In the previous section, we have examined in detail what is suggested as theory of names by the opponents of descriptivism. In this section, we introduce an argument against both the minimalist theory and Kripke’s causal theory of reference. In order to argue against these theories, we introduce a scenario. In the scenario, we see that an agent fails to use a name competently, although she has grasped what is required by the minimalist theory. Based on this scenario, we argue that an agent needs to grasp more than the minimal information required by the minimalist theory to competently use a name. Moreover, we argue that that Kripke’s account of the mechanism of reference is not plausible. Before starting the discussion, there is one important point about the ter- minology used in this chapter that we need to explain. Consider the linguistic expression “Aristotle”. Many individuals can be called “Aristotle”. Hence, this linguistic expression can be used as the proper name of different individuals. One can use the linguistic expression “Aristotle” to refer to the author ofMeta- physics or the second husband of Jacqueline Kennedy. In this thesis, we use the expression “different usages of “Aristotle”” to differentiate these cases. Alter- natively, we can say “Aristotle” has two (or many) different usages as a proper name. One can consider each usage of a linguistic expression as a name.
Let us now consider the scenario: Emma hears the name of John Smith on a Sunday morning from a person walking behind her on the street. The
5.3. FIXING THE REFERENCE 73 next day, she overhears this name for a second time at work from one of her colleague. The speakers on each of these occasions were talking about different persons; however, Emma is not aware of this. Therefore the linguistic expression “John Smith” has two different usages as a proper name each of which refers to a particular individual. After a while, Emma forgets about both occasions on which she was introduced to the name without forgetting the name itself. Emma has not formed any belief such as the following “the people on these two occasions were talking about the same person”. She just forgot that she heard the name on two different occasions and she also forgot any particular information about each of these occasions. She just knows that she heard the name and she intends to use the name to refer to the same individual. Assume that Emma asserts the sentence “John Smith might live in this town.” What is the truth-condition of this sentence? The name should designate an individual for the sentence to have a truth-condition. So it is more accurate to ask how it is possible to determine the referent of the name “John Smith” in this case.
The first point that one can notice by examining the above scenario isthe inadequacy of the minimalist theory ofmeaning. The reason is that the above scenario implies that a language user needs to be able to distinguish different usages of a linguistic expression as a proper name. The minimalist theory implies that the information that a language user needs to grasp in order to competently use a name does not vary from one name to the other. However, a language user needs to grasp more than the minimal information which is suggested by the minimalist theory to differentiate different usages and being able to competently use a name. Hence, the minimalist theory of meaningcannot be accepted.
Now, we can focus on the implication of the above scenario for Kripke’s theory of reference. Our claim is that a plausible theory of reference should explain why the name as used by Emma fails to refer. The task of the theory of reference is to explain the mechanism of reference. It is crucial for a mechanism of reference to just designate a single object. In fact, one of Kripke’s objections against DTR was that most language users have incomplete descriptions of the bearer of names. Since these incomplete descriptions designate more than one object, the mechanism of reference cannot be explained by appealing to them. In the case of Emma, the expression as used by her passes all the conditions posed by the causal theory of reference; therefore it should refer according to this theory. However, it seems that just borrowing a name from a causal-historical chain of reference and having the intention to refer to the individual referred by the previous person is not a sufficient condition for the mechanism of reference to designate a single object.
So far, we have seen that the above scenario challenges both the minimalist theory and Kripke’s causal theory. However, a proponent of Kripke’s causal theory may try to save his theory while suggesting an alternative for the mini- malist theory. One may suggest that we can solve the problem by just a minor modification. This new theory may require the language user to associate the name with a piece of information about the referent or the previous person in the chain. However, this piece of information should not play any significant role in the mechanism of reference other than helping the language user to dis-
74 CHAPTER 5. A JUSTIFICATIONIST THEORY ...
tinguish different usages of a single expression as a proper name. For instance, in the above scenario, Emma needs to be able to distinguish two different usages of the expression “John Smith” as a proper name. Then, she can refer via a causal chain associated with either of them. In this way, the causal theory of reference can be restored just by a minor modification.
The problem with this suggestion is that the piece of information cannot be arbitrary chosen, otherwise the very problem reemerges. For instance, assume that in the above scenario Emma associates the same incomplete description of John Smith with both usages of the expression. The same problem emerges again. Therefore, we need the information to be in a particular relation with the object, which is suspended in the cases of Emma. We need to formulate a theory of reference, whose conditions cannot be fulfilled in the case of Emma.
The descriptivist theory can handle the problem. However, the descriptivist theory of reference seems to be undermined by the semantic argument formu- lated by Kripke. One may suggest that we may accept descriptivism as a theory of meaningwhile rejecting DTR. In this new approach,each name refers via a causal historical chain but having a definite description of the referent is a competence condition that a language user needs to fulfill. In this new formu- lation, the name does not refer via a description, although for using the name, the language user needs to have the description.
The problem with this suggestion is that it is too demanding. As Kripke notes, language users usually lack any definite descriptions of referents. There- fore, we need to formulate another alternative for Kripke’s theory of reference and the minimalist theory. In the next section, we will examine whether we can have a conception of description where it is possible to formulate a descriptivist theory that is immune to Kripke’s criticism.