Its History and Critique on Ideology-Life Complex
People are much more familiar with the Frankfurt School and Max Horkheimer than with the School’s birthplace, the Institute for Social Research, and Carl Grunberg, the first director of
23 For example, Macherey (1978) argued that a writer is merely a producer who composes words into an article, which is no different from assembling a vehicle. In addition, Eagleton (1976) proposed,
“Literature […] is also an industry. Books are not just structures of meaning, they are also commodities produced by publishers and sold on the market at a profit” (p. 59, emphasise original).
The two scholars share a notion that the process of creating literature is no different from producing commercial goods.
Theoretical Inspiration this Institute. Originally, the objective of the Institute was to research and strengthen Marxism; such an objective was followed by many of its previous leaders until Horkheimer (Jay, 1996). Under Horkheimer’s directorship, the Institute did not simply focus on economic dimensions, others such as cultural and psychological dimensions were also considered as analytical angles to understand society24
Eventually, they came to be known as the Frankfurt School. Although members of the Frankfurt School possess diverse backgrounds, their arguments shared the same considerations: attempting to determine what had gone wrong within society and to debate what was ordinarily not discussed (Horkheimer, 1972). Their thoughts on analysing and criticising society have been described succinctly as ‘Critical Theory
(Jay, 1984). The reasons that these dimensions, beyond economics, were emphasised were also related to the specialist background of the Institute (Rose, 1978; Held, 1980; Jay, 1996). For example, Marcuse and Fromm possessed backgrounds in psychoanalysis while Adorno focused on musical and aesthetic perspectives.
25’. Critical theory is more like a collective noun or a concept. The purpose of its existence is to position itself to tell the truth (Jay, 1996), which, to a great degree, shares the same characteristic as ideological critique.
24 That whether Horkheimer was a Marxist has been questioned a lot. It is said that there was no opportunity for Horkheimer to be appointed as professor in the department of philosophy at that time;
therefore, if he could become the director of the Institute for Social Research, he could be promoted as professor (because the director is a vacancy for professor level). Since the goal of such an institute is Marxism-oriented, it seems that adopting a position close to Marxism would help him obtain the position. This interesting suspicion might also provide an answer to the question of why the Frankfurt School is criticized extensively for abandoning the economic angle (Wiggershaus, 1994).
25 Critical Theory is different from other theories. Other theories focus on specific notions or offer a complete system of discourse. Although Critical Theory or, say, the Frankfurt School theorists, to a great degree, inherited from Marx’s ideas, it still showed a certain diversity, especially to orthodox Marxism which hinges on the viewpoint of class consciousness (Jay, 1996). As discussed above, Critical Theory is composed of diverse research angles such as culture, society, psychoanalysis, music, and aesthetic. In his article “Traditional and Critical Theory”, Horkheimer (1972) had explained the difference between these two terminologies. Traditional theory (i.e., other theories mentioned above) excessively praises objectivity to avoid prejudice and conflicts of interests. It wishes to depart from value judgement via intelligent determination in order to pursue an agreeable theory without any contradictions. With traditional theory, the research objects are positioned outside theories. On the contrary, Critical Theory subsumes the study objects into the analysed structure, such that it claims itself as an indispensable link to change the world. The purpose of Critical Theory is not to reach absolute knowledge. This is because even though Critical Theory helps to change reality, it varies itself simultaneously during the whole process. In other words, traditional theory tries to place itself outside of the research object in order to provide the abstract concept with a concrete system; however, in Critical Theory, the concrete system is represented as various ideologies which serve certain interest groups. If traditional theory supports the “existing reality” (p. 217), then Critical Theory lifts this veil which, to a great degree, shares the same function as ideological critique.
One of the Frankfurt School’s central argumentative points is that ideology and daily life are indeed and unquestionably integrated in the age of capitalist society. Simply put, an ideology-life complex has been created. Encountering this phenomenon, several Institute theorists have provided their perspectives. Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) in their book Dialectic of Enlightenment explained that the pursuit of rationality (which, in fact, is the representation of certain ideologies) has led human beings to make progress ever since the age of enlightenment. These rational disciplines were originally established only to eliminate barbaric and illiterate human manners; however, they replaced the very social guiding logics, which they used to criticise most, becoming themselves a new myth. Inside this myth, the ideology, which promotes the sublime of rationality, was involved with human life becoming the only discipline.
Moreover, Marcuse (1991) provided this new myth a terminology, that is, Instrumental Rationality. To him, advanced society per se indeed possesses the characteristics of ideology which help to reproduce dominant thought. This thought is that rationality is important. With the assistance of ideology, such thought is repeatingly reproduced where so-called scientific knowledge and technology (i.e., instrumental rationality) are blindly pursued and identified.
Eventually, a world that lives with one-dimensional man is created. The impact of such a one-dimensional society could find further theoretical explanation in Adorno’s (1990) notion of identity where he discussed how this ideology-life complex led to human irrationality on the scale of the Holocaust.
If the phenomenon of the ideology-life complex is the starting point of the Frankfurt School—i.e., the presentation of society now is opposite to its reality— then what this School continues to do is to begin their critiques (see section 3.3) and look for solutions (see Chapter 9). As mentioned above, it is better to understand some critical concepts of the Frankfurt School to ascertain how they diagnose society before investigating how they criticise it as well as guiding ways out of it. Concepts that the following section will review include notions of Dialectic of Enlightenment, Instrumental Rationality, and Identity(-thinking) and Totality.
Theoretical Inspiration Concept: Dialectic of Enlightenment
To the Frankfurt School26
Yet, Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) in their book, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, questioned “why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism” (2002, p. xiv). They answered that although the world has become more civilized since the age of enlightenment, a blind fetish of enlightenment-correct has become another new dominant myth and ideology with a better disguised appearance. The enlightenment rejected myth, but ultimately it became a new myth itself. This myth was borne out of human belief in rationality, science, technology, and knowledge where they were forced to abandon individuality of thinking. The characteristics of their thoughts can only be shown through material formation becoming a new form of thinking, which is based on an instrumental and technological rationality.
, the purpose of enlightenment is to release humans from fears of barbarism via the guidance of rationality. Enlightenment thus claims to establish knowledge based on neutral mathematical disciplines and objective logic to eliminate illusion and myth.
In other words, the idea of enlightenment upholds the logical form and highly praises the mathematical disciplines. This is to eradicate the sensitive characteristics of everything, simplifying everything into countable quantities. In so doing, all things in the world, even human feelings, could be equally calculated and exchanged (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002).
What should be clarified is that it is not the instruments, technologies, and knowledge per se which the Frankfurt School criticised, but rather the thinking logic, or the ideology, that upholds rationality, (blindly) believing in the correctness of instruments, technologies, and knowledge.
In short, the Frankfurt School argues that while the spirit of enlightenment shepherds humans from being savage to being civil, humanity itself has retreated back to the barbarian stage due to the new myths it has created. The difference is that the reasons that have provoked this relapse into barbarism are no longer factors such as the economy, but rather
26 What must be explained here is that, to a certain extent, this thesis has simply and irresponsibly generalized thoughts of the Frankfurt School’s theorists into an angle of totality, and collectively presented this as “the Frankfurt School.” (Ironically, seeing all incidents, even though they are close, as a totality is to a certain extent agreed with by Lukacs, but rejected by Adorno). The reasons for presenting it this way are not only that this is not a thesis on the Frankfurt School, but also that the thoughts of the Frankfurt School’s members are mutually demonstrated and complementary to each other. Frankly speaking, there is a certain difficulty in distinguishing their individual thoughts across such a limited number of pages.
rationality. With the sword of rationality, enlightenment was able to criticise old ideologies;
this rational sword, however, has become another form of violence that itself should be argued against.
Drawing on Horkheimer & Adorno (2002), if the humans’ enlightenment initially involved the pursuit of rationality to escape from barbarism, then what the Frankfurt School wishes is to ask us to undertake the second enlightenment, that is, to criticise the irrationality of rationality derived from the first enlightenment.
The reason why the first enlightenment was veiled in itself or why rational reason became violent reason could be explained by Marcuse’s and Adorno’s other ideas, which is the task of the following discussion. To Marcuse (1991), the first enlightenment has encouraged people to follow the discipline of scientific technology (i.e., instrumental rationality), which becomes the only way for the public to prove their rationality. To Adorno (1990), the impact that the first enlightenment, or the instrumental rationality, has created is that human beings have begun to pursue identity to create a dreamed totality.
Concept: Instrumental Rationality
How scientific technology, as a formation of ideology, influences society could be traced back to Marx’s (1971) relative discourses where he demonstrated how productive forces and the relations of production together determine the social formation of an age27
The same men who establish their social relations in conformity with their material productivity, produce also principles, ideas, and categories, in conformity with their social relations. (p. 119)
. Marx’s demonstrative logic is: scientific technology is part of the productive forces—the diverse labour instruments (and its users) determine the expression of the productive forces (and its corresponding relations of production, i.e., the means of production), which will determine the whole formation of social development (and its corresponding relationships of dominance). Essentially, this reflects an ideology of a time. As Marx (1955) said,
27 The productive forces refer to what type(s) of labourers are in demand and the instruments they adopt to create products. Although it is human beings as labourers who create their own instruments, it is the certain social economic conditions at the time which determine what sort of labourers these humans become and what type of instruments they are able to (invent and) use. Handiwork in the feudal manor, the steam engine machine in an industrial capital society, and Internet business in the era of information all show that the means of production, to a certain degree, reflect the corresponding formation of society.
Theoretical Inspiration If Marx pointed out the veiled relationship between the productive forces (especially the corresponding instruments) and one ideology of a time, then arguments claimed by the Frankfurt School are to demonstrate how scientific technology, which was nourished in the era of enlightenment, became the dominant ideology of their time (and, of course, our present-day), or, has become the only standard to achieve rationality. Although members of the Frankfurt School, e.g., Horkheimer and Adorno, more or less, entered into the discussion on how scientific technology influences human consciousness, Marcuse should be considered as the one who actually offered a complete analysis and critique on the influence of scientific technology.
Marcuse’s (1991) foci were mainly on the relationship between the political content of scientific/technological rationality and the characteristic of ideologies. His findings were that scientific technologies per se are a new kind of ideology. To Marcuse, mechanization (i.e., the result of scientific technology development) has redefined the meaning of labour28
However, using an iPhone 4, as Steve Jobs did, does not mean that the class difference between him and us is removed. As Marcuse (1991) argued,
because technological progress promotes the productive forces that also have improved human lives, including those of the bourgeoisie and proletariat. In other words, the improvement of instruments has brought about a better working environment, which in turn has changed the proletariat’s attitude regarding their labouring, and eventually makes them feel that the gap between the two classes has been reduced.
this assimilation indicates not the disappearance of classes, but the extent to which the needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the Establishment are shared by the underlying population. (p. 8)
In fact, to Marcuse (1991), exploitation does still exist because the very truth of exploitation is now veiled by the development of scientific technology (e.g., the operation of instruments becomes more convenient). To him, “The slaves of developed industrial civilization are sublimated slaves, but they are slaves” (p. 32). The definition of slaves does not refer to the difficulty of performing labour but to workers’ conditions of playing disposable yet instrumental roles.
28 For concept of labour, please refer to Chapter 5.
Marcuse (1991) stated that technology eliminated the original form, which serves a single purpose and created a new general form, which can serve several major purposes. The scientific technologies quantify the abstract natural world, transforming it into one with countable materials offering humans an efficient, reasonable, and comprehensive sensibility to reach objectivity. The scientific technologies meet not only the material but also the spiritual needs of humans, creating an illusion where humans neglect the false and deceitful characteristic of scientific technology and forget the real freedom. The worship of and reliance on scientific technology becomes a key part of humans’ living discipline, and further creeps into their daily life. Marcuse described these phenomena as the pursuit of
“technological rationality” (i.e., instrumental reason29
The characteristics of technological rationality are composed of logical, mathematical, and instrumental formations, including both the application of visible scientific instruments and invisible derivative/constructed knowledge. Under the guidance of technological rationality, humans stand on quantified data and formalised, standardised procedures to evaluate things in the world; in so doing, they think that they are able to objectively and neutrally establish a principle for all things. Thus, such positive thinking of technological rationality, to the public, is the principles guiding humans’ social practices.
).
However, to Marcuse (1991), the technological rationality per se possesses the characteristic of ideology, which is the leading logic of social control. Since technological rationality possesses the characteristic of ideology, the application of visible technologies and invisible derivative knowledge could never be neutral. On the contrary, it is unidirectional and interest-oriented, and it is destined to construct a systematic and cultural totality by eliminating other differences of things. It transpires that the application of scientific technology, whether through visible instruments or invisible knowledge, is a method to maintain a certain ideology. This phenomenon is what Marcuse described as the rationality of irrationality, or an alienated rationality.
29 Although Marcuse’s terminology of instrumental rationality was inherited from Weber’s notion of rationality (including value-rational and instrumental-rational action), Marcuse often adopted technological rationality instead of Weber’s term instrumental-rational action or instrumental reason as termed by his other colleagues, such as Horkheimer and Adorno. Generally speaking, these terms share the same concept.
Theoretical Inspiration To Marcuse (1991), when aliened rationality reaches a certain degree, the foreseeable impacts will be “the closing of the political universe” (p. 19), “the conquest of the unhappy consciousness: repressive desublimation” (p. 56), and “the closing of the universe of discourse” (p. 84). In other words, because such social consciousness (i.e., technological rationality) created by the advanced industrial society controls and dominates political and social thinking, the goal of social development gradually becomes identical to governments’
goals, where all sorts of social problems are subsumed into the governance of states. Society could be extremely rich and so could be unusually poor; it could be a welfare state and also could be one that initiates wars. In terms of politics, oppositional parties are becoming identical; in terms of economics, unions and firms in fact are run by the same guiding logics.
These notions are summarised by Marcuse (1991) as the one-dimension society—“the paralysis of criticism: society without opposition” (p. xli).
Concept: Identity and Totality
Marcuse’s (1991) argumentation on technological rationality explained not only how a one-dimension society is created but also how people living in such a society lose their negative thinking when facing the “triumph of positive thinking” (p. 170). By pointing out the concepts of identity and totality, Adorno (1990) also shared Marcuse’s concern regarding the changing society.
To Adorno (1990), the characteristic of identity—or identity-thinking30
For example, the term freedom originally contained diverse concepts, e.g., including its conditions and legal limitations; but, under the function of identity, humans easily and lazily recognize this term as ‘being free’. Freedom has lost its original intention (with required
—is to categorize, connect, and simultaneously simplify concepts of various terms or humans’
cognitions in order to forge a particular way of thinking. In so doing, the contents of a term, which seemingly contains diverse and abundant meanings, become inwardly narrow and singular due to the operation of identity.
30 Gillian Rose (1978) concluded that identity-thinking, non-identity thinking, and rational identity thinking are three elements which constructed Adorno’s notion of identity(-thinking). Due to the limitation of page length, this thesis will only introduce the notion of identity-thinking in this chapter and non-identity thinking in Chapter 9. For a complete treatment of rational identity thinking, please refer to Rose’s (1978) book The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W.
Adorno, Chapter 3.
conditions); instead, it is seen simply as the protection of personal interests in which people take ‘self-interests’ or ‘being free’ as the only way of thinking regarding freedom. While freedom is simplified to a particular way of thinking (i.e., identity-thinking), it testifies Adorno’s concern that the function of identify helps to create a certain ideology. Adorno (1973) stated that “identity is the primal form of ideology” (p. 148). Similarly, the identity-thinking of ‘being free’ is the ‘primal form’ that constructs the ideology of seeing freedom.
The operating model of identity, according to Adorno (1990), is to pursue the quantitative singularity instead of the qualitative diversity which is the reason why Adorno was disgusted at identity(-thinking). The tragedy of Auschwitz is the example through which Adorno demonstrated the threat of Nazis looking for identity. Under the discipline of instrumental reason—evaluating things based on quantifiable matters, Jewish people were presented as the countable Others. Consequently, death in the Holocaust is not an individual
The operating model of identity, according to Adorno (1990), is to pursue the quantitative singularity instead of the qualitative diversity which is the reason why Adorno was disgusted at identity(-thinking). The tragedy of Auschwitz is the example through which Adorno demonstrated the threat of Nazis looking for identity. Under the discipline of instrumental reason—evaluating things based on quantifiable matters, Jewish people were presented as the countable Others. Consequently, death in the Holocaust is not an individual