The future of economic development

It is unlikely that the Thai government will abandon economic d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m m e s as a strategy of social integration in the foreseeable future. To a large degree, such programmes are in the interests of the bureaucracy, irrespective of their economic benefits to rural dwellers, for they can attract substantial funds from foreign governments and agencies and thereby extend the influence of the government departments involved (Riggs 1966). Feeny has also argued that economic changes in Thailand only take place where they serve the interests of the elite (1982, Ch.2), and that development projects are more often guided by perceived threats to national security than by economic considerations (ibid., Ch.8). I would argue that security concerns are paramount in the southern border provinces, because Malay actions threaten not only Thai government control of the countryside, but also Thailand's relations with countries in Southeast Asia and tiie Middle East (Pitsuwan 1982). In tiie 1980s incidents where Malay separatists have bombed government buildings, kidnapped officials, burnt schools, or shot Thai settiers have been few, but tiie separatist groups continue to exist and will continue to be a threat to stability. History has shown that oppressive behaviour by Thai officials only feeds the separatist cause and increases the number of violent incidents. For that

r e a s o n , t h e g o v e r n m e n t has chosen t h e r o u t e of socio-economic development programmes to bring about the integration of Malays. These programmes have h a d poor results, but the government presently has no other weapon in its armory.

Using development programmes to serve government ends often means a failure to serve the needs of the ostensible recipients. DOAE has no institutional a r r a n g e m e n t for assessing the needs of Malay villagers in Yala, let alone incorporating these into the department's projects. This criticism can be levelled against much of the development work that takes place in Thailand (Heim et al. 1986). Nothing in the conduct of GPM groups and RCM sales in Yala has shown that government officers are interested in, or even capable of, determining the needs of Malay villagers. While some hard-working and conscientious officers have a strong commitment to the notion of helping to develop smallholder agriculture, they are too o f t e n constrained by their lack of power to change things, or by an insufficient knowledge upon which to act. Many others take a dim view of rural people, and see their j o b solely in terms of delivering services planned and approved in Bangkok. Exploration of rural needs is beyond such a f r a m e w o r k .

It is patendy wrong to suggest, as some government officials do, that Malays are not interested in bettering their economic circumstances. The actions of people in Maju and Khala are unambiguous testimony that this is not true, and my experiences with Malays elsewhere in Yala show that they are usually keen to improve the productivity of current activities and to develop new sources of income. If government programmes served these aspirations, then Malay antipathy towards the Thai government would be substantially lessened, and much of the Thai government's wealth would

n o t be s q u a n d e r e d in unproductive schemes. In 1988 t h e p l a n n e d e x p e n d i t u r e for the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives in Yala, which c o v e r e d t h e work of DOAE, was over 190 million b a h t

eJS^Qn 2529, p.29), and Yala is among the smallest of Thailand's seventy- t h r e e provinces. T h e e n o r m o u s a m o u n t of money involved, and the potential for its misuse to deepen Thailand's foreign debt, should give the government cause to reassess the bases on which it plans and executes its economic development programmes.

It is unlikely that rural Malays in southern Thailand will accept, even in the long term, complete integration into the Thai state. The notion of the negeri Melayu is far too strong and pervasive for that. And while the Thai state remains associated with an identity that incorporates elements such as exclusive use of the Thai language and Buddhist principles, it will be anathema to Malays. As I have argued in the previous section, a major reason for the failure of government programmes has been a conscious decision by Malays to resist government intervention where their control over social activity and communal life is threatened. Given that fact, the best that can be h o p e d for in the short and medium terms is die design of government programmes which are based on sound research of villagers' n e e d s , which o f f e r g e n u i n e avenues for b e t t e r i n g the e c o n o m i c circumstances of most rural dwellers, and over which the government is willing to relinquish control to Malay communities. The result is likely to be a more amicable relationship between government officers and Malay villagers, r e d u c e d pohtical tension in the border areas, a considerable saving of money, and a diminished potential for conflict between Thailand

and its neighbours. The question is whether the Thai government and its bureaucracy has the will and ability to make such changes.

Finally, I should reiterate the point that any f u t u r e changes to development programmes in Yala or neighbouring provinces must be based on research that takes account of the social life and aspirations of rural Malays, for they constitute the vast majority of the population. Historians a n d political scientists have given little attention to them, while anthropologists have downplayed the importance of the Thai nation state in shaping the circumstances of village life. These omissions weaken our understanding of social life in this region, and do a grave disservice to the people who live there.