Grammatical metaphor

Grammatical metaphor involves a shift in the realisational domain of a phenomenon such that a sequence, which is typically realised as a clause nexus joined by a conjunction, is reconstrued as a figure, typically realised as a clause, a figure is reconstrued as an element of clause structure, or an element of clause structure is reconstrued as a different transitivity role. Notwithstanding, the grammatical metaphor does not lose the status of the congruent phenomenon (Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999; 2004). Examples are given in figures 2.12 and 2.13.

Figure 2.12 Grammatical metaphor: sequence reconstrued as figure (adapted from Halliday, 1998: 190,191 )

Figure 2.13 Grammatical metaphor: figure reconstrued as element (adapted from Halliday, 1998: 191) figure

elements: the driver drove the bus too fast down the hill (clause)

element

the driver’s overrapid downhill driving of the bus (nominal group)

sequence l [relator]

l

figures: the driver drove the bus so the brakes failed too fast down the hill

figure

elements: driving the bus too fast caused brake failure down the hill

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Various transformations have taken place in the examples above. In the first, the logico-semantic Relator ‘so’ has been reconstrued as Process, and the clauses have been shifted down in rank to function as Participants. In the second, ‘the driver’ [Actor] has been reconstrued as Deictic, ‘too fast’ [Circumstance] as Epithet, ‘down the hill’ [Circumstance] as Classifier, ‘drove’ [Process] as Thing, and ‘the bus’ [Goal] as Qualifier, such that the elements functioning at the rank of the clause are now functioning as constituents within a nominal group. Typical clausal realisations of phenomena as Process + Participant + Circumstance are referred to as being congruent, while metaphorical realisations, i.e. those that involve grammatical metaphor, are referred to as incongruent (Halliday, 1990/2002; Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999). Halliday and Matthiessen (1999: 537) argue that congruent realisations typically precede metaphorical realisations across phylogenesis, ontogenesis and logogenesis.

There are 13 types of elemental grammatical metaphor (table 2.5), of which five reconstrue the congruent realisation as Thing. A grammatical metaphor of this type is termed nominalisation. As Halliday and Matthiessen are careful to point out, the examples given in the table are examples, not glosses for the class.

congruent: metaphorical:

=» circumstance =» process =» quality =» thing quality =» unstable 1 instability process =» absorb 3 absorptive 2 absorption circumstance =» instead of; on the surface 6 replaces 5 alternative; superficial 4 replacement surface relator =» for/because [b, for/because a] so [a, so b] 10 because of; as a result 9 causes, proves; ensues, follows from 8 causal; consequent 7 cause, proof; result Ø =» 12 occurs; imposes; does, has 11 phenomenon, fact thing, circumstance =» driver [be safe]

decided [today]

13 expansion of thing <in environment of 1 or 2>

driver [safety], dirver’s [safety], [safety] of the driver today’s [decision], [decision] of today

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Grammatical metaphors can be oriented towards ideational (experiential or logical), interpersonal (Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999) or textual meaning (Martin, 1992). An example of each kind of meaning orientation is given in 2.1 – 2.5. The metaphor is underlined. While examples 2.3 and 2.4 are both oriented towards interpersonal meaning, 2.3 is explicitly subjective, and 2.4 is explicitly objective (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 613-616), the latter contributing to a more objective sounding text.

Ideational: experiential

2.1 Beliefs arise from perceptions. (Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999: 588) Ideational: logical

2.2 Beliefs arise from perceptions. (Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999: 588) Interpersonal

2.3 I don’t believe that pudding will ever be cooked. (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 613)

2.4 The Granada move has also focused attention on the possibility that other companies will become targets for stake-building. (Schmid, 2000: 237).

Textual

2.5 That point is just silly. (Martin, 1992: 417)

Grammatical metaphor has become an important resource in modern scientific discourse for representing and explaining physical phenomena (Halliday, 1988/1993; Halliday & Martin, 1993; Banks, 2005). Halliday (1988/1993) schematises its evolution through time (figure 2.14), where the first set corresponds to a relation between two events, in rebus, and the second corresponds to a relation between two stages in the discourse, in verbus (Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999: 262,263).

1 Externally

From a happens; so x happens

because a happens, x happens that a happens causes x to happen

happening a causes happening x

To happening a is the cause of happening x 2 Internally

From a happens; so we know x happens

because a happens, we know x happens that a happens proves x to happen

happening a proves happening x

To happening a is the proof of happening x

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The scheme indicates a drift towards nominalisation such that nominalised Processes functioning as Participants come to be related through relational Processes, and these relational clauses, in particular intensive or circumstantial relational clauses, have become a prevalent feature in scientific or academic writing (Halliday, 1998; Ravelli, 2004). According to Halliday (1988/1993) many verbs other than ‘be’ have come to realise the relational Process. Verbs realising external relations (i.e. in rebus) in intensive relational clauses include, among others, be, become, form, equal, represent, constitute, symbolise, and mean, while verbs realising circumstantial relational Processes, themselves examples of grammatical metaphor, include cause, lead to, accompany, follow, produce, arise from, result from, to name but some. Examples 2.6 and 2.7 illustrate an identifying intensive relational Process clause and a circumstantial relational Process clause respectively. The grammatical metaphor is in bold.

2.6 These people constitute a reservoir for the transmission of the virus. (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 235)

2.7 This situation is apparently caused by anomalous low temperatures. (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 243)

Internal intensive relations - in verbus - may be realised by verbs such as prove, show, predict, illustrate, suggest, indicate, and confirm. Such verbs are an important resource for developing an argument in academic writing (Halliday, 1988/1993; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004; Christie & Cléirigh, 2008; Martin, 1992). Because many of the verbs that realise internal relations also function as sources of projection, Halliday (1988/1993) suggests that when they function to relate nominalisations, they are more clearly relational, but when they introduce a projected clause, they may also be interpreted as mental Processes, glossed by ‘makes us think’, such as in example 2.8.

2.8 Our discovery of the importance of molecular diffusion near the crack tip indicates that surface coatings might be designed to block the opening of the crack. (Halliday, 1988/1993:65)

Thus, two interpretations are possible for 2.8 given that the Senser may be realised by a product of human consciousness (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 203). The two analyses are given in figure 2.15.

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Our discovery of the importance of molecular diffusion near the crack tip

indicates [[that surface coatings might be

designed to block the opening of the crack]].

Token Pro. Rel Value

Our discovery of the importance of molecular diffusion near the crack tip

indicates that surface coatings might be

designed to block the opening of the crack.

Senser Pro.

mental

Phenomenon

Figure 2.15. Indicate interpreted as identifying Relational Process and as Mental Process. Adapted from Halliday, 1988/1993: 65

Christie and Cléirigh (2008: 17) refer to this kind of fuzziness as ‘symbolic slippage’, and they demonstrate how it is possible to produce alternate analyses for verbs such as show, indicate, or reveal when the Subject is abstract and the Complement is a projected clause. They argue that the verb may be parsed as an intensive identifying relational Process, in which case the projected clause is embedded as a fact clause, or as a verbal Process, in which case the projected clause is hypotactic and construes the Locution. Their choice to interpret these verbs as verbal rather than mental Processes is based on the principle of systemic indeterminacy (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 173), on whose basis the grammar of experience is interpreted as a continuous space within which verbal Processes shade into relational Processes (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 172). Interpreted relationally, these verbs are a valuable resource for construing abstract relationships because Token and Value are ‘stratally distinct’ (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 230), Value being understood to be more abstract than Token.

Halliday (1998) argues that the grammatical metaphor of nominalisation in particular unlocks meaning potential for the discourse. When Processes or qualities are nominalised, they can then be expanded using all the resources of the system available to Thing, and the potential for modification is extremely useful in the construal of technical taxonomies. In addition, nominalisation renders the meaning less negotiable. In Halliday’s (1993b: 39) famous words: “you can argue with a clause but you can’t argue with a nominal group”. This reification (Halliday, 1998; Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999), i.e. reconstruing the meaning of a figure as a nominal group, creates the impression of a stable entity, which makes nominalisation particularly suitable for scientific writing as the apparent stability of the phenomena in the discourse is in

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keeping with scientific goals (Banks, 2005). It also identifies the occasion of a process as unique (Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999: 266).

Another benefit stemming from nominalisation is that the nominalisation can enter into environments that a clause cannot. This textual feature can be strategically used to structure the reasoning of the argument, carrying it forward (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004). For example, choosing a nominalisation to compose Theme can serve to orient the flow of information. Halliday (1998: 228) refers to this feature as ‘compacting’. Nominalisations in Theme position that follow a more congruent realisation have also been called “ensuing intratextual dynamic grammatical metaphors” (Guillén Galve, 1998). Similarly, nominalisations can become the focus of a clause when they compose New. As Halliday (1998: 205) states: “The complex interplay of Theme + Rheme in the clause with Given + New in the information unit constitutes an immensely powerful discursive resource: it is the primary source of energy for the dynamic of scientific and technical argument.” Nominalisation enables the writer to take advantage of these systems in order to present information as foregrounded or backgrounded.

The textual benefits of compacting information by means of a nominalisation at the level of the clause also hold for larger units of information such as sections of a research article. Ravelli (2004) has noted their usefulness in hyper-Themes, and Guillén Galve (1998) has found them prevalent in the final sections of abstracts and research article introductions. He has called these “culminating grammatical metaphors”.

Despite the payoffs of nominalisation, there may also be costs. The nominalisation may result in some loss of meaning such that logical relationships are left implicit rather than explicit (Halliday, 1989/1993; 1993b; Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999). In addition, nominalisations also affect the density of a text with the result that a dense text may be more difficult to understand. Nonetheless, it is possible to adjust the density of the nominal group in which a nominalisation construes Head. The three examples from Gould’s critique on Darwin, which are discussed in Halliday (1993b), will provide the starting point for this discussion. The grammatical metaphors of interest – all nominalisations – are highlighted in bold.

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2.9 Yet the peculiar character of this evidence has not matched Darwin’s prediction of a continuous rise in complexity towards Cambrian life. (Gould, 1989/1991: 57 in Halliday, 1993b: 39)

2.10 Thus, instead of Darwin’s gradual rise to mounting complexity, the 100 million years from Ediacara to Burgess may have witnessed three radically different faunas ... (Gould, 1989/1991: 57 in Halliday, 1993b: 34

2.11 He insisted that any complex Cambrian creature must have arisen from a lengthy series of Precambrian ancestors with the same basic anatomy. (Gould, 1989/1991: 57 in Halliday, 1993b: 38)

Halliday notes, in particular, that 2.10 is ambiguous and that it illustrates the loss of precision arising from the grammatical metaphor. While examples 2.9 and 2.10 contain nominalisations, 2.11 is a projecting clause and is clearly the most congruent. The projected clause is still up for negotiation, so to speak. Halliday uses a projecting clause to unpack 2.10 (figure 2.16).

Figure 2.16 The tension between literal and figurative readings of Gould’s nominalisation of Darwin’s theory (Halliday, 1993b: 31)

2.9 represents an intermediate step between the others. Assuming a congruent version similar to that of 2.10 (figure 2.16), the verbal Process is nominalised, the Sayer is reconstrued as Deictic, and the projecting figure is reconstrued as Qualifier (figure 2.17).

‘literal’ wording

‘transferred’ meaning

noun adjective noun verb noun

Darwin’s gradual rise to mounting complexity

Darwin thought that species gradually became more complex noun verb noun adverb verb adverb adjective

metaphor in tension

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Figure 2.17 The tension between literal and figurative readings of Gould’s nominalisation of Darwin’s prediction2

Because the grammatical metaphor is a nominalised verbal Process, it is also possible to realise the Qualifier as a projected clause rather than prepositional phrase, and as a result, it is possible to adjust the realisation of the projected clause. For example, less information is lost in 2.12 than 2.13, both variations on 2.9. The first rewrite construes a more congruent version, the second retains the grammatical metaphor, which construes Existent.

2.12 Yet the peculiar character of this evidence has not matched Darwin’s prediction that species continually became more complex until they became Cambrian life.

2.13 Yet the peculiar character of this evidence has not matched Darwin’s prediction that there was a continuous rise in complexity until Cambrian life. Nouns of projection such as ‘prediction’ seem to represent an intermediate step in the formation of nominalisations analogous to the fact clauses in the evolution of patterns of grammatical metaphor featured in figure 2.14 (p.29). While nominalisations of verbal and mental Processes all have the ability to project, i.e. be modified with a projected clause as Qualifier, other grammatical metaphors – fact nouns such as evidence, problem, or fact – also have this ability. Such nouns have been called ‘shell nouns’ (Schmid, 2000). Other shell nouns include concept, possibility, surprise, or knowledge, to name but a few. It is these nouns that are the subject of this

2

Due to space constraints and because it is not the focus of the example, ‘towards Cambrian life’ has not been fully unpacked.

‘literal’ wording

‘transferred’ meaning

noun noun prep. deictic adjective noun prep. noun prep. adjective noun Darwin’s prediction of a continuous rise in complexity towards Cambrian life

Darwin predicted that species continually became more complex until they became Cambrian life noun verb noun adverb verb adverb adjective prep. noun verb adjective noun metaphor

in tension with

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study. Examples of shell nouns in sentences are given in 2.14 – 2.19. In each case the shell noun – a grammatical metaphor – is underlined.

2.14 This is consistent with the concept that the Antarctic ozone hole phenomenon causes a dilution effect throughout much of the Southern Hemisphere (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 645)

2.15 A standard empirical hypothesis is that one component of the mind/brain is a parser, which assigns a percept to a signal (abstracting from other circumstances relevant to interpretation). (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 645) 2.16 The Bill is short and modest in scope, and it is doubtful whether the other

Private Members’ Bills in the offing will fill all the gaps. This fact may give the government an extra excuse for counselling patience until the next report form the Molony committee. (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 471)

2.17 You’ve said that one of your editorial rules is not to publish your buddies. (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 479)

2.18 Warwick Town Council originally decided to build its own crematorium, but in April last year it abandoned the idea and entered into a joint scheme with Leamington Town council and Warwick Rural District Council. (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004. 471)

2.19 The talks lasted for three hours. This was a surprise, for they had only been scheduled to last two hours. (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004: 468)