Formal decision-making processes and actual practices

The leading role in the dossier is played by the government, which constitutionally holds the ‘keys’ to Italy’s foreign policy and external relations in general.

Within the government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC) exerts a clear supremacy over the formulation and expression of the Italian position on EU enlargement, as well as its contribution to the wider EU enlargement process, including via national participation in the relevant technical programmes and financial instruments. Two Units in the MFAIC are specifically in charge of the preparation of the Italian position on the region and EU enlargement, respectively. The latter is first expressed in the Council’s Working Party on Enlargement and Countries Negotiating Accession to the Union (COELA) and is then discussed in the Comité des Représentants Permanents (COREPER). It is finally approved in the General Affairs Council (GAC), where Italy is represented by the Minister of European Affairs, a non-portfolio minister attached to the Prime Minister’s Office.

Another set of governmental institutions, notably the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice, are involved to varying degrees in the formulation of the Italian position. This is notably due to their respective competencies in the implementation of bilateral treaty provisions and in ensuring Italy’s participation in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument (TAIEX),

193 _{Brown, Stephen and James, William, “UK, Germany Offer Plan to Break Bosnia's EU Deadlock”, Reuters, November 2014,}

available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/us-bosnia-eu-accession-idUSKBN0IP1V620141105 (last accessed on: 17 March 2015).

194 _{See, Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Office of the EU Special Representative to Bosnia}

and Herzegovina (2015), “Transcript of the First Press Conference of the Head of Delegation of the European Union and EU Special Representative in BiH, Ambassador Lars-Gunnar Wigemark, held in Sarajevo”, Sarajevo: EU, April 2015, available at: http://europa.ba/News.aspx?newsid=10832&lang=EN (last accessed on: 19 April 2014), and Gross, Eva (2015), “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Back on an EU Track?”, Alert, No. 19, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), March 2015, available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/bosnia-and-herzegovina-back- on-an-eu-track/ (last accessed on: 19 April 2015).

and CSDP missions and operations, among others. Coordination among these ministries takes place via regular inter-service meetings and on the occasion of high-level ministerial visits or meetings with Balkan counterparts.

In recent years, the former President of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, has played a special role. His symbolic role and international prestige tended to reinforce the government’s own demarches in the region, as was the case on the occasion of his official visit to Albania in March 2014.195

The formal role of the Italian Parliament counterbalances the Executive’s general action in external relations, including in European affairs. It does this by exerting a function of orientation and control, as well as through (confidential) informative flows from Italian diplomatic posts, interrogations and hearings with senior governmental representatives.196 _{However, the actual practice reportedly tends}

to differ. Normally, the Parliament struggles to discuss EU affairs (including enlargement issues) in a timely and systematic manner, due to the rather ‘schizophrenic pace’ of Italian domestic politics. Relations between the government and the Parliament are also affected by some lack of effective coordination on the dossier. This is due to what is perceived by some observers in the Parliament as the Executive’s underlying resistance to promptly submit to the constitutionally-granted authority of the Italian Parliament to co-shape foreign and European policies. At the same time, a general lack of interest by Italian Members of Parliament (MPs) in the intricacies of the EU enlargement process is observed. In turn, this tends to weaken the influence of the legislator in this policy area. Last but not least, the relative ‘normalisation’ of the Balkans, in terms of stability and security, has lessened the (already volatile) political attention of MPs towards the region. Instead, they focus on ‘hotter’ topics such as the Ukrainian crisis, Northern Africa (notably Libya) and the Middle East.

Despite such problematic constraints, a wide – yet sometimes superficial – support for the Balkans’ European perspective exists across the Italian political spectrum. This is normally expressed in general acts and statements by the relevant parliamentary Committees, both in the Chamber of Deputies (Committee III – Foreign and EU Affairs) and the Senate (Committee XIV – Policies of the European Union).197 _{The political positions that are occasionally taken by Italian MPs reportedly emphasise the}

need to maintain the momentum of EU enlargement towards both the Balkans and Turkey, despite the current difficult juncture, through the continuation of accession or pre-accession negotiations and the application of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria. Formal and informal contacts also take place between Italian MPs and official representatives from the Balkans, particularly Serbia and Albania, including through ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ with regional political representatives.198

A number of Italian regions, such as Friuli Venezia Giulia, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Marche, and Puglia, have also become fairly pro-enlargement players. This is due to their tradition of commercial and people- to-people relations with the Balkan area, as well as their participation in nationally and EU-funded cross-

195 _{For a detailed report on that visit, see, for instance, Pedrazzi, Nicola (2014), “Napolitano in Albania: Le Repubbliche di}

Fronte”, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, March 2014, available at:

http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Albania/Napolitano-in-Albania-le-Repubbliche-di-fronte-149013 (last accessed on: 2 December 2014).

196 _{For the legal basis, see: Official Journal of the Republic of Italy (2012), “Norme Generali Sulla Partecipazione dell'Italia alla}

Formazione ed all'attuazione della Normativa e Delle Politiche dell'Unione Europea”, January 2014, Official Journal, No. 3, available at: http://www.politicheeuropee.it/normativa/18408/legge-24-dicembre-2012-n-234 (last accessed on: 2 December 2014).

197 _{See, for example: Chamber of Deputies (2011), Resolution 6-00091, Rome: Italian Parliament, available at:}

http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/files/download/082dbcc53267f2a1013272a9b23407c8.do (last accessed on: 2 December 2014).

198 _{For a selection of activities on the Balkans by the Chamber of Deputies between 2008 and 2012, see Italian Parliament}

(2015), “Temi dell’attività Parlamentare: Balcani Occidentali”, available at:

border cooperation programmes. For example, in the framework of the Italian ‘Decentralised Cooperation’ policy, as well as via EU’s ‘European Territorial Co-operation’ and IPA funds. The present collaboration between Italian and Balkan local actors covers a wide range of policy areas such as welfare, environmental cooperation, tourism, culture and territorial economic development. Several Italian regions, particularly Marche, have also strongly advocated the development of EUSAIR and reportedly pushed the Italian government to fully commit to that objective.199

Other actors are acknowledged to play an informal advocacy role in shaping the Italian pro- enlargement position. These include the private sector and the ‘big players’ who are involved in the Balkans. For example, the state-owned ‘energy giants’ ENI and ENEL, as well as FIAT, the biggest Italian car-producer. Other economic factors that have a different modus operandi, such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), could become more influential in the near future. It is likely that this could gradually shift the focus of Italy’s economic presence in the region from traditional export (or re-import-) oriented ‘de-localisation’ to a more network-based collaboration, and long-term integration, with local businesses.200

A much lesser degree of influence is exerted by social (and sometimes politically affiliated) movements, trade unions and non-governmental organisations, notably those that are involved in development cooperation and environmental protection. Such actors have often pointed out a number of problematic elements in Italy’s relations with the region, including the issue of social and normative dumping driving de-localisation of Italian businesses to the region201_{, the potential environmental risks}

posed by the ongoing energy projects202_{, as well as the need to make local recipients more accountable}

for the use of Italian and EU development aid.

The expert community, including think tanks and academia, tends to strongly support the European perspective of the Balkans, often urging the Italian government to keep the regional dossier at the top of its diplomatic agenda.203 _{Nonetheless, decreasing budgetary resources for Balkan-focused research}

and information activities, as well as the traditional difficulty for foreign policy debates to resonate in the Italian media, tend to limit the impact of expert opinions on national policymaking.

199 _{See, for instance, Conference of the Regions and the Autonomous Provinces, “Ordine del Giorno Sulla Macroregione}

Adriatico Ionica”, 11/17/CR12/C3, 23 June 2011, Rome: Conference of the Regions and the Autonomous Provinces, available at: http://www.regioni.it/upload/230611_Macroreg_Adr_Ion.pdf (last accessed on: 17 March 2015).

200 _{See, for example, Stocchiero, Andrea (2014), op.cit.}

201 _{See, for example: Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) (2010), “FIAT: Epifani, Azienda Riapra Dialogo con}

CGIL e FIOM”, 23 July 2010, Rome: CGIL, available at: http://www.cgil.it/news/Default.aspx?ID=14332 (last accessed on: 4 December 2014).

202 _{In particular, the debate on the environmental impacts of TAP has recently evolved into a politically sensitive}

confrontation between Puglia’s regional authorities and the Italian Government but also, among Italian political parties. See, for example, “Puglia, Grillo e i Parlamentari M5S Contro il Tap: ‘Opera di Fantascienza’”, Il Fatto Quotidiano, September 2014, available at: http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2014/09/20/m5s-grillo-e-i-parlamentari-in-puglia-alla- manifestazione-contro-il-tap/1127717/ (last accessed on: 5 December 2014), and “Gasdotto Tap, Matteo Renzi: ‘Non si Può Dire No a un'opera Così’. Sindaci Salento: ‘Troveremo Soluzione Alternativa’”, Huffington Post, September 2014, available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2014/09/13/gasdotto-tap-matteo-renzi_n_5815806.html (last accessed on: 19 April 2015).

203 _{See, for example, Greco, Ettore (ed.) (2014), “Scegliere Per Contare: Rapporto Sulla Politica Estera Italiana”, Quaderno IAI}

No. 11, Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, pp. 32-43, available at: http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiq_11.pdf (last accessed on: 4 December 2014), and Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso (2013), “Position Paper: L’allargamento dell’UE ai Balcani e alla Turchia”, 21 November 2013, Rovereto: Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, available at: http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/Occasional-papers/L-allargamento-dell-UE-ai-Balcani-e-alla-Turchia (last accessed on: 17 March 2015).