The post-war campaign has been criticised for failing to create a secure Iraq, immediately after the fall of Saddam. This disapproval has emphasised the tactics used in OIF as one of the key reasons for post-war violence.55 Such assertions are inaccurate. The approach undertaken by the Coalition in liberating Iraq minimised civilian and friendly and enemy combatant casualties. Different tactics and strategies could have been utilised. For example, relocating the 4th Infantry Division from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf, prior to the Coalition invasion would have been such a strategy. However, such tactics and strategies would have increased human suffering and collateral damage. This is because, in the case of relocating the 4th Infantry Division, Iraqi force elements would have had the time and strategic knowledge to redeploy to urban areas, prior to the Coalition advance. The violence and looting, was in part, due to the lack of combat forces deployed in the Gulf. However, the number of combat forces could only have been increased by dramatically altering the Coalition war-fighting strategy. This would have undermined the element of surprise, enabling Iraqi units to deploy in urban terrain and in fighting positions that could have hindered
the Coalition advance. This would have led to significantly heavier Iraqi combat casualties. What is significant is whether the post-conflict phase could have been improved, without degrading the combat phase of the war.
Retrospectively, intelligence organisations involved in the Coalition have been criticised for misrepresenting the passivity of the Iraqi population. It must be made clear, that forecasting the actions of an oppressed people, with perfect clarity is impossible. Looting and violence was expected, but not at the levels which occurred. Moreover, the vast majority of the Iraqi population is passive towards the Coalition. It is only a minority that violently oppose both the Coalition and the Iraqi governing bodies. A humanitarian crisis was also envisioned, which did not occur. This crisis did not occur, as the Coalition had contingencies in place to avert such a crisis.56
The provision of security as the priority, ahead of humanitarian operations and nation-building operations was a necessary prerequisite to creating stability in Iraq. However, this strategy has been criticised. The Coalition has also been criticised for using soldiers to create internal security.57 The reality is reconstruction cannot proceed without the provision of security. Neither will security materialise without soldiers undertaking security missions. There are simply no other forces, sufficiently available or capable, to apply security in any foreign situation. The reconstruction and stabilisation of Iraq has also become highly politicised. These factors have undermined the creation of security, and the administration and reconstruction of Iraq. The British Minister of Defence stated that “the continued absence –for a variety of reasons including political concerns and the uncertain security environment – of a number of the normal participants in post-conflict reconstruction (various [Non-Governmental Organisations] NGOs, development agencies, etc) meant that the military had to combine their primary role of providing security with reconstruction tasks”.58
Conclusion
The war-fighting capabilities of the Coalition succeeded in the Iraq War, while minimising collateral damage and human casualties. However, the post-war situation has become a violent LIC. The Coalition’s nation-building capabilities
and security procedures are effective, and will create a democratic and free Iraq if given time.
The professionalism of commanders and soldiers, combined with technological superiority, agility, jointness, intelligence and precision, created a synergy of warfare that was critical to the Coalition. In terms of counterinsurgency, these capabilities were critical as the Coalition was able to defeat the enemy and ensure that the population was not deliberately harmed. The expeditionary nature of the force was significant. This was illustrated by elements of the Marine Corps, Airborne forces and Special Forces being projected where heavier forces could not be. The effectiveness of these forces was important in reference to LIC, as light forces are invariable those that can close with and engage the enemy. This, however, does not relegate armoured forces to obsolescence. Without these heavy forces, the southern ground campaign would not have been possible. Combined air dominance was once again decisive in warfare. On numerous occasions Coalition air dominance enabled ground forces to overcome numerically superior enemy ground forces. This joint capability is significant in counterinsurgency, as it provides ground forces with augmented firepower and the protection that firepower can generate. In contrast to the previous Gulf War, combat aircraft were not given permission to use friendly regional bases. This made evident the critical nature of naval forces, in support of ground and air forces. Joint capabilities are critical in LIC as they enable a flexible response in difficult environments.
Given the unwillingness of the Coalition’s regional allies to support the war, power projection capabilities have become more important. Precision, technology and joint warfare has enabled firepower to be projected at a distance. This ability to project power is important for counterinsurgents as they will often be required to deploy over a great distance. However, there is a requirement to improve logistics projection. Logistics projection is critical, so as to enable force elements to be deployed and sustained in remote battlefields. Moreover, reducing the weight of armoured ground forces may not be the unilateral panacea, as it has been described. In the Iraq War, heavy armour illustrated a capability to sustain heavier fire and survive on the battlefield. Even in LIC, heavy firepower and protection is required by the counterinsurgent in certain circumstances, especially when the insurgent is numerically superior or is in a concealed position.
Furthermore, modern urban war has shown the essential nature of intelligence, especially human intelligence. In addition, psychological operations are fundamental in modern war.
In terms of doctrinal principles, the invasion of Iraq demonstrates that a counterinsurgent must be able to generate internal security and apply civil operations immediately after the authority of the previous regime is removed. The Coalition was able to neglect political, economic and diplomatic forms of force, at the strategic level, until the point when the Ba’athist government was deposed. Following this point, a lack of holistic force has undermined any attempt to re-establish order in Iraq. In terms of military principles in the initial invasion, professionalism was a leading element in making combat survivable and winnable. Doctrinal precision, especially in reference to the doctrine of the special force deployed, meant that the capabilities of the forces deployed were compatible with the combat environment. Effective communications and quality intelligence enabled precision joint and combined force to be applied in most combat scenarios. Notwithstanding the professional nature of the forces deployed in Iraq, doctrine and strategic imperatives have restricted the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations in post-war Iraq.
Notes
1Cordesman, A. 2003, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons, p. 15, Center for
Strategic Studies Press, Washington.
2Murray, W. & R. H. Scales, Jr. 2003, The Iraq War; A Military History, p. 33, Harvard
University Press, London.
3Knox, M. 2003, March-April 2003: The End of the Beginning of the Third World War,
conference on National Sovereignty and Universal Challenges: Choices for the World after Iraq, Commission on Globalisation, Brussels, June 19,2003.
4
Murray, W. & R. H. Scales, Jr. 2003, The Iraq War; A Military History, p. 33, Harvard University Press, London.
Keegan, J. 2004, The Iraq War, Hutchinson, London.
Friedman, N. 2003, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s NEW WAY OF WAR, Naval Institute Press, Maryland.
Katzman, K. 2002, Iraq: Sanctions, and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, Washington.
Sifry, M. L. & C. Cerf. Eds. 2003, The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, Touchstone, London.
5Murray, W. & R. H. Scales, Jr. 2003, The Iraq War; A Military History, p. 33, Harvard
University Press, London.
Keegan, J. 2004, The Iraq War, Hutchinson, London.
Friedman, N. 2003, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s NEW WAY OF WAR, Naval Institute Press, Maryland.
Katzman, K. 2002, Iraq: Sanctions, and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, Washington.
Sifry, M. L. & C. Cerf. Eds. 2003, The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, Touchstone, London.
6Condolezza Rice quoted in; Lemann, N. 2002, The Next World Order, The New Yorker, New
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7
Richard Haass quoted in; Lemann, N. 2002, The Next World Order, The New Yorker, New York.
8Cordesman, A. 2003, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons, Center for Strategic
Studies Press, Washington.
Keegan, J. 2004, The Iraq War, Hutchinson, London.
Murray, W. & R. H. Scales, Jr. 2003, The Iraq War; A Military History, p. 33, Harvard University Press, London.
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9
Murray, W. & R. H. Scales, Jr. 2003, The Iraq War; A Military History, Harvard University Press, London.
10Murray, W. & R. H. Scales, Jr. 2003, The Iraq War; A Military History, pp. 185-190, Harvard
University Press, London.
Keegan, J. 2004, The Iraq War, p. 139, Hutchinson, London.
11Murray, W. & R. H. Scales, Jr. 2003, The Iraq War; A Military History, p. 190, Harvard
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12
Murray, W. & R. H. Scales, Jr. 2003, The Iraq War; A Military History, pp. 88-129, Harvard University Press, London.
Keegan, J. 2004, The Iraq War, pp. 127-165, Hutchinson, London.
13Keegan, J. 2004, The Iraq War, pp. 127-165, Hutchinson, London. 14
Murray, W. & R. H. Scales, Jr. 2003, The Iraq War; A Military History, pp. 145-150, Harvard University Press, London.
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17Keegan, J. 2004, The Iraq War, p. 179, Hutchinson, London. 18
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20
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21Murray, W. & R. H. Scales, Jr. 2003, The Iraq War; A Military History, pp. 184-187, Harvard
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22Murray, W. & R. H. Scales, Jr. 2003, The Iraq War; A Military History, pp. 187-188, Harvard
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