I have sketched certain choices that any human geographer makes when carrying out research and have suggested that you are better to be aware of them than not. Underlying your dissertation research will be certain philoso-phical assumptions (those of naturalism or anti-naturalism, for example) and,
probably, a particular conception of the nature of relationships in society.
Ignorance of your philosophical roots implies a less than full understanding of what you are doing. However, the practice of geography, its approaches and methods, does not map neatly onto the philosophical choices you might make.
Although philosophical problems and answers are implicated in choice of method, theories and approaches, particular philosophical positions do not necessitate particular research designs. As one writer on philosophy and social inquiry comments, ‘. . . a positivist, qua positivist, is not committed to any particular research design. There is nothing in the doctrines of positivism that necessitates a love of statistics or a distaste for case studies’ (Phillips, 1987: 96). Sayer, an advocate of realist geography, makes much the same point when discussing the links between radical or Marxist research and realism (1985: 161):
. . . this association of realism and radical geography is not a necessary one: some radical work has been done using a nomothetic deductive method . . . and acceptance of realist philosophy does not entail acceptance of a radical theory of society – the latter must be justified by other means.
It is impossible, then, to specify in advance which methods are most appropri-ate to the philosophical and theoretical choices you might make. Nevertheless, I do want to offer some comments on approaches since, as a matter of historical record, some ways of doing geography have been strongly linked to certain philosophical and theoretical positions.
Any research project starts from a question or problem that defines the topic, or what is to be studied. It may seem quite straightforward, then, to assume that the approaches and methods used to tackle the research problem (i.e. how the study is to be conducted) should be appropriate to the question posed. If your aim is to investigate the relationship between deprivation and health across the UK, then quantitative modelling appears to be the most suit-able method whereas, if your intention is to understand the (multiple) meanings of a particular place for different ethnic groups, then qualitative methods involving in-depth interviews seem much more appropriate. Notice that both of these aims are rather generally specified and a good research question requires much greater focus (see Chapter 3); nevertheless, they serve to illustrate two very important points.
First, the way in which the aim of a piece of research is conceptualised and expressed contains within it assumptions that tend to direct researchers towards certain methods. For instance, the assumption that there is a singular relationship between deprivation and health across space encourages a research design that ‘tests’ this relationship and thus uses methods similar to those found in the natural sciences. In contrast, attention to multiple meanings is part of a postmodern anti-foundationalism that emphasises difference and the role of language in representations of the world. This requires sensitivity to what people say; hence the use of qualitative methods designed to elicit their discursive constructions. In both cases, the way in which the research is ‘framed’ – its aim conceptualised – contains within it a methodological direction. Thus deciding what to study and how you are going to study it are not separate dimensions
of research design but are closely intertwined. This means that in formulating your research aim (or aims) you are to some extent prejudging the issue of what methods are appropriate for achieving your objective/s. A much more fundamental question, then, is whether your research problem itself is appropri-ately formulated.
Secondly, it is the framing of the research problem that links epistemology and social theory to method. An interest in deprivation and health could be conceptualised quite differently to the example above if expressed in terms of experiences of deprivation and multiple understandings of ‘health’, leading to the use of qualitative rather than quantitative methods. Framing the research problem in this way would ground it in theories of knowledge and society at odds with the positivism implicit in the original conceptualisation. Yet theory and method are not correlated in the uncomplicated manner this might seem to suggest. McKendrick’s (1999) tabulation of the relationships between research traditions in geography and a variety of methods is imperfect (Graham, 1999) but his main message is sound: epistemology informs, rather than precludes, methodological strategy. Innovative research might use methods familiar within one research tradition to investigate research questions grounded in a different philosophical or theoretical position. The challenge for the researcher is to adopt a critical attitude to research design and the key to this lies in the initial formulation of the research problem.
A good research project requires a well-formulated research problem. There are numerous ways in which research questions can be conceptualised but a critical attitude to research design requires an understanding of the philoso-phical underpinnings implicit in the way a research problem is ‘framed’. It is this framing that informs the choice of research method/s, and that choice is itself open to critical interrogation (Hoggart et al., 2002). Since epistemology does not prescribe research method, there can be no recipe book for bridging the gap between theory and research practice. The translation of critical realist philosophy into an empirical research strategy, for example, is not unproblematic (Pratt, 1995; Yeung, 1997). The same can be said of Giddens’s theory of structuration, which Gregson (1987) calls a second order theory, removed from events or contingencies of particular periods and places (i.e. from the domain of empirical enquiry). The difficulties of extending such abstract ideas and apply-ing them in empirical research are considerable and go some way to explainapply-ing why the philosophical discussions of human geographers can seem so divorced from the business of doing research. Nevertheless, it is only through a dialogue between theory and practice that knowledge and understanding will be advanced.
This is especially challenging when you are embarking on your first indepen-dent research project.
Finally, I want to raise one further issue. Earlier I used the term ‘warranted knowledge’ to indicate that answers to research questions need justification.
It should now be evident that philosophical and theoretical choices form part of that justification, along with the details of empirical evidence (or data) collected. I also suggested that the purpose of an undergraduate dissertation, or any piece of human geography research, is to add to our stock of knowledge.
It is important to recognise that this ‘stock’ is in a constant state of flux as research findings which are at first accepted may later be modified or rejected.
In addition, rejected knowledge claims may be reinstated at a later date as more empirical evidence becomes available or new ways of thinking confer a new significance on them. Knowledge, then, is cumulative, not in the sense of adding to some otherwise fixed pile but rather because it accumulates through a process in which current researchers assume a critical attitude towards past research.
For some, this critical attitude has a moral dimension and is applied not only to the work of other researchers but also to the human world being researched.
The point of research, on this view, is not simply to add to knowledge but to change the world for the better. Thus critical researchers who adopt this attitude aim to do more than analyse social relationships or human landscapes, for their purpose is to change society itself. Habermas (1974, 1978), a social philosopher and theorist, sees this as a third type of science, critical science, and his ideas have been developed in human geography especially by Gregory (1989, 1994a), who has written extensively on critical social theory. Gregory is quite clear about his own position when he says in the introduction to Geographical imaginations (1994b: 10):
My particular concern is with the multiple discourses of critical theory: discourses that seek not only to make social life intelligible but also to make it better.
A critical human geography would produce action-oriented knowledge and it may be that you choose to adopt a similar aim in your dissertation research.
If so, you need to think about the normative element of your project both when formulating your research design and when presenting your findings, for there are a number of different ways of arriving at conclusions about how society ought to be. Further, there is a tension between postmodern ideas of differences and diversity and the aspirations of a critical human geography (McDowell, 2002). If there are many ‘voices’ and we privilege none of them, what grounds would we have for telling others how things ought to be?
This chapter has sought to raise a whole series of questions about how knowledge can be justified, about philosophical and theoretical choices and about the ultimate aims of research. All these issues remain contentious in human geography and it is up to you to join the fray and participate in the debates. With these debates in mind, you can move on to what may seem to you more practical matters of how to choose a research topic and decide upon data sources and methods. Remember, however, that philosophical choices underlie these decisions. If you set up a project that attempts to replicate the methods of the natural sciences, you are probably assuming the positivist aim of uncovering laws of behaviour. If, on the other hand, you ignore social structures and focus on the intentionality and motivations of individual human beings in their lived experience, you are assuming a humanist interpretation of the nature of human agency. The choices are up to you but consistency and a deeper understanding of the basis of your research design demands that you take philosophy seriously.
Further reading
Hubbard, P, R Kitchin, B Bartley and D Fuller 2002 Thinking geographically: space, theory and contemporary human geography, London: Continuum
A good introduction to theoretical thinking in human geography, with a focus on post-positivist approaches. It touches upon some of the debates outlined more starkly in this chapter and provides an extended discussion of the practice of human geography organised around themes of the body, text, money, governance and globalisation.
Gregory, D, R Martin and G Smith (eds) 1994 Human geography: society, space and social science, London: Macmillan
A collection of essays by various authors which seeks to emphasise the relationship between geography and other social sciences. The chapter by Derek Gregory on
‘Social theory and human geography’ is particularly useful for its discussion of discursive spaces and multiple voices, outlining some of the influential develop-ments in the understanding of both social structures and human agency.
Phillips, D C 1987 Philosophy, science and social inquiry, Oxford: Pergamon Press For the more adventurous, this provides a philosophical treatment of debates about the nature of science and social enquiry. Although no mention is made of geography, it is written in a style accessible to non-philosophers and its ‘mild Popperianism and naturalism’ should be particularly challenging to human geographers who favour post-positivist, hermeneutical approaches.