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Creativity and Accountability at the BBC: 2004 and Beyond

OTHER GENRES

Children’s (CBBC) Transmission Impossible, Blue Peter Children’s (CBeebies) Andy Pandy, Autumnwatch

Open University The Money Programme, Life in the Undergrowth

Sport 2009 World Championship Snooker

Table 6.1: BBC Genre / Commissioning Breakdown with Programme Examples

6.3.2 The Commissioning Process

The commissioning process, taking place in each genre division, is broken down into the following four overlapping phases (Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2006).

• Strategy and Planning

• Solicitation and Development

• Negotiating and Commissioning

• Production and Delivery

Although Deloitte conducted its research before the implementation of the WoCC (analysed below), the structure of commissioning has remained relatively unaffected as shown in the similarities of the more recent PricewaterhouseCoopers diagram (2008) regarding the commissioning cycle (figure 6.2).

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Following is a detailed look at how BBC Vision functions during the first two phases since these are the ones that this thesis is particularly interested in. The final two phases are briefly touched upon in order to highlight certain important characteristics of the conception phase of television production, and for an overall better understanding of the whole commissioning process.

1. Strategy and Planning

The most important feature of the Strategy and Planning phase consists of decisions on how to allocate approximately one billion pounds worth of programming budgets. These decisions are based on surplus resources from the previous year and on licence fee agreements with the government. The BBC Trust also frequently offers advice to the editorial board in these decisions based on various Value for Money tests and studies they conduct on a regular basis. Once the budgets are agreed upon some time in April, and before the financial year ends, the strategy and planning phase then looks at how programming budgets are allocated to channels, genres and specific slots. For example, for factual television in 2008-09, BBC Vision decided on producing 1600 hours, an increase of 36 percent when compared to the time before BBC Three and Four were launched (Bennett, 2007).

Figure 6.2. The Commissioning Cycle at the BBC Source: Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2008

Annual Planning/

Buying model

Quotas and targets

Commissioning priorities and slate plans

Audience reaction Strategy

Transmission Production

Decision to commission

Quotas and targets Decision to develop

Running

series Paid

development In-house idea

Independent idea generation

DEVELOPMENT

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Apart from allocation decisions regarding genres, channels and slots, decisions are made on programmes that will continue running from previous seasons and on which slots will open up for the independent quota (25 percent), the in-house production guarantee (50 percent) and as of 2007, the window of creative competition (WoCC) (a 25 percent competitive window that is open to the best ideas from either in-house or independent producers - analysed below). The above allocation is known as the annual planning process, or the

‘buyer model’ (refer to figure 6.2), and is similar to the planning cycle analysed in Burns (1977) and in Born (2004), and discussed in Chapter four of this thesis. According to the BBC, ‘this takes the channel and genre strategies and builds them into a detailed plan, or

‘shopping list’, of what kind of programming we are looking for, at what price, in each TX slot’

(BBC, 2009a). In the PricewaterhouseCoopers report (2008) regarding the WoCC, it is noted, ‘considerations such as efficiency agenda (need to control costs), network supply targets and quotas, regional quotas, and audience trends are taken into account in drawing up a fairly detailed plan of what programmes should be commissioned from which supply base’ (p.19). As already noted, that supply base is broken down into three areas, the 50 percent in-house guarantee, the 25 percent quota whereby programmes are commissioned from the independent sector, and the open creative window that in-house and external suppliers try to earn commissions from.

Effectively, an annual schedule (or draft schedule that is subject to monthly, weekly and even daily changes), is agreed upon by senior executives including schedulers, audience researchers, genre and channel controllers, commissioning editors, executive producers as well as other strategy support executives. For instance, empty slots might exist for entertainment programmes on BBC One based on the draft schedule for independent producers. As noted in the PricewaterhouseCoopers report, ‘it might indicate that a new drama series for a weekday evening could be commissioned from an independent producer outside of London, or that a one-off event will be produced in-house in London’ (p.19).

However, the annual plan needs to be relatively flexible and it therefore goes through constant changes such as ‘talent availability’ of specific programmes, genre or channel strategy changes, audience research and other factors of a similar nature.

In order to fill slots with programmes, briefs of programmes are made and published on the BBC’s commissioning website. Additionally, commissioning priorities are made available to both in-house and external suppliers via briefings and on the commissioning website. In the BBC’s commissioning priorities for a BBC One entertainment programme (BBC, 2007d), the following description is announced in order for in-house producers and independent producers to generate the best ideas,

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Brief for Entertainment Programme on BBC One

Shape

30 minute or 60 minute factual entertainment shows.

There are opportunities both pre and post watershed.

Requirement

With the arrival of The Apprentice on BBC ONE the bar is set high for factual entertainment. Shows need to create a big splash both on TV and beyond, and have real conviction. This scale and ambition is more important than subject matter – and they’ll need a strong narrative to bring audiences back week after week. We’ve already commissioned a show on weddings and Celebrity Masterchef is returning so we’re casting our net wide for subject matter that can be spun in an original way.

Audience

Again this is about appealing to mainstream audiences.

Think of topics, talent and treatment that will appeal to both men and women and across age groups. There’s no formula – The Apprentice and What Not To Wear both achieve this in very different ways.

In order to create a structure of how to allocate such a large amount of public money into unpredictable audience viewing habits, different mechanisms have been used as benchmarks. As noted in the BBC’s code of practice, indicative prices need to be set within different genres. The BBC uses these tariffs in order to divide genres into different price ranges. BBC genre tariffs allow those involved in the commissioning process to have a starting point in what programmes are required and what budgets are available for each programme. Additionally, tariffs are set without any regard to whether a programme will be made in-house or commissioned by an independent production company. Tariff’s are reviewed every two years and are fixed by the Director and Finance Director of BBC Vision (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2008, p. 35). One such example is the Cost Per Viewer Hour (CPVH) that is used with the commissioning tariff. For example, Drama has 7 different tariff categories that differ in price range based on Cost Per Hour. Following is an example of Drama category 5 and 6:

High cost Drama

Indicative Tariff Range: £700k - £900k

Within this range, programmes tend to fall into the following categories:

Category Specification

Drama 5

£700k - £790k per hour

High levels of cast; stunts; foreign locations and period settings all drive this category. Cast will be large and talent established

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Drama 6

£800k - £900k per hour

Heavy combination of multi-location; period; high cast and short runs in serials and event singles. CGI and effects may be significant here.

(source: bbc.com)

The significance of strategy and planning is that it establishes a blueprint for what and how many programmes will be made and in which category. It essentially allows those involved in generating ideas to start with some form of direction rather than from a blank page.

However, asking to pitch for a programme in a specific slot does not mean the idea of the programme is close to being finished. BBC controller of comedy commissioner Lucy Lumsden notes, ‘we never put down [prescribe] a subject matter – the whole point is that we welcome a range of ideas…20% of the strategy is, here are the bits of the schedule that we need to fill’ and 80% is ‘What have you got?’’ (Rushton, 2009b).

Strategy and Planning is extremely hard to carry out since those responsible during this phase are essentially attempting to match costs with anticipated viewing figures (see Caves, 2000 and Napoli, 2003 for more on the unpredictable nature of media consumption). As on-demand platforms such as iplayer become available to a broader audience via both television (project canvas) and the personal computer, strategy and planning will inevitably have to change its current structure. Prime-time viewing, daytime viewing and other aspects of the daily schedule will erode, and therefore audience insights will become more important. Planning a specific number of programmes per year that will fit into a predetermined schedule will hold less value. As audiences will be given more freedom to build their own schedule, the BBC issuing briefs for example for the 9 p.m. slot, will not hold the same weight as it does now. Strategy and planning will have to be based on how many programmes will be made in different genres and at what price range without taking into consideration daily schedules but rather on what programmes audiences want to watch and when they want to them.

The Window of Creative Competition

Possibly the most important aspect of the strategy and planning phase that is used in order to stimulate creativity is the implementation of what is known as the window of creative competition (The WoCC). The window constitutes the BBC’s attempt to open up a large amount of public funds intended for television programmes, to competition between in-house and external suppliers and as the BBC itself notes, ‘to ensure that the best ideas are commissioned for BBC’s audience irrespective of who makes them’ (BBC, 2007e). Like Producers Choice, it also constitutes a recent empirical example of new public management (NPM) (see chapter two of this thesis; Hood 1991; and Ferlie et al, 2002). The WoCC dates back to 2004 when BBC management was working on its Building Public Value document and at ways to make license fee money more efficient. Subsequently after the implementation of Building Public Value, a group of BBC executives began work on what

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was known as the BBC Content Supply Review. This review was created ‘in order to set out the BBC’s future strategy for content supply’ (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2008, p.10).

The review was approved by the then BBC Governors (BBC, 2006a) and recommendations were consequently made to them. The key changes approved by the Board were as follows (BBC Trust, 2008, p. 21):

• Independent and in-house productions commissioned by the same commissioning editor to ensure a level playing field

• A more streamlined commissioning structure with fewer layers

• Creation of executive producer roles under commissioners to manage output from independents

• Appointment of specialist commissioners outside London

• New arrangements for communication with in-house and independent producers

• Introduction of response time commitments fro in-house producers in line with those in place for independents

• Strengthening of ‘genre commissioning’ with genre commissioners given the final authority for individual commissioning decisions

As such, the commissioning process was restructured to introduce the WoCC and implement the above changes. Ultimately, the WoCC was created to make television production more creative by allowing numerous organisations to compete for television commissions and as a result make the license fee better value for money. The WoCC is worth 25 percent of the BBC’s production budget, or approximately two hundred and fifty million pounds. With 25 percent of production funds already guaranteed due to statutory obligations created during the Broadcasting Act of 1990, the WoCC has given the independent production sector an opportunity to increase the amount of funds it receives from the BBC to a total ceiling of 50 percent (see figure 2.). Essentially, the WoCC requires BBC controllers and genre commissioners (the two main divisions of labour responsible for choosing which original television programmes are produced), to choose from either in-house production or external suppliers.

(source:bbc.com)

Figure 6.3 The Window of Creative Competition (WOCC)

50% of production is still guaranteed to be commissioned internally.

25% is guaranteed to be produced by the independent production sector due to statutory obligations. Consequently, there is now a remaining window of 25% worth of BBC production that is ‘up for grabs’; competition now exists between the independent production sector and in-house production.

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In many respects the WoCC has stimulated and supported the television production sector by giving external suppliers an opportunity to compete for large commissions that were previously unavailable to them. Significantly, it should be noted that Ofcom’s television production review (2006a) recognized that the BBC is actively seeking to increase its external suppliers through the WoCC. As the Ofcom review states, ‘the BBC may become an increasingly important access point to the market for small producers’ (p. 70).

Consequently, the BBC has responded, commissioning programmes from 289 external suppliers in 2008/09 compared to the 279 it used the previous year. The results of the WoCC have been interesting. Thus far, external producers have surpassed in-house producers by landing three-quarters of the funds available in the WoCC (Rushton, 2009a).

John McVay PACT’s chief executive is undoubtedly satisfied with how the indy’s have faired hitherto, stating, ‘Commissioners are doing what they are supposed to do – which is taking the best programmes’ (ibid.). As a result, the BBC Trust Biennial WoCC Review (a review the Trust is obliged to carry out at least once every two years), concludes that until now, the WoCC seems to be functioning well.

Despite the obvious advantages of the WoCC, such as the increased diversity of suppliers given access to television programming budgets, there are various issues regarding its logic that need to be addressed. These are as follows:

1. Henry (2001) notes that freedom ‘refers to employees having the confidence to take initiatives’ (p.35), whereas Andriopoulos and Dawson (2009) state that high levels of freedom and autonomy directly correlate with high levels of creativity. The WoCC means fewer opportunities for in-house production. It is possible therefore that at least during the first years of the WoCC, as in-house producers adapt to the changes, freedom and autonomy might decrease because they are simply winning less commissions. This might lead to producers pitching for less risky programme ideas, and are trying less experimental techniques and ideas. As things stabilise and the BBC gets use to competing for slots, there is possibly more freedom for in-house programme-makers to experiment and take risks. This could be the reason why the BBC fares better in 2009/10 than in 2008/09 in regards to the WoCC (Rushton, 2010).

2. From Amabile’s (1996) characteristics that either stimulate of stifle creativity, encouragement is given the most emphasis. Encouragement is directly connected to motivation which is considered of such importance in creativity theory. Since creative processes are driven more by intrinsic motivation than extrinsic motivation, programme-makers are more likely to produce new and useful ideas if they are encouraged for what they have already achieved as this is linked to intrinsic motivation. Unfortunately for in-house production, it is difficult to encourage employees and work in an environment that is rewarded by means of

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encouragement when they are being made redundant because of the fewer commissions won as a result of the WoCC. Again however, as things stabilise and fewer redundancies are made due to an averaging-out of the commissions won and lost in the WoCC, encouragement could increase. It should in fact be an advantage of in-house production to be more stable and secure than the independent sector, and this should relate to more opportunity to encourage creative excellence.

3. Ever since the WoCC began in 2007, in-house producers have had fewer funds available to develop original programmes. Since having available more resources is directly linked with more creativity (see Amabile’s stimulants list), as a result, it can be argued that employees are less creative. It could also result in producers pitching for programmes they know will have a better chance of being commissioned rather than going for something completely out of the ordinary since even they might be hesitant to try something different. If it does not work they are left with no resources to try again. The apparent pecuniary stability of the in-house guarantee should allow programme-makers to be different, to act different and think different from independent producers. This is simple enough, and its benefits in creating a more diverse and creative broadcasting ecology are easy to understand. However, it is important also to bring to the forefront research which argues that even the perception of ‘the adequacy of resources may affect people psychologically by leading them to beliefs about the intrinsic value of the projects that they have undertaken’ (Amabile, Contil, Coon, Lazenby and Herron, 1996, p. 1161). In television production it might be a good idea for programme-makers to feel they have space and the perception of resources in order to stimulate creativity and bring to life new and useful ideas.

4. West and Sacramento (2006), looking at how creativity and innovation develop, note ‘several studies suggest that, in general, creative cognition occurs when individuals feel free from pressure, safe, and experience relatively positive affect ...

moreover, psychological threats ... are associated with rigid thinking’ (p. 27).

Amabile’s view on pressure is slightly different. As she argues, pressure can allow creativity to flourish. This happens when pressure is governed at a moderate level and therefore becomes challenging. There is a point however that Amabile and colleagues call ‘excessive workload pressure’, which undermines creativity and which is more in line with West and Sacramento’s thinking. How much pressure exactly the WoCC puts on in-house programme-makers is something that requires further investigation since television production is by nature a sector in which pressure, either in the form of time, budgets or other kinds, is common.

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5. Despite the obvious advantages of the WoCC, such as the increased diversity of suppliers given access to BBC television programming budgets, there are various issues regarding its logic – that of competition driving creativity - that need to be addressed. Notably, there is a disproportionate level of competition between in-house and external suppliers. The two ‘sides’ arguably do not compete on a level playing field. BBC’s in-house production, with BBC Vision as its only client, is asked to compete against an influx of ideas deriving from a burgeoning sector of roughly 400-600 active organisations. This alone, is enough to increase the controlling aspects and therefore make programme-making more of an extrinsically motivating activity rather than an intrinsically motivating one. Furthermore, if BBC commissioners and controllers reject an idea that has been pitched from an independent production company, the company is free to take its idea elsewhere therefore alleviating the pressure when pitching to the BBC. Conversely, if an idea is pitched to BBC commissioners and controllers from in-house studios and is rejected, then it becomes of no use since in-house studios cannot pitch or produce programmes for other broadcasters. At best, it might be shelved until another commissioning editor arrives at the BBC.

It should come as no surprise therefore that most of the WoCC programming opportunities

It should come as no surprise therefore that most of the WoCC programming opportunities