B-10. The noncontiguous battlefield and guerrilla environments of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have highlighted force protection requirements for theater tactical signal units that are much greater than those that were projected, equipped for, and trained for under Cold War doctrines. The following paragraphs discuss some of these requirements.
EQUIPMENT
B-7. Based on experiences from Operation Iraqi Freedom, theater signal support personnel accompany combat arms units during the performance of their duties. An example of this occurred when theater signal units accompanied combat elements of the Third Infantry Division on the march to Baghdad. To ensure that signal troops receive adequate protection from small arms fire, they require the same protective individual equipment (for example, body armor) as the combat forces. This is in contrast to the Cold War norm that assumed that theater signal units would locate and operate only in protected, rear areas. Force development planners need to ensure that this equipment is included in requirements documents (TOE) and authorization documents (MTOEs).
B-8. On the nonlinear battlefield, there are no protected rear areas;
everywhere is the front-line. Theater signal units require robust weapons (for example, heavy machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, night vision devices, and weapon sights) for self-defense, both during convoy movement and at the halt. Ideally, possessing the appearance and equipment of a formidable defense can be a deterrent to an attack. Signal soldiers need and deserve every edge that robust weaponry provides if and when a battle occurs. Force development planners need to insure that this equipment is included in requirements documents (TOE) and authorization documents (MTOEs).
TRAINING
B-9. Weapons qualification and combat-worthy weapons proficiency are not the same. True weapons proficiency is not a task to be set-aside after obtaining annual qualification. Weapons proficiency must be cultivated as a way of life, much like personal physical fitness. Commanders, leaders, and planners must provide both personal example and resources (range time, funds, instruction, and ammunition) to make this happen.
B-10. All unit members should be trained, qualified, and proficient on all unit-crew served weapons in addition to their individual weapons. Both primary and alternate weapon crew members pull shift, go on sick call, and are often detailed to jobs away from the vicinity of their assigned weapons and/or the signal site, they get hurt, and even killed. With the demands of normal signal operations and the turmoil of battle, primary and alternate weapons crews are not sufficient to ensure that weapons will be manned and effective during battle.
B-11. Land navigation proficiency is equally as important as weapons proficiency. The combat arms forces supported by personnel assigned to theater tactical signal units have fully embraced the operational capabilities that the GPS offers, allowing them to rapidly and accurately move over vast distances of featureless terrain, sometimes with limited map coverage and under conditions of limited visibility. Operational doctrine and planning require theater tactical signal units to keep pace while avoiding or bypassing enemy strong points and maneuvering around minefields and other obstacles.
While the ability to navigate and negotiate obstacles on the battlefield has always been critical, it was never more evident than during the tragic ambush of the 507th maintenance company during Operation Iraqi Freedom when the company missed a turn at a road intersection ventured into uncleared territory.
B-12. Proficiency with the GPS does not replace or reduce the requirement for proficiency with maps and compasses, nor does it reduce the requirement to issue and carry maps and compasses in sufficient quantities. Many of the GPS sets likely to be encountered in signal units have either inadequate map storage and display capability or no map storage or display capability at all.
Knowing the numerical coordinates of a position will not provide the critical information obtained from a map. Maps can provide you with information about terrain within the vicinity of your location, the location of nearest bridge, enemy positions or obstacles, or identification of the road on which you are traveling. Proficiency with both GPS and maps enables theater signal units to move about with the same speed and accuracy as the force they support.
B-13. Effective unit employment of GPS is as much a leader and staff
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B-14. Some techniques for designating waypoints are more precise than others. For example, designating a waypoint by range and bearing from a known waypoint is less precise than recording it directly or plotting it on a map and reading the coordinates from the map. The greater the range from the known waypoint, the greater the potential error when the waypoint is used. Many GPS sets only display to the nearest degree. At long distances from the reference waypoint, the distance represented by this +/- ½ degree can be significant. If an off-set technique is used to mark a road junction and the bearing is not at or near right angles to the road, the error along the road can be significantly greater than the normal high degree of accuracy that users expect of GPS and enough to cause the user to take a wrong turn.
Using the wrong technique can lead to a dangerous false sense of security.
B-15. Under conditions of operational stress and fatigue and conditions of difficult navigation, turnoffs and jogs in the road are often easily missed.
Marking turns in the route with GPS waypoints and then providing subsequent nearby waypoints along the direction of the turn is a useful technique to reduce this confusion. In contrast, if only major changes in the general direction of the route are marked, soldiers could easily miss a short dogleg in the desired route and end up in a minefield or hostile neighborhood.
While numerous factors contributed to the ambush of the 507th Maintenance Company, a preliminary after-action report indicates that only a smaller number of more general waypoints were programmed into the unit GPS set(s) in the area of a critical missed turn. Under these conditions, the GPS sets would have indicated that the unit was still heading in the general direction of the next waypoint even after the turn was missed. The full potential of the available GPS sets to avert missed turns was not realized.
B-16. The above examples are only a small sample of possible pitfalls and compensating techniques in the use of GPS. Leaders at all levels must study the technology thoroughly and practice with it frequently to develop the complete understanding and intuitive feel for its strengths and weaknesses required to fully realize its potential as a combat multiplier and life saver.
SITE DEFENSE PLANNING
B-17. Signal unit defense plans must consider the nature of signal operations, organizations, and the equipment to be realistic and effective.
Only under certain circumstances are the personnel of a typical signal unit or node enough to maintain a perimeter large enough to adequately protect all of the unit’s systems. Even under such ideal instances, units would find great difficulty manning the entire perimeter and manning all of its communications systems concurrently.
B-18. The mathematics to calculate the potential for a signal unit to establish and maintain a perimeter is fairly simple. Generally, two-person fighting positions should be placed approximately 20 meters (66 feet) apart, and single-person positions may be placed about 10 meters (32 feet) apart. These distances provide reasonable assurance that enemy soldiers will not be able to infiltrate between the positions while facilitating battlefield tasks such as redistributing ammunition, replacing fallen individual soldiers or fallen crew members on crew-served weapons, communicating with adjacent positions,
distances interfere with these functions. Frequently, terrain, weather, visibility, and other factors dictate closer spacing. The diameter of the perimeter can be calculated by multiplying the number of positions that the unit can man by the spacing and dividing by 3.14.
B-19. When a signal site is established with 50-meter (164 feet) spacing between systems so that a single mortar round will not cause damage to more than one system, the size of the site rapidly grows beyond the capacity of the unit to man an effective perimeter.
B-20. Vehicular-mounted communications systems project large silhouettes and are extremely vulnerable to small arms and indirect fire. When at a semipermanent or permanent halt, often the most prudent defensive measure would be to place these systems in buildings or field fortifications, rather than relying on dispersion for protection. This approach also has the advantage of facilitating a smaller, more manageable and defensible perimeter.
B-21. Clustering with other units at the semipermanent or permanent halt can provide a common defensive perimeter. Since most combat support and combat service support organizations also have defensive problems, such clustering is mutually beneficial. The exception to clustering as a norm would be when the enemy has sufficient electronic warfare capability coupled with adequate firepower to threaten clustered units based on information gathered from the electronic signature of the signal unit. In such cases, commanders must make their decisions based on their assessments of the relative severity of the different threats.