FO 371/3307 File 4790, Papers 168045 and 181231 PRO.

The question of the British attitude towards the Russian refugees in Finland was again dealt in early 1919. A telegram from Mr. Clive informed the Foreign Office that there were approximately 13-15,000 Russian refugees in Finland. These refugees had formed a Committee to look after their interests, and it had been supplied by the Finnish

government with 500,000 Finnish marks. Mr Clive suggested that Britain should approach the Finnish government to see what steps they would desire Britain to take. The reply from the Foreign Office was that they should not take any action in the matter at present, and that the only way they could come in would be by Mr. Bell, the British representative in Finland, cooperating in giving relief and assistance.^^

A conference between Sir John Pedder and Mr. Haldane Porter of the Home Office, Major Spencer of the War Office, Mr. Steward o f the Treaty Department and a Foreign Office representative, on the question of Russian refugees in Finland and their

admission to UK was held in February 1919. The Foreign Office memorandum o f the meeting pointed out that, hitherto, permission had been granted in very exceptional cases, such as persons intimately connected with this country, those owing property in England, those likely to be use to the government, or else to some wives and families o f Russians who had joined the Allied forces on the Archangel front.

In the memorandum it was pointed out that Major Spencer from the War Office had stated that the matter was one which did not really concern his department. On the other hand, the attitude of Sir John Pedder from the Home Office was that all Russian

refugees should remain where they were, and if this could be achieved, the means whereby it was done did not really interest the Home Office. He was also of a view that the admission of people who were likely to carry on monarchist propaganda was

undesirable. This is of course quite an interesting view, especially as Britain itself was a monarchy.

FO 371/3968, File 176, Paper 15559. Telegram from Mr. Clive to FO 26.1.1919. PRO.

FO 371/3968, File 176, Paper 28740. Russian refugees. Memorandum on question o f allowing them to enter UK, 21.2.1919. PRO.

On the other hand, it is understandable that the government did not want to receive politically active monarchists, as the British government clearly wanted to distant itself from people carrying propaganda for the Russian monarchy. The collapse o f the Tsarist system in Russia had also led to anti-monarchist expressions at home in Britain, which made the issue more sensitive. Pedder continued that he also objected to the admission o f people who would be likely to compete with workers in Britain. However, he also pointed out that there would probably be difficulties (moral difficulties?) if persons of means and influence were admitted whilst those without means were left destitute in Scandinavia or driven back to Russia.

The memorandum then considered the advantages and disadvantages of the admission o f Russian refugees from Finland into the UK. The advantages would be that the

refugees admitted would be grateful towards Britain and that the Scandinavian countries would at the same time be relieved. The disadvantages were that a large proportion were unable to support themselves and most of them were not the ‘best elements’ but had instead fled in order to save their own skins. Some undesirable persons would then probably be able to enter, too. Additionally it was considered that as soon as the door was opened, at least several thousands would probably make applications for entry.

As different possible solutions it was considered a) that all except undesirables would be admitted (meaning those without sufficient means, criminals?) b) that the British

government would maintain their present attitude (not to admit refugees), c) that the subsidies to the Scandinavian countries would be increased, d) that the Allied

governments would be consulted to persuade them to help the British government. ^ The documents do not contain any decisions on the issue, but considering the general line o f government’s policy on the refugee question there is little doubt that the option to maintain the present attitude was chosen as the best course.

The evacuation of Russian refugees from North Russia and especially the question of how many Russians were brought to Britain had been the subject o f much controversial and conflicting information. The report by Rawlinson, the Commander-In-Chief in

North Russia, stated that only 200 civilians were taken from Archangel to England, and the rest were taken to the Baltics and South Russia. On the other hand, there are also statements pointing out that the refugees from North Russia were the largest single group that came to Britain, approximately 15,000.

Sir John Simpson, in his Refugee Problem (1939) stated that very few Russian refugees entered Great Britain after the war and that the only single large group coming to Britain after 1917 were those evacuated in British ships from Murmansk after the fall of the popular government in Archangel. His estimate was that, at one time, there were probably about 15,000 refugees in all, but the greater part of them were assisted with funds raised for the purpose to emigrate to France, the Balkans and the elsewhere in

1922-23.93 Marc Raeff and Claudena Skran simply state that 15,000 Russians were evacuated directly from North Russia to Britain 94^ but their information is based upon Simpson’s study.

There is some uncertainty by what Simpson means with the ‘fall o f the popular government’. Most probably he is referring to the evacuation o f the British forces and the evacuation of some Russians that coincided with it, in autumn 1919. The actual fall o f the Archangel government happened in February 1920. 95 All the British ships, however, had left Murmansk by October 1919 and thus could not be involved with any evacuations in the following February.

In fact the final fall of the Archangel government happened very quickly, thereby preventing any organised evacuation o f troops or civilians. In early February the successful Bolshevik offensive on the Dvina front caused panic in Archangel. In the middle o f February most of the officers left Archangel in the direction of Onega and Finland. On 18-19 February the remainder of the North Russian government evacuated Archangel and General Miller left from Murmansk by sea, first to Norway and later to

91 WO 33/975, File 3717. The Commander-In-Chief, North Russia to WO 4.10.1919. PRO.

9^ See for example Simpson 1939, p. 339; Skran 1995, p. 36; Marrus 1985, p. 149; R aeff 1990, p. 28. 93 Simpson 1939, p. 339.

94 Raeff 1990, p. 28; Skran 1995, p. 36. 93 Strakhovsky 1944, p. 252.

Britain. He soon emigrated to France, where he disappeared in 1936, allegedly kidnapped by Soviet agents. Many others, however, never managed to leave North Russia. The British attitude towards the whole issue can be seen in a message stating: ‘there is nothing we can do. Miller was given a chance of going to Murmansk and of evacuating all who wanted and he refused’.

This does not, however, mean that the British had planned to evacuate refugees from Russia to England. The telegram of Rawlinson, the Commander-in Chief o f North Russia, enquired in August 1919 whether certain Russian families who had either relations in England or direct business connections with England could be sent to Britain, provided that they could show proofs of being able to maintain themselves. The War Office telegram to Archangel stated clearly that ‘in no circumstances can Russians be received in England ‘. It was also informed that the Home Office view was that the destination o f these Russians should be ‘anywhere but England ‘. ^9

The letter of Under Secretary of the State for the Home Department to the Director of Military Intelligence on 2 September stated that no definite decision could be given as to whether any refugees with connections to England should be granted admission to the UK. The Home Office could not provide either accommodation or maintenance for a large number o f refugees. Thus a telegram had been despatched to the Military

authorities in North Russia saying that in no circumstances could refugees be received in Britain. The Home Secretary was strongly of the opinion that all possible ships should be taken to transfer Russians who wish to leave Archangel by direct sea route to other ports of Russia. Considering the strictness of the message to the authorities in North Russia, the more accurate statement would have probably been that the Home Office was not willing to provide accommodation or maintenance ‘ to miy number o f refugees ‘.

w o 106/1183. Fall o f the North Russian government. Report from the East Finland Mission, March-May 1920. PRO.

Silverlight 1970, p. 352.

9^ w o 32/5709. Situation in Archangel 13.2.1920. Report by R. Steel. PRO.

99 FO 371/4029, File 124546. Telegram respecting refugees from North Russia 14.8.1919 and 3.9.1919. PRO. 100 pQ 371/4029, File 124546. Copy o f the letter o f the Under Secretary o f the State for the Home department to the Director o f the Military Intelligence, 2.9.1919. PRO.

The proposal of the Secretary of the State for War, Winston Churchill, was to repatriate these civilians to Southern Russia. This was also the recommendation Curzon and that of the Foreign Office in general, The War Office telegram to General Ironside stated that at the conference held between the representatives of the Home Office, Foreign Office and the Ministry of Shipping it was decided that all Russian civilians would be sent to South Russia when evacuated from North Russia and would not be allowed to land in the UK unless passed at the port of call by Home Office officials. The remainder would be accommodated on board ships bringing them to UK ports until re-embarkation on vessels proceeding to South Russia. ^^2 The C-in-C of North Russia was informed that civilians should not leave North Russia under the impression that they were going anywhere but South Russia.

In the light o f currently-available documents it is reasonably clear that, contrary to earlier suggestions, the number of Russians evacuated from North Russia to Britain never reached more than a few hundred. The fact that the figure 15,000 is repeated in many studies is partly due to the fact that they have merely repeated the figures given in older studies, for example that of Simpson. Originally, the mistake might have happened because of several reasons; because of the marked difference between the estimations and the actual evacuation numbers; because of the uncertainty about the destination of the evacuated refugees, and so on. For example, General Rawlinson replied to the War Office enquiry about the earlier estimation of General Officer Commanding, i.e. that of 15,000 refugees, that this estimation had included refugees that were to be taken to Murmansk. The refusal of General Miller to evacuate his troops to Murmansk, however, reduced the figures. In addition, as Rawlinson stated, the number of Russians that were evacuated from Archangel was also less than had been originally estimated.

The most difficult refugee problems were still ahead; the final fall o f the Archangel government, the defeat of Denikin’s army and finally the evacuation o f Vrangel’s refugees. British policy in relation to the admission of refugees remained, for the most