Trinitarian talk about God conceives of God as embracing the whole of reality: God embraces the whole of reality for He is both immanent and transcendent. But Christian theology must not stop here since even Hegel's God does the same. Rather, Christian theology must emphasize
that unlike Hegel's God who is incapable of suffering, the Triune God of the theology of the cross shows Himself to be the God who suffers for the sake of Love. As Kazoh Kitamori points out, this distinction is crucial to a Christian understanding of the God who brings salvation to man and the whole of creation precisely because He suffers pain which Hegel's God is incapable of.
In the gospel message, God suffers pain because he embraces. But in Hegel, God does not suffer pain although he embraces. Even if Hegel's God allows individuals to wound one another, he remains a universal being, undisturbed and invulnerable. This God protects himself from being disturbed by 'cunning of reason' (List der V e m u n f t ) . By cunning of reason, Hegel's God never suffers wounds. Thus the abstractness of Hegel's philosophy lies not in his portrayal of God as embracing the world, but in his portrayal of God as a being without pain.
Because of this abstractness, Hegel's rationalism cannot bring salvation to our reality. 43
The question of speaking about God in response to the challenge posed by Marx's atheistic and anthropocentric world-view imposes a heavy
o f ’making the faith relevant to the needs of man and his world without losing the identity of the faith in the cross of the crucified and risen Christ. In the discussion above we attempted to point out that the Church may face this dilemma by talking about the "suffering" of God for the pain of man in order to heal him. This theme of the hidden presence of God in the suffering world permeates our study
of the theology of the cross as an evangelical response to the challenge which Marx* s Weltanschauung presents to theology. Before we turn
to Luther1s theologia crucis, we will attempt to summarize our argument thus far.
In our appraisal of the challenge of Marx's world-view to Christian theology, it was pointed out that Marx's "radical humanism" calls for a radical concept of God. We pointed out that this radical concept of God is found in a trinitarian understanding of the suffering God of the cross. It was emphasized that this theology of the cross is not a reduction of theology to Ghristology. On the contrary, it is the way of speaking of the praxis within God, and of God within history for the sake of man. A theology of the cross was conceived of in contrast to a theology or philosophy of glory. Whereas the former took with radical seriousness the human condition, which is understood in more than, but including the socio-economic and political conditions of life, and is paradoxical in nature, the latter was triumphalistic in essence, with its emphasis on unambiguous success. Classifying Marx's world-view as a "philosophy of glory" seems a logical conclusion in the light of its express optimism about, as well as emphasis upon the ultimate success of human effort at ultimate and total self transformation within history. It is a form of justification through human praxis vis-a-vis justification through the transcendent grace of the suffering God. It was maintained
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that it is inherently triumphal!stic in spite of Marx's radical concern with the pervasiveness of alienation and of human degradation. Admittedly, Marx takes man's suffering most seriously but not seriously enough, for his understanding of man is severely limited. Man, we noted, is both
the estimate of what is human and the architect of his own destiny. Everything about him is therefore limited to his own creation within history.
The theology of the cross, on the other hand, provides a radical understanding of man which arises out of its radical concept of God, Here, man's future is not confined to the history of his own creation. His future is bound up with the future of the "crucified" God who
transcends history. Yet, human praxis within history, as well as the whole of history are given their correct meaning in the light of the cross. This meaning surpasses that given in Marx's historical material ism. Man's freedom is not denied by the freedom of God, but is found only through the freedom of the suffering God who suffers his Son to die for the sake of man and the whole of creation.
This "suffering" God is not found or met through human speculation. On the contrary, it is He who finds man, comes to man and meets him in suffering and paradox. Though apparently absent, yet He is fully present for He reveals Himself in His hiddenness. Thus, when it may appear that God is absent from the tragedy of the human situation, He is most present, though not necessarily in the triumph of human success and accomplishment. Indeed, He is really most present in nihil. He suffers in and with the suffering.
Moreover, we are concerned that speaking about the suffering God does not lead to the glorification of suffering, and that the presence of God in suffering is not reduced to a mere identification of God with fellow sufferers.^ Indeed, we wish to show that the presence of the
suffering God is salvatory for man because the God of the cross is also the God of the resurrection. Therefore, in ’the suffering of the cross there is the resurrection hope. At the same time, we wish to point out that talk about resurrection hope apart from its grounding in the cross seems illusory and triumphalistic, in short, a theology of glory. How ever, without the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, the cross remains the symbol of tragedy and doom. Thus, in the light of the cross and the resurrection, there is hope for alienated and sinful man: hope • in the world, and hope beyond death and the world.
As we shall see below, the theology of the cross does not call man to quietism, and apathy based upon a reactionary ethic of the status quo. This will become especially clear when we finally discuss the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms, To speak of the praxis of transcendent grace is to exhort to radical praxis to transform the inhuman conditions which might mean, in many parts of the world, the transformation of the socio
economic and political conditions of life. Moreover, to accept that our ultimate future is in the hands of the suffering God, is not to dismiss or reduce the necessity of and import for a more "human1' future of human praxis. On the contrary, radical forgiveness through the cross of Christ calls Christians to radical praxis. This praxis, which is always in danger of becoming legalistic, and of reducing the Gospel to a form of Law through the justification of man by his works, must be complemented by the praxis of celebration: celebration of the future of God which is already here in the presence of the crucified and risen Christ Jesus. At the Lord’s table we are called to partake of the messianic banquet which is given proleptically in the Eucharist. Moltmann captures this
indispensable sense of joy and celebration, which is also characteristic of a theology of the cross, in Theology and Joy .
In contrast to Marx's critique of religion as belonging "merely to the realm of necessity as the groaning of the creature in bondage," Moltmann argues that it is only partially so, for "it (religion) also and more properly belongs to the realm of freedom as the play of remembrance, as an expression of joy, and as the imaginative hope of man's basic and
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final humanity before God." It would seem that such talk about joy and celebration in the crucified God in the midst of alienation could arguably be called "ideological" in the Marxian sense of the term. However, Moltmann maintains that
Religious myths and images are not just ideological tranquil izers which compensate for unbearable conditions or mitigate suppressed misery. They are daydreams of human communities in which the totally-other is made manifest, no matter how inappro priately, and where consequently the transformation of the here and now is already being anticipated. These communities are already celebrating that creative play which heavy-laden and labouring mankind longingly desires when it desires liberty, 46
We conclude, therefore, that the liberating power of the crucified and risen Jesus Christ is present in the anticipatory celebration of the transformation of sin and alienation. The genuine urge for wholeness emanates from God, It is therefore not the product of historical circum stances, It is not the result of human achievement; nor is it sustained and even heightened by optimistic hope in man's capacity to transform ultimately the human condition. It is through the Holy Spirit that man
"becomes" the power and love of God in Christ in the world. Openness to God is completely and totally the gift of the Triune God who brings the Absolute Future and who is none other than the God of the cross. But
this does not deny the celebration of the real liberating divine-human activities in history. To do so would be to distort the theology of the cross by making it appear and actually become a form of docetism. The cry for wholeness in history is the cry for the salvific presence of God in history which is already available to the "eyes" of faith.
According to this view, God is not confined to history even as He ’’participates" in the suffering in history. It is a cry whose primary presupposition, contrary to Marx’s atheistic and anthropocentric world view, is not only that God is, hut, above all, that He hears the cry of suffering man. The epistemological centre of Christian faith is the revelation of God in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Thus, Marx’s proletarian cry; "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it," finds its true and most radical meaning and expression, not in Marx's prole tarian revolutionary praxis-theoria, but in the loving praxis of the suffering God of the crucified and risen Jesus Christ.
B.
Luther’s Theologia Grucis: A theology of "radical reversal".
In our examination of the challenge which Marx's atheistic, anthro pocentric and materialistic Weltanschauung presents to theology, we noted that the question of God \/as primary. We claimed that a radical concept of God not only meets the Marxian demand for the emancipation of man and for an "open" and "free" future, but also redefines human freedom and the future of man and the world. In this redefinition, man and the future are liberated not only from socio-economic and other contingent alienating forces but from a reality limited to an immanent, historical materialism. In short, M a r x ’s concept of the immanent freedom of man is taken up and transformed in Christian faith's concept of the trans cendence of God, Here we find that immanence is neither absent nor taken lightly. To do that would lead to a dehumanizing distortion of
reality which would result in an insipid form of docetism. On the contrary, in the concept of the transcendence of God, both immanence
and transcendence are taken seriously. As we shall see below, in Luther* s theology of the cross, talk about God is simultaneously talk about man, his condition, his suffering, his salvation and his future, Luther repeatedly reminds his readers that God revealed in the cross of Jesus Christ is God pro-me. , Consequently, man is not subsequently brought
into the theology of the cross following the discussion about God: man is present from the very beginning.
Furthermore, as the discussion in the previous section showed, it was accepted that there are ways of talking about God which do not conduce to ma n ’s liberation but to his enslavement. In such cases, Christian theology might find itself supporting the ’’protest” atheism of Marx (and others). When this happens, Christians are (should be) motivated by altogether, and, ultimately, different reasons from those of Marx or any other "protest” atheist. The Christian theologian wishes to protest in the name of the revealed truth about the "crucified" God, and, in consequence, in the name of man. His protest is prompted by
the love of God in Christ and is aimed at pointing to the meaning and implication of that love for the Church and the world at large. This is a cathartic and evangelical protest. On the other hand, Marx wishes to protest exclusively in the name of man whom he claims creates himself and is the ultimate and only measure of himself, Marx's protest is
rooted in his humanistic passion for man whose enslavement is pervasively tied to his (man’s) subordination to God. There is no doubt about Marx’s intention to liberate man from his dependence upon God or any other deity or power to whom man is slavishly held accountable. The funda mental difference between Christian faith and Marx’s philosophy is most
vividly and critically expressed in the theology of the cross. It is precisely in such a theology that the question about the God who frees, who suffers, who is for and not against man, which, we have been arguing
is raised by Marx, finds its most evangelical explication. This explica tion is by nature paradoxical as we shall see when we turn to Luther's exposition of his theological method: theologia crucis.
There is no way of escaping the fact that there is a historical distance between Luther and Marx: Luther lived in the sixteenth century and Marx in the nineteenth century. But this is not the only crucial issue which should be considered when any attempt is made to establish a hermeneutical dialogue between the two thinkers. Of even greater significance is the basic difference between their respective ways.of looking at historical and eschatological reality. Whereas, on the one hand, Luther was a theologian for whom the existence of God was not the question - he accepted the existence as basic to his own existence - on the other hand, for Marx, the existence of God was a priori and methodologically rejected, Luther, we are told, had been burdened by the crucial question: How do I find a righteous and gracious God? For Marx, the question was: How do we find free, unalienated, autonomous man? This undisputed difference between Luther's and Marx's "ultimate" questions is made even more acute when we consider the attitude of Marx the economist to Luther's works. Per Frostin informs us:
Already in Marx's early works, Luther is an object of his interests. He is described as a revolutionary, who was never theless unfulfilled. Also in Kapital and the Grundrisse Luther is often quoted, but there in a new perspective. Indeed Luther is probably the German economist most quoted by Marx in Kapital, and this with considerable agreement with his views. According
Grundrisse he is the ^earliest national, economist*. In
Theories of Surplus Value, i.e. in the closing volumes of Kapital Luther is frequently quoted with agreement. For Marx it is not Luther's moral commitment nor his pathos in the fight against incipient capitalism that is important, but his economic analysis.
He is portrayed in contrast to Proudhon, who showed no lack of moral pathos during his revolutionary phase. Marx indicates, however, that the sixteenth century Luther saw something in developing capitalism that Proudhon did not discover in the fully developed capitalism of the nineteenth century, namely, that capital consists of accumulated surplus value. 47
Marx’s preoccupation with economic categories leads him to see Luther's main positive contribution to the liberation of man in Luther's analysis of the evils in capitalism. Needless to say, this interpretation is far from the central thrust of Luther’s concern with a gracious God who is pro-man. As we have already shown, Marx, through the influence of Feuerbach, criticizes the concept of man held by Luther (and others), in which man is seen as utterly depraved before the righteous and holy God who alone can save man from sin, death and the power of the devil. In the process of doing so, he posited his own peculiar anthropocentric and atheistic world-view. It is precisely this overriding concern with man that opens up the way for a critique of his world-view from the
standpoint of Luther’s theology of the cross.
Luther's theologia crucis is a ’’practical method” ; it is not abstract and speculative. Though his concept of man, as well as his understanding of reality as a whole differ fundamentally from Marx's Weltanschauung, there is, nevertheless, a common element in their "living" concern with man. It is this "living" concern in Luther that draws us to him as we seek to articulate a radical concept of God in the face of the challenge which Marx's world-view presents to theology. Thus our concern with Luther's concept of God is existential, and this is paralleled, not only in the situation described by Walter von Loewenich in which he notes that we are "today experiencing a return from a theology of glory to a
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theology of the cross similar to the one we observe in Luther," but also in the very fact that Luther's theology arose out of the existential need for a gracious and loving God.
Luther refused to reduce theology to anthropology. Yet he insisted that any talk about God is simultaneously tsLlk about man. It is
"relational" talk: the relationship between God and man for the sake of man. As Gerhard Ebeling points out, it is impossible to speak about