory in this research means not only valuing the perspectives of marginalised women’s voices but also exploring deaf issues from multiple perspectives.

To further these insights, I draw on work from FDS which brings together ideas from disability and feminist studies to produce critical insights on gender and disability that

“helps to make visible the historical and ongoing interrelationship between all forms of oppression” (Hall, 2011: 4). Importantly this stance recognises that disabled people are also gendered beings, an insight overlooked for a long time by feminist studies (Garland-Thomson, 2011). It is an intersectional way of interrogating oppression and troubling how this has bearing for the lives of people with disabled people’s lives. It does so by centralising embodiment, body variety and normalisation in order to rethink, reimagine and recast how embodiment is perceived (Hall, 2011). It foregrounds the critical question of how systems of oppression build in to and reinforce each other to develop “an imaginary norm” (Garland-Thomson, 2011: 16) that bestows privilege on some while excluding others. This is extended for its use in exploring how normalisation is experienced through the lens of audism by deaf women.

As set out in chapter two, Hill Collins and Bilge (2016: 2) define intersectionality as “a way of understanding and analysing the complexity in the world, in people and in human experiences…as generally shaped by many factors in diverse and mutually influencing ways” This is used as a guide in this research for understanding the multiple

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factors and identities that intersect to shape and contour the intimate experiences of participants in this research.

Feminist standpoint theories, as with much sociological theory, are subject to challenges to conceptual dissonance. As Harding (2004) reflects, feminist standpoint as a theory and a methodology attracts a number of criticisms for reasons as varied as its legacy of drawing on Marxist thought, to its uneasy fit with postmodernism. Postmodernism calls into question the universal category of woman and thus opens up feminist standpoint theory to accusations of espousing essentialism and how it accounts for differences between women. Standpoint theory disrupts the tradition of separating epistemology, methodology, and political strategies. Shildrick, a disabled academic (2012: 9) strongly criticises the use of standpoint theory, contending that it promotes a “hierarchy of truth-telling in which the putatively powerful – effectively the historic oppressors - are not to be trusted” and the argument that disabled people speak the truth of their own experiences is to overextend an authority on truth to the voice of anyone who is disabled. This raises questions about valid knowers and valid ways of knowing approaches which has been subject to considerable critique and contentious debate in how disability research should be carried out (see Barnes and Mercer, 1997; Oliver, 1997). Kitchin (2002: 1) contends that this debate is – “mostly one-sided and dominated by a group of mainly British sociologists”. It has not been representative of the experience of disabled people because much of the research has been carried out by non-disabled people, who will never have an embodied understanding of what it is to be a disabled person.

Nonetheless, using the approach of feminist standpoint analysis provides a rich starting point for generating a nuanced knowledge of individual and shared, collective experiences, whilst in parallel, acknowledging differences and challenging essentialist views (Buzzanell, 2003). I draw inspiration from the work of bell hooks (1989) and Hill Collins (1997) on including the standpoints of diverse, marginalised groups and considering the potential of these spaces at the margins. An essential component of standpoint theory relates to the agreement that a standpoint is occupied through collective, political struggle – not simply by virtue of being deaf or being a woman for instance. While individual experience is certainly important, emphasis remains on the social conditions that construct groups (Hill Collins, 1997). Hill Collins’ (2000) ideas

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on black feminist epistemology (ways of knowing and validating knowledge) bears much relevance to this research. In contrast to positivistic modes of inquiry, Hill Collins espouses the credibility of knowledge developed from lived experience and refers to,

“connected knowers” – “those who know from personal experience” (Allan, 2013: 3).

In this Hill Collins contends that we should not remove ourselves from research participants’ experiences in a desire to be objective as this positions subjects as objects and ignores an intersectional understanding of experiences of oppression. She further argues for the use of dialogue as opposed to adversarial debate. This posits that knowledge emerges through dialogue between at least two subjects, through lived experience and does not exist objectively. The researcher is also present and tells a narrative that includes the ‘I’ and ‘We’ personal pronouns. The researcher becomes and remains bound up with the narrative unlike the removed, third person language of positivists. She attaches significance to narrative in this way, marking it as a valuable way to develop counter-narratives that confront and challenge dominant myths.

In following these tenets, knowledge emerges through an “ethics of caring” whereby

“all knowledge is intrinsically value-laden and should thus be tested by the presence of empathy and compassion” (Allan, 2013: 3). This holds space for and promotes the validity of the thoughts, feelings and emotions of the researcher and contends that emotion evidences the belief of the researcher in knowledge production. There is then a moral expectation of the researcher that they must be accountable to this knowledge.

Hill Collins further promotes the need to be cognisant of the tension between group knowledge and diverse experiences as a heterogenous collective – a pertinent point.

Deaf women are not a homogenous group - deaf women’s ways of knowing and experiencing are key, but an intersectional understanding of this must be recognised.