Frames about nature

Linguistics literature identifies numerous frames that are used in sustainability and environmental discourse to frame the natural world in certain ways and which have implications for how people think and act towards it (e.g. see Lakoff 2010; Goatly 2007; Larson 2011; Blackmore & Holmes 2013). There is not scope in this thesis to discuss the theory relating to all these frames and their implications for environmental behaviour. However, I created a working mind map of frames to aid my understanding of them, which I show below.

Fig 2.9 Mind map of cognitive frames about nature

In this subsection I focus on discussing four common metaphors referred to in the literature because these are metaphors likely to occur in the participants’ accounts. These metaphors are:

• Nature is container / object

• Nature is economic resource

• Nature is machine

• Nature is evil

Nature is container / object

The phrase being in nature uses the conceptual metaphor NATURE IS CONTAINER and NATURE

IS OBJECT. In order to discuss this metaphor I first need to explain the construct of an image

schema, of which a container is an example.

One of the central ideas in cognitive linguistics is that language is embodied, situated and intersubjective (Johnson & Lakoff 2002). Conceptual metaphors are grounded in the everyday embodied experience of interacting with the world. However, we may not be consciously aware of the embodied nature of these interactions depending on the quality of our embodied awareness and degree of integration of various parts of our psyches as discussed previously in the sections on values etc. (see 2.3.3 on mindfulness), identity (see 2.4.3 on nature connection and wellbeing) and psychological threat (see 2.5.4 on emotions and embodied cognition). One of the most basic source domains that we can use are called image schema. These are gestalt structures – abstract structures that organise mental representations based on embodied pre-reflective experiences such as recurring patterns in body movement, object manipulation and perceptual interactions (Johnson 1987). According to Johnson (1987), one of the most pervasive features of human experience is the

experience of physical containment, spatial boundedness and differentiation: in-out, verticality, balance, force, motion, intensity, scale, orientation and so on. I will focus on containment because of its implications for how the natural world is conceptualised. Discourse often positions a speaker inside or outside a container. Johnson explains that the

schematic structure of in-out orientation that comes from the experience of containment implies:

• Protection from or resistance to external forces

• Forces within the container are limited or restricted

• The contained object gets relatively fixed in its location, which can be accessible or inaccessible

The Container schema is often used as a conceptual domain source for safety and security from what is inside or outside the container. The entailment of NATURE IS CONTAINER may therefore be that nature is a threat that needs to be contained, or alternatively that humans are the threat from which nature needs protecting. The entailment of nature as accessible or inaccessible has consequences for development of ecological identity through encounters with the natural world. Johnson explains that the Container schema also conveys separation through exclusion, division and boundaries that differentiate the container object from other objects. Conceptualising nature as an object that is separate from us is also conveyed with the term ‘environment’ because it is a view of nature as a separate object that surrounds, as opposed to contains, us (Lakoff 2010). This potential for separation is relevant to my study in terms of sense of connectedness with nature. Lakoff (2010) posits that perception of

separation from nature is deep in North Americans’ conceptual systems, and it is likely to be the same for British people. My research participants live and work in the UK and Canada. As stated in my conclusion to the section on identity (see 2.4.5) ecological identity is an aspect of experience I enquire into in my study because of its positive correlation with pro-

environmental behaviour.

A subject-object frame for conceptualising human relationship with nature as Larson (2011) points out, allows us to view nature as an object that we do something to. Environmental philosopher Val Plumwood (1993) discusses subject-object dualism as a particular mode of

attention to the world, where observation is a form of domination. This dualism she argues denies dependency and kinship between observer and observed. Recalling the psychology literature on values and ecological identity, such a dualism of hyperseparation of humans from nature is likely to suppress universalism values (see 2.3.1) and frustrate emergence of ecological identity because nature is perceived as out-group (see 2.4.1). Human-nature dualism “appears to suggest that we can be objective and independent observers - rather than part of the system and inevitably bound up in it” (Pretty et al 2007 p19). Plumwood regards the subject-object / human-nature dualism as a legacy of Cartesian denial of mind- like features to the physical world (p123). I discuss human-nature dualism further in the next section on cultural worldviews (see 2.7.2).

But a perception of nature as separate, whilst being deep in the conceptual system of English speakers at least, is not innate and there are alternative ways of conceptualising the

relationship. Some linguists and anthropologists for example have compared English language metaphors with those found in other cultures especially indigenous languages. Larson (2011) for example in his study of metaphors for environmental sustainability draws on the work by anthropologists such as Bird-David. The peoples she studied such as the Cree, Bushmen and !Kung relate to nature with a subject-subject frame, which is a relational frame understood to arise in part from direct experiencing of the land. This relational approach is the kind of ecological identity discussed earlier (see 2.4.3), which emerges through situated experience and sense of kinship to the inhabitants of the place. Historically in African and Native American languages, there is no equivalent term for nature as an entity distinct from humans (Larson 2011; Kesby 2003). But whilst subject-object frames are not inevitable for Western industrialised peoples, in Lakoff’s (2010) opinion the possibilities for changing frames through language are limited. For frames of human-nature interconnection to take hold, they need to be institutionalised and the metaphors need to be powerfully resonant.

Lakoff (2010) says:

“Introducing new language is not always possible. The new language must make sense in terms of the existing system of frames. It must work emotionally. And it must be introduced in a communication system that allows for sufficient spread over the population, sufficient repetition, and sufficient trust in the messengers.” (p. 72)

But Lakoff also thinks that pro-environmental frames can be strengthened through positive experiences of the natural world, a view that echoes the psychology literature discussed previously (see 2.4.3 on strengthening ecological identity).

Nature is economic resource

The natural world of nonhuman beings and their habitats is often framed in instrumental and economic terms (Lakoff 2010; Larson 2011; Goatly 2007; Stibbe 2015), for example ecosystem services, natural capital, natural resources, stock, asset and pollinators. With regards to human beings, examples of instrumental and economic metaphor are consumer and human resources, which describes humans in terms of their economic function in society. Alternative meanings of what it means to be human in society, such as a citizen, are hidden.

Instrumental and economic framing of nature is part of a larger trend. According to Goatly (2007) other common goods such as knowledge that were in the public domain are being increasingly brought within the sphere of economics, and this means private ownership. Property rights are a key ideological belief of capitalism, a belief considered to have

developed in the Middle Ages in northern Europe as an integral component of human rights (Palazzo & Hoffrage 2014). The notion of private property, Goatly states, relies on the in-out orientation of the Container schema, which makes possible the idea of exclusivity: what is

mine cannot be ours, and what is yours cannot be mine. Another aspect of experience that has been commodified is time. Lakoff & Johnson (1980) argue that the Westernization (i.e. industrialisation and consumer capitalism) of cultures throughout the world “is partly a matter of introducing the TIME IS MONEY metaphor into those cultures” (p145).

As the above two quotes indicate, an Economic frame10 is prevalent in the discourse of

industrial growth societies (see also Lakoff 2010; Dryzek 1997; Dunlap 2008). Indeed Michaels (2011) asserts that the Economic frame is the dominant monoculture of our time against which everything else is judged. In foregrounding the instrumental value of the natural world as a resource to be exploited for human ends, the Economic frame privileges financial interests and reinforces materialistic goals (Crompton & Kasser 2009; Blackmore & Holmes 2013). This way of conceptualising nature, it is argued, obscures a view of nature as having intrinsic value and can reinforce a belief that humans are separate from nature, denying our dependence on the Earth for survival (Lakoff 2010; Stibbe 2015; Larson 2011).

An entailment of the Economic frame for nonhuman nature is that habitats and wildlife can best be protected for on-going human use through monetising nature - by putting an economic value on the services that nature provides, and by commodifying it. Even carbon has been turned into a commodity: for example carbon offsetting and carbon markets (Newell & Paterson 2010). But markets are not morally neutral, political philosopher Sandel (2012) argues, marketising a communal good corrupts and degrades it.

Historically, economic growth is closely linked with fossil fuel use (Böhm 2015), and so dealing with climate change is often discussed by those who wish to have their cake and eat it, in terms of ‘decarbonising’ the global economy (Wright & Nyberg 2015). This means

decoupling economic growth from greenhouse gas emissions so that consumption of nature’s resources can continue to increase unabated by planetary disruptions and catastrophes. But the dominant discourse of the current UK government is one that pits climate change action in direct opposition to economic growth. For example George Osborne in his 2011 Conservative party conference speech said “we are not going to save the planet by putting our country out of business”.

With regards political environmental discourse in the USA, Lakoff (2010) identifies two main contradictory moral systems that he labels ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’. These moral systems are not just cognitive frames they are cultural worldviews and I therefore return to discuss the core beliefs contained within them in the next section.

The conservative moral system includes the Economic frame just discussed, and in Lakoff’s view works against environmentalism and dealing with climate change. Goatly (2007) identifies five main conceptual metaphors of this moral system: NATURE IS RESOURCE, NATURE

IS PROPERTY, NATURE IS ADVERSARY (to be conquered and made to serve us), NATURE IS A

MECHANICAL SYSTEM (to be figured out and put to use) and NATURE IS GOD’S DOMINION (given

to Man to steward/have sovereignty over). This latter is at odds with current thinking in some denominations of Christianity, as I observe in the next section on cultural worldview (see 2.7.2, 2.7.3) with reference to Pope Francis’ recent encyclical.

The progressive moral system involves values of empathy, and personal, social and

environmental responsibility to make the world a better place (starting with yourself), so it promotes self-transcendence values and intrinsic goals (see 2.3.1). Goatly (2007) links it to conceptual metaphors such as NATURE IS A WHOLE (of which we are an inseparable part),

needs must be met if it is to survive), NATURE IS MOTHER, and NATURE IS VICTIM (who has been harmed and needs to be healed).

According to Lakoff (2010), a large proportion of the public is significantly bi-conceptual with versions of both ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’ value-systems in their minds, which they may apply to different issues or in different contexts, or indeed experience as being in conflict – being literally in two minds. He argues that what needs to be done is to inhibit the conservative frames and activate the progressive frames on the environment, through positive nature experiences and by using resonant pro-environmental language.

Nature is machine

An example of the NATURE IS MACHINE conceptual metaphor is the term ecosystem engineer to refer to species such as beavers or worms that significantly alter habitats. The entailment of a mechanistic frame is that nature can be understood and controlled like a machine, and the mystery and complexity of natural phenomenon is obscured. Machines do not have feelings, so another entailment is that nature does not have feelings, which makes living beings easier to exploit. Machines also perform a function for humans, and the corresponding entailment is therefore that nature exists for us to use (Stibbe 2015). Conceptualising the natural world as a machine involves what Weber (1991 cited in Curry 2011) called ‘disenchantment’, where the mystery and magic of nature is denied. Such disenchantment is regarded as a pre-requisite to exploiting, commodifying and selling it (Curry 2011). I discuss the disenchantment of nature through science and mechanistic metaphors in more depth in the next section on cultural worldviews (see 2.7.3).

Mechanistic frames are also used to describe aspects of human experience. Operating, rusty, running out of steam are examples of the conceptual metaphor MIND/BODY IS MACHINE (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), as discussed earlier (see 2.6.1).

Nature is evil

Many wild animals have come to be seen negatively, and not just as nuisances e.g. foxes or rats as vermin, but as embodying human vices. To call a person a rat, cow, snake or bitch tends not to be a compliment. Midgley (2003) says the general equation of wild animals with evil is strong. An entailment of this frame is that it clears us from any guilt for killing or persecuting them, but in Midgley’s view it also fulfils another psychological purpose. By killing the personification, the person feels like they have killed the vice: “they are

symbolically destroying their own wildness” (p166). From this perspective such projection is a psychological defence against threats to civilised life.

2.6.3 Frames and ethical decision-making in organisations