did not set up controls in order to detect whether the same beneficiary was benefiting from different risk capital operations, either managed directly or through financial
Egypt 98- 08 Within the framework of the AA, the objectives of strategy documents (CSPs)
have been geared towards the opening and liberalisation of the Egyptian economy to stimulate growth and employment. The Commission’s assistance supported:
GoE reforms of the regulatory, administrative and financial framework for business development (Trade Enhancement Programme, Support to the Association Agreement, Support to the Implementation of the Action Plan Programme, Financial and Investment Sector Cooperation Programme - Financial, Support to the Water Sector);
existing GoE reform programmes in sectors critical for the Egyptian economy (Spinning and Weaving Sectors Programme, Support to the Association Agreement, Trade Enhancement Programmes, Financial and Investment Sector Cooperation Programme – Social and Rural); and
GoE efforts to modernise the administrative capacities of the institutions responsible for the provision of economic infrastructure essential for business development (Trade Enhancement Programmes, Support to the Association Agreement, Support to the water Sector, Support to the Implementation of the Action Plan Programme).
In terms of financial resources, this support represented 49% of the Commission’s bilateral assistance: €489m have been devoted to economic infrastructure, private sector development, external trade and the financial sector. (p36)
EIB IF/OR
(2010) n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)
The evaluation does not provide specific information on this topic.
CDE (2011) The CDE evaluation states that opportunities of synergies with the Commission remained underexploited (in the response to EQ 1) and concludes that the CDE lacked a strategic approach (Conclusion 10):
“The CDE made policy commitments favouring synergies with Commission programmes with a view to achieving maximum coherent impact with its limited resources. Overall, its support was in line with the Commission private sector development policies but actual complementarities with Commission programmes have been rare. Contacts between the staff of the RFO [Regional Field Offices] and of the EUD varied according to the country and to timing, with a net improvement in 2010-2011.”
Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p22)
“The CDE adopted a demand-led approach to deliver its services, attempting to focus on specific sectors. Its support however lacked strategic orientation.
The mandate of the CDE as defined in the Cotonou Agreement broadly defines the domains where the CDE should intervene, in particular the enhancement of the competitiveness of ACP enterprises and promotion of a business environment conducive to PSD, but it does not indicate the key strategic orientations that the CDE should pursue. These orientations have to be defined by the CDE. The 2005 Statutes and rules of procedures of the CDE indeed stipulate that “the CDE shall define its objectives in greater detail in a policy document”. But over the evaluation period the CDE has not further delineated in detail its objectives and main pillars of support in a policy or strategy document.
Instead, the CDE’s approach has mainly and deliberately been “demand-led”, attempting to concentrate CDE responses on requests in specific sectors of intervention.
(…)
The CDE’s approach has therefore been rather vague, based more on what was already in the pipeline, and on available expertise in the field, than on a strategic vision that could have been aligned on the strategies and priorities of the partner countries and of other donors. A strategy was however under preparation in 2011.”
Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p86) EIB IF/OR (2010) n.a. Channeling DBs and EIB (2008) Banking Measures in the Mediterranean
The report gives no evidence of prioritization of support through the three banking measures managed by the EIB and funded by MEDA. It rather gives evidence of lack of communication between the EIB and the Commission, especially at EUD level which likely prevented strategic programming and
area prioritization:
“The Commission, and especially two of the EC delegations in the partner countries
visited by the Court, were not sufficiently informed of EIB projects and was therefore
not able to monitor or follow them. Furthermore, even when information had been
transmitted by the EIB to the Commission’s central offices in Brussels, it had not
always been shared with the delegations visited by the Court. The audits on the spot
did, however, show that the establishment of EIB representative offices had facilitated
communication between the Commission and the EIB at the local level. This was
especially noted in Morocco, with the organisation of regular meetings.” (.14).
« In the case of Risk Capital Operations, the Report found that “The Commission
did not set up controls in order to detect whether the same beneficiary was benefiting
from different risk capital operations, either managed directly or through financial
intermediaries. This was due to the absence of a central database at Commission level
of all beneficiaries benefiting from risk capital operations.” (p.20).
However the purpose of Risk Capital Operations was determined from the outset, in the MEDA Regulation: “Risk capital shall be used, first and foremost, to make available own funds to undertakings in the production sector, in particular those that can bring together natural or legal persons who are nationals of a Community Member State and of Mediterranean non-member countries or territories. Risk capital shall be used primarily to strengthen the private sector, and in particular to reinforce the financial sector in MEDA countries. It shall add value clearly, by offering financial products and terms that are not available locally”. (p.19).
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008
The report is critical of the lack of integration of employment issues in other sectoral forms of support: “The sectoral and thematic approach to ESI is still poor. With few exceptions, mainly in the ENP area, there are no attempts to address the ESI themes, in particular employment, as a comprehensive and complex issue requiring interconnected and complementary interventions (inclusive growth, education, governance) which would benefit from strong government coordination, the participation of the social partners, and joint harmonized action with other donors.” (p.72).
JC 2.7 The Commission designed its PSD support so as to promote gender