Figure 28: Governance
mechanisms determine whether farmers can participate in decision-making processes that affect their crop management.
Figure 29: Landscape-level agreements on land use can, for example, maintain or create corridors of natural vegetation, such as hedgerows and trees, between farms.
improving rural livelihoods. Their experience shows that good planning which is widely acceptable to the local population, needs to involve (representatives of) all of the many different people living in, and using the resources of, an area, (i.e. local “stakeholders”). However, it is not always to arrive at binding agreements as there are often competing interests and much time may need to be invested to get different stakeholders to agree to their changing behaviour. In many cases, differences in power and influence as well as market forces make it almost impossible to predict what decisions will be arrived at. In countries where institutions and governance mechanisms are weaker, landscape-level negotiations can be more difficult and often necessitate embarking on a process of “building constituencies, negotiating deals and muddling through” (Sayer and Dudley 2008). Landscape scale interventions in such situations particularly need to be flexible and locally adapted.
3.2.2 Intellectual property rights, crops and
small-scale farmers
In farmer-centred PGR systems, exchanges of seed between farmers have always been based on free and unrestricted access. Because seed varieties have evolved through the efforts of generations of farmers, seed exchanges are seen as a way of mutually sharing the benefits. Until formal institutions started developing new crops and varieties, the idea of owning seed was not even something to consider. All this changed in 1961 when, for the first time, patent protection was
introduced to living organisms with the international convention from the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). Until then, the extension of “intellectual property rights” (or IPRs – see Box 8) had only been applied to new, industrial products. IPRs, such as patents, are intended to stimulate (and reward) innovation. In what was called the “farmers’ privilege”, seed and other plant genetic resources were consciously excluded from patent protection, so that seed re-use and exchange could go on unrestricted. However, the scientific breakthroughs in genetic engineering and related techniques have changed this situation. The crop varieties produced by modern techniques are considered to be so “new”, time-consuming and costly, that the UPOV convention considered patent protection on these varieties to be justifiable. Holding IPRs over genetic resources allows plant breeders to prohibit others from using them, or to ask for payment for their use over a certain period of time. It can take 7-10 years to get from the first cross to the marketable variety (Almekinders and Hardon, 2006). Through IPRs, breeders can take time to research and experiment to develop new genetic resources, knowing that they will be rewarded through exclusive rights to sell them. In recent years a number of international treaties have been signed, with mixed results for small-scale farmers (see Box 9). Patents on plant varieties Go to R1.4 for an exercise
for students in developing a landscape approach to reforestation in your region. Go to R2.14 to read the article about a community-based and managed protected area in Ethiopia. Compare this initiative with one in Indonesia (R2.6.2).
Figure 30: IpR regimes need to safeguard small-scale farmers’ rights to re-use and exchange plant genetic resources, as part of the “farmers’ privilege”.
Intellectual property is the term used to refer to a group of legal regimes, such as patents, trademarks and copyright, that provide legal protection to creators and inventors (and in the case of agriculture, breeders), from others copying
(and even on genes) now provide much stronger protection to the breeder and do not take into account the customary rights of farmers. Although there continue to be many efforts to safeguard the farmers’ privilege (see CBD and ITPGRFA in Box 9), breeders’ rights have gradually been strengthened in recent decades, to the detriment of farmers. For this reason, many developing countries refused to sign the 1991 revision of the UPOV. There is now a very confusing situation as IPRs are based on national laws and so protection granted in one country may not be valid in other countries.
The extension of intellectual property rights on plant materials is a major governance issue for the sustainability of cropping systems. Farmers were not involved in the decision to extend the patent system to plant breeding. IPRs on plant varieties conflict with the values of farming communities which have always relied on the free exchange of materials. Such protection should not be granted to new varieties that make use of farmers’ varieties without the consent of the community that developed them. And such communities should be rewarded for the contribution that their work has made to making a new variety possible. Also, if IPRs must be extended, ways need to be found for the people of these regions, who are in effect custodians of local agrobiodiversity, to share in the benefits. By excluding farmers from the debates about IPRs for plant varieties, it will be problematic to enforce these rights.
Find out whether your country has signed any of the treaties in Box 9. Do you know whether they have affected small-scale farmers’ access to seed? Are there examples in your area of farmers benefiting from breeders using their seeds?
• UPOV (Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants): started with a convention in 1961, in which signatories agreed to introduce patent protection on plants and other living material. Basically, UPOV requires member states to provide for the registration and protection of plant breeders’ rights over new varieties in their national jurisdictions. It was revised in 1978 and 1991. The first revision allowed farmers to save, use and exchange farm-saved seed since this was not considered to be commercial exploitation (referred to as the farmers’ privilege). “Breeders’ rights” became the priority in the 1991 revision, negating the farmers’ privilege. For this reason, many developing countries have only signed the 1978 version.
• WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organisation): specialised agency of the United Nations, and the leading organisation in increasing IP norm-setting since 1970. It has a controversial history, and many call for its reform as it does not adequately consider development concerns such as biodiversity and food security.
• TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property): this agreement was part of the Uruguay Round that established the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1986. It obliges all WTO members to set certain minimum
requirements for protection of intellectual property (IP); however, developing countries are given some flexibility to adapt their IP regimes to their own specific circumstances.
• CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity) is the principle multilateral framework to address the issue of agrobiodiversity. Signed by 192 countries in 1993, it supports “farmers’ privilege” and sustainable small-scale farming. CBD sets out certain basic principles but leaves it up to individual states to implement them in the way they choose. It has no binding standards of behaviour.
• ITPGRFA (International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food & Agriculture) was initiated by the FAO in 2001 and provides a general framework for conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA. It aims to establish a common pool of resources, and for breeders to be transparent about and share benefits farmers. It has similar objectives as the CBD, recognising “farmers’ rights” but applied to a narrower scope of plant genetic resources for a limited number of crop and forage species. It introduces binding rules and institutional mechanisms to facilitate
3.2.3 Including farmers in formal research,
breeding and conservation
programmes
Formal plant breeding institutions develop improved seed for a particular range of crops and for environments whose productive conditions justify investments. These seeds are mostly bred for high yields but also for other general improvements such as drought tolerance. By being able to control the ecological environment through irrigation and applications of fertiliser and pesticides, farmers often enjoy success with these genetic materials. However, modern varieties do not always fit with the priorities, needs or preferences of small-scale farmers. For example, farmers may prefer varieties that grow well under the specific conditions on their farm. They may select varieties that are early maturing, for the amount of by-products they yield for feeding livestock, or because of their taste, cooking or storage properties. In formal breeding programmes, selections are generally on the basis of the conditions (i.e. soil fertility, water and climate) that prevail on-station, which may differ from those found on farms.
In response to these issues, experiments were initiated in the 1990s by formal breeding research institutions and NGOs to involve farmers more in the process of developing improved varieties. Small-scale and especially low-capital farmers were the main target group for Participatory Plant Breeding (PPB) programmes. Such farmers were seen as benefiting the least from conventional breeding programmes and also were recognised as having more knowledge about adapting varieties in marginal and complex environments. It was hoped these programmes could not only improve productivity for major food crops, but also for minor crops that play an important role in local food security. NGOs had a further interest in giving farmers more control over the process and emphasised the value of local landraces. A study that looked at eleven pilot projects from around the world shows that PPB has indeed led to better materials being developed in a relatively short time and being rapidly distributed through farmer seed systems (see Almekinders & Hardon, 2006). However, while formal PPB programmes often involved farmers in the process of selecting varieties, the breeders often retained control over decisions about selection and breeding. The study concluded that PPB leads to successful development of crops that are not included in formal PGR systems, but has not moved beyond that. Successful programmes have led to farmers taking charge of breeding and production activities. PPB is not easy to initiate and requires the flexibility and willingness of professionals in governmental and non-government organisations to cooperate with farmers and other institutional actors.
Figure 31: Farmer breeders often have different priorities when selecting crops and varieties, than formal pGR breeding programmes.
Go to R2.15 to discuss the article about a PPB programme with bean farmers in
Nicaragua.
Do you know of any PPB programmes in your area? How successful are they in including farmers and in coming up with materials they like to use? If there are no programmes, why do you think that is the case?
Throughout this module, many examples have been given of how small-scale farmers can improve the sustainability of their (diversity-based) cropping systems, as well as how important it is they participate in decision-making. This section gives examples of policies that support the sustainability of cropping systems.
3.3.1 Research & Development priorities
Investment and research priorities are often determined by a few large formal PGR and agrochemical companies – basically because they have enough resources and ability to turn research outcomes into marketable products. This has resulted in little investment in crops that are important in different parts of the developing world, such as underutilised crops, but also “minor” staple crops like millet and teff. Even when research is done by large agrochemical and seed companies it is often not made available to farming systems in developed countries. Policies that support the development of infrastructure (e.g. research, processing and marketing) of certain minor crops important to local/regional food security, or for example of organic or other “niche” markets for crops, can open up new possibilities for small-scale farming. At the same time, pressure is needed on companies to make improved plant genetic resources available to areas that are the least developed.3.3.2 Regulations on inputs: hazardous
pesticides and GM organisms
Many efforts have been made to limit the use of chemical pesticides, especially those that are hazardous to the health of farmers and their families, as well as those that contaminate the environment. Policies that relate to pesticide use include: all-out bans on particularly dangerous pesticides; and restrictions on the use of pesticides that have potentially harmful impacts on public resources such as water quality. The FAO has written a Code of conduct on the distribution and use of pesticides, which suggests minimum standards (see Section 3.4 for reference). As shown Sub-section 2.4.2, there are alternatives to the use of pesticides that involve more integrated approaches to pest and weed management. Some possible policies that can be introduced include supporting training on IPM practices and the safe use of chemicals (e.g. through Farmer Field Schools). A special type of programme concerns the safe disposal of unused stocks of obsolete pesticides (e.g. the FAO’s Africa Stockpiles programme). A related issue is the restriction by several countries on the development and use