Deliberative democracy is a much-debated concept championed by many but contested by others, some in support of agonism, often referred to as agonistic pluralism. Agonistic pluralism is seen by a number of contemporary democratic theorists (for example see Honig 2013; Mouffe 2005; Connolly 2005) to be a more genuine normative representation of the democratic process than deliberative theory. Whilst there are variations in the detail of agonistic theory dependent upon the author of the work, Mouffe, writing with Laclau in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics (2001), and individually with Agonistics Thinking the World Politically (2013) and also On the Political (2005). The latter is probably the most recognisable proponent of the theory, and it is Mouffe’s model of agonism that will be used as a basis for the arguments presented in this study.
It would, however, be helpful to detail the normative facets of agonistic theory and explain how Mouffe’s agonism differs to other contemporary agonists, namely Bonnie Honig and her inspiration Hannah Arendt, and also William Connolly. The term agonism is derived from the Greek word agon, meaning contest, and is generally perceived as relating to competition, struggle and particularly in the political sense, conflict, and more specifically conflict between individuals and groups, in democratic society. Agonism developed as a theory largely in
Chapter 2 – Democracy 38 response to deliberative democratic models and represents the notion of ineradicable pluralism whereby opposing, legitimate value preferences negate the possibility of consensus without exclusion. Other established norms of agonism include conflict as not just being inevitable in contemporary politics, but also productive and desirable.
Hegemonic and counter hegemonic practices are vital to Mouffe’s agonism. Cultural hegemony, in Mouffe’s eyes, relates to the power struggle that goes beyond the Marxist class struggle and is evident in, ‘every type of social order’ (Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006). The unending hegemonic pursuit as one prevailing view in a binary argument is replaced by another, for Mouffe, dictates that consensus without exclusion is unachievable. In other words it embodies ‘the impossibility of a fully inclusive rational consensus’ (Andreas 2000 in Schaap 2007 p11). The afore-mentioned agonists would agree that passion is endemic in politics and that identity is a key driver of participation in the democratic process. Finally, the notion of the antagonistic we/they or friend/enemy relationship (Mouffe 2005) (as attributable to Nazi sympathiser Carl Schmitt) is accepted to differing degrees as being another important component of the political, though adapted in a manner which is compatible with democratic pluralism, something far removed from Schmitt’s original version of the theory.
The specific differences attributed to politics and the political are the central premise in the relationship between the other key components of conflict, hegemony, passion and antagonism, in Mouffe’s version of agonistic pluralism. Politics for Mouffe is procedural and mechanistic, embodying political practices and institutions, whilst the political embodies the social, and that social is driven by antagonism. It is, however, an antagonism, it is important to note, in the form of an adversarial encounter without force as opposed to an enemy conflict in the commonly accepted sense of the phrase. Mouffe explains that:
I have suggested distinguishing between the political, which is linked to the dimension of antagonism present in human societies – an antagonism that can emerge within a large variety of social relations – and politics, whose aims are establishing an order and organising human coexistence [through political practices and institutions] under conditions that are marked by The political and thus always conflictual (Mouffe 2014 p150).
Mouffe attempts to clarify what is an abstract theory which is open to contestation, by separating political science, which Mouffe sees as empirical enquiry and political theory which is ‘the domain of philosophers, who enquire not about facts of politics but the essence of the political’ (Mouffe 2005 p.8). The differing interpretation of the political is one of the ways that
Chapter 2 – Democracy 39 Mouffe’s agonism differs from Arendt (although Arendt never specifically used the term the political) whom Mouffe sees as identifying it with liberty and common action rather than conflict and antagonism (ibid.). In this respect, Mouffe sees Arendt’s agonism as communitarian and incorporating the ability to see things from multiple perspectives in a Kantian expression of
‘enlarged thought’ (Mouffe 2014 p.152) whereby the individual has the ability to see issues in a way that others holding different viewpoints to themselves do, ultimately resulting with consensus in the public sphere. This nuanced difference of Arendt’s definition of the political brings it closer to the first generation of deliberative democratic theory.
Mouffe, in her own words in By Way of a Postscript (2014), distances herself from the Arendtian work of Bonnie Honig, whose concept of agonism in her eyes is built upon,
‘preventing the closure of the questioning process’ (ibid. p.152) but fails to articulate the counter hegemonic struggle (as detailed on the previous page) which Mouffe sees as ever present. William Connolly is also seen by Mouffe as having, in her eyes, fundamental differences when it comes to their respective theories of agonism. Mouffe states that Connolly is influenced by Frederick Nietzsche rather than Arendt, and she agrees with Connolly’s belief in the requirement of agonistic respect, which is an important aspect of both of their visions of agonism. This requires each individual to acknowledge the other in any confrontation, as having a legitimate role in the democratic process (an assertion that is somewhat controversial for reasons we come to shortly).
For Mouffe though, not all antagonisms can be transformed into agonism (in the manner which Arendt believes so) through agonistic respect which is partly delivered by the afore-mentioned
‘enlarged thought’. This limits the agonistic respect that Connolly (Mouffe suggests) deems to be perpetual:
Must all positions be considered legitimate and must they be granted a place inside the agonistic public sphere? Or must certain claims be excluded because they undermine the conflictual consensus that constitutes the symbolic framework in which opponents recognise themselves as legitimate adversaries (ibid. p.153).
The crucial moment when the notion of agonistic respect becomes limited for Mouffe, is at the point where a democratic decision is required to be made, and this is when, for her, the persistent hegemonic struggle is situated. For example, decision time within the independence referendum was at the ballot box on the 18th September 2014, the result of which would see one side prevail and the result would see the exclusion of the losing side. The implication is
Chapter 2 – Democracy 40 that the space for conflictual consensus is then closed (at least temporarily) contrary to Connolly’s theory, and the antagonism of the losing position remains.
Conflict and the impossibility of (rational) consensus along with the fundamental unending existence of the other are absolutely central to Mouffe’s agonism. The point of the impossibility of consensus without exclusion is predicated by the assertion that all things political cannot be decided from a strictly rational point of view, and this leads to the irreducibility of pluralism.
This is a point that Mouffe reiterates again and again as her works develop and is explicit in her most recent book, Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically (2013). Mouffe believes that the task for democracy is to create spaces which allow for ‘conflictual consensus’ (ibid.) which sees adversaries agreeing on the ethical principles which are the basis of their association, for example liberty and equality, (ibid.) but disagreeing on the interpretation of the said principles to exist and be played out. Mouffe refers to conflictual consensus in the setting of the European Union whereby the starting position is a belief in the Union but contestation as to elements of, for example, its constitution. The question at hand in terms of this project, is whether the independence referendum fits with these assertions and whether the internet and more specifically social media platforms such as Twitter, are a place for them to be played out and whether these do, or can, contribute to enhancing the democratic communication process in the UK.
There are a number of writers who choose to dispute the arguments put forward by Mouffe, and in doing so generally defend deliberative democracy (see Erman 2009; Karppinen, Moe and Svensson 2008; Dryzek 2005; Brady 2004). Knops (2007) and Dryzek (2005) deliver pointed arguments whereby they suggest that the main flaw in Mouffe’s agonism is the unanswered question of where the agonistic respect between adversaries, which is the starting point of the journey to agonism, comes from, if not from some kind of intrinsic notion of the common good. Erman stands very much in opposition to Mouffe in the area of conflict and the universalism of the them and us argument, instead declaring that such conflict is the basis of deliberative theory rather than a reason to dismiss it. Brady (2004) and Karppinen, Moe and Svensson (2008) put forward positive cases for the possibilities of a combined theoretical argument whereby the deliberative and the agonistic, ought not to be seen as inherently incompatible but recognised as ‘ways in which political contestation can support the achievement of consensus’ (Brady 2004 p.351).
Karppinen, Moe and Svensson (2008) interpret the deliberative/agonistic argument from the same field as this study, in the area of democratic public communication. This author again suggest that the differences between the two are nuanced rather than inherently oppositional,
Chapter 2 – Democracy 41 suggesting ‘that the public sphere is best understood as an arena of articulating expressions of both solidarity and difference, and in a general sense, this understanding is shared by both Mouffe and Habermas’ (ibid. p.8). Similarly, Honig (1993), correctly points out the perpetual presence of settlement and unsettlement in politics. Karppinen goes on to state ‘that an openness to potential combinations of the two approaches might have positive implications for media and communication research’ (ibid. p.11). These two approaches have been used in combination, as suggested by Karppinen, in evaluating the role of Twitter in the independence referendum because, in line with the fact of settlement and unsettlement as just stated, eliminating either from the discussion seems inappropriate and counterproductive in explaining the realities of online political debate.