Fisheries issues

There is general agreement that the major issues for fisheries, such as over-fishing and over-capacity, but as discussed above, there is disagreement as to the solutions. The issue of capacity and the related issue of subsidies are seen as a critical obstacle in achieving EBFM for fisheries (Ward et al., 2002). Another issue is that of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. In response the FAO have developed an

International Plan of Action (IPOA) for the Management of Fishing Capacity (FAO, 1999c) which encourages states to address the problem, through capacity management in order to align fishing capacity with the sustainable use of fish stocks. A number of FAO Technical Fisheries Papers and guidelines have been published to aid stakeholders and fisheries mangers in developing National Plans of Action (NPOAs) for the

management of fishing capacity (FAO, 2008 p.iv). The FAO has also developed an International Plan of Action (IPOA) to prevent, deter and eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (FAO, 2001). The FAO also published a set of Technical Guidelines to aid the development and implementation of National Plans of Action (NPOAs) for Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (FAO, 2002). Other important statements of intent developed by the FAO include an IPOA for seabirds (FAO, 1999a), which is a voluntary instrument that applies to all states (nations) whose fishermen engage in longline fisheries, to reduce the incidental catch of seabirds in longline fisheries. The IPOA for sharks (FAO, 1999b) is a voluntary instrument that applies to all states (nations) whose fishermen engage in shark fisheries, for the conservation and management of sharks.

Over-fishing

Over-fishing is a common problem, as the world’s oceans are at or near maximum sustainable yields, and rebuilding depleted fishery resources is a world-wide problem (Brodziak et al., 2008). To understand the issue of over-fishing it is useful to review the history and development of fisheries from a global perspective. The period after World War Two was one of intense fisheries development, where world fisheries production increased, and major problems affecting fisheries in the northern hemisphere were identified in 1945 (Hall, 1999). Between 1959 and 1972 there was a rapid geographic expansion of fisheries, and the world catch rate doubled from 30 to 60 million tonnes. During this period severe over-fishing occurred in many developing counties; and was accompanied by public concern for the mismanagement of fisheries. Between 1972 and 1982 fisheries production increased from 60 to 68 million tonnes and the status of fish stocks deteriorated. Between 1983 and 1992 catches increased from 68 to 85 million tonnes and global issues of sustainability and the environmental implication of fisheries were raised (Hall, 1999 pp. 3-5). The continuing problems of over-exploitation of fisheries resources led to the 1992 International Conference on Responsible Fishing,

which formulated a declaration and a series of principles, and was subsequently followed by a more complete specification within the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing.

The FAO provides biennial reports on the state of world fisheries and aquaculture. The current State of world fisheries and aquaculture 2008, notes with regard to the overall state of fishery resources, that the proportion of over-exploited, depleted and recovering stocks has remained stable over the last ten to fifteen years, after the noticeable

increasing trends observed in the 1970s and 1980s with the expansion of fishing effort. Global estimates of fish stocks for 2007 were as follows: moderately exploited (20%); fully exploited (52%) over-exploited (19%); depleted (8%); and recovering (1%). Most of the top ten species (30% of total world capture) are fully exploited or over-exploited. These statistics suggest that the maximum wild capture fishery potential has probably been reached, and reinforces the call for more cautious and effective fisheries

management, particularly for some highly migratory and straddling species, and other fishery resources exploited in the high seas (FAO, 2009 pp. 7-8).

The world’s oceans and fisheries have been changed and impacted throughout human history so it is difficult to predict what ecosystems would look like in the absence of fishing. As Pitcher (2005) outlined the “back to the future” approach includes methods for describing past ecosystems, designing fisheries that meet criteria for sustainability, and evaluating the costs and benefits of fisheries in restored ecosystems. According to Ward et al. (2002) preventing further decline is an imperative, because setting

ecosystem targets and benchmarks can be influenced by shifting baselines, where successive generations have lower expectations of what are acceptable ecosystem changes. Marine ecosystems are not well understood and there are few long-term datasets, under these conditions it is difficult to predict and recognise ecosystem changes due to natural variability or those due to human impacts, especially in relation to shifting baselines (Ward et al., 2002 p. 9). The purpose of traditional fisheries management was to ensure that harvesting of fish stocks were ecologically sustainable in the long-term (King, 2007). In the past new fisheries have often been fully capitalised and reached unsustainable catch rates before management processes and measures have been established as effective constraints (Kaiser et al., 2005 pp. 416-418). Guidelines developed by FAO (2003) include avoiding over-fishing, and where stocks have been

reduced to low levels that these should be rebuilt, noting that once threshold limits have been exceeded changes may be irreversible. The rebuilding of stocks by 2015 was also a requirement under the 2002 WSSD JPOI. As outlined by Brodziak (2008) when

developing a rebuilding plan it is important that stakeholders understand the timeframe required for rebuilding depleted fishery resources.

Over-fishing may result in growth over-fishing, that is a level of fishing in which many small individuals are caught before they grow to a size where the stock biomass is maximised (a level of fishing greater than that required to maximise yield or value per recruit). More serious is recruitment over-fishing that is a level over-fishing in which spawning stock are reduced to the level where the relationship between stock and recruitment, and the number of recruits produced are insufficient to maintain the population (Beamish et al., 2006; King, 2007 pp. 374-376). As a consequence of over- fishing, many ecosystems exhibit ecological changes due to over-harvesting of fish stocks (King, 2007). Beamish et al. (2006) identified longevity over-fishing, the removal of large numbers of older age groups of long lived species are removed by fishing. Beamish et al. (2006) argue that if older age classes have greater resilience (due to life history strategies) to environmental perturbations than younger fish, this could prevent a population from rebuilding after periods of unsuitable ocean conditions. According to Murawski (2000) there is no consensus on criteria for defining ecosystem over-fishing. However, it is possible to identify the symptoms of ecosystem over- fishing, which include reductions in diversity; reduction in aggregate production of exploitable resources; decline in mean trophic level; increased bycatch; greater

variability in abundance of species; greater anthropogenic habitat modification; and in extreme cases changes to alternative stable ecosystem regimes.

Over-capacity

Over-capacity is a key factor contributing to the decline of many of the world’s fisheries (Mace, 1997). Excessive fishing capacity is often a result of over-capitalisation and is of increasing concern, as it affects sustainability, undermines conservation management responses, and is economically wasteful (Greboval and Munro, 1999). The issues of over-capacity in fishing fleets and their reduction to the levels that should be in balance with long-term sustainable exploitation of resources have received global attention in

the past two decades (FAO, 2009 p. 29). The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture

2006 included information on over-capitalisation and excess capacity in world fisheries,

but statistics on total tonnage and total power of world fishing are not available on a global basis. The issue of over-capacity in fishing fleets has been of concern for the last 20 years, with many countries introducing measures to deal with the issue (FAO, 2007). The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing (FOA, 1995) outlined the need for states to take measures to prevent or eliminate excess fishing capacity. The code was followed by the 1999 FAO International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity, to be implemented by 2005, through regional fisheries organisations and by states (FAO, 2007).

Over-capacity includes both over-capitalisation in terms of investment in vessels and equipment, and the numbers of fishery operators participating in a particular fishery. In some cases over-capacity has been caused by government intervention though subsidies. The capacity of fishing has been estimated to have increased fourfold since 1965, and is greater than the growth in landings. The need for effective management of fishing capacity has been recognised because many of the fishing resources are biologically and economically over-exploited. Fishing nations are experiencing the limits of sustainable exploitation and are increasingly recognising the need to deal with the issue through structural adjustment programs (jurisdictional, fiscal, political, biological and economic components) in terms of change in management procedures to achieve desired outcomes (Metzner and Rawlinson, 1998).

The elements for managing capacity are a means to assess current level of capacity, identify the desired level of capacity, and a mechanism to reach that level. Capacity may be expressed in terms of inputs (potential fishing effort) or outputs (potential catch). Capacity and capacity utilisation relate in the short-term to the ability of the existing fleet to increase output given current conditions. Over-capacity and over- capitalisation are longer-term concepts that indicate the extent to which the current fleet may need to be reduced, in order to meet a long-term target level of output. Fleet capacity has four components: the number of vessels; size of each vessel; technical efficiency of vessel operation; and potential fishing time of each vessel, per specified period of time (Pascoe et al., 2003). Evaluation of fleet capacity in relation to the increasing fishing power and the use of technology on fishing boats is important due to

effort creep. The key is to plan the desired fishery configuration (number and types of fishing units) and limit the overall fishing effort at sea through effective management and capacity reduction (Ward et al., 2002). It may be difficult to interpret indicators of over-capacity, such as a decline in catch and reduced fishing seasons. Garcia and Newton (1997) suggested that a reduction of up to 50% in fishing capacity may be required for the sustainable harvest of many fisheries; and estimated world fishing capacity would need to be reduced by 25% for revenues to cover operating costs, and by 53% for revenues to cover total costs.

The issues of over-capacity are complex. It often reflects high investment and debt for fishers which may lead to increased harvesting that exceeds MSY in order to service the debt. Solutions to the problem are not simple for technical, political and social reasons. Governance and management need to take into consideration concerns regarding food security, the economic and financial impacts of adjustment on commercial fishers, fishing communities and the local economy. Even with a well defined property rights based system, these will still need to be monitored as imperfect markets may continue to provide incentives for over-capacity, together with technology developments, which increase fishing power and result in effort creep. Political pressure to increase yield from a fishery in some cases outweigh the biological advice to reduce harvest levels to rebuild stocks (Ward et al., 2004). Subsidies can result in over-capitalisation leading to over-capacity and over-fishing and have been significant in distant water fishing nations (DWFNs), and trans-boundary and high seas fishery resource issues (Greboval and Munro, 1999).

Government subsidies

While the threat of over-fishing has been well publicised government subsidies are also a major reason why fisheries are not sustainable. Subsidies result in over-capacity that leads to over-exploitation of fish resources. Basic economic theory argues that fisheries should be self sustaining, but fisheries receive government subsidies which enable otherwise unprofitable fleets to continue fishing. Subsidies also introduce trade distortions, as countries that do not provide subsidies are disadvantaged, as their

counterpart in the subsidising countries can supply fish at a lower price and still make a profit (Sumaila et al., 2007). The need for action to reform fishing subsidies was

identified at the 2002 WSSD in Johannesburg, and has been discussed by international intergovernmental bodies, and national governments. The State of World Fisheries and

Aquaculture Report 2006 (FAO, 2007) noted that subsides influence the economic,

social and environmental dimensions of fisheries, involving many different stakeholder interests. Technical aspects have been discussed and working group activities have been undertaken by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); United Nations Environment Programme; Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation; and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); and other international organisations. Policy issues form part of the agenda for the multi-lateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Previously discussions focused on subsidies which contributed to over-capacity and over-fishing, but more recently have included subsidies that seem to be expanding into other areas, such as aquaculture and fish processing (FAO, 2007 pp. 60-61). Non-government organisations such as the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICSTD) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) are also actively engaged on this issue (Gooday, 2002).

Subsidies to the world’s fishing fleets are significant and are high compared with subsidies for other food products, with 1990s estimates at US$14-20 billion a year compared with world fishing revenues of US$85-95 billion a year (Milazzo, 1998). More recent estimates puts global fishery subsidies at US$ 30-40 billion per year, and of this sum US$6-10 billion may go to bottom trawlers alone (Sumaila et al. 2007).

Gooday (2002) discusses the related issue of over-capacity and unsustainable levels of fishing (over-fishing) together with government subsidies and the need to clarify and improve the situation regarding fisheries subsidies. The international debate relates to the consequences resulting from these subsidies and what actions are needed. The types of subsidies may include: direct transfers; lending support programs; fuel subsidies; tax preferences and insurance support programs; sector specific employment and social security provisions; general services; and marketing and price support programs (Gooday, 2002 pp. 2-3; Schrank, 2003 pp. 10-14).

The World Trade Organization (WTO) also has a role to play, as fishing subsidies distort international trade and markets. The WTO Committee on Trade and

members to clarify and improve the situation regarding fishing subsidies. There is currently no agreement or definition on what a subsidy is; how the effects can be measured; or when they are useful or harmful. There are difficulties with evaluating the effects of subsidies on the economy, environment, international and internal trade, and the sustainability of fish stocks. Many subsidies may have been useful at the time of introduction and justified in economic terms, but over time have became entrenched, often serving the interests of participants, and eliminating them can be a difficult political issue (Schrank, 2003; Schorr, 2004; FAO, 2004 pp. 128-131). If global

fisheries are to attain sustainability, the elimination of fishing subsidies is necessary, as currently the global fishing fleet is twice the size that the oceans can sustainably

support. Unilateral action by individual countries may not be attractive as such countries would suffer trade disadvantages, but multi-lateral actions could be effective with all nations ending or reducing subsidies under similar rules. The WTO is the only global multi-lateral organisation that can enforce its agreements. According to Sumaila et al. (2007) under the current Doha Trade Round Negotiations there is a possibility that member countries may agree to cut government subsidies to fisheries.

Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing

Illegal fishing refers to fishing carried out by unauthorised vessels; unreported fishing refers to fishing in which catches have not been reported to management authorities; and unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities carried out in the absence of management measures (King, 2007; Sumaila et al., 2006). Unregulated fishing is conducted by vessels without nationality, or flying flags of the state, which do not belong to relevant fishing organisations and therefore do not consider themselves bound by those organisations rules (Le Gallic, 2008). Although some international instruments contain provisions that relate to IUU none of these were set up directly to deal with the issue. IUU is commonly understood to refer to fishing activities that are inconsistent with or in contravention of the management or conservation measures in force for a particular fishery (Kirkwood and Agnew, 2004).

IUU, although not new, has recently become a major international issue. IUU has become a global widespread activity involving fishing companies and fishers from many countries and occurs in both national waters and on the high seas. The recent

emergence of organised IUU fishing operations through fleets of vessels with common ownership has also facilitated and accelerated the development of IUU fishing (Sumaila et al., 2006; Le Gallic and Cox, 2006). An outcome and impact of IUU is that it can undermine regional and national state management strategies aimed at managing fisheries on a sustainable basis, or when rebuilding depleted stocks. It may also undermine mitigation measures developed, for example to reduce bycatch as unregulated fleets are unlikely to implement such measures (FAO, 2002). Under the FAO IPOA IUU is defined as illegal fishing conducted by vessels of countries that are parties to Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) but operate in violation of its rules, or operate in a country’s waters without permission. The IPOA is a voluntary instrument that applies to regional bodies and states, entities, and to all fishers. The IPOA addresses the nature and scope of IUU; its objectives and principles and the implementation measures to prevent and deter IUU fishing. These measures focus on regional and state responsibilities; flag-ship responsibilities; coastal state measures; port state measures; and internationally agreed market related measures (FAO, 2001). The FAO also developed a set of technical guidelines for the

implementation of the IPOA to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU. The guidelines review the available measures and provide advice for decision makers and policy makers associated with the management of fisheries and how the measures may be used and implemented (FAO, 2002). Following this initiative the 2002 WSSD called for the control of IUU by 2004. At the June, 2003 G8 meeting in Evian, Heads of State adopted a G8 Action Plan for the elimination of IUU fishing. More recently the Organisation for the Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Committee for Fisheries

completed a major study to address the full economic dimensions of IUU fishing, in an integrated and comprehensive manner to make sure that all the underlying causes had been correctly identified in order to select the most appropriate solutions (Sumaila et al., 2006; Le Gallic, 2004; Le Gallic and Cox, 2006).

IUU involves the illegal harvesting of fish, shipment, processing, landing, sale and distribution of fish and fishery products, as well as support and provisioning of vessels. Because it is unreported it is difficult to quantify (FAO, 2007). However information available suggests it may account for up to 30% of total catches and that the amount world-wide is increasing. Examples of IUU catches for the 2000/01 period for particular

areas and fisheries are as follows: in the Antarctic area 39% of the total Conservation of